Clegg

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-00056-KDB-SCR

JEFFREY S. CLEGG,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND

ORDER

JACOB PRESNELL,

Defendant.

In 2024, Statesville, North Carolina police officer Jacob Presnell arrested Plaintiff Jeffrey

Clegg for fleeing the scene during a traffic stop. Clegg filed this action to assert a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 related to that arrest. Now before the Court is Defendant Presnell’s Motion to

Dismiss Clegg’s claim. (Doc. No. 8) The Court has carefully considered this Motion, the

Complaint and attachments, and the parties’ briefs in support and in opposition. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court will GRANT the Motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted” tests whether the complaint is legally and factually

sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th

Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 30 (2012). A court need not accept a complaint’s “legal conclusions,

elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Nemet

Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court,

however, accepts all well-pled facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor.

See Conner v. Cleveland Cty., N. Carolina, No. 19-2012, 2022 WL 53977, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 5,

2022); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).

In so doing, the Court “must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be

drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.

v. Beach Mart, Inc., 932 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2019). Construing the facts in this manner, a

complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 520 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft, 556

U.S. at 678). Thus, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines only whether a claim is

stated; “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability

of defenses.” Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).

When deciding a motion to dismiss, “a court considers the pleadings and any materials

‘attached or incorporated into the complaint.’” Fitzgerald Fruit Farms LLC v. Aseptia, Inc., 527

F. Supp. 3d 790, 796 (E.D.N.C. 2019) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448).

The Court may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss when they are “integral

and explicitly relied on in the Complaint,” and where “plaintiffs do not challenge [the document’s]

authenticity.” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606–07 (4th Cir. 2015).

Further, this Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a

less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);

King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal

construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts

which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements

under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 20, 2024, while on duty, Statesville Police Officer Jacob Presnell stopped Clegg

on Wilson Lee Boulevard. Doc. No. 1 at 4. According to Clegg, the stop revealed that his license

had been suspended for at least eight days, although he claims to have been unaware of the

suspension.1 Id. During the stop, Officer Presnell reviewed the license and returned it to Clegg,

who then drove off toward his driveway (which Clegg alleges was about 250 feet away from where

he was stopped). Id. Clegg does not contend that Officer Presnell permitted him to leave the scene.

Officer Presnell subsequently arrested Clegg and charged him with (1) “M – Flee/Elude Arrest

W/MV (M)” in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat § 20-141.5(A), and (2) “M – DWLR Not Impaired

Rev” in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-28(A). Doc. No. 1-1 at 2.

On April 14, 2025, Clegg filed this suit against Officer Presnell in his individual capacity

only, alleging he was falsely arrested for fleeing because he was only driving “about 15 miles an

hour,” although the police report states that he was driving ten miles per hour over the speed limit

at 35. Doc. Nos. 1 at 4; 1-1 at 3. On April 16, 2025, Clegg attempted to serve the Summons and

Complaint on Officer Presnell at the Statesville Police Department but was told by “Corporal

Turner” that the suit could not be accepted. Doc. No. 3. The next day, Clegg mailed a copy of the

Summons and Complaint to the “Chief of police of the Statesville Police Dept. [a]nd to Stephanie

Adkins, the lawyer for the Statesville [P]olice,” using the same mailing address. Doc. No. 4 at 4.

Both sets of documents were signed for by “Rodney Garner.” Id. On May 16, 2025, Officer

Presnell filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Clegg both failed to state a claim and properly

serve him, and Clegg timely responded. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for this Court’s review.

1 However, Clegg attaches to his Complaint a notification related to his license suspension.

Doc. No. 1-1 at 1. The notification is dated “04/15/2024” and warns him that “[e]ffective 12:01

a.m. 05/12/2024” his “North Carolina driving privilege is suspended indefinitely.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Because the Court favors resolution on the merits over procedural grounds, the Court will

focus its consideration on whether Clegg plausibly alleged a Section 1983 claim based on his

allegation that he was unlawfully arrested for fleeing a traffic stop. In order to bring a claim for

unlawful arrest, under either federal or state law, a plaintiff must allege that the arrest was made

without probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George’s Cty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007);

Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 213 (1988). Probable cause requires the Court to review the

totality of the circumstances and “is informed by the ‘contours of the offense’ at issue.” See Hupp

v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 291 (4th

Cir. 2001)). Probable cause exists if the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge

... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person ... in the circumstances shown, [to conclude] that the

suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo,

443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). “The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually

committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he is

arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest.” Id. at 36.

“In assessing the existence of probable cause, courts examine the totality of the

circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest.” Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 434

(4th Cir. 1996). “Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion,’ but requires less than

evidence necessary to convict.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). Also,

reasonable law enforcement officers need not “resolve every doubt about a suspect’s guilt before

probable cause is established.” Torchinsky v. Siwinsky, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991). Probable

cause is a “commonsense, nontechnical” concept that deals “with the factual and practical

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (internal citations omitted).

In North Carolina, it is a misdemeanor “to operate a motor vehicle on a street, highway, or

public vehicular area while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer who is in the

lawful performance of his duties.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141.5(a). In his Complaint, Clegg admits

that Officer Presnell was conducting a traffic stop due to his suspended license and that he drove

away from Officer Presnell despite knowing his license was suspended.2 While Clegg takes issue

with Officer Presnell’s report that he was driving 35 miles an hour (and not 15, as he alleges), that

dispute is irrelevant for purposes of a misdemeanor flee charge under the statute.3 Accordingly,

Officer Presnell had probable causes to arrest Clegg. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401(b)(1) (when

a criminal offense is committed in an officer’s presence, the officer may arrest the perpetrator

without a warrant).

But, even if the Court determined that Officer Presnell lacked probable cause for Clegg’s

arrest (which he did not), it would find that Officer Presnell has qualified immunity as to Clegg’s

Section 1983 claim. When, as here, a law enforcement officer is sued in his individual capacity,

he is “entitled to invoke qualified immunity, which is ... immunity from suit itself.” Cooper v.

Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013). “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit

constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that

2 Even if the Court assumes that Clegg didn’t know his license was suspended before the

stop occurred, he admits that Officer Presnell informed him of his suspended license. Doc. No. 1

at 4.

3 Plaintiff also claims he would have had to drive over 15 miles per hour over the speed

limit to be liable for fleeing, which the record shows he did not do. Doc. No. 1 at 6. However,

Plaintiff misstates the statute. Driving 15 miles per hour over the speed limit is one of several

factors–as is driving with a suspended license–that if present, can covert the misdemeanor of

fleeing into a Class H Felony. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141.5(b)(1)-(8).

their actions were lawful.” Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 214 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Henry

v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)). The doctrine balances two important values– “the

need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to

shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Fourth Circuit has stated:

The basic rules of § 1983 [qualified] immunity are well known. Underlying the

doctrine is a desire to avoid overdeterrence of energetic law enforcement by

subjecting governmental actors to a high risk of liability. The concerns behind the

immunity defense are especially salient in the context of street-level police work,

which frequently requires quick and decisive action in the face of volatile and

changing circumstances. The law thus shields police officers from civil liability

unless the officer reasonably should have known that his actions violated clearly

established constitutional rights.

Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

In carrying out the qualified immunity analysis, a court’s “first task is to identify the

specific right that the plaintiff asserts was infringed by the challenged conduct.” Winfield v. Bass,

106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th Cir. 1997). The court then engages in a two-step inquiry, asking “whether

a constitutional violation occurred” and “whether the right violated was clearly established” at the

time of the official’s conduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231; Melgar ex rel. Melgar v. Greene, 593

F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010). Courts have discretion to take these steps in either order. Id.

As discussed above, the Court finds that a constitutional violation did not occur, so it need

only further address the second alternate question. A right is “clearly established” if “the contours

of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526

U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). The inquiry into whether a right is clearly established must “be undertaken

in light of the specific context of the case” and “not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2001).

It is not required, however, that a court previously found the specific conduct at issue to

have violated an individual’s nights. Me/gar, 593 F.3d at 258; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct need only be manifestly apparent

from broader applications of the constitutional premise in question. /d. Put differently, a right may

be clearly established if a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law applies

with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question. E.W. by & through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884

F.3d 172, 185 (4th Cir. 2018); 4.G. v. Fattaleh, No. 520CV00165KDBDCK, 2022 WL 2758607,

at *8—9 (W.D.N.C. July 14, 2022).

With respect to his claims of false arrest, Clegg has not offered, nor has the Court found,

any authority that would clearly establish that a reasonable officer would have known that there

was no probable cause to arrest him under the facts alleged. To the contrary, as discussed above,

Officer Presnell had probable cause to arrest Clegg under the circumstances. Therefore, Officer

Presnell is entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity for Clegg’s Section 1983 claims based

on “false arrest.’

IV. ORDER

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED; and

2. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.

SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED. Signed: October 29, 2025

* Officer Presnell also alleges that the claim should be dismissed for insufficient service of

process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4; however, the Court need not reach the merits of

that argument.