Opinion

Mohler v. Univ. of Toledo Athletic Dept.

  • 2025 Ohio 4961
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Oct 30, 2025
Status
Published
On the bench
Dorrian
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.0%

The opinion

[Cite as Mohler v. Univ. of Toledo Athletic Dept., 2025-Ohio-4961.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Caitlin Mohler, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :

No. 25AP-248

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2023-00630JD)

University of Toledo Athletic Department, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellee. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on October 30, 2025

On brief: K Street Law, LLC, and Katie Street; Taylor

Dykema, PLLC, and Meredith Lloyd, for appellant.

Argued: Meredith Lloyd.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Peter E. DeMarco,

and Daniel J. Benoit, for appellee. Argued: Peter E.

DeMarco.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio

DORRIAN, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Caitlin Mohler, appeals from a judgment of the Court of

Claims of Ohio granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, University of

Toledo Athletic Department (“UT”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 2020, appellant was recruited as a goalkeeper to play on UT’s women’s

soccer team. She began attending UT in spring 2022. In June 2022, appellant was

dismissed from the team.

No. 25AP-248 2

{¶ 3} In September 2023, appellant commenced an action against appellee in the

Court of Claims seeking compensatory damages for negligent misrepresentation,

promissory estoppel, and negligence claims relating to her dismissal from the team.

{¶ 4} In her complaint, appellant alleged that, in 2020, she accepted an athletic and

academic scholarship package totaling $72,753 to play soccer at UT as part of the 2022

recruiting class. Based on a conversation with T.J. Buchholz, the head coach of the soccer

team, appellant decided to graduate early from high school and begin attending UT in early

spring 2022. In the 2022 spring semester, appellant was not yet on an athletic scholarship.

{¶ 5} Appellant alleged that, as a result of a physical examination required by the

National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) prior to her athletic participation, UT’s

doctor recommended she have surgery on her knee. Appellant alleged that the surgery was

required for her participation on the team but that Coach Buchholz told her that her

scholarship would remain intact as long as there was a viable road for recovery following

the surgery.

{¶ 6} Appellant alleged that, both prior to and after surgery in spring 2022,

assistant coach Jaelyn Cunningham belittled her, embarrassed her, and isolated her from

the rest of the team. In her complaint, appellant described a meeting with Coach

Cunningham in April 2022 during which the coach yelled at her and told her she was “the

type of player I don’t want on this team.” (Sept. 25, 2023 Compl. at ¶ 25.) Appellant alleged

that her treatment by coaching staff induced anxiety and mental health issues.

{¶ 7} After appellant spoke to some of her teammates regarding her interaction

with the coaching staff at a team party, her teammates contacted the coaches. According to

appellant, numerous meetings between her and the coaching staff followed in an attempt

to resolve their conflicts, but the meetings involved the coaching staff yelling, belittling, and

using abusive language toward appellant. Appellant alleged that she attempted to apologize

to Coach Cunningham for “the way that the team found out” about appellant’s concerns

about her treatment, but Coach Cunningham accused her of lying to her teammates and

demanded that appellant apologize to the team and coaching staff or be dismissed.

Appellant alleged that, “[b]ecause of her refusal to lie, [she] was ultimately dismissed from

the team and her scholarship was taken away.” (Compl. at ¶ 29, 32.)

{¶ 8} Appellant alleged that the situation caused her to seek off-campus mental

health counseling and incur bills for physical therapy and recovery related to her knee

No. 25AP-248 3

surgery. Appellant also alleged she was unable to enter the NCAA transfer portal in order

to play soccer elsewhere after her dismissal from UT because UT informed her she had not

signed a binding National Letter of Intent (“NLI”).

{¶ 9} In October 2024, appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was

entitled to immunity for appellant’s claims and, in the alternative, appellant could not state

a claim for relief.

{¶ 10} On January 31, 2025, the Court of Claims entered judgment granting

appellee’s motion for summary judgment. On the issue of appellee’s immunity, the court

stated as follows:

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s argument is not about the manner in

which she was removed from the team, but her removal

altogether as she lost her potential Fall 2022 scholarship

opportunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s contention that she is

arguing against the manner in which she was removed from the

team, not her removal, is unpersuasive, and the only

reasonable conclusion is that Defendant is entitled to

discretionary immunity for the decision to remove her from the

team.

(Internal citations omitted.) (Jan. 31, 2025 Decision at 15.) Despite finding that appellee

was entitled to discretionary immunity for the decision to remove appellant from the soccer

team, the Court of Claims also addressed the merits of appellant’s negligent

misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and negligence claims and concluded that

appellee was also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 11} Appellant appeals and assigns the following four assignments of error for our

review:

[I.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the

University of Toledo Athletic Department (“UT”) since

genuine issues of material fact exist.

[II.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to

Defendant-Appellee on Plaintiff-Appellant’s claim of

negligent misrepresentation as a result of its failure to

construe the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff-

Appellant.

[III.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to

Defendant-Appellee on Plaintiff-Appellant’s promissory

No. 25AP-248 4

estoppel claim based on a finding of fact, rather than an

operation of law.

[IV.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to

Defendant-Appellee on Plaintiff-Appellant’s negligence claim

based on an erroneous conclusion that no common-law duty

of care is owed to student athletes to prevent hostile or abusive

conduct by athletic coaching staff.

III. Discussion

{¶ 12} Each of appellant’s assignments of error argue that the Court of Claims erred

in granting summary judgment to appellee. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed on

appeal under a de novo standard. Capella III, LLC v. Wilcox, 2010-Ohio-4746, ¶ 16 (10th

Dist.), citing Andersen v. Highland House Co., 2001-Ohio-1607. “[D]e novo appellate

review means that the court of appeals independently reviews the record and affords no

deference to the trial court’s decision.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Holt

v. State, 2010-Ohio-6529, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the

moving party demonstrates that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come

to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion

for summary judgment is made.” Capella III at ¶ 16, citing Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 2004-

Ohio-7108, ¶ 6. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all

doubts and construe the evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Pilz v. Ohio Dept. of

Rehab. & Corr, 2004-Ohio-4040, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). “In order to defeat summary judgment,

the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s

pleadings,” citing Civ.R. 56(E), but rather, “must respond with evidence of the type listed

in Civ.R. 56(C) that demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Taylor

v. XRG, Inc., 2007-Ohio-3209, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 13} Additionally, the question of discretionary immunity implicates a trial court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law for which

we apply a de novo standard of review. Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 2024-Ohio-764, ¶ 11;

Wilkes v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2025-Ohio-1030, ¶ 50 (10th Dist.).

A. Discretionary Immunity

{¶ 14} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues the Court of Claims erred in

granting summary judgment to appellee based on discretionary immunity because there

No. 25AP-248 5

exist genuine issues of material fact. Specifically, appellant argues that the court

improperly concluded that Coach Buchholz’s decision to remove her from the soccer team

was protected by discretionary immunity.

{¶ 15} “[D]iscretionary immunity is a jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense,

and the Court of Claims does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over suits brought against

the state when discretionary immunity applies.” Smith at ¶ 21. The source of discretionary

immunity is R.C. Chapter 2743 in which the state has waived its sovereign immunity for

certain suits brought against it in the Court of Claims. Id. More specifically, the Supreme

Court of Ohio held in Reynolds v. State, Div. of Parole & Community Servs., 14 Ohio St.3d

68, 70 (1984), as follows:

The language in R.C. 2743.02 that “the state” shall “have its

liability determined . . . in accordance with the same rules of

law applicable to suits between private parties . . .” means that

the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions

or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving

the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by

the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.

{¶ 16} In granting summary judgment to appellee based on discretionary immunity,

the Court of Claims concluded that “reasonable minds can conclude only that Coach

Buchholz used his discretion as head coach to remove [appellant] from the team roster.”

(Jan. 31, 2025 Decision at 14.) The Court of Claims’ reliance, however, on the fact that

Coach Buchholz used discretion in his decision to dismiss appellant from the team warrants

a closer look because, as discussed below, it is not the existence of a discretionary decision

alone that triggers discretionary immunity. See Foster v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.,

2013-Ohio-912, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.); infra ¶ 20. In order to find discretionary immunity, we

must identify what policy might be at issue here.

{¶ 17} The Court of Claims concluded that appellee was entitled to discretionary

immunity “for the decision to remove [appellant] from the team.” (Jan. 31, 2025 Decision

at 15.) But discretionary immunity applies to a state’s “legislative or judicial functions or

the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy

decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or

discretion.” (Emphasis added.) Reynolds at 70. Although it might not be difficult to

conclude that a coach exercises a discretion when removing an athlete from his or her team

No. 25AP-248 6

roster, we are not convinced that an individual coach’s decision to remove an athlete from

the team is a “function involving the making of a basic policy decision.” Neither appellant

nor the Court of Claims identified the particular policy the coach was making when

exercising his discretion to remove appellant from the team.

{¶ 18} Notwithstanding, appellee cites cases in which courts have recognized

immunity for a coach’s discretionary decisions. See Michael v. Worthington Ohio City

School Dist., 2020-Ohio-1134 (10th Dist.); Pope v. Trotwood-Madison City School Dist.

Bd. of Edn., 2004-Ohio-1314 (2d Dist.); Starkey v. Hartzler, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1177

(9th Dist. Mar. 26, 1997). The question of immunity in each of these cases was analyzed

under R.C. 2744.03, part of R.C. Chapter 2744 which establishes tort immunity applicable

to political subdivisions. The immunity described in R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (A)(5), which

are the relevant subsections in the cases appellee cites, is stated differently than it is in

R.C. 2743.02, relevant here. For example, R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) provides that a “political

subdivision is immune from liability if the action or failure to act by the employee involved

that gave rise to the claim of liability was within the discretion of the employee with respect

to policy-making, planning, or enforcement powers by virtue of the duties and

responsibilities of the office or position of the employee.” (Emphasis added.) And

R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) provides immunity to a political subdivision “if the injury, death, or loss

to person or property resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining

whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities,

and other resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious

purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 19} In contrast, R.C. 2743.02 states, in relevant part, that “[t]he state hereby

waives its immunity from liability . . . and consents to be sued, and have its liability

determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules

of law applicable to suits between private parties[.]” Reynolds interpreted this language in

R.C. 2743.02 to mean that “the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions

or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy

decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or

discretion.” Reynolds, 14 Ohio St.3d at 70. But we are not aware of any authority binding

on this court which has extended the categories of political subdivision immunity for

discretionary decisions described in R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (A)(5) to cases like this one to

No. 25AP-248 7

which R.C. 2743.02 applies. Although Reynolds was decided prior to the enactment of

R.C. Chapter 2744, we decline to extend the immunity described in Reynolds to the full

scope of that described in R.C. 2744.03(A).

{¶ 20} Additionally, as noted in Foster, 2013-Ohio-912, at ¶ 23 (10th Dist.),

discretionary immunity under R.C. 2743.02 requires more than just a discretionary

decision by a state employee:

Indeed, many state employees are called upon to exercise a

high degree of discretion while working. Were we to find that

discretionary immunity applies every time a state employee

exercises discretion in performing his or her job, we would be

vastly expanding the scope of the discretionary immunity

doctrine while simultaneously limiting the scope of the state’s

waiver of sovereign immunity from liability as established by

the Court of Claims Act. R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). Accordingly,

application of the discretionary immunity doctrine requires

more than a finding that a state employee . . . made a decision

that required the exercise of a high degree of discretion—it

requires a finding of the exercise of a high degree of official

judgment or discretion as to an executive or planning function

involving the making of a basic policy decision.

See also Al-Jahmi v. Ohio Athletic Comm., 2022-Ohio-2296, ¶ 83-85 (10th Dist.) (applying

Reynolds and Foster to conclude that the state athletic commission’s decisions regarding

referee and ringside physician training requirements and educational materials was

protected by discretionary immunity, but the decisions to license and appoint a specific

referee and physician were not because the agency failed to demonstrate the decisions

concerned an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy

decision); Miller v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2014-Ohio-3738, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.) (concluding

that the Ohio Department of Transportation’s decision regarding whether “to fill a pothole”

was not subject to discretionary immunity, as the decision did not involve the “complex

evaluation” which would demonstrate “the exercise of an executive or planning function

involving the making of a basic policy decision characterized by the exercise of a high degree

of official judgment or discretion”).

{¶ 21} Turning back, then, to the standard announced in Reynolds: even if we

acknowledge that Coach Buchholz’s decision to dismiss appellant from the team was a

decision that involves discretion, discretionary immunity does not apply unless there was

an exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion as to an executive or planning

No. 25AP-248 8

function involving the making of a basic policy decision. See Reynolds, 14 Ohio St.3d at

70.

{¶ 22} Under the particular facts of this case, we find that the basis of liability in

appellant’s claims involves the circumstances specific to appellant’s dismissal and that the

particular circumstances of appellant’s dismissal do not involve the making of a basic policy

decision. Although the coach, when dismissing appellant from the team, may have

exercised the discretion required in performing the job, we do not find that a discretionary

decision alone renders the action subject to discretionary immunity in R.C. 2743.02 as

described in Reynolds. Therefore, on the facts of this case, we find discretionary immunity

does not apply.

{¶ 23} In her opposition to appellee’s summary judgment motion, appellant

asserted that she was not arguing against UT’s decision to remove her from the team, but

instead, the manner in which it did. Because her removal was retaliatory in nature and

punitive, she argued, it was outside the scope of discretionary immunity. In making this

argument, appellant appears to assume there was a policy that was being implemented by

Coach Buchholz when he removed her from the team. Moreover, appellee appears to

recognize that appellant’s claims for liability do not challenge the existence of a policy that

allows a coach discretion to determine his or her roster and instead challenge how Coach

Buchholz made that determination in her circumstance. Appellee pointed out in its brief

that, “[h]ere, the coach decided to dismiss Mohler from the team unless she apologized.

Mohler refused and she was dismissed.” (Appellee’s Brief at 14.) Appellee further noted

that “Mohler points to no laws, rules, policies or procedures that UT breached to implement

her dismissal,” and “[t]here were simply no procedural requirements in place that

prohibited the coach from sending an email to Mohler to dismiss her.” (Appellee’s Brief at

14, 15.) The Court of Claims did not accept appellant’s argument that she was arguing

against the manner in which she was removed from the team.

{¶ 24} In some cases, this distinction between exercising a high degree of official

judgment or discretion to make a policy versus implementing a policy is significant because,

as noted above, the Supreme Court and this court have held that the state’s sovereign

immunity does not apply when the state “acts pursuant to” a policy nor does it extend to

the state’s “acts of implementation” of a policy because the state has a duty to properly

implement its policy decisions. See Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2015-Ohio-4443, ¶ 24.

No. 25AP-248 9

In Reynolds, the Supreme Court distinguished the exercise of making a basic policy

decision pursuant to an executive or planning function from the performance of an activity

or function pursuant to that policy. “[O]nce the decision has been made to engage in a

certain activity or function, the state may be held liable, in the same manner as private

parties, for the negligence of the actions of its employees and agents in the performance of

such activities.” (Emphasis added.) Reynolds, 14 Ohio St.3d at 70. Consistent with this,

the Supreme Court recently emphasized that “[t]he state has not waived its sovereign

immunity when it acts pursuant to its highly discretionary legislative, judicial, executive,

or planning functions.” (Emphasis added.) Smith, 2024-Ohio-764, at ¶ 21. Stated another

way, “[d]iscretionary immunity does not ‘extend beyond [the state’s] discretionary function

to acts of implementation.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 2024-Ohio-

5887, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.), quoting Risner at ¶ 24.

{¶ 25} This is not a case where such a distinction matters. It is not necessary for us

to address appellant’s arguments that the manner in which Coach Buchholz terminated

appellant from the team fall outside the scope of discretionary immunity because the

evidence did not establish that Coach Buchholz’s exercise of discretion involved the making

of a policy and, therefore, discretionary immunity does not apply in the first place.1

1 Furthermore, the evidence did not establish that in terminating appellant from the team, Coach Buchholz

was implementing a policy created pursuant to its executive or planning functions which involved the exercise

of a high degree of official judgment or discretion. In an affidavit that appellee submitted with its motion for

summary judgment, Kenneth Schank, Associate Athletic Director for Compliance for appellee at the time,

averred as follows: “The head women’s soccer coach at the time, TJ Buchholz, had the authority to determine

who was on the soccer team and to dismiss her from the team.” (Schank Aff. at ¶ 10.) In a deposition, Schank

testified as follows:

Q: . . . is it UT’s policy that a coach can add and delete a player in their

discretion?

A: Correct. The coach has the autonomy to make that decision.

...

Q: Your affidavit says that they have the authority to determine who can be

dismissed? Is that for any reason?

A: Correct. A coach can add and remove as they deem necessary.

Q: Is that in accordance with NCAA policy as well?

A: Correct. I mean, from a roster spot, there’s not an NCAA rule that

specifically addresses, you know, why or -- I’m sorry -- any type of

No. 25AP-248 10

{¶ 26} For the reasons articulated above, we find that appellant’s claims fall

outside the scope of discretionary immunity, and we therefore conclude that the Court of

Claims has jurisdiction to determine appellant’s claims. Accordingly, for reasons other

than those set forth by the Court of Claims, we sustain appellant’s first assignment of error.

{¶ 27} Our conclusion that discretionary immunity does not apply in this case is not

to say that appellee is liable for the claims appellant has asserted. It simply means that the

Court of Claims has jurisdiction over the claims. Accordingly, we address appellant’s

remaining assignments of error.2

B. Negligent Misrepresentation

{¶ 28} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the Court of Claims

erred in granting summary judgment to appellee on her negligent misrepresentation claim

as a result of its failure to construe the facts in a light most favorable to her. Specifically,

appellant argues that the court ignored facts indicating that a reasonable person in

appellant’s position would have believed he or she had signed an official NLI despite the

language of the document.

{¶ 29} In response, appellee argues that appellant’s rights to appeal her dismissal

from the soccer team were not based on the letter. It noted that the Student Athlete

Handbook provided a student under a scholarship an opportunity to appeal terminated or

reduced financial aid, which appellant was not receiving at the time of her dismissal from

the team. Appellee also notes that it provided evidence that appellant’s ability to enter the

transfer portal after her dismissal was not based on the nature of the letter that appellant

signed.

procedural matter of which a student-athlete is dismissed from the team. I

mean, the coach has the authority to dismiss them as they see fit.

(Schank Dep. at 109-11.) Aside from this testimony, appellee has provided no evidence of the policy described

by Schank. Appellee also did not provide evidence how the making of any such policy involved the exercise of

a high degree of official judgment or discretion. Furthermore, appellee concedes in its brief that “there were

no NCAA or UT policies that set forth the procedures to remove a player from the roster.” (Appellee’s Brief at

14-15.) Finally, as noted above, neither appellant nor the court identified any such policy.

2 In the decision below, the Court of Claims addressed the merits of appellant’s claims within the scope of

appellee’s summary judgment motion despite having concluded that discretionary immunity applied.

Therefore, we need not remand the case and can proceed with a review of the court’s decision as it relates to

the remaining assignments of error.

No. 25AP-248 11

{¶ 30} The four elements of negligent misrepresentation are as follows: “1) one who,

in the course of his or her business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction

in which he or she has a pecuniary interest, 2) supplies false information for the guidance

of others in their business transactions, 3) is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to

them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, 4) if he or she fails to exercise

reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.”

Federated Mgt. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 137 Ohio App.3d 366, 395 (10th Dist. 2000),

citing Delman v. Cleveland Hts., 41 Ohio St.3d 1, 4 (1989).

{¶ 31} Appellant’s complaint states that she relied on two allegedly false statements

to her detriment; one, the document she signed to agree to play for UT that UT later

described as a non-binding, ceremonial letter rather than an NLI, and two, statements from

UT’s doctor that she could not play without undergoing surgery along with a statement by

the coach that her scholarship was intact as long as there was a viable road for recovery

from the surgery.

{¶ 32} The Court of Claims concluded that, construing the evidence in favor of

appellant, appellant failed to demonstrate that appellee supplied her false information by

providing a document that was not an NLI because the document itself did not bear the

markings or other indicators of it being an NLI. The court further concluded that appellant

could not demonstrate justifiable reliance on Coach Buchholz’s statement that she could

retain her scholarship if she had a viable path to recovery after her knee surgery as a basis

to believe she would not be dismissed for any reason.

{¶ 33} We agree with the Court of Claims that appellee is entitled to summary

judgment on appellant’s negligent misrepresentation claim. Appellant did not present any

evidence to rebut Associate Athletic Director of Compliance Kenneth Schank’s affidavit and

deposition testimony explaining that the document appellant signed was a ceremonial

letter of commitment. Additionally, the document itself did not bear the identifiers of a

binding NLI from the NCAA. Instead, it bore a UT watermark and stated that it was a

“qualified letter of commitment.” (Jan. 31, 2025 Decision at 17.) Appellant’s arguments

appear to rely on the absence of information from UT that the letter she signed was

ceremonial in nature. But appellant points to no affirmative evidence that UT falsely

represented the letter was an official NLI.

No. 25AP-248 12

{¶ 34} Appellant also did not present evidence to rebut Schank’s affidavit statements

that appellant was not on an athletic scholarship in the spring semester of 2022. Thus,

there is no evidence to support a claim that appellant’s reliance on what she signed, prior

to the beginning of her scholarship period, was justifiable.

{¶ 35} With respect to her knee surgery, appellant acknowledged that she “was

required by the NCAA to undergo the pre-participation physical examination” before she

could participate in any athletic activities. (Compl. at ¶ 46.) Appellant has pointed to no

information indicating that the UT doctor or the coaching staff made a false representation

about the nature of her pre-participation medical examination or the diagnosis of her knee.

Additionally, appellant has pointed to no evidence indicating that Coach Buchholz’s

statement that her scholarship would remain intact so long as she had a viable path to

recovery following surgery was false at the time it was made. Appellant acknowledged that

it was, ultimately, her unwillingness to do what the coaching staff had asked her to do that

resulted in her dismissal from the team, not an inability to recover from knee surgery.

Moreover, appellant has not alleged that she believed or that Coach Buchholz represented

that the only way she could be dismissed from the team was for lack of a viable path to

recovery after the surgery. Thus, appellant has not presented facts supporting that she

justifiably relied on appellee’s statements with respect to her knee surgery.

{¶ 36} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second assignment of error.

C. Promissory Estoppel

{¶ 37} In her third assignment of error, appellant argues that the Court of Claims

erred in granting summary judgment to appellee on appellant’s promissory estoppel claim

based on a finding of fact that her relationship with UT was contractual in nature and that

she did not reasonably rely on UT’s alleged promises.

{¶ 38} “The elements necessary to establish a claim for promissory estoppel are a

(1) promise, (2) clear and unambiguous in its terms, (3) reliance that is reasonable and

foreseeable, and (4) injury caused by such reliance.” Patel v. Univ. of Toledo, 2017-Ohio-

7132, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 39} Appellant alleged in her complaint that, in agreeing to have surgery, she

relied on Coach Buchholz’s “promise” that her scholarship would remain intact after the

procedure. (Compl. at ¶ 56.) Appellant also alleged she would have sought other medical

opinions for treatment if she had not been promised her scholarship would be unaffected,

No. 25AP-248 13

and, because she was not able to use UT’s resources for physical therapy and recovery

following her dismissal, she therefore incurred costs. (Compl. at ¶ 58-59.)

{¶ 40} The Court of Claims concluded that appellant’s relationship with appellee

with respect to payment of medical bills relating to pre-existing injuries was contractual in

nature based on the Student Athlete Handbook and, even if it was not, appellant could not

establish that she reasonably relied on the coach’s statements about her knee recovery.

{¶ 41} We agree with the Court of Claims that appellee is entitled to summary

judgment on appellant’s promissory estoppel claim. As described above, appellant

acknowledged in her complaint that she “was required by the NCAA to undergo the pre-

participation physical examination” before she could participate in any athletic activities.

(Compl. at ¶ 46.) Additionally, she stated she was informed “there was no possibility of

playing for UT without undergoing surgery.” (Compl. at ¶ 20.) Thus, appellant’s claims

that she relied on the coach’s “promise” about her scholarship following surgery contradict

her acknowledgment that surgery was necessary for her eligibility to play.

{¶ 42} Additionally, as noted above, appellant has not alleged that she believed, or

that Coach Buchholz represented that, the only way she could be dismissed from the team

was for lack of a viable path to recovery after the surgery. Appellant was ultimately

dismissed from the team, in her words, “[b]ecause of her refusal to lie,” not an inability to

recover from knee surgery. (Compl. at ¶ 32.) Thus, even if we construed Coach Buchholz’s

statement about appellant’s scholarship following surgery as an actionable “promise,”

appellant has presented no evidence to demonstrate that she reasonably or foreseeably

relied on that statement to agree to the surgery, a necessary element to support a

promissory estoppel claim.

{¶ 43} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error.

D. Negligence

{¶ 44} In her fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the Court of Claims

erred in granting summary judgment to appellee on appellant’s negligence claim based on

an erroneous conclusion that no common-law duty of care is owed to student athletes to

prevent hostile or abusive conduct by athletic coaching staff.

{¶ 45} In general, negligence requires proof of “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to

conform to a certain standard of conduct, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a causal connection

between the breach and injury, and (4) damages.” Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of

No. 25AP-248 14

Akron, 2015-Ohio-229, ¶ 23, citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75,

77 (1984). See also Strother v. Hutchinson, 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285 (1981), citing Feldman

v. Howard, 10 Ohio St.2d 189, 193 (1967).

{¶ 46} Appellant alleged in her complaint that the UT coaching staff “had the duty

to provide [appellant] a safe team environment free from abuse, harassment, ridicule,

embarrassment, and hostility.” (Compl. at ¶ 62.) She further alleged that appellee breached

this duty when Coach Cunningham verbally abused her, and that Coach Buchholz created

an unsafe environment by not stopping Coach Cunningham’s behavior or responding to the

alleged abuse.

{¶ 47} In her brief, appellant argues that Cameron v. Univ. of Toledo, 2018-Ohio-

979 (10th Dist.), recognizes a general duty of care “for coaches to supervise athletes in a safe

and supportive environment, which necessarily includes preventing hostile or abusive

behavior” like what she allegedly experienced.3 (Appellant’s Brief at 28.) Appellant further

argues that the Court of Claims incorrectly distinguished and limited Cameron. In

response, appellee argues that appellant’s allegations fall short of establishing that appellee

had an actionable duty to not offend or upset a player.

{¶ 48} In Cameron, this court held that two of UT’s football team coaching staff

owed a duty of care to a player who was injured during an event after practice at which

upperclassmen players instructed freshman offensive line players to complete a series of

activities. Cameron at ¶ 58. Cameron, a freshman offensive lineman, fell during an attempt

to dunk a football over the goalpost crossbar and suffered a brain injury that prevented him

from playing football and resulted in the loss of his athletic scholarship. Id. at ¶ 4-5. This

court explained that it made the determination “[u]nder the particular circumstances of

this case,” that a duty existed based on “(1) [the coaching staff persons’] contractual duties

to protect and keep safe student athletes, (2) a common-law duty between a coach and

student athletes under same or similar circumstances, and (3) the foreseeability of the

harm suffered by Cameron.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 58.

{¶ 49} Here, the Court of Claims concluded that the facts in Cameron were

distinguishable from the facts in this case. It also found that appellant “pointed to no facts”

3 In her brief, appellant incorrectly refers to this case as “Cameron v. Ohio State University, 2019-Ohio-5048.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 27.) Based on the context, however, we understand appellant to be referring to the case

cited in the Court of Claims’ decision, Cameron v. Univ. of Toledo, 2018-Ohio-979 (10th Dist.).

No. 25AP-248 15

that would allow a finding of a duty of care such as that found in Cameron. (Jan. 31, 2025

Decision at 26.) It further noted that appellant cited no authority, and the court itself found

no authority, that would support the proposition that “a common-law duty of care is owed

to student-athletes to prevent hostile or abusive comments made by athletic staff.” (Jan.

31, 2025 Decision at 26.) We agree with the Court of Claims that the duty of care finding in

Cameron was based on the particular facts of that case.

{¶ 50} Furthermore, the court in Cameron specifically held that the determination

that UT owed Cameron a duty of care was based on the specific contractual duties4 of the

coaches, the foreseeability of harm5 suffered by Cameron and “a common-law duty between

a coach and student athletes under same or similar circumstances.” Cameron, 2018-Ohio-

979, at ¶ 58 (10th Dist.). In this case, appellant challenges only the Court of Claims’ finding

that no common-law duty existed.

{¶ 51} Regarding the common-law duty, the Cameron court also noted that it found

only one Ohio case that acknowledged a common-law duty of care for coaches to their

players. Cameron at ¶ 56. In that case, Limerick v. Euclid Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio App.3d 807

(8th Dist. 1990), a high school student was injured while trying out for the varsity football

4 Regarding contractual duties, the Court of Claims held that the relationship between appellant and UT may

reasonably be construed as being contractual in nature based on the Student Athlete Handbook. The court

ultimately determined that “insofar as such policies exist, the alleged policies would be governed by the

Handbook and would be based on contract law, not a claim raised here.” (Jan. 31, 2025 Decision at 24.) As

noted above, appellant did not challenge this conclusion on appeal.

5 Regarding foreseeability, the Court of Claims did not address the issue. In her complaint, appellant did not

allege that the harm she suffered was foreseeable. However, in her memorandum contra the motion for

summary judgment, in support of foreseeability, appellant stated:

The circumstances of this case include plaintiff testifying that she reached

out to various UT personnel regarding the issues she was experiencing from

UT’s soccer coaches. Caitlin Mohler Depo. 132-136. Caitlin testified that she

was intimidated by the coaches, was subjected to ridicule and

embarrassment, and was excluded from team activities. Such testimony

supports a finding of foreseeability of mental harm for purposes of the

existence of a duty.

(Dec. 2, 2024 Pl.’s Memo Contra to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt. at 9-10.) Appellant testified in her deposition

that she talked to several persons associated with the university “about the issues [she was] experiencing.”

(Mohler Dep. at 132-36.) Appellant does not elaborate how this is evidence that the harm she suffered from

Coach Cunningham’s words was foreseeable. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for us to consider the same

because the issue raised and argument in appellant’s brief only addresses the Court of Claims’ conclusion that

there is no common-law duty applicable here. Appellant does not argue that if this court were to affirm the

Court of Claims’ conclusion regarding common-law duty we should still remand for the Court of Claims to

consider whether a duty exists pursuant to foreseeability.

No. 25AP-248 16

team. At the time, he did not have medical insurance. Id. at 809. The student and his

mother sued the school, arguing negligent supervision based on an alleged legal duty of the

school to prohibit participation in practices or games until the player obtained a medical

insurance coverage form from a parent. Id. The court found no such duty and explained

as follows:

The appellants cite no legal precedent imposing a duty on a

school to obtain proof that an athlete has medical insurance.

While there may be a general duty to supervise an athlete by

giving adequate instruction, supplying proper equipment and

supervising the particular contest, that duty cannot be

extended to require proof of medical insurance.

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 810.

{¶ 52} From this source, the court in Cameron found, “Given the circumstances

here, as outlined in this discussion of duty, this court finds that [the coaching staff] had a

common-law duty of care to Cameron consistent with due care a coach under same or

similar circumstances would have.” Cameron at ¶ 56. Nothing in Cameron or Limerick

suggests that a duty of care that a coach may have to supervise an athlete extends to the

circumstances present in this case or the duty of care as described by appellant.

{¶ 53} Additionally, the court in Cameron noted that “[m]ore significant in this case

than any common-law duty is the presence of foreseeability.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at

¶ 57. Because the coaching staff had testified the goal-post dunk was a dangerous activity,

the court was able to find there was a foreseeability of harm for purposes of the existence of

a duty. Id. “ ‘[I]f a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that an injury was

likely to result from a particular act, the court could find that the duty element of negligence

is satisfied.’ ” Id. at ¶ 51, quoting Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire

Marshal, 2002-Ohio-4210, ¶ 23.6 Yet, appellant did not raise the issue of foreseeability on

appeal. Although the question of whether a duty exists for purposes of negligence is a

question of law that we review de novo, we are limited by the arguments the parties present.

See Cleveland v. 8009 Lake L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-2775, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing Snyder v. Old

World Classics, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, ¶ 4.

6 See supra footnote 5.

No. 25AP-248 17

{¶ 54} Because we find that the Court of Claims did not err in concluding that

appellant failed to establish the existence of a common-law duty of care as asserted in the

circumstances of this case, we affirm the Court of Claims’ decision on that basis.7

{¶ 55} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s fourth assignment of error.8

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 56} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that summary judgment was proper

in this case. Although we sustain appellant’s first assignment of error based on our

conclusion that discretionary immunity did not apply to appellant’s claims, we conclude

that appellee was nevertheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims.

Therefore, we overrule appellant’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error and

affirm the decision of the Court of Claims of Ohio.

Judgment affirmed.

JAMISON, P.J., and MENTEL, J., concur.

7 Notwithstanding the task of undertaking a de novo review, “appellate courts do not conduct an independent

review of all potential issues implicated by the dispute.” Cleveland, 2025-Ohio-2775, at ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).

8 Before concluding, we note that appellant has argued that the Court of Claims’ decision to not find a

common-law duty of care to prevent hostile or abusive conduct by athletic staff sets a dangerous precedent

and “effectively paves the way for coaches to create hostile and abusive environments for student-athletes

without any recourse.” (Appellant’s Brief at 28-29.) We reject that contention and the particularly serious

accusation that it contains. Our decision is limited to the facts of this case and the arguments raised in this

case. Furthermore, for the sake of thoroughness, even without the existence of a common-law duty, we note

that a coach who commits misconduct may be subject to any number of consequences and sanctions for his

or her actions, including professional discipline, licensing or credentialing penalties, and even criminal or

other civil sanctions or claims. And other recourse may exist for student-athletes outside of a negligence

action, including claims under Title IX (20 U.S.C. 1681, 1681-89), the U.S. SafeSport Code (36 U.S.C. 220541-

220542), or other state and federal laws. There is no basis on which to read the court’s decision as a green

light for coach misconduct.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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