The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2328-24
JEAN CLAU S. WRIGHT, a/k/a
JEAN CLAUDE S. WRIGHT,
JEAN-CLAUDE WRIGHT,
JEANCLAUDE S. WRIGHT,
JEAN WRIGHT, and
JEAN C. WRIGHT,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_________________________
Argued October 9, 2025 – Decided October 29, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk, Bishop-Thompson and
Puglisi.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Cody T. Mason, Deputy Public Defender II, argued the
cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public
Defender, attorney; Cody T. Mason, of counsel and on
the briefs).
Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C.
Josephson, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Jean-Claude Wright appeals from an April 2, 2025 final
decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) declining to address his
administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.
A jury convicted Wright of two counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A.
2C:15-1(a); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a); and
two counts of fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4). For
each robbery conviction, Wright was sentenced to eleven years in prison with
an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility term and a five-year mandatory parole
supervision (MPS) term, pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2. The sentences were imposed concurrently and the remainder of the
convictions merged into the robbery convictions.
On November 20, 2018, Wright completed his maximum term of
incarceration and was released to the custody of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). He remained in ICE custody until December 1, 2021, when
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he was released into the community and, according to the Board, began serving
his five-year MPS term.
On February 3, 2025, Wright's counsel emailed a Board staff member
inquiring about the commencement date of the MPS term. Wright argued the
MPS term should not have been tolled because ICE custody is civil detention.
He stated the MPS term should have expired on November 20, 2023, and any
extension of the MPS term beyond that date violated his constitutional rights
under State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533 (2021). Therefore, Wright requested the
Board recalculate the term and immediately terminate his MPS.
On February 5, 2025, a staff member from the Board's Legal Unit
responded to the email, explaining:
Regarding your inquiry as to the commencement date
of [Wright's] period of mandatory supervision, be
advised that the Department of Law and Public Safety-
Division of Law provided legal advice to the effect that
the period of [MPS] is to be served in the community
and that if an offender remains in custody following the
completion of a sentence imposed pursuant to [NERA],
whether the continued confinement is criminal in nature
or civil in nature is not determin[ative], the service of
the period of [MPS] remains tolled until the offender is
released to the community.
In another email sent that day, the staff member advised that the
Department of Corrections (DOC) was responsible for the calculation of an
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offender's MPS expiration date, not the Board. Thus, Wright's counsel was
directed to send any inquiries regarding the MPS expiration date to the DOC's
Classification Services office.
The next day, Wright's counsel emailed the DOC's Classification Services
office, reasserting the MPS term should not have been tolled during the period
he spent in ICE custody, and therefore, the term expired on November 20, 2023.
On February 10, 2025, the director of Classification Services responded, stating
the issue raised in the email was a question of "MPS application," not maximum
sentence date. The director acknowledged the DOC's responsibility to calculate
both the maximum release date of a custodial term and the expiration of an MPS
term, but the MPS expiration date "is contingent upon the Actual Supervision
Begin Date provided by the [Board]."
Wright's counsel again emailed the Board's Legal Unit staff member,
advising him of the DOC's position and seeking further review of the issue. On
February 21, 2025, Wright submitted an administrative appeal to the Board
reiterating his arguments: MPS commences upon the completion of a custodial
sentence; Wright was released from DOC custody on November 20, 2023; his
MPS term should not have been tolled during civil detention by ICE; and his
MPS term therefore exceeded the imposed sentence. Wright requested the
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Board correct the commencement date of his MPS term and communicate the
date to the DOC, which would result in immediate termination of Wright's MPS.
On April 2, 2025, the Board issued a letter decision advising Wright it
"declined to consider the merits of" the administrative appeal because "the
Board ha[d] no jurisdiction to consider" it. The Board noted the DOC was
responsible for computing an offender's maximum sentence date and MPS term
expiration date and instructed Wright to direct his concerns to the DOC.
This appeal followed, wherein Wright reprises the substantive arguments
he raised in his administrative appeal. Having reviewed the record and
considered arguments of counsel, we are convinced the Board erred in rejecting
Wright's administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
"Appellate review of a ruling on jurisdiction is plenary because the
question of jurisdiction is a question of law." Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super.
344, 358 (App. Div. 2017). However, review of the "'factual findings with
respect to jurisdiction' is only to determine if those findings are supported by
substantial, credible evidence in the record." Ibid. (quoting Mastondrea v.
Occidental Hotels Mgmt. S.A., 391 N.J. Super. 261, 268 (App. Div. 2007)).
In addition to serving a mandatory minimum term of eighty-five percent
of the sentence imposed, NERA requires a defendant to serve a five-year MPS
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for a first-degree crime or a three-year MPS term for a second-degree crime.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a), (c). The MPS
shall commence upon the completion of the sentence of
incarceration imposed by the court . . . unless the
defendant is serving a sentence of incarceration for
another crime at the time the defendant completes the
sentence of incarceration imposed . . . in which case the
term of [MPS] shall commence immediately upon the
defendant's release from incarceration. During the term
of [MPS] the defendant shall remain in release status in
the community in the legal custody of the
Commissioner of the [DOC] and shall be supervised by
the [Board] as if on parole and shall be subject to the
provisions and conditions of [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(b)].
[N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c).]
It is undisputed the DOC is responsible for calculating an offender's
maximum sentence date and MPS expiration date. However, the DOC's
calculation of an MPS expiration date hinges on an offender's actual supervision
begin date, which is determined by the Board.
Wright's administrative appeal asked the Board to "correct the start date"
for his MPS term to November 20, 2018, and to "communicate this updated
information to the [DOC]." This relief is within the Board's purview. Although
Wright contended the "correction" would result in the immediate termination of
his MPS, he did not ask the Board to recalculate his maximum MPS date, as that
is the DOC's responsibility. We are therefore persuaded the Board's rejection
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on jurisdictional grounds incorrectly construed appellant's administrative appeal
as challenging his maximum MPS date.
During oral argument, the Board conceded its interpretation was mistaken
and consented to a remand of the matter for consideration on the merits .
Appellant objected to a remand and urged us to decide the substantive issue
based on the alternative substantive arguments made in the Board's merits brief.
While we "ordinarily employ a deferential standard when reviewing a
Parole Board administrative determination in the specialized area of parole
supervision," Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 255 N.J. 36, 46 (2023), we
"review decisions construing a statute de novo, owing no deference to the
analysis" of the agency, State v. Cromedy, 261 N.J. 421, 430 (2025). Although
we are not bound by the Board's interpretation, we are nevertheless satisfied a
remand is appropriate in this matter to afford the Board the opportunity to
consider Wright's appeal on the merits.
We granted Wright's motion to accelerate this appeal and are mindful of
the constitutional rights implicated if, as Wright argues, he is subject to MPS
past his maximum date. Therefore, the Board must issue and file with the Clerk
a final agency decision within forty-five days of this opinion.
Reversed and remanded. We retain jurisdiction.
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