Rani

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

GEETA RANI, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 2:23-cv-3986

v. Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M.

Vascura

OSCAR A. RIVERA, et al.,

:

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Geeta Rani’s, Rishipal Singh’s, and Mithlesh Mithlesh’s claims will be tried

to a jury on November 17, 2025. (ECF No. 48). This matter is before the Court on

Defendants’ pre-trial motions (ECF Nos. 63, 66, 71). The Court will address each in

turn.

I. MOTIONS IN LIMINE

A. Standard of Review

A motion in limine allows a court to make an advance ruling on the evidence

that will be admissible at trial. “Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not

explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the

district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United

States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). The motions thus “narrow the issues remaining

for trial” and “minimize disruptions at trial.” United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d

966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999).

To obtain the in limine exclusion of evidence, a party must prove that the

evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. See In re E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 3d 698, 721 (S.D. Ohio 2016)

(Sargus, J.). Still, a ruling on a motion in limine is “no more than a preliminary, or

advisory, opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court, and

the district court may change its ruling where sufficient facts have developed that

warrant the change.” United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994).

The Court will therefore hear objections to evidence as they arise at trial, even if the

proffered evidence falls within the scope of a denied motion in limine.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony on Legal

Conclusions Regarding Ultimate Issues

In their first Motion in Limine, Defendants state that they anticipate

Plaintiffs will seek to introduce expert testimony that provides a legal conclusion

and they ask the Court to preclude such expert testimony under Federal Rule of

Evidence 702. (ECF No. 63.)

Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or

otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact

in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the

facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. The rule “imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to

ensure that scientific testimony is not only relevant, but reliable.” Kumho Tire Co.

v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 137 (1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,

509 U.S. 579 (1993)). This basic gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert

testimony. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147.

District courts have a wide, but not unlimited, degree of discretion in

admitting or excluding testimony that arguably contains a legal conclusion. See

United States v. Nixon, 694 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2012). Opinion testimony may

embrace an ultimate issue, Fed. R. Evid. 704(a), but an opinion “carefully couched

in the precise language used in case law” may be suspect. Berry v. City of Detroit, 25

F.3d 1342, 1353 (6th Cir. 1994). Exclusion is proper when an opinion “tracks almost

verbatim the language of the applicable statute” or uses a term that “has a

specialized meaning in the law and in lay use the term has a distinctly less precise

meaning.” Torres v. Cnty. of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985) (citations

omitted). However, testimony is admissible when terms have overlapping medical

vernacular and legal usages. See United States v. Volkman, 797 F.3d 377, 389–90

(6th Cir. 2015).

Defendants seek to preclude medical expert Dr. Priti Nair from testifying

that Plaintiffs Singh and Mithlesh each “suffered permanent and substantial

physical deformity” as a result of the accident, arguing that the phrase “suffered

permanent and substantial physical deformity” tracks the statutory language for

the exception to Ohio’s damages cap in personal injury litigation.1 (ECF No. 63,

PAGEID # 788.) Plaintiffs oppose, responding that Dr. Nair’s use of the phrase

“suffered permanent and substantial physical deformity” is not a legal conclusion

because: (1) the phrase does not have a unique legal meaning; and (2) Dr. Nair’s use

of the phrase is medical rather than legal. (ECF No. 73, PAGEID # 929.) The Court

agrees.

The statute governing Ohio’s damages cap in personal injury litigation sets

forth an exception for “permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of

a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.18(B)(3)(a). While

Dr. Nair’s use of the phrase “permanent and substantial physical deformity” tracks

the language of Ohio’s damages cap statute, the legal understanding of that phrase

does not carry with it a separate, distinct and specialized meaning from its medical

counterpart; “instead, one elucidates the other.” Volkman, 797 F.3d 377 at 389–90.

Moreover, the Court would not preclude Dr. Nair’s use of the individual components

of the phrase (i.e., “permanent” and “substantial”) in her testimony given that they

are often used in the medical world and thus are necessary to permit sensible and

coherent expert opinion on the relevant medical issues. Thus, the Court finds no

basis to preclude Dr. Nair’s use of such terms combined in a phrase.

Accordingly, the Motion (ECF No. 63) is DENIED.

1 Defendants contend that “[n]o expert witness . . . should be permitted to

render conclusions regarding an ultimate issue at trial[]” but only specify Dr. Nair’s

use of the phrase “permanent and substantial physical deformity” as excludable

testimony. (ECF No. 63.) To the extent that Defendants request that the Court

preclude unspecified expert testimony, that request is DENIED.

C. Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Plaintiffs’ Expert Charles

Scales from Testifying as to Negligent Hiring, Training,

Supervision, and Retention Opinions

In their second Motion in Limine, Defendants ask the Court to exclude

testimony from Plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert, Charles Scales, on Veeco’s

alleged negligent hiring, training, supervision and/or retention of Mr. Rivera,

arguing that (1) such testimony falls outside the scope of Mr. Scales’s expertise; and

(2) his opinions would not aid the jury. (ECF No. 66).

The Sixth Circuit employs a three-pronged approach in Rule 702 analysis.

First, the witness must be qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education.” Second, the testimony must be relevant,

meaning that it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue.” Third, the testimony must be reliable.

In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 529 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R.

Evid. 702). “The party offering the expert testimony has the burden of establishing

its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing Pride v. BIC Corp.,

218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2000) and Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d

244, 251 (6th Cir. 2001)).

1. Knowledge and Experience

“To qualify as an expert under Rule 702, a witness must first establish their

expertise by reference to ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’”

United States v. Higgins, No. 3:18-CR-186, 2022 WL 36511, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4,

2022) (Rose, J.) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). Additionally, the expert’s training and

qualifications must relate to the subject matter of the proposed testimony. Smelser

v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1997). “[T]he issue with

regard to expert testimony is not the qualifications of a witness in the abstract, but

whether those qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to answer a specific

question.” Berry, 25 F.3d at 1351. Exclusion is proper when “the subject of the

testimony lies outside the witness’ area of expertise.” 4 Weinstein’s Fed. Evid. §

702.06[1], at 702-52 (2000).

Defendants argue that Mr. Scales is not qualified as an expert to offer the

following opinions:

1. Mr. Rivera “failed to describe the basic steps necessary to properly

conduct a pretrip inspection.”

2. Mr. Rivera “was confused or did not understand the rule of thumb for

establishing a safe following distance. He should know to look 15

seconds ahead and follow at about 7 to 8 second. He cited 15 [seconds]

as the following distance.”

3. “On five occasions, [Mr. Rivera] did not document air leaks or brake

adjustment issues that should have been discovered during a pre-trip

inspection.”

4. Mr. Rivera “was only documenting a few minutes of ‘On Duty’ time

before driving each day, which is not enough time to complete a pre-

trip inspection.”

5. Mr. Rivera “twice failed to properly document hours of service.”

6. “These examples reflect a lack of skills and knowledge that Veeco’s

management team should have detected while maintaining required

files and during the initial hiring and training process.”

(ECF No. 66, PAGEID # 816 (citing ECF No. 66-2, PAGEID # 841).)

Plaintiffs counter that Mr. Scales’s crash reconstruction expertise includes

expertise in “commercial vehicle regulations” and, therefore, he is “familiar with,

and can explain the importance of, proper commercial driver training, pre-trip

inspections, and [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations / Commercial Drivers

License] Manual compliance.” (ECF No. 74, PAGEID # 952.)

The Court is not persuaded at this juncture that Mr. Scales lacks the

expertise under Rule 702 to render an opinion on these issues. Mr. Scales is a

former Ohio State Highway Patrol Sergeant who led a crash reconstruction team

and supervised over 700 accident reconstructions in that role. (ECF No. 66-2,

PAGEID # 845.) He testified that his expertise “is a carryover from being a state

trooper and the -- the crash reconstruction as it ties into handling crashes, dealing

with commercial vehicles, the regulations of the industry.” (ECF No. 39, PAGEID #

529.) His experience includes “[d]evelop[ing] the required vehicle and driver files

including medical certificate, hours of service logs, and successful new entrant

safety audit for compliance as a US Department of Transportation regulated

operator of a commercial vehicle.” (ECF No. 66-2, PAGEID # 850.)

2. Relevance and Reliability

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it

has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” The

testimony must “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a

fact in issue . . . . Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is

not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (cleaned up).

“Whether an opinion ‘relates to an issue in the case’ or helps a jury answer a

‘specific question’ depends on the claims before the court. Thus, when analyzing the

relevancy of expert testimony, a court should consider the elements that a plaintiff

must prove.” Madej v. Maiden, 951 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2020).

The elements of a negligent hiring, retention, or supervision claim are:

(1) the existence of an employment relationship;

(2) the employee’s incompetence;

(3) the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of such

incompetence;

(4) the employee’s act or omission causing the plaintiff's injuries; and

(5) a causal link between the employer’s negligence in hiring,

supervising, and retaining the employee and the plaintiff’s injuries.

Alleman v. YRC, 787 F. Supp. 2d 679, 683 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (citing Lehrner v. Safeco

ins./Am. States Ins. Co., 872 N.E.2d 295, 305 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)). For a negligent

hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention claim in the context of car accidents,

factors that may be considered include:

[W]hether the driver had been involved in other accidents,

whether the driver participated in regular training, whether the

driver was properly licensed, whether the driver could speak

English, whether the employer conducted a background check of

the employee, and whether the employer conducted a reasonable

inquiry into the driver’s abilities before hiring.

Madera v. KTC Express, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-01516, 2022 WL 2916868, at *7 (N.D.

Ohio July 25, 2022) (collecting cases).

Mr. Scales’s testimony on Mr. Rivera’s compliance with commercial vehicle

regulations goes towards Mr. Rivera’s competence (or lack thereof) as a commercial

vehicle operator and Veeco’s ability to foresee the accident that allegedly caused

Plaintiffs’ injuries.

Accordingly, the Motion (ECF No. 66) is DENIED.

II. Motion to Bifurcate Compensatory and Punitive Damages at Trial

Defendants also move to bifurcate Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages

from liability and compensatory damages under Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.21 and Fed.

R. Civ. P. 42(B). (ECF No. 71.) Plaintiffs oppose to the extent Defendants request

“bifurcation in full of the punitive damages claims and compensatory damages

claims.” (ECF No. 72, PAGEID # 923.)

Defendants argue that the Ohio statute mandates bifurcation of Plaintiffs’

claims for punitive damages. Ohio Revised Code § 2315.21(B)(1), governing tort

actions, requires the court to bifurcate claims for compensatory damages from

claims for punitive or exemplary damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), on the other hand,

permits the court, in its discretion, to bifurcate claims for trial. Saxion v. Titan-C-

Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1996). “Rule 42(b) is a valid procedural rule

and therefore controls a bifurcation analysis in federal court despite the conflicting

Ohio law.”2 Bonasera v. New River Elec. Corp., 518 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1151 (S.D.

Ohio 2021) (Sargus, J.) (collecting cases). Thus, “while bifurcation is required in

Ohio state courts upon a party’s request, ‘in suits involving claims for compensatory

2 Defendants argue that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that Ohio Revised

Code § 2315.21(B)(1) creates a substantive right. (ECF No. 71, PAGEID # 917

(citing Havel, 963 N.E.2d 1270 at 1276–77 (Ohio 2012)). However, “[j]ust because

the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted this statute to provide a substantive right

to bifurcation does not mean that a federal court is bound by the characterization. A

state’s characterization of its own rule as substantive instead of procedural must

yield to the strong presumptive validity of the properly promulgated federal

procedural rule, which will be upheld as controlling the procedure in the federal

court.” Bonasera, 518 F. Supp. 3d at 1152 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Patel

Fam. Tr. v. AMCO Ins. Co., No. 2:11-CV-1003, 2012 WL 2883726, at *2 (S.D. Ohio

July 13, 2012)) (citation omitted).

and punitive damages,’ the same is not true in federal court.” King v. City of

Columbus, Ohio, No. 2:18-CV-1060, 2023 WL 179554, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13,

2023) (Sargus, J.) (citing Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270, 1276–77 (Ohio

2012)).

Defendants argue that trial should be bifurcated because the “[p]resentation

of any evidence related to intentional or reckless conduct would cause confusion to

the jury and unfairly prejudice the Defendants.” (ECF No. 71, PAGEID # 919.)

Plaintiffs respond that “much of the same evidence is going to overlap in both the

case for compensatory damages and punitive damages” and that the Court should

bifurcate evidence that relates solely to the issue of punitive damages. (ECF No. 72.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiffs

“allege negligence against [them], including willful, wanton, and reckless

misconduct.” (ECF No 71, PAGEID # 918.) Punitive damages are available under

Ohio law for personal injury caused by malice or intentional, reckless, wanton,

willful and gross acts. Whetstone v. Binner, 57 N.E.3d 1111, 1114 (Ohio 2006)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, any evidence of Defendants’

intentional or reckless conduct is relevant not only to liability and compensatory

damages but also to punitive damages.

Thus, this Court will bifurcate evidence admissible only for purposes of

punitive damages from the compensatory damages phase. In the first phase, the

jurors will hear all evidence, except for evidence only admissible for determining

punitive damages. If the jurors find Defendants liable and indicate by interrogatory

that the standard for punitive liability has been met, the trial will proceed to the

second phase where the jurors will be permitted to hear evidence that is admissible

only as to punitive damages, such as Defendants’ financial condition.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate the Issue of Punitive

Damages is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the pending pretrial motions are decided as follows:

• Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony on Legal Conclusions

Regarding Ultimate Issues (ECF No. 63) is DENIED.

• Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert Charles

Scales from Testifying as to Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision and

Retention Opinions (ECF No. 66) is DENIED.

• Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate Compensatory and Punitive Damages at

Trial (ECF 71) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison

SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT