LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

DEBORAH LEBLANC CIVIL DOCKET NO. 6:21-cv-01975

VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

JAIME HOYOS-OCAMP, ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROL B.

WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED RULE 50 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS

A MATTER OF LAW, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, RULE 59 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR,

ALTERNATIVELY, RULE 59 MOTION TO ALTER AND AMEND JUDGMENT (the “Motion”)

[Doc. 223] filed by Defendants Jaime Hoyos-OCamp, BDG Trees, LLC, Endurance

American Specialty Insurance Company, and GuideOne National Insurance

Company (hereinafter, “Defendants”). Plaintiff Deborah Leblanc (“Plaintiff”) opposes

the Motion [Doc. 232], and Defendants filed a Reply brief [Doc. 233]. On August 12,

2025, the Court conducted oral argument on the Motion. [Docs. 237 & 238].

Considering the briefs of the parties, the arguments in open court, and the record

before the Court, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The instant lawsuit arises out of a motor vehicle accident, which occurred on

March 22, 2021, in Iberia Parish, Louisiana. On this date, Deborah Leblanc was

operating a 1997 Ford Crown Victoria in an easterly direction on LA Highway 92.

Defendant, Jaime Hoyos-OCamp, was operating a 2018 Dodge Ram box truck, which

was loaded with logs, in a westerly direction on LA Highway 92. At the time, Mr.

OCamp was in the course and scope of his employment with BDG Trees, LLC. Mr.

OCamp lost control of his vehicle, causing it to enter Plaintiff’s lane of travel and

striking her vehicle head-on. The facts surrounding the accident were not disputed,

and the Defendants stipulated to liability prior to trial.

The parties proceeded to a jury trial on April 7-11, 2025, on the issue of

damages. Prior to trial, the parties entered into a Gasquet settlement, whereby the

Plaintiff settled with Mr. OCamp and BDG Trees, LLC, who remained in the case

only nominally to allow the Plaintiff to pursue damages from Endurance American

Specialty Insurance Company and GuideOne National Insurance Company under

excess insurance policies. [Doc. 196] (sealed). The stipulation states as follows:

The parties have stipulated and agree, subject to an agreement that this

stipulation and any evidence of a prior settlement will be under seal and

will not be disclosed to the jury, that a confidential “Gasquet Receipt,

Release, Indemnification and Hold Harmless Agreement” in settlement

was previously reached in this matter between Plaintiff and Defendants

Jaime Hoyos Ocampo (“Ocampo”), BDG Trees, LLC (“BDG”), Old

Republic Insurance Corporation, Navigators Specialty Insurance

Company, Lexington Insurance Company, and Allied World Assurance

Company (U.S.) Inc., for the full amount of the first $15,000,000.00 of

insurance coverage. All claims against Old Republic Insurance

Corporation, Navigators Specialty Insurance Company, Lexington

Insurance Company, and Allied World Assurance Company (U.S.) Inc.

have been fully and finally released pursuant to the aforementioned

settlement agreement. All claims against BDG and Ocampo for

uninsured exposure or damages of any kind or amount have also been

fully and finally released pursuant to the aforementioned settlement

agreement. Therefore, Endurance Specialty Insurance Company, which

provided the next layer of insurance coverage for Ocampo and BDG,

would only be liable for any amount awarded over $15,000,000.00, up to

its $5,000,000.00 policy limits. Additionally, GuideOne National

Insurance Company, which provided the next layer of insurance

coverage for Ocampo and BDG, would only be liable for any amount

awarded over $20,000,000.00, up to its $5,000,000.00 policy limits. The

parties also agree that judicial interest and court/trial costs may be owed

by Endurance Specialty Insurance Company and GuideOne National

Insurance Company as determined by the law and the policy of

insurance, as well as the Gasquet release previously executed by the

plaintiff.

Id.

At the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s presentation of evidence, Defendants moved

for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to FRCP 50(a). Specifically, Defendants

argued they were entitled to judgment because a reasonable juror could not find,

based on the stipulation that had been entered into the record, that Plaintiff’s

damages exceeded the amount she had already received by way of the Gasquet

settlement. The Court denied the motion, [Doc. 204], and the jury ultimately awarded

the Plaintiff the following damages: (1) $1,672,791.92 in past medical expenses;

$4,079,752 in future medical expenses; and (3) $32,300,000 in general damages.

Because of the terms of the Gasquet settlement, both Endurance American Specialty

Insurance Company and GuideOne National Insurance Company were cast in

judgment for $5,000,000.

In the instant Motion, Defendants renew their motion under Rule 50(b), again

arguing that no reasonable juror could find that the Plaintiff is entitled to any

recovery beyond what she has already received pursuant to the Gasquet settlement,

and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the amount

of damages to which the Plaintiff is entitled. Alternatively, Defendants seek a new

trial, or an amended judgment, on grounds the damages awarded by the jury were

excessive, pursuant to FRCP 59.

II. Legal Standards

A. FRCP 50

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) allows a court to review its earlier denial

of a Rule 50(a) motion as a matter of law if the movant again raises the motion after

a jury verdict. Kevin M. Ehringer, 646 F.3d at 324–25, citing Downey v. Strain, 510

F.3d 534, 543 (5th Cir.2007). A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “is

a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.” Heck

v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 272-73, quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir.

1995). The Fifth Circuit’s “standard of review with respect to a jury verdict is

especially deferential,” Brown v. Bryan County, OK., 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir.

2000), and “[a] jury verdict must be upheld unless there is no legally sufficient basis

for a reasonable jury to find as the jury did.” Heck, 775 F.3d at 273, quoting Foradori

v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2008). In considering a Rule 50(b) motion, the

court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all credibility determinations

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id., citing Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician

Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001). See also Apache Deepwater, L.L.C. v.

W&T Offshore, Inc., 930 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations and quotations

omitted) (a party is only entitled to judgment as a matter of law on an issue where no

reasonable jury would have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find

otherwise); Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001)

(a district court must deny a motion for judgment as a matter of law “unless the facts

and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that

reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion).

B. FRCP 59 Standard

Alternatively, Defendants seek a new trial under FRCP 59(a), which permits

a district court to grant a new trial “on all or some of the issues after a jury trial, for

any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in

federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).1 Though undefined by the Rule, a district court

may grant a new trial if, for example, it finds that “the verdict was against the weight

of the evidence,” or “the damages awarded were excessive.” In re DePuy

Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 784 (5th

Cir. 2018). “A motion for a new trial should not be granted unless the verdict is

against the great weight of the evidence, not merely against the preponderance of the

evidence.” Dahlen v. Gulf Crews, Inc., 281 F.3d 487, 497 (5th Cir. 2002). The decision

to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, including the determination of whether a

verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, is a question committed to the

court’s sound discretion. Six Dimensions, Inc. v. Perficient, Inc., 969 F.3d 219, 230

(5th Cir. 2020); Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 503-04 (5th Cir. 2008).

“Where a damage award is excessive or so large as to appear contrary to right

reason, the award is generally subject to remittitur, not a new trial.” Warner v. Talos

ERT, L.L.C., 133 F.4th 412, 427 (5th Cir. 2025), citing Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11

F.3d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 1994). To determine whether an award is excessive, courts

generally compare it “with rulings in other factually similar cases decided under

1 Rule 50 provides that a party “may include an alternative or joint request for a new

trial under Rule 59.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 132 (5th

Cir. 1989) (An alternative motion for a new trial “may be granted even if the moving party is

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).

controlling law.” Warner, 133 F.4th at 430, citing Marcel, 11 F.3d at 568. See also

Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., LLC, 379 So. 3d 636, 644 (La. 2023), reh’g denied,

374 So. 3d 135 (La. 2023) (Louisiana appellate courts consider “prior awards in

similar cases, as well as the particular facts and circumstances of the case under

review.”). Furthermore, “[u]nder the [maximum-recovery] rule, ‘we remit damage

awards that we find excessive to the maximum amount the jury could have awarded.’”

Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 738 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted). The maximum-recovery rule “permits a verdict at 150% of the highest

inflation-adjusted recovery in an analogous, published decision.” Warner, 133 F.4th

at 430 Echeverry, 988 F.3d at 236, quoting Longoria v. Hunter Express, Ltd., 932 F.3d

360, 365 (5th Cir. 2019). 2

2 In discussing the difference between a Rule 50(b) and a Rule 59 motion, the following

is instructive:

The motions have wholly distinct functions and the two are governed by

entirely different standards. Id. Although the evidence may be legally

sufficient to take the case to the jury so that a judgment as a matter of law is

not justified, still a new trial may be warranted where the verdict is against

the great weight of the evidence. See Urti v. Transp. Commercial Corp., 479

F.2d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 1973). “The court has wide discretion to order a new

trial whenever prejudicial error has occurred.” Op Art, 2006 WL 3347911, at

*1. Among the grounds for a new trial are that the verdict is against the weight

of evidence, that the damages are excessive, or for other reasons the trial was

not fair. See Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940).

Veach v. State Farm Lloyds, 2022 WL 1651951, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2022). Significantly,

in Martin v. Heritage Manor S. Nursing Home, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited Frank

Maraist and Harry T. Lemmon, who explained:

The important distinction between a JNOV and a judgment granting a new

trial is that a JNOV reverses the jury’s award and makes the apparent winner

the loser, while a judgment granting a new trial merely erases the jury verdict

(or trial court judgment) and puts the parties in the positions they occupied

prior to trial.

C. Louisiana Law Applies to the Issue of Damages

As an initial matter, in this diversity case, state substantive law controls what

injuries are compensable and in what amount. Longoria v. Hunter Express, Ltd., 932

F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 2019), citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.

415, 430-31, 116 S. Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (state law governs “review [of]

the size of jury verdicts” in diversity cases). Thus, when looking at the amount of

damages, and particularly the issue of whether they are excessive, state law should

be applied at the first step, however, the maximum-recovery rule is used in setting

any remittitur. Longoria, 932 F.3d at 366. See also Warner, 133 F.4th at 430.

III. Analysis

As explained hereinabove, under Rule 50(b), the Court’s analysis is highly

deferential to the jury’s verdict. Here, the jury heard four days of testimony about

the Plaintiff’s accident, her extensive injuries, and the care she will require in the

future. As part of the Plaintiff’s presentation of evidence, the jury heard that the

Plaintiff was rendered unconscious from the impact of the accident; was extricated

from the vehicle by emergency personnel; and was air-lifted for immediate emergency

medical treatment. The Plaintiff was hospitalized for over 30 days; underwent

multiple surgeries; and remained in inpatient care for three weeks after being

discharged from the hospital. Plaintiff endured at least seven surgeries to try and

save her right leg before it ultimately was amputated, and the jury heard evidence of

her considerable difficulties in finding a prosthetic leg that fits and does not hurt to

784 So. 2d 627, 631 n.4 (La. 4/3/01), citing Frank L. Maraist and Harry T. Lemmon, Louisiana

Civil Law Treatise, Volume 1, Civil Procedure, § 13.4, p. 353 (1999).

wear. Additionally, Plaintiff suffered a subarachnoid/subdural hemorrhage on

neuroimaging consistent with a closed head injury and was subsequently diagnosed

with mild neurocognitive disorder due to post-traumatic brain injury. Kayla Perrin,

the Plaintiff’s daughter, testified about her mother’s vibrant life before the accident,

in which she enjoyed vacations to the beach, playing with her grandchildren, and

gardening. Ms. Perrin further testified that her mother’s cognitive deficiencies and

prosthetic leg issues now hinder most of her activities. The jury also heard from the

Plaintiff herself, who speaks with slightly slurred speech, and who testified about the

ways in which her life has changed since the accident. The jury also heard competing

expert testimony from numerous qualified expert witnesses concerning the extent

and scope of the Plaintiff’s injuries, particularly her brain injury and her

amputation.3

Considering the record of this case, the Court concludes that the testimony

adduced at trial forms a sound basis of support for the jury’s verdict, and the

Defendants have presented no overwhelming evidence that points so strongly in their

favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion. Therefore, the

3 Specifically, the Court heard evidence and testimony from Dr. Robert Autin (general

surgery and trauma); Dr. Blake Saul (orthopedic surgery and trauma); Dr. David Weir

(neurology); Dr. Jeffery Lewine (neuroscience); Dr. Susan Andrews (clinical

neuropsychology); Dr. Daniel Hodges (psychiatry and pain management); Michelle Castille

(prosthetics); Cheryl Troxclair (physical therapy); Dr. Mary Ann Miknevich (physical

medicine and rehabilitation); Dr. Shelly Savant (neurology and life care planning); G.

Randolph Rice, Ph.D. (economics); Dr. Joshua Shimony (neuroradiology); Denis Boudreaux

(finance and economics); Laura Woodruff Rasmussen, Psy.D. (neuropsychology); Dr. Archie

Melcher (neurology); and Stephanie S. Haupt (life care planning).

Court must deny the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law under

FRCP 50(b).

Turning to the Defendants’ Rule 59 Motion, however, the Court finds that the

damages awarded by the jury are excessive. While the evidence at trial showed that

the Plaintiff’s injuries are unquestionably significant, she is not house-bound, she

lives independently, and she still participates in activities and vacations with her

family.4 Yet the parties have not provided this Court—nor has the Court found—an

analogous case providing any foundation for a comprehensive remittitur analysis.

Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that there is “no directly analogous case capturing the

breadth of [the Plaintiff’s] injuries, disability, and suffering,” and argues that the

Court should therefore evaluate each of her major injuries independently and

aggregate the quantum of damages. Louisiana law makes clear that this approach is

improper. See, e.g., Brouillette v. State Through Dep’t of Highways, 275 So. 2d 196,

199 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (where defendant/appellant filed motion for new

trial/remittitur and argued the court should divide the plaintiff’s injuries into several

categories and that the plaintiff’s damages should be the sum of the awards for the

individual injuries she sustained, court held that “[s]uch an approach has no basis in

law or in reason.”); Smith v. Harrah’s New Orleans Mgmt. Co., 213 F. App’x 353, 362

(5th Cir. 2007) (in assessing motion for new trial or remittitur, court found that

4 When considering damages, the Defendants urge this Court to strictly apply state

standards and contend that because the maximum recovery rule is not part of the new

trial/remittitur standard under Louisiana law, the rule should not be applied in this case.

However, as the Plaintiff argues, the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s

remittitur of a jury’s damages award using the maximum recovery rule. See Warner, 133

F.4th at 430.

Louisiana courts assess total damages in globo rather than piecemeal). And the

Defendants selected a case—Netecke v. State through Dep’t of Transp. and

Development, 715 So. 2d 439, 442 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Netecke ex

rel. DOTD, 747 So. 2d 489 (La. 1995)5—that is not sufficiently analogous for the Court

to conduct a meaningful remittitur analysis. Furthermore, conducting a remittitur

analysis using the Defendants’ preferred case would result in a damages amount less

than the Gasquet settlement. Plaintiff would therefore in all likelihood decline the

remittitur and opt for a new trial. See, e.g., Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d at 503.

Here, the jury awarded the Plaintiff $32,300,000 in lump sum general

damages.6 While “the ultimate determination [that the fact finder] abused their

‘much discretion’ as a matter of law is a judgment call,” Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc.,

341 So. 2d 332, 335 (La. 1976), the Court is mindful that it, too, has wide discretion

to order a new trial whenever prejudicial error has occurred. Op Art, Inc. v. B.I.G.

Wholesalers, Inc., 2006 WL 3347911, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2006). Upon thoughtful

consideration of the individual circumstances of this case, and a review of Louisiana

5 In Netecke, the plaintiff was hit head-on by a driver who crossed the center line of a

highway. Though there are some similarities in the injuries of both plaintiffs, including a

closed head injury and an amputation of a leg, 715 So. 2d at 442, there were significant

differences between the plaintiffs in terms of injuries and prognosis. In Netecke, the jury

awarded the plaintiff $400,000 each for physical pain and suffering, mental pain and

suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life, for a general damages award of $1,200,000. On

appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit held that $1,500,000 was the lowest reasonable amount

within the fact finder’s discretion to compensate the plaintiff for her loss of enjoyment of life,

while the other two categories of general damages remained unchanged. Id. at 448.

Therefore, the plaintiff was awarded $2,300,000 in general damages, resulting in an additur.

Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 500 (on appeal, only the percentages of fault of the defendants were

altered).

6 Although the verdict form does not delineate the categories of general damages, the

jury was instructed on the legal standards for pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement,

mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life under Louisiana law. [Doc. 207].

case law, the Court concludes that the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to

substantiate a general damages award of $32,300,000. For these reasons, and

because of the unique circumstances of this case vis-a-vis the terms of the Gasquet

settlement, the Court finds that a new trial as to the amount of general damages

recoverable by Plaintiff—and not remittitur—is appropriate.

Considering the foregoing,

ITIS HEREBY ORDERED that DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED RULE 50 MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, RULE 59 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL,

OR, ALTERNATIVELY, RULE 59 MOTION TO ALTER AND AMEND JUDGMENT [Doc. 223] is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants’ RULE 50 MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW is DENIED. Defendants’ RULE 59 MOTION FOR NEW

TRIAL is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial of this matter on the issue of general

damages is SET for March 2, 2026, and the pre-trial conference is set for February

4, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. No additional pre-trial motions will be filed by the parties,

however a new pre-trial order with all attachments shall be filed no later than

January 28, 2026. A Scheduling Order will issue under separate cover.

THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 29' day of October 2025.

Chord Cc Loop

DAVID C. JOSEPH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 11 of 11