Mean

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARNELL MEAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 23-cv-4011-DWD

SCOTT REIS, )

KRISTOPHER MUSTON, )

DAKOTA GOODWIN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Darnell Mean, a former inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and despite a notice about the obligation

to respond, Plaintiff has not responded. The time for a response has long since lapsed.

BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a petition for

mandamus relief, with the sole named defendant being the State of Illinois. (Doc. 1). The

Court reviewed the petition, dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction (Doc. 11), and granted

Plaintiff leave to file a § 1983 action if he felt he had relevant claims that could be

presented in that context. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 16, 2024, that

discussed many individuals but only named Pinckneyville Correctional Center in the

case caption. (Doc. 13 at 1). The amended complaint focused primarily on disciplinary

proceedings that were held at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, in relation to an event

with Scott Reis on November 13, 2023. The Court dismissed the amended complaint as

insufficient to state a claim for a variety of reasons. (Doc. 14). On May 7, 2024, Plaintiff

filed a Second Amended Complaint that named many defendants, including Scott Reis,

Officer Munch (now identified as Kristopher Muston), and Officer Goodman (now

identified as Dakota Goodwin). (Doc. 16).

Relevant to the present motion, Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that Reis

retaliated against him for filing a PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act) complaint on

multiple occasions. First, he alleges that on May 31, 2023, Defendant Reis confiscated a

special pillow that he had a medical permit to possess. (Doc. 16 at 11-12). Second, he

alleges that Defendant Reis confiscated two sheets that he possessed via a medical permit,

and Reis wrote a disciplinary report on July 25, 2023, related to the sheets. (Doc. 16 at 14).

Third, he alleges that on November 7, 2023, Reis instructed another officer to confiscate

his walker. (Doc. 16 at 15). Fourth, he alleges that on November 13, 2023, Defendant Reis

“carried out a premeditated retaliatory action,” by entering Plaintiff’s cell to confiscate a

sheet, and the engaging in a physical altercation with him. (Doc. 16 at 15-16). On

November 17, 2023, after being transferred to Pinckneyville, Plaintiff was served with a

disciplinary report about the incident with Reis. (Doc. 16 at 21).

In relation to Defendants Muston and Goodwin, Plaintiff alleged that on

November 12, 2023, they told him that Defendant Reis had “egregious intent” and was

coming for Plaintiff before he retired. (Doc. 16 at 15). Plaintiff faulted them for not doing

anything to intervene.

The Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on two claims related to these allegations,

and it severed many other claims into additional lawsuits:

Claim 1: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Reis

for taking Plaintiff’s pillow, his walker, and his additional

sheets (all of which were medically approved) in the Spring

of 2023 at Robinson, and for the physical altercation in

November of 2023;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment failure to intervene against Defendants

Muston and Goodwin for acknowledging Reis’s conduct

but failing to act.

(Doc. 19 at 8).

Plaintiff submitted many grievances as exhibits to his second amended complaint,

and the Defendants submitted many of the same grievances with their motion for

summary judgment. They also submitted a declaration from a member of the

Administrative Review Board (ARB)—Lisa Weitkamp—who reviewed grievance files to

locate any relevant appeals that Plaintiff lodged thru the final level of the IDOC grievance

process.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance, number 23-0775E, in relation to the

confiscation of his pillow, but he explains in his complaint that it was denied emergency

status. (Doc. 16 at 12). He alleges he then “rewrote” the grievance and resubmitted it.

The resubmitted grievance was assigned number 23-0842. (Doc. 16 at 48-51). In grievance

23-0842, Plaintiff wrote:

Originally written as an emergency grievance 23-0775E Rob, PP-19a of

being in fear here at Robinson Corr. Due to Lt. Reis confiscating my pillow

claiming it was altered because there is no plastic coating on it but I was

told the removal of it was optional. However, I have difficulty breathing

and was medically given extra pillow to elevate as opposed to lying flat a

code was called for me to be rushed to the infirmary by Officer Val and

Officer Neal who witnessed me nearly pass out in their presence trying to

explain the trouble I was having breathing. Being unable to lie down sleep.

Sgt. Stevens gave me an extra pillow the next day. How many pillows has

he taken in the past 6 mo. None! My pillow was taken in retaliation.” (Doc.

16 at 48-49).

In response, the grievance officer opined that a transfer to Lincoln was approved, per the

grievance log Plaintiff had not returned 23-0775E for further review, and there was no

support for the allegations of staff misconduct, so the grievance was denied. (Doc. 16 at

50). The ARB rejected the appeal of grievance 23-0842 on September 14, 2023, explaining

that it was inappropriate to refile the grievance instead of pursuing 23-0775E thru all

levels. Plaintiff was directed to finalize 23-0775E and to resubmit it “if within

timeframes.” (Doc. 16 at 51). Defendants argue that Plaintiff never resubmitted 23-0775E,

and thus never followed the appropriate steps to exhaust the claim against Reis about the

pillow. ARB member Weitkamp declared that she could not find any appeal of grievance

23-0775E, which was “submitted to the ARB during between May of 2023 and December

22, 2023.” (Doc. 52-1 at p. 5 ¶ 13).

As for the confiscation of sheets on July 25, 2023, Plaintiff submitted grievance

number 23-1408, complaining that he was improperly disciplined on July 25, 2023,

concerning excess bedsheets. (Doc. 52-2 at 9-10). Plaintiff’s original grievance did not

mention Defendant Reis by name, though it did allege the incident involved retaliation.

The grievance was focused on due process. The grievance officer’s response indicated

that the disciplinary report in question was authored by Defendant Reis. (Doc. 52-2 at 8).

The Administrative Review Board processed this grievance on the merits and returned it

to Plaintiff on February 27, 2024. (Doc. 52-2 at 7).

Plaintiff filed grievance number 23-1653E alleging that on October 17, 2023,

Defendant Reis retaliated by confiscating his walker. (Doc. 52-2 at 5-6). The grievance

office processed this grievance, and the ARB reviewed it on the merits and returned it on

March 15, 2024. (Doc. 52-2 at 3).

Finally, Plaintiff filed grievance number 4117-12-23 about his November 17, 2023,

disciplinary ticket, and the disciplinary hearing. (Doc. 16 at 61-62). The grievance was

filed at Pinckneyville and focused heavily on issues with the fairness of the disciplinary

hearing. Reis was not mentioned by name. The ARB ruled on the merits of the grievance

on February 27, 2024, directing a reduction of the disciplinary charge but making no

mention of Reis. (Doc. 16 at 84).

There are no records of grievances appealed to the ARB mentioning Defendants

Muston or Goodwin’s conduct on November 12, 2023. (Weitkamp Decl., Doc. 52-1 at p.

5 ¶ 12).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In

determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most

favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex

Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is

not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an

evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to

exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008).1 After hearing evidence,

finding facts, and determining credibility, the court must decide whether to allow the

claim to proceed or to dismiss it for failure to exhaust. Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004

(7th Cir. 2018). The court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if there is no

genuine dispute of material fact, and the determination is purely legal. See e.g., Walker v.

Harris, 2021 WL 3287832 * 1 (S.D. Ill 2021).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring

a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740. “The exhaustion

requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.”

Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). For a prisoner to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and

1 This case does not involve intertwinement as contemplated by Perttu v. Richards, 145 S.Ct. 1793 (2025).

at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,

1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the

administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024.

As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process

outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).

An inmate must file a grievance within 60 days of an event, 20 Ill. Admin. Code §

504.810(a), and generally, a grievance officer shall make a report to the Chief

Administrative Officer within two months of receipt of the written grievance, when

reasonably feasible, 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.830(e).

If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he can file an appeal with

the IDOC Director through the Administrative Review Board (ARB). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s

decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the responses from the grievance officer

and CAO to his appeal. Id.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff was notified of his obligation to respond to the Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 53) on April 3, 2025, but he did not file a timely response. On September

8, 2025, he transmitted a Notice of Change of Address (Doc. 57) and sought documents

from multiple cases. As to this case, he asked for a final order and instructions to lift a

stay. There have been no recent orders in this case, so there was nothing to transmit, and

there is no stay, so there was not a stay to lift. Given that Plaintiff missed the deadline to

respond by months without asking for an extension, the Court did not retroactively

extend Plaintiff’s deadline.

The record demonstrates that Plaintiff was well aware of the grievance process,

and that he regularly accessed it at all levels of review at multiple prisons to grieve issues.

Thus, Defendants have satisfied the initial burden to demonstrate that a grievance

process existed, and Plaintiff was able to use it to raise issues presented in this case. The

Defendants also carry the burden of establishing that Plaintiff failed to appropriately use

the process for claims in this case.

Defendants Goodwin and Muston have established that Claim 2 against them for

failure to intervene was not exhausted. Plaintiff made no mention of grieving this in his

second amended complaint, and he did not tender any grievances relevant to these two,

as he did with many other claims and defendants in his second amended complaint.

Defendants presented credible evidence via the declaration of ARB member Weitkamp

that no grievances were received at the ARB about Muston and Goodwin. Thus, Plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies for Claim 2, and it is dismissed without

prejudice.

Turning to Defendant Reis, Reis primarily argues that none of the grievances were

fully exhausted before Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in December of 2023, so Plaintiff is out

of luck because he sued first and exhausted later. This argument is unpersuasive in this

case given the nature of the original complaint, and the contents of the first amended

complaint. The Seventh Circuit has held that an inmate needs to complete exhaustion of

a claim by the time the claim is presented to the Court, but that if an amended complaint

adds a new claim, that new claim may have a different exhaustion deadline than the

claims associated with the initial suit. See Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005)

(finding that an inmate who initially filed an FTCA claim against the CDC, but later

amended to add Section 1983 claims against individual defendants, had to complete

exhaustion of the 1983 claims before amending his complaint, but not before he had filed

the entire action with the FTCA claims); Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719-20 (7th

Cir. 2005) (finding that additional 1983 claims added by an amended complaint were

properly exhausted where the inmate exhausted them after filing the lawsuit, but before

adding new claims and parties by an amended complaint). Here, Plaintiff’s initial suit

was a mandamus petition, and his first amended complaint focused on facts and a sole

defendant largely distinct from the claims and issues presented in the Second Amended

Complaint. The original complaint was filed in December of 2023, and Plaintiff pursued

exhaustion thru February and March of 2024. By the time Plaintiff filed his Second

Amended Complaint to designate novel claims against Reis on May 7, 2024, he had

completed exhaustion of all grievances he attached as exhibits to the amended pleading.

Under Cannon and Barnes, Plaintiff’s actions were sufficient to exhaust new claims

presented by his Second Amended complaint.

Thus, the Court must take a more detailed look at the four allegations against

Reis—confiscation of a pillow, sheets, and a walker, and the physical altercation.

Beginning with the walker, Plaintiff alleged in his Second Amended Complaint that the

walker was confiscated in retaliation on November 7, 2023, but the only grievance he

supplied about the issue cited an incident in mid-October of 2023. Without a grievance

specific to the November 7 incident, Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his claim about

the walker.

Second, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance about his pillow, grievance number

23-0775E, and when it was rejected emergency status, he re-filed a grievance via normal

channels. Reis argues that because the ARB rejected this as the improper procedure,

Plaintiff did not exhaust this claim, but this relies on an overly technical reading of the

rules. The Illinois Administrative Code, 20 Ill Admin. 504.840(c) provides that if a

grievance is deemed a non-emergency, then the inmate “may resubmit the grievance as

non-emergent, in accordance with the standard grievance process.” Defendant has not

provided any authority to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s resubmission on a new grievance

form of the grievance that got rejected emergency status was procedurally improper.

Although the ARB instructed Plaintiff that he should not re-file a duplicate grievance and

should have instead re-filed the grievance that got deemed a non-emergency, they also

pointed to no authority for this position. The view pushed by the ARB and Defendant

Reis is too narrow, and overly technical. Plaintiff complied with the Administrative Code

by re-filing a grievance when he was not afforded emergency review. This gave the

prison a full and fair opportunity to address his concerns, but they simply refused to do

so. Thus, the Court concludes Claim 1 was properly exhausted concerning the

confiscation of Plaintiff’s pillow in May of 2023.

As to the confiscation of sheets in July of 2023, the Defendant’s sole argument is

that Plaintiff did not fully exhaust this grievance before suing, but this grievance was

processed at the last level of review February 27, 2024, and Plaintiff did not add this claim

to the suit until May of 2024. Against this backdrop, the claim was fully exhausted before

it was added.

Finally, the Court considers Plaintiff’s allegation that Reis retaliated against him

by engaging in a physical confrontation on November 12, 2023. Plaintiff’s grievance

number 4117-12-23 talks about disciplinary proceedings that were later held at

Pinckneyville about this incident with Reis, but it makes no mention of Reis by name, and

suggests no intention to hold anyone at Robinson responsible. Substantively, the

contents of the grievance are focused on the Due Process afforded during Plaintiff’s

disciplinary proceedings at Pinckneyville. This is different from an allegation that Reis

acted out of retaliation at Robinson. Therefore, even though grievance 4117-12-23 was

properly exhausted, it is not substantively sufficient to exhaust the claim against Reis

about a retaliatory physical altercation.

In sum, Plaintiff properly exhausted his retaliation claims against Reis for the May

2023 confiscation of his medically-approved pillow and the July 2023 confiscation of

medically-approved sheets. By contrast, Claim 1 was not exhausted concerning his

walker or the physical altercation, and Claim 2 was not exhausted concerning Muston or

Goodwin.

DISPOSITION

The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52) is GRANTED in part, and DENIED

in part. Claim 1 is unexhausted as to the walker or physical altercation, and Claim 2 is

fully unexhausted. These claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust

remedies. The Clerk of Court shall TERMINATE Defendants Goodwin and Muston and

judgment shall be entered in their favor at the close of this case.

Claim 1 may proceed against Defendant Reis solely related to the May 2023 and

July 2023 confiscations of a pillow and sheets and a merits summary judgment schedule

shall follow.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2025

/s/ David W. Dugan

______________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge