Maney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEBORAH MANEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 3:25-cv-01129

v. )

)

f/n/u BELL, Judge, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint

against Judge f/n/u Bell, Judge Rochell Rockill, McDonald Women’s Shelter, Glen Albetio, Birch

Courthouse, and Jane Doe, a division of “Counter Tatian”. (Doc. No. 1).

I. FILING FEE

Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP

Application”). (Doc. No. 2). The Court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying

the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915 is intended to insure that indigent persons have

equal access to the judicial system by allowing them to proceed without having to advance the fees

and costs associated with litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Adkins v. E.I.

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). Pauper status does not require absolute

destitution. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339; Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21

F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the relevant question is “whether the court costs can be

paid without undue hardship.” Foster, 21 F. App’x at 240. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a

privilege, not a right, and “[t]he decision whether to permit a litigant to proceed [in forma pauperis]

is within the Court’s discretion.” Id.

According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals $967 from

Supplemental Social Security payments, she is homeless, her monthly expenses total $750, and

she has $1600 in a bank account. (Id.) Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient

financial resources to pay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No.

2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under

§ 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any complaint,

or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a short

and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “liberal

construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing

Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v.

Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no obligation to act as counsel

or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). Nor are they “required

to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836,

837 (6th Cir. 2003). And pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011).

III. ALLEGED FACTS

As best the Court can discern,1 the complaint alleges that Judge f/n/u Bell declared Plaintiff

“incompetent” in a state court proceeding in Nashville. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). According to the

complaint, Plaintiff has never been before Judge Bell; she alleges “[t]hat’s funny the whole

incompetence pussy bey humor or the killing murder torturing.” (Id.) Plaintiff concedes that she

has a “mental challenge/chemical imbalance” but “as long as [she] can read write understand—

[she’s] good.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “try to embarrass [her] in front of

courthouse.” (Id.)

Judge Rockill and Glen Albieto “has [sic] no right labeling [Plaintiff] refusing [her] to

write up lawsuit at Birch Building.” (Id. at 4). “McDonald stopped an attorney from working for

[Plaintiff].” (Id.)

1 It is difficult to distill Plaintiff’s handwritten statements into coherent narratives and causes of

action.

The complaint asks for the terminations of Judges Bell and Rockill and Glen Albieto as

well as punitive damages. (Id.)

IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT

After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds

that Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2).

First, with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against state-court judges for decisions rendered in

state-court cases, Rooker-Feldman provides that federal courts are divested of subject-matter

jurisdiction in “cases where they are called upon to review state court judgments.” Johnson v. Ohio

Supreme Court, 156 F. App’x 779, 781 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 282 (2005)). In other words, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction

over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state court judgments,” id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted), and over claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with state court

judgments. Id. at 782.

This lawsuit, at least in part, appears to arise from state court proceedings before Judge

Bell.2 Plaintiff’s claims that she should not have been declared incompetent are inextricably

intertwined with Judge Bell’s decisions and hearings that occurred in state court. Thus, for the

Court to review Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims against Judge Bell, it would have to review

the reasoning behind the judge’s incompetency ruling and consider the judge’s conduct during the

state court proceedings. This is precisely the type of review prohibited by Rooker-Feldman.

In any event, it is well-settled that judges are immune from suit for money damages,

2 The Court understands Plaintiff to be referring to Davidson County General Sessions Division

VIII Judge Rachel L. Bell. However, the Court is unable to locate a judge named Rochell Rockill,

and the complaint does not allege any judicial actions taken by a Judge Rockill concerning Plaintiff

or any other person.

including actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of civil rights. Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2002). The act of

which Plaintiff complains—Judge Bell declaring Plaintiff incompetent—is quintessentially

judicial. Judicial immunity also applies to Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. See Ward v. City

of Norwalk, 640 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016).

As for the other named Defendants, the complaint does not allege that Glen Albieto or Jane

Doe are state actors subject to suit under Section 1983. The Court has been unable to locate any

individual employed by a Davidson County Court named Glen Albieto. Plaintiff’s failure to

identify a defendant acting under color of state law is a failure of the required “basic pleading

essential[s].” See Sango R. Ault, No. 1:14-CV-345, 2014 WL 1744726, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr.

30, 2014).

Moreover, there are no allegations in the complaint describing any actions allegedly taken

by Jane Doe. See Green v. Correct Care Sols., No. 3:14-cv-01070, 2014 WL 1806997, at *4 (M.D.

Tenn. May 7, 2014) (citing cases) (“It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual

allegations to particular defendants. Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation

of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal as to that defendant, even under the liberal

construction afforded to pro se complaints.”).

Finally, Defendants Birch Courthouse and McDonald Women’s Shelter are buildings, not

“persons” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Fuller v. Cocran, No. 1:05-CV-76, 2005

WL 1802415, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 27, 2005) (dismissing § 1983 claims against the Bradley

County Justice Center on the same basis); Seals v. Grainger County Jail, No. 3:04CV606, 2005

WL 1076326, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005) (“The Grainger County Jail, however, is not a suable

entity within the meaning of § 1983.”).

Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed on immunity grounds, for failure to state

claims upon which relief can be granted, and for failure to name Defendants capable of being sued

under Section 1983. Alternatively, the complaint must be dismissed as frivolous or delusional.

V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Plaintiffs in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal under

28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an

appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

WAVERLY D. Dit JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE