The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROBERT MARTINO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 21-1808 (RDM)
V.
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Between 2003 and 2017, various terrorist organizations perpetrated over 200 attacks
against United States servicemembers and civilians in Iraq. The 623 Plaintiffs in this action are
American service members and civilians who were killed or wounded in these attacks and their
families. Plaintiffs bring this suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran, invoking the state-
sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A(a), to recover for their irreparable injuries.
Pursuant to the case management order, Dkt. 35; Min. Order (Aug. 16, 2023), the Court
previously entered default judgment and awarded damages to 45 “Bellwether Plaintiffs,” Dkts.
60, 72, adopted an administrative plan to govern further proceedings, and appointed Special
Masters to make reports and recommendations (“R&Rs”) as to the remaining Plaintiffs’ claims,
Dkts. 56, 64. Now before the Court is Special Master Stephen A. Saltzburg’s latest report and
recommendation, concerning 36 plaintiffs whose injuries arise from 14 attacks occurring in
western Al Anbar Province. Dkt. 101. For the reasons that follow, the Court will adopt in part
and modify in part the Special Master’s findings and recommendations.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2024, the Court issued a memorandum opinion (“Bellwether
Opinion”) pertaining to 45 “Bellwether Plaintiffs” associated with 25 “Bellwether Attacks.” See
Dkt. 60 at 1-2. Although the opinion addressed only a subset of the Plaintiffs and attacks at
issue in this case, the Court made several findings relevant to all Plaintiffs, and it set forth a
framework for analyzing the other attacks. The Court concluded that (1) “Iran provided the
Zarqawi organization and [Ansar al-Islam],” two terrorist organizations, “with significant
support in the form of arms, funding, training, technical expertise, and safe haven,” (2) the
Zarqawi organization and Ansar al-Islam carried out the Bellwether Attacks, and (3) “neither the
Zarqawi organization nor [Ansar al-Islam] would have been able to effectuate the
attacks . . . without the assistance of Iran and that the attacks were a foreseeable result of Iran’s
material support.” Dkt. 60 at 8-10. Based on these findings, the Court granted Plaintiffs’
motion for entry of default judgment against Iran with respect to the 45 Bellwether Plaintiffs. Jd.
at 102. Special Master Stephen A. Saltzburg then submitted a report and recommendation as to
the Bellwether Plaintiffs’ compensatory damages. Dkt. 66; see Min. Order (Oct. 9, 2024). The
Court adopted the Special Master’s recommendations, agreeing that the Bellwether Plaintiffs
were entitled to recover compensatory damages under the FSIA’s private right of action. See
Dkt. 71 at 2. The Court also awarded punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and post-
judgment interest, id. at 11-12, and entered final default judgment as to the Bellwether Plaintiffs,
Dkt. 72.
Meanwhile, after issuing its Bellwether Opinion, the Court appointed six Special
Masters—Deborah E. Greenspan, Stephen A. Saltzburg, Paul G. Griffin, Shelby R. Grubbs,
David L. Broom, and Brad Pigott—to prepare R&Rs addressing the claims of the remaining
Plaintiffs. See Dkt. 56; Min. Order (August 16, 2023); Dkt. 64. The remaining Plaintiffs were
divided into three groups. The first group consists of 52 Plaintiffs who are also associated with
the Bellwether Attacks but were not included in the initial group of 45 Bellwether Plaintiffs
(“Additional Bellwether Plaintiffs”); the second group consists of approximately 400 Plaintiffs
(“Tranche 1 Plaintiffs”); and the third group consists of approximately 128 Plaintiffs (“Tranche 2
Plaintiffs”). Given the large number of Tranche 1 Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs divided the Tranche 1
attacks into five subgroups based upon the regions of Iraq in which they occurred. Dkt. 81 at 2—
3.
Because the Court had already adjudicated Iran’s liability with respect to the Bellwether
Attacks, Dkt. 60 at 89-91, the Court referred the Additional Bellwether Plaintiffs’ claims to
Special Master Deborah E. Greenspan to prepare an R&R on the remaining issues, Dkt. 56 at 1.
The Court then referred all Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 Plaintiffs’ claims to the six Special Masters
for R&Rs regarding both liability and damages. Dkt. 64 at 1. The Court instructed the Special
Masters to assess “whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (‘FSIA’) terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.” Id.
at 2. To establish subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must show that their personal injuries or
death were “caused by an act of. . . extrajudicial killing . . . or the provision of material support
or resources for such an act,” and that the support was provided by “an official, employee, or
agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or
agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1); see also Dkt. 60 at 89-90. Moreover, “the claimant or
victim must be a U.S. national, a member of the U.S. armed forces, or a U.S. government
employee or contractor at the time the act of terrorism occurred.” Dkt. 60 at 89-90 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)).
On May 7, 2025, the Court adopted in part and modified in part two R&Rs; one
submitted by Special Master Greenspan for 49 Additional Bellwether Plaintiffs, Dkt. 87, and one
submitted by Special Master Saltzburg for 54 Tranche 1 Plaintiffs associated with 16 attacks that
occurred near Fallujah, Al Anbar Province, Dkt. 86; see Dkt. 94 at 4. For the Greenspan R&R,
which concerned attacks that the Court had already determined met the FSIA requirements for
subject matter jurisdiction and liability, the Court adopted the Special Master’s recommendations
for damages with minor adjustments. Dkt. 94 at 5—7. For the Saltzburg R&R dealing with the
Fallujah Plaintiffs, the Court adopted the Special Master’s factual findings, concluded that the
Court had subject matter jurisdiction and that Iran was liable for each of the attacks, and
similarly adopted the R&R’s award recommendations with minor adjustments. Jd. at 9-11.
Finally, the Court awarded punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and post-judgment interest.
Id, at 12-13, 13 n.5.
Now before the Court is an additional R&R prepared by Special Master Saltzburg
addressing claims by 36 plaintiffs arising from 14 separate attacks that occurred in western Al
Anbar province (“Tranche 1 W. Al Anbar Plaintiffs”). Dkt. 101 at 10. In preparing the R&R,
Special Master Salzburg relied on sworn declarations, birth certificates, passports, naturalization
records, and expert reports. See, e.g., id. at 14, 18-19, 55. The R&R explains the effects that the
attacks have had on these Plaintiffs, all of whom lost family members. Special Master Saltzburg
also explains his conclusions that Iran is liable for each of the 14 attacks. See id. at 27-103. The
R&R carefully analyzes these issues under the applicable framework for state-sponsored
terrorism cases. The Court thanks the Special Master for his thorough and thoughtful analysis
and assistance.
As explained below, the Court adopts in part and modifies in part the proposed findings
and recommendations of the Special Master. In addition, the Court will award punitive damages
to Plaintiffs. In total, the Court awards the Tranche 1 W. Al Anbar Plaintiffs $420,689,939 in
compensatory damages and $420,689,939 in punitive damages.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Compensatory Damages
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Liability
As the Court explained in its Bellwether Opinion, the question of subject matter
jurisdiction overlaps with Iran’s liability. Under the FSIA, the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over claims against foreign nations where:
[(1)] money damages are sought against a foreign state [(2)] for personal injury
or death [(3)] that was caused by [(4)] an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources
is [(5)] engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.
Dkt. 60 at 89 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)).’ The FSIA imposes two additional
jurisdictional requirements. “First, the claimant or victim must be a U.S. national, a member of
the U.S. armed forces, or a U.S. government employee or contractor at the time the act of
terrorism occurred.” Id. at 89-90 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)). “Second, the foreign
state must be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism both at the time the act occurred . . . and
at the time the lawsuit was filed.” Jd. at 90 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)G@)(D). Because
! A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign nation where the court has subject
matter jurisdiction and the foreign defendant has been properly served. GSS Grp., Ltd. v. Nat'l
Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The Court previously concluded that Plaintiffs
properly served Iran. Dkt. 60 at 101. Thus, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Iran with
respect to the Tranche 1 W. Al Anbar claims so long as it has subject matter jurisdiction.
“[t]here is almost total ‘overlap between the elements of [§ 1605A(c)’s] cause of action and the
terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity,’ . . . a plaintiff that offers proof sufficient to
establish a waiver of foreign sovereign immunity under § 1605A(a) has also established
entitlement to relief as a matter of federal law,” so long as the plaintiff is also a qualifying U.S.
national, member of the armed forces, government employee or contractor, or the legal
representative of the above. Id. at 98-99 (quoting Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp.
3d 186, 205 (D.D.C. 2017)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).
Based on the ample support in the record, the Court will adopt Special Master Saltzburg’s
factual findings that these requirements are satisfied with respect to the Tranche 1 W. Al Anbar
Plaintiffs and the 14 W. Al Anbar attacks. Special Master Saltzburg found that all the attack
victims were “nationals” of the United States at the time of the attacks, and that all of the
Plaintiffs are U.S. nationals, entitling Plaintiffs to sue under the FSIA’s private right of action.
Dkt. 101 at 14, 25 (citing Dkt. 99-3). The Court also adopts the Special Master’s factual findings
that each Plaintiff is an immediate family member (or the functional equivalent) of a victim who
was killed in a W. Al Anbar attack.” As for the attacks, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Gartenstein-Ross
assessed the circumstances of each of the 14 W. Al Anbar attacks and concluded that the Iran-
backed Zarqawi organization and/or the Iran-backed Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunna was either
“likely” or “very likely” responsible for each attack. Dkt. 101-3 at 56 (Gartenstein-Ross
? One Plaintiff, Nathan Strong, passed away after this case was filed. Dkt. 101 at 26. In keeping
with its past practice, the Court will award damages, as applicable, to his estate. See Dkt. 92 at
7. Courts in this district have disagreed as to whether estates of eligible plaintiffs have an
inherent federal statutory entitlement to bring claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), or whether
their ability to do so turns on the power of the estate to bring legal claims under state law.
Compare W.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 427 F. Supp. 3d 117, 138 (D.D.C. 2019), with Worley
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 F. Supp. 3d 311, 333 (D.D.C. 2014). The Court need not address
the question here, as Nathan Strong’s estate qualifies under either standard. See Dkt. 101 at 26
and n.7 (citing Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 1452 (2024)).
Attribution Report). The Court concurs with the Special Master’s analysis and, for the reasons
set forth in this report and recommendation, finds that Iran is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction
and is liable for each of the 14 Tranche 1 W. Al Anbar attacks.
2. Solatium Damages
Evaluation of the Plaintiffs’ Tranche 1 W. Al Anbar claims for solatium damages is
governed by the same framework that this Court applied in its prior opinions. See Dkt. 94 at 5—
7. The state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA contemplates the award of solatium
damages to close relatives of terrorism victims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). An award of
solatium damages is intended to compensate for “the mental anguish, bereavement and grief that
those with a close personal relationship to a decedent experience as the result of the decedent’s
death, as well as the harm caused by the loss of the decedent.” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 (D.D.C. 2009). There is a “‘presumption’ that family members in
direct lineal relationship ‘suffer compensable mental anguish[,] . . . and testimony proving a
close emotional relationship will usually be sufficient to sustain an award of solatium damages.”
Kaplan v. Hezbollah, 213 F. Supp. 3d 27, 38 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Kim v. Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, 87 F. Supp. 3d 286, 290 (D.D.C. 2015)) (alterations in original).
Moreover, decisions in this district recognize that half-siblings, stepparents, stepchildren,
stepsiblings, and others who are the “functional equivalent” of an immediate family member may
recover where their relationship to the deceased is sufficiently close. See, e.g., Fritz v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 324 F. Supp. 3d 54, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2018). Family members need not be
present for the attack to recover solatium damages. In fact, “[s]olatium claims are typically
brought by family members who were not present or injured themselves.” Cohen v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 3d 71, 84 (D.D.C. 2017).
“Solatium damages, like damages for pain and suffering, are by their very nature
unquantifiable.” Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 77 F. Supp. 3d. 57, 72 (D.D.C. 2015). But
prior FSIA decisions have identified certain baselines that help ensure that similarly situated
victims receive comparable awards. Specifically, decisions in this district have “established two
primary frameworks, sometimes called the ‘Peterson ID or ‘Heiser’ frameworks,” which, for
family members of deceased victims, “provide a baseline of $8 million for spouses, $5 million
for parents and children, and $2.5 million for siblings.” Cabrera v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No.
19-3835, 2022 WL 2817730, at *47 (D.D.C. July 19, 2022). These amounts, however, are
merely guideposts, and courts should deviate depending on the circumstances. See Fraenkel v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 892 F.3d 348, 361-62 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
The size of the award is based on multiple factors, including “evidence establishing an
especially close relationship between the plaintiff and decedent,” “medical proof of severe pain,
grief or suffering on behalf of the claimant,” and the particular “circumstances surrounding the
terrorist attack which made the suffering particularly more acute or agonizing.” Oveissi v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 26-27 (D.D.C. 2011). As relevant here, prior
decisions have increased solatium damages when the evidence demonstrates that the family
members have experienced, or are experiencing, more extreme effects of the loss of their loved
one. See, e.g., Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 85-86 (D.D.C. 2010);
Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 90-91 (D.D.C. 2002). The Tranche 1
W. Al Anbar Plaintiffs have experienced profound suffering. The Court will adopt the Special
Master’s recommended awards, with the following exceptions.
3 Devan Eutin, a Tranche 1 W. Al Anbar Plaintiff, lost her stepfather SGT Bryan Large in an
IED attack on October 3, 2005. Dkt. 101 at 55—58. Plaintiffs have not yet supplied a declaration
First, the Court concludes that Irma J. McVicker and Edward R. Ricci should receive
baseline awards rather than 25% enhancements. See Dkt. 99-1 at 63-68. Both plaintiffs lost
LCpl. Daniel McVicker—Irma J. McVicker’s stepson, and Edward R. Ricci’s stepbrother—in an
improvised explosive device (“IED”) attack. Jd. at 59, 63, 66. Although both plaintiffs
doubtlessly suffer from “serious detrimental effects” from LCpl. McVicker’s death, the Court
determines that those effects are accounted for in the baseline framework and are similar to the
horrific losses suffered by other victims who have received baseline awards. Cabrera, 2024 WL
3225942, at *14.
Second, the Court will award Melissa J. Warner, Scott Nicholas Warner, and Ashton
Warner 25% enhancements, rather than 100% enhancements. See Dkt. 99-1 at 75-81. All three
plaintiffs’ claims arise from the death of Pvt. Heath Warner—Melissa J. Warner and Scott
Nicholas Warner’s son, and Ashton Warner’s brother—in an IED attack. Jd. at 74-79. The
Warners request, and the Special Master recommends, a 100% upward departure in large part
Ss
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aay. and the Court concludes that a 25% enhancement is appropriate considering the
from Devan Eutin, however, and so the Special Master was unable to make any recommendation
for her damages. Jd. at 58 n.9. The Court’s conclusions with respect to Devan Eutin are
therefore limited to Iran’s liability for this attack.
attack’s devastating consequences for the Warner family and their relationships LSS
Third, the Court determines that Jim Anthony Kaylor should receive a baseline award
rather than a 25% enhancement. Following the death of his stepson SPC Jon-Erik Loney, Jim
Anthony Kaylor suffered from [i
As there is insufficient evidence to conclude that ay are attributable to the loss of
SPC Loney, the Court will award the baseline figure.
Fourth, the Court concludes that Doris Pangelinan Kent should receive a baseline award
rather than a 25% enhancement. As with Jim Anthony Kaylor, Doris Pangelinan Kent
experienced
However, there is insufficient evidence for the Court to determine that [I arc
attributable to that loss, and, therefore, the Court holds that a baseline award is appropriate.
* &k
The Court’s conclusions with respect to the appropriate award for each Plaintiff in no
way diminish the magnitude of their terrible losses. The Court carefully reviewed Plaintiffs’
declarations and does not doubt that each Plaintiff has suffered enormously. Any reductions in
the proposed enhancements are not intended to gainsay or to undervalue Plaintiffs’ pain. To the
contrary, the Court recognizes that no monetary award—no matter how large—can return to any
of the victims in this case what they lost through the abhorrent actions of Iran and the terrorist
groups it supports. The Court’s goal, instead, is simply to do its best to treat like cases alike and
to ensure that the limited funds that are available to compensate the victims of terrorist attacks
are allocated as fairly as possible among the thousands of deserving applicants. The process is
not a perfect one but, given the nature of the endeavor, rough justice will have to do.
B. Punitive Damages
Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages. Dkt. 15 at 306 (Am. Compl. 2080). Punitive
damages “serve to punish and deter the actions for which they [are] awarded.” Valore, 700 F.
Supp. 2d at 87. The FSIA expressly contemplates the award of punitive damages. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A(c). Pursuant to the case administrative plan, the Special Master did not consider an
appropriate award of punitive damages. See Dkt. 56 at 2; Min. Order (Oct. 9, 2024); Dkt. 64 at
2s
The Court previously concluded that the Bellwether Plaintiffs, the Additional Bellwether
Plaintiffs, and the Fallujah Plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages for their respective
attacks, Dkt. 78 at 9; Dkt. 94 at 12, and for those same reasons, the Court concludes that punitive
damages are appropriate for the W. Al Anbar Plaintiffs as well. In keeping with its prior
opinions, the Court will use the total compensatory damages awarded as the multiplicand and
will use a multiplier of one. See Dkt. 78 at 10-11. Punitive damages will be “apportioned
among each individual plaintiff ‘relative to their individual compensatory awards.’” Jd. at 11
(quoting Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 268 F. Supp. 3d 19, 28 (D.D.C. 2017)).
C. Prejudgment Interest
Finally, Plaintiffs seek prejudgment interest on these awards. Dkt. 15 at 306 (Am.
Compl.). The Special Master also recommends that the Court award Plaintiffs prejudgment
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interest on their compensatory damages. Dkt. 101 at 33-34. “The decision to award
prejudgment interest, as well as how to compute that interest, rests within the discretion of the
court, subject to equitable considerations.” Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya,
775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 86 (D.D.C. 2011). The Court has previously concluded that prejudgment
interest is appropriate for the Bellwether Plaintiffs, the Additional Bellwether Plaintiffs, and the
Fallujah Plaintiffs, Dkt. 78 at 11-12; Dkt. 94 at 12-13, and the Court reaches the same
conclusion here. The Special Master calculated prejudgment interest using the Federal Reserve’s
data for the average annual prime rate in each year from the date of the various attacks, in
accordance with Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 84 F.3d 446, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Dkt. 101 at 33-34. The Court adopts the Special Master’s methodology, as it has done in prior
cases using this same approach. E.g., Force v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 617 F. Supp. 3d 20, 42
(D.D.C. 2022).*
CONCLUSION
The Court will enter a separate order awarding damages to the western Al Anbar
Plaintiffs as described above.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: October 31, 2025
* The W. Al Anbar Plaintiffs also request post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
Dkt. 101 at 34. “Application of section 1961(a) is mandatory.” Gration v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, No. 21-1859, 2023 WL 5221955, at *37 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2023) (collecting cases); see
Allen v. District of Columbia, 969 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that § 1961(a)
“requires payment of interest”); Winternitz v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 17-2104, 2022 WL
971328, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2022) (awarding post-judgment interest where plaintiffs did not
request it in their complaint). The Court, accordingly, will award post-judgment interest at the
statutory rate.
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