The opinion
[Cite as Schaffer v. Ohio State Univ., 2025-Ohio-4962.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Alex Schaffer, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 25AP-376
v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2024-oo876PQ)
The Ohio State University, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellee. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on October 30, 2025
On brief: Alex Schaffer, pro se. Argued: Alex Schaffer.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Regina Mendicino
Dwyer, and Scott Welch, for appellee. Argued: Regina
Mendicino Dwyer.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
BOGGS, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Alex Schaffer, appeals the judgment of the Court of
Claims of Ohio, which overruled Schaffer’s objections to a special master’s report and
recommendation (“report”), adopted the report, and entered judgment for defendant-
appellee, The Ohio State University (“Ohio State”), on Schaffer’s complaint alleging a denial
of access to public records in violation of R.C. 149.43. Schaffer has also filed a motion to
strike portions of Ohio State’s appellate brief. For the following reasons, we deny Schaffer’s
motion to strike and affirm the Court of Claims’ judgment in favor of Ohio State.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75, Schaffer filed a complaint in the Court of Claims on
December 12, 2024, alleging a violation of R.C. 149.43(B) and seeking an order compelling
Ohio State’s compliance with public-records requests he submitted on November 24
and 25, 2024. In his public records requests, Schaffer sought lists of the names and email
No. 25AP-376 2
addresses of all persons who receive newsletters about Ohio State’s athletic activities. Ohio
State denied Schaffer’s requests based on its policy limiting commercial records requests.
{¶ 3} The Court of Claims appointed a special master, who reviewed the evidence
and memoranda submitted by the parties and issued a report recommending that the Court
of Claims enter judgment in favor of Ohio State. The special master determined that Ohio
State properly denied Schaffer’s requests through application of its policy on commercial
records requests, but the special master also addressed Ohio State’s alternative argument
that the requested lists are not “records” within the meaning of R.C. 149.011(G) or “public
records” within the meaning of R.C. 149.43. The special master rejected Schaffer’s
argument that Hicks v. Union Twp., Clermont Cty. Bd. of Trustees, 2024-Ohio-5449,
compels the conclusion that the lists are “records” under R.C. 149.011(G). Rather, the
special master stated that the lists are “very similar” to the lists at issue in Doe v. The Ohio
State University, 2024-Ohio-5891 (10th Dist.), in which this court distinguished Hicks and
held that the requested materials were not “records” under R.C. 149.011(G). (Feb. 13, 2025
Report & Recommendation at 5.) The special master reasoned that, like the lists in Doe,
“the lists at issue here do not document anything about [Ohio State’s] activities except who
it communicates with and how it does so.” Id. at 6.
{¶ 4} Schaffer filed objections to the special master’s report, and Ohio State
responded. Schaffer argued, in part, that the special master erred by relying on Doe because
this court did not decide Doe until after Schaffer filed his complaint and because Hicks is
controlling, binding precedent. Schaffer also argued that the special master erred by
determining that the requested lists do not document Ohio State’s organization, functions,
policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of Ohio State. Further,
Schaffer argued that the special master erred by determining that Ohio State properly
applied its policy on commercial requests to deny Schaffer’s requests.
{¶ 5} The Court of Claims overruled Schaffer’s objections, adopted the special
master’s report, and entered judgment in favor of Ohio State. The Court of Claims agreed
with the special master that Ohio State properly applied its policy limiting the number of
records that will be provided for commercial purposes, noting Schaffer’s work in the ticket-
reselling business, the obvious utility to that business of the requested lists, and Schaffer’s
use of an email address with a commercial domain. The Court of Claims also agreed with
No. 25AP-376 3
the special master’s application of Doe, which it recognized as binding precedent: “It is not
for this Court to decide whether in Doe the Tenth District Court of Appeals misinterpreted
or misapplied Hicks.” Schaffer v. The Ohio State Univ., 2025-Ohio-1649, ¶ 20 (Ct. of Cl.).
{¶ 6} Schaffer has appealed the Court of Claims’ judgment to this court and
presents two assignments of error:
[1.] The Court of Claims erred in overruling Appellant’s
objections and adopting the Special Master’s Report and
Recommendation, which overruled the Ohio Supreme Court
and Rule of Law in Hicks . . ., which held Email and Mail
Distribution Lists of Newsletter Programs of public offices are
“records” under the Ohio Public Records Act and thus violated
the Doctrine of Stare Decisis.
[2.] The Court of Claims erred in overruling Appellant’s
objections and adopting the Special Master’s Report and
Recommendation, which failed to reconcile how the Email
Newsletter Distribution Lists do not fit the definition of
“records” in R.C. 149.011(G) despite acknowledging the
decision is “hard to square” with the syllabus of the Ohio
Supreme Court in Hicks which held Email and Mail
Distribution Lists of public offices for Newsletter Programs are
“records” per the definition in R.C. 149.011(G).
(Appellant’s Brief at vi.)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Schaffer’s motion to strike is not well-taken
{¶ 7} Before turning to Schaffer’s assignments of error, we first address and deny
Schaffer’s motion to strike portions of Ohio State’s appellate brief. Schaffer argues that, in
its appellate brief, Ohio State misstates that this case involves requests for the same
information that was requested in Doe, mispresents the contents of Schaffer’s public-
records request, and raises new arguments that it did not raise in the Court of Claims.
{¶ 8} Schaffer’s motion to strike is not well-taken. First, to the extent Ohio State
may conflate the requests in Doe and the requests in this case, this court is aware of the
differences between the information requested in the two cases. Further, reading Ohio
State’s brief as a whole, we can only conclude that any such conflation was unintentional.
Moreover, Ohio State clearly and correctly addresses elsewhere the specific, different
requests at issue in Doe and here. We further disagree with Schaffer’s suggestions that Ohio
No. 25AP-376 4
State has misrepresented the relief Schaffer seeks in this case and that Ohio State raises
new arguments it did not raise in the Court of Claims. As in the Court of Claims, Ohio
State’s overarching argument here concerns application of the relevant case law—
particularly, Hicks and Doe—which the parties and the Court of Claims fully addressed
below. Finding no basis to strike any of Ohio State’s brief, we deny Schaffer’s motion to
strike and turn to Schaffer’s assignments of error.
{¶ 9} As both of Schaffer’s assignments of error challenge the Court of Claims’
judgment overruling Schaffer’s objections and adopting the report, we address the
assignments of error together.
B. The Public Records Act and standard of review
{¶ 10} Ohio’s Public Records Act requires a public office to promptly make copies of
public records available to any person upon request. R.C. 149.43(B)(1). A “public record”
is a record kept by any public office, except as otherwise provided in R.C. 149.43(A)(1). For
purposes of the Public Records Act, the term “records” includes:
any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or
characteristic, including an electronic record . . ., created or
received by or coming under the jurisdiction of any public office
of the state or its political subdivisions, which serves to
document the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, operations, or other activities of the office.
R.C. 149.011(G). Courts construe the Public Records Act liberally in favor of broad access
to public records and resolve doubts in favor of disclosure. State ex rel. Cable News
Network, Inc. v. Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Local Schools, 2020-Ohio-5149, ¶ 8.
{¶ 11} A person aggrieved by a denial of access to public records in violation of R.C.
149.43(B) may file either a mandamus action, pursuant to R.C. 149.436(C)(1), or a public-
records-access complaint in the Court of Claims, pursuant to R.C. 2743.75. “[T]he General
Assembly enacted R.C. 2743.75(A) ‘to provide for an expeditious and economical procedure
that attempts to resolve disputes alleging a denial of access to public records’ in violation of
R.C. 149.43(B).” Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2020-Ohio-5371,
¶ 12, quoting R.C. 2743.75(A). In an R.C. 2743.75 action, the requester must plead and
prove facts showing that it “sought an identifiable public record pursuant to R.C.
149.43(B)(1) and that the public office or records custodian did not make the record
available.” Id. at ¶ 33. In Welsh-Huggins, the Supreme Court of Ohio assumed without
No. 25AP-376 5
deciding that a requester must demonstrate entitlement to relief under R.C. 2743.75 for the
denial of access to public records in violation of R.C. 149.43(B) by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶ 12} Whether material qualifies as a record under R.C. 149.011(G) presents a
mixed question of law and fact. Doe, 2024-Ohio-5891, at ¶ 19. When presented with such
an issue, an appellate court “ ‘will independently review the legal question de novo but will
defer to the trial court’s underlying factual findings, reviewing them only for clear error.’ ”
Id., quoting Welsh-Huggins at ¶ 37. To prove that requested materials are “records” for the
purposes of R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43, the requester must establish that they are “(1)
documents, devices, or items, (2) created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction of
the state agencies, (3) which serve to document the organization, functions, policies,
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the office.” State ex rel. Dispatch
Printing Co. v. Johnson, 2005-Ohio-4384, ¶ 19.
{¶ 13} Schaffer maintains that, in determining whether the requested distribution
lists qualify as records under R.C. 149.011(G), the Court of Claims erroneously applied this
court’s Doe decision rather than the Supreme Court of Ohio’s earlier decision in Hicks.
Indeed, in his first assignment of error, he goes so far as to state that the report, adopted by
the Court of Claims, erroneously “overruled” Hicks. (Appellant’s Brief at vi.) We will
address Hicks and Doe in turn.
C. Hicks
{¶ 14} We first turn to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s opinion in Hicks. Hicks
submitted a public-records request to the Union Township, Clermont County Board of
Trustees (“the township”), requesting email and mail distribution lists for the township
newsletter. After the township denied the request, Hicks filed a complaint in the Court of
Claims pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D).
{¶ 15} Affidavits established that the township published a quarterly newsletter to
provide the community with pertinent information from its governing body. The township
used a third-party, direct-mail vendor to send the newsletter to all mailing addresses in the
township. The mailing list was maintained in conjunction with the local post office and was
based on local zip codes. A township employee maintained an email distribution list for
those who elected to receive the newsletter by email. The township administrator stated
No. 25AP-376 6
that the township used the email list solely for the administrative purpose of sending the
newsletter electronically. The parties agreed that the newsletter, itself, qualified as a public
record subject to production upon request, but they disagreed whether the lists of mailing
and email addresses to which the township directed the newsletter constituted public
records.
{¶ 16} Contrary to Hicks’s argument that the distribution lists documented the
functions or other activities of the township in keeping its constituents informed and were
therefore public records, the Court of Claims held that the distribution lists did not
document the township’s organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures,
operations, or other activities. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of
Claims’ judgment, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed.
{¶ 17} The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the lists documented an
essential function of the township, as they were “central to connecting the township with
its constituents.” Hicks, 2024-Ohio-5449, at ¶ 17. The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized
that R.C. 9.03 allows a political subdivision to use public funds to publish and distribute
newsletters to communicate its plans, policies, and operations to members of the public
within the political subdivision and to others who may be affected by the political
subdivision. The township newsletter in Hicks was distributed to mailing addresses within
the township (and by email to others who opted in through the township’s website), and it
provided recipients with information about township meetings, events, and services,
contact information for each township department, and updates from the township’s
police, fire, service, and zoning departments. See Hicks v. Union Twp., 2023-Ohio-874,
¶ 5, 8 (12th Dist.), rev’d, 2024-Ohio-5449. On those facts, the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated, “[T]he distribution lists document particular functions and procedures of the
township, revealing how and to whom the township’s newsletter is regularly distributed.”
Hicks, 2024-Ohio-5449, at ¶ 17.
D. Doe
{¶ 18} We now turn to this court’s decision in Doe, which involved public-records
requests for names, email addresses, mailing addresses, and telephone numbers, and seat-
location information for Ohio State faculty, staff, and donors who had purchased or
received season tickets for university sporting events. The Court of Claims ordered Ohio
No. 25AP-376 7
State to produce copies of records responsive to the requests, with certain redactions,
including ticketholders’ mailing addresses. Both Doe and Ohio State appealed to this court.
{¶ 19} This court considered whether the season ticketholders’ personal
information—their mailing addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers—documented
Ohio State’s organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other
activities, so as to qualify as “records” under R.C. 149.011(G).1 In answering that question,
this court reviewed a series of Supreme Court of Ohio cases, including Hicks, that addressed
whether personal information held by a public office meets the third requirement of a
“record” under R.C. 149.011(G). Synthesizing those cases, we stated, “[W]hether personal
information satisfies the third requirement of a record turns on whether that personal
information sheds any light on the public office’s performance of its activities,” and we
concluded that season ticketholders’ mailing addresses, email addresses, and telephone
numbers did not do so. Doe at ¶ 31. “[B]y themselves, the mailing addresses, email
addresses, and telephone numbers provide no information about or insight into Ohio
State’s ticketing organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or
activities,” and its disclosure “would not further the public understanding of the inner
workings of Ohio State’s ticketing process.” Id.
{¶ 20} The Supreme Court of Ohio refused a discretionary appeal of this court’s
decision in Doe, despite Doe’s argument that this court’s decision conflicted with Hicks.
See Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 2025-Ohio-857; Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 2025-Ohio-2416.
E. The Court of Claims did not err by applying Doe
{¶ 21} The essence of Schaffer’s appellate argument is that Hicks held that mail and
email distribution lists for newsletters issued and distributed by public offices are public
records under R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43(A). As such, Schaffer maintains, based on Hicks
and the doctrine of stare decisis,2 that the Court of Claims was required to hold that the
distribution lists for Ohio State’s athletics newsletters are public records subject to
disclosure upon request. We disagree.
1 Like in Hicks, the parties in Doe did not dispute that the requested information satisfied the first two
requirements under R.C. 149.011(G).
2 The doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to recognize and follow an established legal decision in
subsequent cases in which the question of law is again in controversy. New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of
Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc., 2019-Ohio-2851, ¶ 18. It is intended to provide continuity
and predictability in the legal system. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 43.
No. 25AP-376 8
{¶ 22} Contrary to Schaffer’s suggestion, neither the report nor the Court of Claims’
judgment applying Doe “overruled” the Supreme Court of Ohio’s opinion in Hicks, nor do
they violate the doctrine of stare decisis. (Appellant’s Compl. at 11.) First, the Supreme
Court of Ohio did not hold in Hicks that all mail and email distribution lists maintained or
utilized by a public office constitute public records; it held only that “the email-and mail-
distribution lists at issue” there satisfied each requirement in R.C. 149.011(G) and 143.43.
(Emphasis added.) Hicks, 2024-Ohio-5449, at ¶ 15. Second, although Hicks is
undisputedly binding precedent on both the Court of Claims and this court, Doe is likewise
binding on the Court of Claims. See In re Schott, 16 Ohio App.2d 72 (1st Dist. 1968); R.C.
2743.20. Furthermore, this court neither ignored nor contradicted Hicks in Doe.
{¶ 23} In Doe, we discerned from Hicks and other Supreme Court of Ohio caselaw
that whether personal information held by public offices satisfies the third prong of the
definition of “record” in R.C. 149.011(G) “turns on whether that personal information sheds
any light on the public office’s performance of its activities.” Doe at ¶ 31. For example, we
noted the Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior statement that a public office has “no obligation
to disclose personal information about individuals that accumulates in government files
that reveals little or nothing about the agency’s own conduct.” Id. at ¶ 22, citing State ex
rel. McCleary v. Roberts, 2000-Ohio-345, 88 Ohio St.3d 365, 368. See also Johnson,
2005-Ohio-4384, at ¶ 25 (state employees’ home addresses represented contact
information used for administrative convenience but did not document the acts of state
agencies). It is the application of that rule to the specific facts of Doe that led this court to
conclude that the personal information requested there, unlike the personal information
requested in Hicks, did not fall within the statutory definition of “record.” In other words,
this court distinguished Hicks based on the particular facts of each case. Finding the facts
of this case more like those in Doe than those in Hicks, the Court of Claims determined it
was required to follow Doe unless and until the Supreme Court of Ohio announces a
contrary ruling that would take precedence.
{¶ 24} The Court of Claims’ holding is consistent with both Hicks and Doe. As
required by both cases, the Court of Claims asked whether the requested materials are
records under R.C. 149.011(G), i.e., whether they are “ ‘(1) documents, devices, or items, (2)
created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction of the state agencies, (3) which serve
No. 25AP-376 9
to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or
other activities of the office.’ ” Hicks, 2024-Ohio-5449, at ¶ 15, quoting Johnson at ¶ 19; see
also Doe at ¶ 20, citing Johnson at ¶ 19. As in both Hicks and Doe, the central issue here
was whether the requested material documents the organization, functions, policies,
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the public office.
{¶ 25} In Hicks, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the distribution lists for the
township newsletters, which were published to provide Union Township residents and
businesses with pertinent information from the governing body, were “central to
connecting the township with its constituents, which is the purpose of a newsletter.” Id. at
¶ 17. The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that information revealing how and to whom
the township newsletter was regularly distributed “document[ed] particular functions and
procedures of the township.” Id. The distribution lists shed light on the township’s
performance of its duties; to whom the township distributed the newsletter was a necessary
component of evaluating the township’s communication of essential information to its
residents. Had the township not chosen a newsletter format for communicating with its
constituents, it would have had to choose another way to communicate governmental
information. In Doe, on the other hand, ticketholders’ personal information did not shed
light on Ohio State’s ticketing activities, as “[a]ny particular ticketholder’s mailing address,
email address, or telephone number reveals little to nothing about Ohio State’s activities
with regard to ticketing.” Doe at ¶ 31. Ticketholders’ personal information did “not
document anything about Ohio State’s structure, duties, general management principles,
determinations, specific methods, processes, or other acts.” Id. at ¶ 37.
{¶ 26} Although this case involves requests for newsletter distribution lists like in
Hicks, this distribution lists here, unlike in Hicks, reveal nothing about the public office’s
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities.
They contain only contact information voluntarily provided by members of the public who
have opted in to receive newsletters about Ohio State athletics. The lists are not curated by
Ohio State, as any member of the public can opt in to receive the electronic newsletters
through Ohio State’s website. The contents of the newsletters, which Ohio State does not
dispute qualify as records under R.C. 149.011(G), are freely available to anyone who
registers to receive them. Unlike in Hicks, however, Ohio State’s dissemination of its
No. 25AP-376 10
athletics newsletters is not tied to its performance of statutory duties. There has been no
suggestion that the identities and contact information of individuals who voluntarily
subscribe to the athletic newsletters has any effect on how Ohio State carries out its
operative functions. Because the identities and addresses of those who receive Ohio State’s
athletics newsletters reveal nothing about Ohio State’s organization, functions, policies,
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities, we conclude, like the Court of Claims,
that the requested material does not qualify as a record under R.C. 149.011 or a public
record under R.C. 149.43.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 27} For these reasons, we overrule Schaffer’s two assignments of error and affirm
the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio. Additionally, we deny Schaffer’s motion to
strike portions of Ohio State’s brief.
Judgment affirmed;
motion to strike denied.
DORRIAN and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.