Maltese

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MARYANN MALTESE,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

1:25-CV-1292 (RPK) (MMH)

v.

SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE

DEPARTMENT; SUFFOLK COUNTY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY; KEVIN

CATALINA, Suffolk County Police

Commissioner; NEW YORK STATE

LEGISLATURE; SUPREME COURT OF

NEW YORK, SUFFOLK COUNTY;

DAVID GRIER; JUSTICE RICHARD

AMBRO, Supreme Court of New York,

Suffolk County,

Defendants.

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RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Maryann Maltese brings this action against, among others, Justice Richard

Ambro of the Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County, and Suffolk County Police

Commissioner Kevin Catalina. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants defendants

Ambro’s and Catalina’s motions to dismiss.

The complaint consists of handwritten answers to questions in a form complaint, along

with attached exhibits. See generally Compl. (Dkt. #1). Plaintiff appears to allege that certain

defendants arrested and prosecuted her for aggravated harassment under New York law without

probable cause. Id. at 5. The complaint also alleges that clerks in the Supreme Court of New

York, Suffolk County, barred her from filing an answer in a separate suit involving the Suffolk

County Police Department. Id. at 5, 8–17. Plaintiff brings claims under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the police department, Commissioner Catalina, the Suffolk County District

Attorney, the New York State Legislature, the Supreme Court of New York, clerk David Grier,

and Justice Ambro.1 Id. at 2–3, 6. Defendants Ambro and Catalina each moved to dismiss the

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, and failure to state

a claim.

The motions to dismiss are granted based on insufficient service of process. When a

defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for improper service of process, “the plaintiff bears the

burden of proving adequate service.” Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 752 (2d Cir. 2010)

(citation omitted).

Plaintiff does not specify whether she sued defendants Ambro and Catalina in their

personal or official capacities (or both), but she failed to effect proper service in either case. An

official-capacity suit is “in effect a claim against the governmental entity itself.” Lore v. City of

Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 164 (2d Cir. 2012). Per the Federal Rules, a state entity may be served

by “(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or

(B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving” a like summons.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). New York law prescribes that a state officer “sued solely in an official

capacity” shall be served by “(1) delivering the summons to such officer or to the chief executive

officer of such agency or to” their designee, or “(2) by mailing the summons by certified mail . . .

to such officer or to the chief executive officer of such agency, and by personal service upon the

state” by delivering the summons to an assistant attorney general at an Attorney General’s office,

or to the Attorney General within the State. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 307. If plaintiff sues Catalina as an

1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption to limit the defendants to the seven parties

enumerated in the complaint: the Suffolk County Police Department; the Suffolk County District Attorney;

Commissioner Catalina; the New York State Legislature; the Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County; law

clerk David Grier; and Justice Ambro. Compl. 2–3.

officer of Suffolk County, summons must be “deliver[ed]” to “the chair or clerk of the board of

supervisors, clerk, attorney or treasurer.” Id. § 311(a)(4). And to serve the New York Supreme

Court, Suffolk County, plaintiff must deliver the summons “to any one of” its judges. Id. § 312.

Plaintiff meets none of these standards. Her proofs of service indicate that she mailed a

copy of the summons to each defendant by priority mail. See Summons (Dkt. #6). But nothing in

the record suggests that plaintiff delivered the summons to the relevant chief executive officers,

the appropriate county officials, an assistant attorney general, or the defendants. See Dinsio v.

App. Div., Third Dep’t, No. 16-CV-324 (GTS/CFH), 2016 WL 11807175, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July

25, 2016) (collecting cases finding mail service alone insufficient under Rule 4(j)); Jimenez-

Fogarty v. Fogarty, No. 24-CV-8705 (JLR) (GWG), 2025 WL 2775988, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

30, 2025) (finding mail service alone insufficient under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 307); Sander v. Off. of

Comptroller of Currency, No. 15-CV-5879 (VSB), 2016 WL 11951030, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

29, 2016) (similar reading of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)). While New York law permits service by first

class mail “[a]s an alternative,” plaintiff has not produced a requisite “signed acknowledgement of

receipt.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 312-a; see Smith v. Smith, No. 19-CV-1638 (AMD) (RML), 2020 WL

6334794, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2020).

Nor has plaintiff demonstrated that she properly served defendants in their personal

capacities. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2) provides that an individual may be personally

served by “(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of

suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each” to an authorized

agent. An individual may also be served in any manner permitted by state law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(e)(1). New York law allows service on an individual by a combination of delivery to the

individual’s place of business and mail, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(2), but service by mail alone is

inadequate, Dixon v. Stedman, No. 22-CV-3581 (RPK) (LB), 2023 WL 2710405, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 30, 2023). Plaintiff’s receipts, which indicate only that she sent summons to the officers by

priority mail, do not satisfy the requirements for service.

Accordingly, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants because plaintiff has

not established proper service. Considering plaintiff’s filings, which do not respond to defendants’

briefs, explain the failure to serve, or request an extension of time to complete service, I decline to

extend plaintiff’s time to serve defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Bey v. Nassau Cnty. Dist.

Att’y’s Off., No. 21-CV-5714 (RPK) (PK), 2022 WL 1469401, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2022).

Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Ambro and Catalina are dismissed without prejudice

for insufficient service of process. While the remaining defendants have not moved to dismiss,

the foregoing reasons appear to apply to them too. Accordingly, plaintiff is also ordered to show

cause in writing by November 28, 2025, why the Court should not dismiss the complaint as to all

defendants. See Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Rachel Kovner

RACHEL P. KOVNER

United States District Judge

Dated: October 29, 2025

Brooklyn, New York