Crawford

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JIMMY LEE CRAWFORD, as : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-1380

Administrator of the estate of :

JAMAL CRUMMEL, deceased, : (Judge Neary)

:

Plaintiff :

:

v. :

:

DAUPHIN COUNTY et al., :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Jimmy Lee Crawford, in his capacity as the administrator of the

estate of Jamal Crummel, (plaintiff hereinafter “Crawford”), is seeking justice for

the tragic death of his son, who was detained in Dauphin County Prison (“DCP”).

But federal pleading standards require plaintiffs to be specific, to put defendants on

notice of what exactly they are being sued for, and Crawford’s second amended

complaint lacks the requisite specificity in many respects. Therefore, defendants’

partial motions to dismiss will be granted and Dauphin County’s and Warden

Gregory Biggs’s joint motion to strike will be denied.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Crawford asserts claims against a variety of defendants, and these

defendants are grouped by association: County Defendants, PrimeCare Defendants,

Individual Defendants, and Dr. Garrett Rosas.

A. The Defendants

The first targets of this lawsuit are the “County Defendants,” Dauphin

County, which owns the DCP, (Doc. 54 ¶ 5), and Gregory Briggs, the warden of DCP

during the times relevant to this case. (Id. ¶ 13). Warden Briggs is being sued in

both his individual and official capacities. (Id.).

The next group is PrimeCare Medical Inc. (“PrimeCare”), which is the

company in charge of the medical needs of pre-trial detainees at DCP, (Id. ¶ 7),

Thomas Webber, its CEO, and Todd Haskins, its COO, (Id. ¶ 14). The complaint

also identifies an anonymous Medical Director for PrimeCare. (Id.). These three

individuals (“PrimeCare Executives”) are being sued in their individual and official

capacities. (Id.).

Third, there are several individual medical defendants. Specifically, Crawford

brings suit against Katie McGinn, Jessica Nye, Autumn Brennan, EMT, Cheree

Sultzbach, Lauri Case, PMHNP-BC, Shade Crawford, PA, Tia Drabich, Addonna

Thomas, LPN, Kayla Zeiders-Heichel, LPN, Mallory Stokes, LPN, Nicole Gallup,

Carla Rotherman, Enos Martin, MD, Diane Wolfe, RN-HSA, Tykeisha Metz, MA,

Johanna Reidel, MA, Stephanie Dietz, RN, Robert Nichols, PsyD., Kathryn Sciotti,

CMA, Mildred Montalvo, MA, Claudia Jurado, Diana Cornejo, Mark Haney, Leslie

Irons, LPN, Marielle Ritchie, Anna Bordner, LPN, Ryan Schmuck, RN, Eugenia

Franklin, LPN, and Tashawana Gordon, MA, and John/Jane Does # 1-10

(collectively, “Individual Defendants”). (Id. ¶ 15).

Finally, Garrett Rosas, PsyD, is also a named individual defendant, (id.),

however, he has separate counsel and will be treated apart from the other

individual defendants. For the rest of the Individual Defendants, they are being

represented together along with PrimeCare and its executives. The Individual

Defendants and Dr. Rosas are being sued only in their individual capacities. (Id.).

B. Facts

This case concerns the death of Jamal Crummel, and the events leading up to

it. On September 15, 2021, Crummel was arrested for various charges and detained

at DCP. (Doc. 54 ¶ 17). This was not Crummel’s first incarceration at DCP and some

DCP personnel were familiar with Crummel and the fact that he had schizophrenia.

(Id. ¶ 18).

Crummel’s stay at DCP involved troubles from the very beginning. During

intake, Mildred Montalvo, MA, noted Crummel was experiencing mental health

issues for which he had been hospitalized and been prescribed Haldol. (Id. ¶¶ 19-

20). DCP initially placed Crummel on suicide watch. (Id. ¶ 23). A week after intake,

Crummel was evaluated by Shade Crawford, MA, and Robert Nichols, PsyD, and

removed from suicide watch. (Id. ¶ 25). A few days later, Crummel contracted

COVID-19. (Id. ¶ 26). He had low oxygen levels and was taken to UPMC Harrisburg

for the first of what would be three occasions during this particular stay at DCP.

(Id.). A few days after returning to DCP from UPMC Harrisburg, on November 11,

2021, Crummel made a sick call request regarding a rash, tenderness, and bleeding

in his scrotum area. (Id. ¶ 28). In response, he was seen by Marielle Ritchie who did

not examine Crummel, but prescribed Bacitracin. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31). Despite the

prescription, no one ever approved the order and Crummel never received

Bacitracin. (Id. ¶ 32).

As the weeks passed, Crummel’s mental health continued to deteriorate. On

December 13, 2021, Cheree Sultzbach, LPN, noted Crummel was purposefully

flooding his cell with water to the point that the water was leaking out under the

cell door, and that he was severely agitated and not responding to external stimuli.

(Id. ¶ 37). At this time, Crummel was also covered in feces and urine, and his cell

was not adequately heated. (Id. ¶ 40). Three days later, Sultzbach, Susan Deloe,

LPN, and Lauri Case, PMHNP-BC, reported Crummel’s cell having a pungent

smell, and there being vomit, food, urine, feces and water on the floor, and also that

his physical health was rapidly declining. (Id. ¶ 42). Crummel’s blood pressure was

188/102, his heart rate was 56 bpm, and he was cold to the touch. (Id. ¶ 43). As a

result, Crummel was taken back to UPMC Harrisburg, but stayed there less than

24 hours before being returned to DCP. (Id. ¶ 44).

By December 17, 2021, Case noted Crummel’s cell was still flooded and

scattered with food debris. (Id. ¶ 45). Two days later, Tia Drabich and Stephanie

Deitz, RN, examined Crummel and discovered he had slurred speech, dry oral

mucosa, macerated skin on his hands and feet, incontinence, tachycardia, was

breathing abnormally, and smelled of urine. (Id. ¶ 48). Someone passed along the

status of Crummel’s condition to PrimeCare COO Todd Haskins via email before

Crummel was transferred to UPMC Harrisburg for the third time. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52).

The hospital noted Crummel was bradycardic (had a slow heart rate) and

hypotensive (abnormally low blood pressure), appeared physically ill, and had a core

body temperature of 85 degrees Fahrenheit. (Id.).

After examining Crummel, doctors determined he had a host of ailments. For

one, he had cherry red non-blanching rash on his medial thighs, tip of his penis,

buttocks, and lower back region, and his skin was sloughing on his bilateral wrists

and feet. (Id. ¶ 54). Additional testing indicated Crummel had an acute kidney

injury and leukopenia, abnormal blood glucose, lactic acid, c-reactive protein and

creatine readings, and Systematic Inflammatory Response Syndrome (“SIRS”),

which is an exaggerated defense response of the body to a noxious stressor such as

infection or acute inflammation. (Id. ¶ 56). Though Crummel had made a sick call

request about his rash, Nicole Gallup informed UPMC Harrisburg only that he had

been incontinent and smelled of urine; she told the hospital that no one from DCP

was aware of any rash on Crummel. (Id. ¶ 59). UPMC doctors later determined

Crummel’s rash was Stevens-Johnson Syndrome/Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis

(“SJS/TEN”). (Id. ¶ 60). From December to January, Crummel spent a total of 36

days at UPMC Harrisburg and returned to DCP on January 24, 2022. (Id. ¶ 65).

Conditions in DCP were cold in January and Crummel’s cell still did not have

separate heating. (Id. ¶¶ 66-67). By late January, Crummel became delusional and

stopped taking his medications. (Id. ¶¶ 71-73). Just before 8:00 a.m. on January 31,

Dr. Rosas did a visual check on Crummel and noted he was lying face down, facing

interior the wall (away from window), partially covered as his right leg and a

blanket were hanging partially off the bed. (Id. ¶ 76). Dr. Rosas believed there to be

no signs of medical distress at the time, but never talked to Crummel. (Id.). At

approximately 9:30 a.m., staff noticed Crummel was unresponsive and not

breathing. (Id. ¶¶ 77-78). Crummel was not revived and died of hypothermia on

January 31, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 80-81).

C. Procedural History

Crawford initiated this suit on August 18, 2023, when he filed the original

complaint. (Doc. 1). On November 13, 2023, Crawford filed a first amended

complaint as a matter of course in accordance with Rule 15. FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(1)(B); (Doc. 18). The various defendants then filed partial motions to dismiss

the first amended complaint in accordance with Rule 12. (Docs. 24, 25, 27, 28, 37).

Then, on January 17, 2024, Crawford’s initial counsel requested to stay all

deadlines as new counsel for the plaintiff would be making an appearance. (Doc.

43). This motion had the concurrence of all parties, (id.), and was granted by the

court, (Doc. 45). Current counsel for Crawford entered their appearances on

January 19, 2024. (Docs. 46, 47).

On February 26, 2024, all parties reported they were ready to proceed and

Crawford’s current counsel specifically reported they would “respond to and oppose

the pending Motions to dismiss within fourteen days of the Court’s Order lifting the

stay.” (Doc. 52). On March 11, 2024, the court lifted the stay. (Doc. 53). Two weeks

later, Crawford’s current counsel—without seeking consent of the parties or leave of

the court—filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 54). The court then denied the

pending motions to dismiss as moot due to the new, second amended complaint.

(Doc. 55). In response, PrimeCare filed a new partial motion to dismiss on behalf of

itself, the PrimeCare defendants, and the Individual Defendants, (Doc. 57), and Dr.

Rosas filed a new motion to dismiss to end all claims against him, (Doc. 59).

Dauphin County filed a motion to strike the second amended complaint or, in the

alternative, a new partial motion to dismiss.1 (Doc. 60). Briefing on the latest round

of motions is complete and this matter is ripe for disposition. (Docs. 63, 64, 65, 66,

67, 68, 69, 70).

II. Legal Standards

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under

any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”

Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker

v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

1 This motion also sought relief under Rule 60. (Doc. 60 ¶¶ 42-46). However,

the County never specifically explains how the court should modify a previous order

or the record. As such, it treats this request as abandoned.

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court

conducts a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121,

130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of

a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal

conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual

allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible

claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A claim is

facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[] the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at

678.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the court may strike from a

pleading “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(f). District courts have “considerable discretion” in resolving a Rule 12(f)

motion. Krisa v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 109 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (M.D. Pa.

2000) (quoting N. Penn. Transfer, Inc. v. Victaulic Co. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 154, 158

(E.D. Pa. 1994)). In general, such a motion will be denied unless the allegations are

severely prejudicial to one of the parties and unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims. Id.;

see also 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1382

(3d ed. 2016). A party is prejudiced when the challenged pleading “confuses the

issues” or places an undue burden on the responding party. Karpov v. Karpov,

307 F.R.D. 345, 348 (D. Del. 2015).

III. Discussion

Crawford’s second amended complaint contains eight counts against the

defendants. Counts II, VII, and VIII2 are against all defendants and allege

inhumane conditions of confinement violating Crummel’s civil rights through 42

U.S.C. § 1983, a Wrongful Death Act action under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301, and a

Survival Act action under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8302, respectively. Count I alleges

inadequate medical care violations of Crummel’s civil rights in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against all individual defendants except for Warden Briggs. Crawford

asserts violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq,

against Dauphin County in Count III. In Count IV, Crawford brings Monell claims

against PrimeCare, Dauphin County, Warden Briggs, CEO Webber, and COO

Haskins. Count V alleges corporate and gross negligence against PrimeCare.

Finally, Count VI alleges negligence and vicarious liability against PrimeCare, the

Individual Defendants, and Dr. Rosas.

The pending motions to dismiss have two areas of overlap. First, each motion

seeks to dismiss at least some claims on the grounds that the complaint fails to

establish defendants acted with “deliberate indifference.” To prevail on a claim that

prison officials violated a detainee’s rights regarding his health or safety, a plaintiff

must show the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. See Farmer v.

2 Mis-labeled as a duplicative Count VII in the complaint. (Doc. 54 at 34-36).

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations omitted).3 A person acts with

deliberate indifference when they “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

In the medical context, deliberate indifference is proven where a plaintiff

shows “that prison officials knew of and disregarded ‘an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety,’ meaning a ‘substantial risk of serious harm.’” Durham v. Kelley,

82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “Indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide

care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed

medical treatment, or a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that leads to

suffering or risk of injury.” Id. at 230 (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68

(3d Cir. 1993)).

The second similarity among the motions to dismiss is that each asserts some

allegations in the second amended complaint lack needed specificity. Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires pleadings contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(1). The reason for this rule is to “provide fair notice of ‘what the . . . claim is and

3 While Farmer deals with a convicted prisoner’s rights under the Eighth

Amendment, 511 U.S. at 828-29, the Third Circuit applies the same standards for

claims by pre-trial detainee’s suing under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Hubbard

v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 n.22 (3d Cir. 2005).

the grounds upon which it rests.’” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d

Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)). In

other words, complaints must pass the newspaper test—they must offer “the who,

what, when, where, and how.” See Badia v. Warden, HCCC, No. CIV. 10-5662 JLL,

2011 WL 221709 *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2011) (quoting Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180

F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999)).

A. Dauphin County and Warden Briggs

The County Defendants seek to strike the second amended complaint or, in

the alternative, seek dismissal of Count II as to Warden Briggs, Count III in its

entirety, Count IV as to Warden Briggs, as well as dismissing the requests for

punitive damages against Dauphin County or Warden Briggs in his official capacity.

Addressing the motion to strike first, at the outset, the County Defendants have not

identified any prejudice they would suffer if the court does not strike the second

amended complaint. At most, the County Defendants complain about deception on

the part of the plaintiff in seeking requests for additional time to respond to the

original motions to dismiss rather than draft a new complaint. (See Doc. 65 at 13-

14). Yet requests for extension of time are routinely granted, regardless of the

reason. See Cox v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 15-CV-2013, 2017 WL 3189022 *2

(M.D. Pa. July 26, 2017), aff’d, 753 F. App’x 103 (3d Cir. 2018). Moreover, the

County Defendants claim the second amended complaint is “redundant” as it brings

the same claims as the previous one. (Doc. 65 at 11-12). To the extent the second

amended complaint is redundant, though the County Defendants may have “briefed

the issues before this Court extensively,” (id. at 13), they may largely reuse that

same briefing if not copy it verbatim, eliminating any articulable prejudice. Finally,

if the claims are indeed the same between the first amended complaint and the

second amended complaint, ruling on the latter will give the County Defendants the

relief they ultimately seek—“a ruling on the merits of their Motion to Dismiss.” (Id.

at 12).4 Therefore, the County Defendants’ motion to strike will be denied.

Turning to the merits of the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss, there is a

sizable amount of common ground. Crawford concedes the ADA is inapplicable to

this case and punitive damages are unavailable against a municipality for suits

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 68 at ECF 9). Accordingly, Count III will be

dismissed in its entirety and claims for punitive damages against Dauphin County

will be dismissed for all counts where that demand is present.

Stripped down, both parties ultimately agree there is no Monell claim against

Warden Briggs in his personal capacity. (Doc. 65 at 23; Doc. 68 at ECF 13). This is

because the Third Circuit has made clear Monell claims cannot be brought against

individuals in their personal capacity. See Mervilus v. Union Cnty., 73 F.4th 185,

197 n.5 (3d Cir. 2023). In his brief, Crawford clarifies his Monell claim against

Dauphin County is “predicated on [Warden Briggs’s] actions.” (Doc. 68 at ECF 13).

4 This is not to say the court condones the actions of plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has not offered any explanation for their misleading representations to

opposing counsel, much less made an apology. The court expects plaintiff’s counsel

to be diligent in their adherence to the rules going forward, especially their duty of

candor and responsibility of seeking the concurrence of opposing counsel when filing

motions or amended complaints.

This is because Warden Briggs served as a policy maker acting on behalf of

Dauphin County. (Id.). Still, Count IV lists Warden Briggs, in addition to the

Dauphin County, as being liable under Monell. To clear any confusion, all claims

asserted against Warden Briggs in his individual capacity on Count IV will be

dismissed. But Crawford’s claim against Dauphin County, using the policies and

actions of Warden Briggs and foundational support, shall survive.

The County Defendants and Crawford clash over to what extent Warden

Briggs remains a part of this lawsuit. To begin, Warden Briggs asserts he is

protected by qualified immunity for the remaining counts against him—Counts II

and III. “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages

unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the

challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Warden Briggs argues Crawford suffered no violation of a constitutional right

because he did in fact receive medical care. (Doc. 65 at 25). Crawford responds

Warden Briggs is liable not for alleged inadequate medical care, but for unsanitary

and deplorable prison conditions. (Doc. 68 at ECF 12-13). Warden Briggs never

addresses this argument. Crawford, for his part, also fails to point to a clear case

showing the right was clearly established. Rather, he simply cites a case called

“Wilson” in 2001. (Id. at ECF 12). The court’s best guess is that Crawford was

referring to Wilson v. Seiter, a Supreme Court case from 1991. 501 U.S. 294. Yet, by

its own terms, that case only addressed “whether a prisoner claiming that

conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment must show a

culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials,” and so is not directly

applicable. Id. at 296.

Fortunately for Crawford, it is the defendant who bears the burden of

establishing a qualified immunity defense. Stringer v. Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76,

86 (3d Cir. 2025). Moreover, this burden is notoriously difficult for defendants to

meet on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 86-87. In any event, Taylor v. Riojas was issued

before the events alleged in the complaint took place and firmly establishes that

prison officials are deliberately indifferent and violate a detainee’s rights when they

are kept in a “frigid cold cell” that is covered in human feces. 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020).

Given the facts alleged where Crummel is to have been sleeping in his own urine,

feces, and in a cold cell, (Doc. 54 ¶¶ 35, 40-42, 68), this is sufficient to defeat

Warden Briggs’s invocation of qualified immunity on the motion to dismiss.

In the alternative, Warden Briggs also argues he should be spared from any

individual liability, and the punitive damages that could come along therewith. He

argues Crawford “failed to demonstrate personal involvement of Warden Briggs,

beyond mere conclusory language and unsupported assertions.” (Doc. 65 at 23).

That is correct. The second amended complaint alleges Warden Briggs “knew that

[Crummel] had been allowed to remain for days in his cell, covered in feces and

unrine [sic] and in wet conditions caused by the flooding of the cell.” (Doc. 54 ¶ 89).

“Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must

be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208

(3d Cir. 1988). Crawford’s charge that Warden Briggs knew of Crummel’s condition

is a mere “bare assertion[]” reciting an element necessary (knowledge) to prove a

claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The complaint

does not include any specific allegations of the actions, or non-actions, undertaken

by Warden Briggs that violated Crummel’s civil rights. Accordingly, all claims

against him will be dismissed.

B. Dr. Rosas

Crawford also asserted claims against Dr. Rosas; however, the only time Dr.

Rosas is specifically mentioned in the complaint is one event on the day Crummel

died. Crawford alleges Dr. Rosas created a note documenting that around 7:50 a.m.,

he went to see Crummel who “was in some type of agitated state that represented a

mental status change that occurred at some point over the weekend.” (Doc. 54 ¶ 76).

The doctor made the visit to observe Crummel’s status and he reported him “laying

face down, facing interior wall (away from window), partially covered as right leg

and also blank [sic] were hanging off partially off the bed. Slight movement

observed, no distress or signs of acute medical event observed.” (Id. ¶ 54).

This allegation is insufficient to plead a case against Dr. Rosas. As an initial

matter, there is no allegation of deliberate indifference. That requires that an

“official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Nothing in the complaint establishes Dr. Rosas knew of an

excessive risk to Crummel’s health. The specific allegation against him is that he

was checking on Crummel’s “agitated state.” (Doc. 54 ¶ 76). By itself, being in an

agitated state does not create an excessive amount of risk to one’s wellbeing.

Additionally, when Dr. Rosas observed Crummel, he saw slight movement which

indicates Crummel was somewhat responsive. (Id.). Therefore, the complaint fails to

attribute to Dr. Rosas actual knowledge of Crummel’s perilous condition.

Crawford protests that his complaint sufficiently alleges that Dr. Rosas was

aware of Crummel’s condition because it “was documented in the medical chart and

because Dr. Rosas received a verbal update from nursing staff that morning stating

that Crummel was deteriorating.” (Doc. 67 at 10). Although this argument is made

in Crawford’s brief, he does not provide citation to his own complaint which would

substantiate this point. Looking at the second amended complaint, Crawford only

alleges nursing staff told Dr. Rosas that Crummel was “agitated,” nothing more.

(Doc. 54 ¶ 76). As for the allegation there was documentation of Crummel’s

deteriorating condition in the medical chart, that allegation is simply not in the

complaint (which itself never uses the word “chart”). Moreover, the only time the

complaint uses the general term, “medical records,” it is in reference to

documentation of the physical conditions of Crummel’s cell, not his medical status.

(Doc. 54 ¶¶ 46, 50). Finally, the complaint is completely silent on what exactly the

“medical records” are, what specific information they contained, who had access to

them, who actually read them, and when people actually read them. Without this

information, Crawford fails to plead that Dr. Rosas actually knew of the risks

Crummel faced.

Nor has Crawford pled sufficient allegations against Dr. Rosas concerning

medical malpractice. Both parties agree that in Pennsylvania, to establish a prima

facie case of malpractice, the plaintiff must establish (1) a duty owed by the

physician to the patient; (2) a breach of duty from the physician to the patient; (3)

that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of, or a substantial factor in,

bringing about the harm suffered by the patient; and (4) damages suffered by the

patient that were a direct result of that harm. (Doc. 63 at 12; Doc. 67 at 12);

Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 584 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1990). At the same time, there is no

requirement a physician “be infallible, and making a mistake is not negligence as a

matter of law.” Thierfelder v. Wolfert, 52 A.3d 1251, 1265-66 (Pa. 2012) (quoting

Toogood v. Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., 824 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Pa. 2003)). The complaint

does not identify how Dr. Rosas breached a duty owed to Crummel. Rather, it only

says all defendants failed to “render reasonable, proper, adequate and appropriate

medical care” to Crummel. (Doc. 54 ¶ 127). Nowhere does the complaint specify

what duty of care Dr. Rosas failed to uphold and how. The “sweeping conclusions”

contained in the second amended complaint are not supported by the requisite facts,

and as such, the medical negligence claims against Dr. Rosas will be dismissed. See

McCracken v. Fulton Cnty., No. 3:19-CV-1063, 2020 WL 2767577 *10 (M.D. Pa. May

28, 2020).

Last, Crawford mischaracterizes Dr. Rosas’s argument on the Wrongful

Death Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301, and the Survival Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8302. Both parties

acknowledge these claims are “are derivative of [a] decedent[‘s] injuries.” (Doc. 63 at

13; Doc. 67 at 14); Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 660 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 2013). Per Crawford, Dr. Rosas’s argument is that, because they are derivative

claims, Dr. Rosas believes they should be included in Counts I and II and not

separately stated. (Doc. 67 at 14-15). This is incorrect. The point is rather these

claims only exist by virtue of the allegations in Counts I and II. Because the court is

dismissing all the other claims against Dr. Rosas, there is not a basis to assert

claims under the Wrongful Death Act or the Survival Act as there are no remaining

allegations showing Dr. Rosas caused an injury to Crummel. Thus, all claims

against Dr. Rosas will be dismissed.

C. PrimeCare and the Individual Defendants

With the County’s and Dr. Rosas’s arguments resolved, the court turns its

attention to PrimeCare and the Individual Defendants.

1. Individual Defendants

PrimeCare argues Crawford simply “lumps all of the [] Defendants together

with no delineation.” (Doc. 64 at 9). As such, it asks for dismissal due to a lack of

showing personal involvement. (Id. at 11). For quite a few of the Individual

Defendants, PrimeCare is correct. Adrienne Freeman is only listed in the caption of

the complaint and nowhere else. One defendant is just referred to as “Sheely” and

no other identifying information has been given, nor was this individual named as a

party. (Doc. 54 ¶ 83). Additionally, the second amended complaint is devoid of any

specific facts against defendants Ms. McGinn, Ms. Nye, Ms. Zeiders, Ms.

Rotherman, Nurse Wolfe, Nurse Dietz, Ms. Sciotti, Ms. Jurado, Ms. Cornejo, Mr.

Haney, Nurse Irons, Nurse Bordner, Nurse Schmuck, Nurse Franklin, and

John/Jane Does # 1-10. It simply says these individuals knew Crummel “suffered

from schizophrenia” and failed to treat him. (Id. ¶ 36). Yet the complaint does not

state when each defendant acted or failed to act in an illegal way. To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must put a defendant on notice by explaining “who

did what to whom when.” See Cupp on behalf of Cupp v. Cnty. of Lycoming, No.

3:20-CV-001784, 2021 WL 4478304 *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (quoting Mills v.

Ethicon, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 363, 387 (D.N.J. 2019)). Because the second amended

complaint lacks specifics as the actions or nonactions of these defendants, claims

against them will be dismissed.

Further, a notice of death was filed for Dr. Robert Nichols, (Doc. 44), and no

motion to substitute another party has been filed by Crawford. As such, all claims

against Dr. Nichols will be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(a)(1).

While other named defendants had some level of interaction with Crummel,

it was insufficient to form the basis for liability. For example, Ms. Metz, Ms. Reidel,

Ms. Brennan, Ms. Gordon, and Nurse Magwood are alleged to have seen Crummel

after he stopped eating on January 26, but that is the extent of their interactions.

(Doc. 54 ¶ 83). It is not clear what “seen” is supposed to mean or how any of these

defendants are alleged to have denied Crummel some treatment or contributed to

his living in deplorable prison conditions. Similarly, Nurse Thomas’s only

interaction was at one point documenting Crummel’s refusal to take his medication

and his lying on the bed, saying nothing. (Id. ¶ 54). Ms. Montalvo is only mentioned

doing intake when Crummel was first admitted to DCP. (Id. ¶ 19). Dr. Martin’s only

involvement is seeing Crummel in the medical office about a week before he died

and describing his condition. (Id. ¶ 71). Nurse Stokes was only around during the

morning “pill call” the day Crummel died. (Id. ¶ 77). Similar to Dr. Rosas, none of

these interactions establish these defendants knew of the serious risks Crummel

faced and ignored them. Therefore, there is no personal involvement for these

defendants and the claims against them must be dismissed.

Other defendants had a touch more interaction with Crummel, but still

nothing to create a nexus between that interaction and liability. Ms. Drabich and

Nurse Deitz, are alleged to have to have examined Crummel and discovered he “had

slurred speech, dry oral mucosa, macerated skin on his hands and feet,

incontinence, tachycardia, was breathing abnormally and smelled of urine.” (Doc. 54

¶ 48). Yet, the same day, Crummel was taken to the hospital. (Id. ¶ 51). Therefore,

there is nothing alleged to establish Ms. Drabich or Nurse Deitz were deliberately

indifferent to Crummel’s condition; he was seen and then received treatment in the

form of being taken to a hospital. Shade Crawford conducted an initial exam of

Crummel, but had no other interaction with him except “seeing” him some time

after January 26. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 83). Again, nothing alleged shows Shade Crawford

knew of Crummel’s decrepit condition and ignored it.

Similarly, Nurses Sultzbach, Deloe, and Case may have documented that

Crummel was in deplorable conditions. (Id. ¶ 42). Though, after seeing him like

that, Crummel was sent to the hospital for treatment. (Id. ¶ 44). Given this,

Crawford cannot show these nurses were deliberately indifferent. They saw the

state Crummel was in, and he was sent to the hospital. No care was denied, rather

corrective action was taken. See Brooks v. Steberger, No. 23-CV-4535, 2024 WL

1181460 *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2024) (finding no deliberate indifference where

detainee was taken to the hospital in response to various symptoms); White v.

Dauphin Cnty., No. 1:22-CV-1241, 2023 WL 6392735 *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2023).

This just leaves Ms. Ritchie. She is alleged to have responded to one of

Crummel’s sick call requests, but did not examine him in any way. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31).

However, the complaint also explains she prescribed Bacitracin to Crummel. (Id. ¶

31). True, the Bacitracin was never approved, but the complaint is mum on who

failed to approve it. (Id. ¶ 32). While a close call, Crawford has failed to allege a

claim against Ms. Ritchie. After seeing Crummel, she prescribed a treatment.

Perhaps such treatment may have been inadequate or ineffective, perhaps she

should have done more, but such concerns “would sound in negligence as a

malpractice suit, and do[] not constitute deliberate indifference.” Weigher v. Prison

Health Servs., 402 F. App’x 668, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential). The

complaint does not allege it was Ms. Ritchie who failed to give Crummel the

medicine and so there are no allegations she was deliberately indifferent to his

condition.

Nor can there be any claim for punitive damages. For one, while Crawford

claims defendants’ motions to dismiss for punitive damages are often denied, (Doc.

66 at ECF 19), the case they cite for that proposition limited such analysis to “motor

vehicle accident cases.” Harvell v. Brumberger, No. 3:19-CV-2124, 2020 WL

6947693 *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:19-

CV-2124, 2020 WL 6946575 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2020). To establish punitive

damages, a plaintiff must show recklessness or indifference. (See Doc. 66 at ECF 19;

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983); Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa.

2005)). Because no claims of deliberate indifference survive, Crawford’s complaint

has no basis for punitive damages. Therefore, the requests for punitive damages

shall be dismissed.

2. PrimeCare Executives

As an initial matter, the only individualized allegation against the

PrimeCare Executives is against COO Haskins. The second amended complaint

alleges someone contacted COO Haskins about Crummel’s condition on December

19, 2021. (Doc. 54 ¶ 51). However, as that same paragraph notes, that day,

Crummel was taken to the hospital. (Id.). Therefore, there cannot be any claims

against COO Haskins. To the extent he was aware of Crummel’s condition, it was

right before Crummel received treatment in the form of being taken to the hospital.

So, no care was denied and there cannot be a claim of deliberate indifference. See

Durham, 82 F.4th at 230 (citing Durmer, 991 F.2d at 68).

As for CEO Thomas Webber and Corporate Medical Director John Doe, there

were no specific allegations made against these men. Because the second amended

complaint does not give the who, what, when, where, and how connecting these men

to Crummel’s plight, they will be dismissed from Counts I and II.

The last argument for the court to consider is PrimeCare’s request to dismiss

Crawford’s Monell claim against it. A plaintiff’s assertion of liability against an

entity in the civil rights context can be sustained based on the U.S. Supreme

Court’s ruling in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. Natale v.

Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). In making this

Monell claim, the entity is not liable through respondeat superior or vicarious

liability; rather, plaintiffs must show “there was a relevant [ ] policy or custom, and

that the policy caused the constitutional violation they allege.” Id.

Crawford has two theories of Monell liability: (1) there is a pattern of

deliberate indifference to the serious medical and mental health needs of inmates;

and (2) a systemic failure to provide for adequate conditions in prison cells. As to

the latter claim, there is no allegation in the second amended complaint asserting

PrimeCare had any authority over the conditions of the prison cells, including water

or heating issues. Therefore, it is impossible for PrimeCare to have a policy or

custom that caused harm to Crummel in this respect. See Kranson v. Valley Crest

Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 51 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Losch v. Borough of

Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir.1984)) (requiring a plaintiff to attribute a

policy to a defendant-entity).

Moreover, given the analysis above, the second amended complaint fails to

allege any individual acted with deliberate indifference towards Crummel. While

true that it is possible for some Monell claims to lie, even when no individual is

liable, that is only true when there is still an underlying constitutional violation.

See Mervilus v. Union Cnty., 73 F.4th 185, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2023). The second

amended complaint fails to show anyone acted with deliberate indifference towards

Crummel with respect to his medical care.5 Nowhere does Crawford show someone

knew of Crummel’s serious medical issues and failed or refused to provide him with

any treatment. Accordingly, there is no underlying constitutional violation and so

the Monell claims against PrimeCare must be dismissed.

D. Leave to Amend

The final task is to determine which of Crawford’s claims must be denied

with prejudice and which claims he may be allowed to reassert with amendment.

When a claim is being dismissed in a civil rights case, the plaintiff must be given

leave to amend “unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Mullin v. Balicki,

875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). For several of the dismissed

claims, even Crawford admits there is not legal basis to support them. As he

concedes the ADA is inapplicable and that punitive damages are unavailable

against a municipality for suits brought under section 1983, (Doc. 68 at ECF 9),

amendment on those points would be futile. So, Count III will be dismissed with

prejudice along with all claims for punitive damages against Dauphin County.

Crawford likewise acknowledges claims cannot be asserted against individuals for

Monell liability, (id. at ECF 13), so Warden Briggs, CEO Webber, and COO Haskins

shall be dismissed with prejudice from Count IV as individuals. Finally, a

5 The situation may be different with respect to the conditions in his cell.

However, those conditions would be controlled by Dauphin County which has not

moved for dismissal regarding the Monell claim against it.

suggestion of death was filed for Dr. Nichols on January 18, 2024. (Doc. 44). As no

motion to substitute a party has been made, amendment with respect to claims

against him would be futile, see FED. R. CIV. P. 25(a)(1), and claims against him

shall be dismissed with prejudice.

As to the rest of Crawford’s claims, no defendant has articulated a basis for

why granting leave to amend would be inequitable or futile. While “repeated

failure[s] to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed” is a factor to

consider, Mullin, 875 F.3d at 149, this is the first time the viability of Crawford’s

claims have been addressed by a court. Moreover, even if no amendments were

made, Crawford’s suit would still continue on involving many of the same

defendants. Even to the defendants who would not have claims against them, they

could still be involved with discovery and possibly trial. Any prejudice to the

defendants would therefore be minimal. See id. at 155-57. Thus, as to dismissal of

the rest of Crawford’s claims, it shall be without prejudice and he shall have leave

to file an amended complaint.

IV. Conclusion

The County’s motion to strike will be denied. Otherwise, its motion to

dismiss, along with the motions to dismiss of Dr. Rosas and PrimeCare in their

entirety, will be granted. Though, not all claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

To recap, the following claims are dismissed with prejudice:

i) All claims in Count III;

ii) All claims against Dr. Robert Nichols;

iii) All claims for punitive damages against Dauphin County; and

iv) The claims against Warden Briggs, CEO Webber, and COO Haskins in

their individual capacities as stated in Count IV.

The following claims are dismissed without prejudice:

i) All claims in Count I;

ii) All claims in Count II except as to those against Dauphin County Prison;

iii) All claims in Count IV with respect to PrimeCare;

iv) All claims against Warden Briggs in his individual capacity; and

v) All claims with respect to punitive damages against PrimeCare, the

PrimeCare Executives, Dr. Rosas, and the Individual Defendants.

An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ KELI M. NEARY

Keli M. Neary

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: October 30th, 2025