Maney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEBORAH MANEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) NO. 3:25-CV-01127

v. )

) JUDGE CAMPBELL

A BLOND HAIRED LADY, et al., ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint

against “A Blond Haired Lady”, “Final Secret Service Secretary”, and attorneys Herzfeld,

Suetholz, Gastel, Leniski, and Wall, along with their paralegals and secretaries. (Doc. No. 1).

I. FILING FEE

Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP

Application”). (Doc. No. 2). The Court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying

the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915 is intended to insure that indigent persons have

equal access to the judicial system by allowing them to proceed without having to advance the fees

and costs associated with litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Adkins v. E.I.

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). Pauper status does not require absolute

destitution. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339; Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.

App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the relevant question is “whether the court costs can be

paid without undue hardship.” Foster, 21 F. App’x at 240. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a

privilege, not a right, and “[t]he decision whether to permit a litigant to proceed [in forma pauperis]

is within the Court’s discretion.” Id.

According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals $967 from

Supplemental Social Security payments, she is homeless and “trying to save up [for an]

apartment,” her monthly expenses total $750, and she has $1600 in a bank account. (Id.) Because

her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the full filing fee

without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is

DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under

§ 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any complaint,

or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a short

and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “liberal

construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing

Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v.

Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no obligation to act as counsel

or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). Nor are they “required

to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836,

837 (6th Cir. 2003).And pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011).

III. ALLEGED FACTS

As best the Court can discern,1 the complaint alleges that Plaintiff is employed by the

Secret Service, but she is not getting paid because Defendants stole her “employment number”,

causing her not to show up on the payroll. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff went into the law offices of

the named attorney and paralegal Defendants “to see if they would take [her] case.” (Id.) They told

Plaintiff not to come to their law office and “had (has) Secret Service agents in [undecipherable]

killed Secretary and [undecipherable] Secret Service.” (Id. at 3). They “trespassed [Plaintiff] off

[her] own job – threatened Secret Service agent to tell Police [Plaintiff] didn’t work there.” (Id.)

Plaintiff “want[s] [her] earnings” and “to go back on [her] job.” (Id. at 4).

IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT

After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds

1 It is difficult to distill Plaintiff’s handwritten statements into coherent narratives and causes of

action.

that Plaintiff's complaint cannot survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2).

Plaintiffs claims are subject to dismissal as frivolous or delusional. Plaintiff's bare-bones

allegation that she was hired by the Secret Service and performed work for the Secret Service for

which she has not been paid due to Defendants’ theft strains credulity. Her allegations that

Defendant attorneys and paralegals are responsible for the deaths of Secret Service employees

likewise strains credulity.

V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Plaintiff's in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal under

28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an

appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).

It is so ORDERED.

(ME Lob

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE