Opinion

Macias

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Oct 28, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.0%

“[U]ntil the defendants respond to the complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel... cannot be gauged.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[U]ntil the defendants respond to the complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel... cannot be gauged.”
  • finding that writing letters to the governor and other officials like the superintendent of prisons was insufficient to form a basis for Section 1983 liability because they are entitled to delegate the provision of good medical care to prison medical staff
  • state officials named in their official capacities may not be sued for monetary damages
  • “deliberate indifference may be found where an official knows about unconstitutional conduct and facilitates, approves, condones, or ‘turns a blind eye’ to it”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LUIS MACIAS,

#Y32629,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:25-cv-00810-SPM

v.

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,

ANTHONY WILLS,

LATOYA HUGHES,

J.B. PRITZKER,

CONNIE DOLCE,

NICOLE BRANDT,

KELLY PIERCE,

KEVIN REICHERT,

MOLDENHAUER,

JACOB GUETERSLOH,

DR. RITZ, and

JANE DOE 1,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Luis Macias, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is currently

incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff claims that he has been denied adequate medical

care for his ongoing side and shoulder pain. He seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.

The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant

who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth

Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that he has not been given adequate medical care for an undiagnosed

condition causing him side pain and shoulder pain while at Menard Correctional Center (Menard).

In the Complaint, Plaintiff states the following:

Beginning in 2019, Plaintiff began complaining to medical staff about pain in his side.

(Doc. 1, p. 8). One of his kidneys is smaller than the other, and Plaintiff believed at the time that

his kidney issues could be the source of his pain. Id. at p. 8. Prior to his transfer to Menard, while

he was at the Cook County Jail, his kidney condition had been monitored. Id. at p. 8. Medical staff

at Menard, however, did not order his medical records from the Cook County Jail and did not send

him to an outside facility “to check his kidneys.” Id. at p. 8. They simply gave him Tylenol. Id. at

p. 8.

It is not exactly clear when Plaintiff was seen by medical staff at Menard. At some point,

Plaintiff had an appointment with Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer, who told him that if his pain

became worse or persisted then he should submit a sick call request. (Doc. 1, p. 8; Doc. 1-1, p. 4).

Plaintiff also had an appointment with a nurse. (Doc. 1 p. 9). During the appointment, Plaintiff

told the nurse that he had a history of kidney problems. The nurse told Plaintiff to submit another

sick call request. Id. at p. 9. Plaintiff states that there is a policy in place that requires inmates to

be examined by a nurse at nurse sick call three times before they can be examined by a doctor. Id.

at p. 8-9. Plaintiff asserts that this policy resulted in a deliberate delay in his treatment. Id. at p. 9.

He states he was repeatedly treated by nurses at sick call who were unable to diagnose or treat him.

Id.

Plaintiff went to “several sick call sessions” from December 2019 through March 2020.

(Doc. 1, p. 9). In March 2020, labs were taken and an ultrasound on his kidney was ordered. Id. at

p. 9. The ultrasound, however, was denied by Dr. Ritz through the collegial review process because

of costs. (Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 1-1, p. 21). According to the exhibits, “Dr. Ritz, Wexford UM, and

Dr. Siddiqui…made an alternative treatment plan to check renal function onsite. Re-present with

any sign of impaired kidney function.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 21).

From 2020-2025, two CT scans and two ultrasounds were performed. (Doc. 1, p. 7, 10,

11). Plaintiff was told that he had a mass in or near his stomach, but he was never given any further

information about the mass or a diagnosis. Id. at p. 7. He remained in constant pain, and medical

staff did not pursue a different course of treatment. Id. at p. 10. Plaintiff continued to be treated

only with Tylenol. Id. at p. 11. Plaintiff was told that Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Wexford)

would not approve for him to be sent to a specialist or to be prescribed stronger pain medication.

Id. at p. 11.

Plaintiff’s right shoulder began to hurt him in 2023 when he would lay down in bed. (Doc.

1, p. 12, 20). He submitted “a few” sick call requests asking to be seen, but these requests were

ignored. Id. at p. 12. He was not called to sick call because there were not enough nurses due to a

Wexford policy of understaffing. Id. at p. 12. Plaintiff was told by Nurse Jane Doe 1 that sick call

requests were “backed up for 3 weeks or longer due to understaffing.” Nurse Jane Doe 1 was the

“(5) day a week nurse [who] could have performed her job [and] run sick call but she chose not to

do it.” Id. at p. 13.

Plaintiff saw Nurse Nicole Brandt on or around November 26, 2023. (Doc. 1, p. 20). He

informed Nurse Brandt that he had been experiencing stomach pain since 2019 and shoulder pain

since 2023. Id. He informed her that he had written grievances that were still pending and that no

one was checking on him or letting him know the results from any tests for his side pain. Id. Brandt

told Plaintiff that she would find out the results of his medical tests and call him back to sick call.

Id. She also said she would refer him to see the doctor or nurse practitioner. Nurse Brandt never

follow-up with Plaintiff, and he continued to have pain “in his kidney area.” Id. at p. 21.

Plaintiff wrote an emergency grievance about the delay in receiving treatment for his

shoulder pain and the undiagnosed mass and pain in his stomach that same day, on November 26,

2023, Grievance #K4-1123-1780. (Doc. 1, p. 12; Doc. 1-1, p. 12). Plaintiff’s right shoulder pain

had increased and especially hurt whenever his hands were cuffed behind his back. (Doc. 1, p. 13).

Although Warden Wills deemed Grievance #K4-1123-1780 an emergency shortly after

filing, Plaintiff did not receive a response until April 5, 2024. (Doc. 1-1, p. 14). In the response,

the director of nursing, Connie Dolce, stated that Plaintiff had “not been seen for the last two visits

that he was scheduled for. He has been scheduled to be seen by a Nurse Practitioner later this

week.” (Doc. 1, p. 15; Doc. 1-1, p. 14). Plaintiff, however, did not see a nurse practitioner that

week. (Doc. 1, p. 17).

Plaintiff also wrote another emergency grievance on February 15, 2024, Grievance #K4-

0224-1000, about the lack of medical care for his shoulder pain and undiagnosed mass and pain in

his stomach. (Doc. 1, p. 18). Plaintiff received a response to this grievance also on April 5, 2024,

and Connie Dolce again stated that Plaintiff had been scheduled twice but not seen by a medical

provider. (Doc. 1-1, p. 19). Dolce wrote that Plaintiff would be scheduled to see a nurse practitioner

later that week, but he did not receive an appointment. Id.

When Plaintiff was not seen by a nurse practitioner that week, he then wrote a third

emergency grievance on April 15, 2024, Grievance #K4-0424-1904. (Doc. 1, p. 22). Warden Wills

determined that the grievance was not an emergency, and the counselor wrote that the grievance

was a duplicate of Grievance #K4-1123-1780. Id. (See also Doc. 1-1, p. 5). Grievance Officer

Guetersloh recommended that the grievance be denied as a duplicate and not timely submitted to

the grievance office. (Doc. 1-1, p. 5). Kevin Reichert concurred in the recommendation, and

Menard staff did not take further action to resolve the ongoing denial of medical care complained

of by Plaintiff in Grievance #K4-0424-1904. Id. (See also Doc. 1, p. 26).

Plaintiff wrote letters to Director Hughes and Governor Pritzker informing them that he

was being denied medical treatment. (Doc. 1, p. 28). Pritzker’s office responded to Plaintiff’s letter

on January 23, 2025, informing Plaintiff that his letter had been received, and they were working

to resolve his issues. Id. at p. 29. (See also Doc. 1-1, p. 24). Plaintiff then received a letter from

Warden Wills on February 27, 2025, telling him that Governor Pritzker’s office had forwarded to

Wills Plaintiff’s letter concerning his medical care. (Doc. 1, p. 29; Doc. 1-1, p. 25). Wills informed

Plaintiff that “a provider has reviewed the results of your CT scan and you have been added to the

provider line to be seen for follow-up.” (Doc. 1, p. 29; Doc. 1-1, p. 25).

Plaintiff was then seen by someone, but he was not told what is causing his pain or provided

any information on the mass discovered in the CT scan. (Doc. 1, p. 30). He was also not given a

treatment plan for his pain. Id. Nothing was done to treat his shoulder stiffness and pain. Id.

Eventually, Plaintiff was sent to physical therapy. (Doc. 1, p. 31). One day, after

completing a session, when Plaintiff returned to his cell, his “shoulder locked up on him,” and he

was in more pain than before doing the physical therapy sessions. Id. Plaintiff’s fingers and hand

were tingling and going numb. Id. Plaintiff tried to continue doing his exercises and stretches, but

the pain continued and even increased. Id. Plaintiff explained these symptoms to the physical

therapist, but nothing was done. Id. Since the day that Plaintiff’s shoulder “locked up,” the pain

has become excruciating, and it is difficult for him to sleep. Id.

Plaintiff continued to submit sick call slips and sent a letter to Connie Dolce and Warden

Wills. (Doc. 1, p. 32). He also wrote again to Director Hughes and Governor Pritzker about not

receiving medical treatment for his shoulder and side pain/mass. Id. at p. 34. As of filing the

Complaint on May 1, 2025, Plaintiff has not received adequate care for his conditions.

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate the

following Counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., Anthony Wills, Latoya Hughes, J.B. Pritzker,

Connie Dolce, Nicole Brandt, Kelly Pierce, Kevin Reichert,

Moldenhauer, Jacob Guetersloh, Dr. Ritz, and Jane Doe 1 for

denying and/or delaying adequate medical care for Plaintiff’s

undiagnosed side condition and associated pain.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., Anthony Wills, Latoya Hughes, J.B. Pritzker,

Connie Dolce, Nicole Brandt, Kelly Pierce, Kevin Reichert,

Moldenhauer, Jacob Guetersloh, Dr. Ritz, and Jane Doe 1 for

denying and/or delaying adequate medical care for Plaintiff’s

shoulder condition and associate pain.

Count 3: Intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in violation of

Illinois state law against Wexford, Wills, Hughes, Pritzker, Dolce,

and Moldenhauer.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the

Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice

as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.1

Counts 1 and 2

To plead an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1)

that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition (objective standard); and (2) that

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

the individual defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition (subjective standard). Berry

v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010); Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir.

2011) (citing Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2006)). A medical condition is

objectively serious if “ ‘a physician has diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need for

treatment would be obvious to a layperson.’ ” Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir.

2019) (quoting Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)). To satisfy the subjective

component, a prisoner must demonstrate that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk

to inmate health. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Neither medical malpractice,

nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment will amount to deliberate indifference.

Id.

As to Defendant Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer, Plaintiff asserts that beginning in 2019

he complained to “medical staff” that he was having pain in his side that may be caused by his

ongoing kidney issues. (Doc. 1, p. 8, 11). He asserts that these complaints put Moldenhauer on

notice about his side pain. Id. At some point, Plaintiff was seen by Moldenhauer who told Plaintiff

that if his pain persisted or worsened, he should submit another sick call request. Id. Plaintiff claims

that after receiving the responses to his grievances from Connie Dolce on April 5, 2024, he wrote

more than once to Moldenhauer asking for a medical appointment, and he was never scheduled.

Id. at p. 19-20. Plaintiff claims that for years Moldenhauer ignored his complaints of pain,

continued to treat him only with Tylenol, and failed to provide and/or ensure he received proper

diagnosis and treatment for the condition causing his side pain. Id. at p. 11, 27. These allegations

are sufficient for Count 1 to proceed against Moldenhauer. Plaintiff does not assert any facts

regarding Moldenhauer’s involvement in the medical care for his shoulder pain, and so, Count 2

is dismissed as to Moldenhauer.

Count 1 will proceed against Nurse Brandt. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff saw

Nurse Brandt on November 26, 2023. (Doc. 1, p. 20). During his appointment with Brandt,

Plaintiff informed her that he had been complaining about side pain since 2019 and pain in his

shoulder since 2023. Id. He let her know that he was not receiving care, despite his ongoing

complaints and grievances. Id. Brandt told Plaintiff that she would refer him to a doctor or nurse

practitioner, look into what was going on with his test results for his side condition, and call him

back to sick call. Id. Brandt, however, did not call him back to sick call to explain his test results,

and Plaintiff continued to go untreated. Given that Plaintiff had been experiencing side pain for

over four years at that point, he had been told that he had a mass near or around his stomach area,

and he still had not been provided effective treatment for his condition, Brandt’s failure to treat

and/or act to ensure Plaintiff received medical care for the condition causing his side pain could

be characterized as “callous disregard” for Plaintiff’s wellbeing even though she and Plaintiff only

interacted on a single occasion. See Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F. 4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022). Thus,

Plaintiff has stated a claim against Nurse Brandt regarding deliberate indifference to the condition

affecting his side.

Plaintiff has not, however, sufficiently pled facts to support a deliberate indifference claim

against Nurse Brandt for his shoulder pain. He states that he started experiencing shoulder pain in

2023, he saw Nurse Brandt around November 26, 2023, and then was eventually sent to physical

therapy. (Doc. 1, p. 31). Although he states he told her about his shoulder pain during the

November 26 appointment, it appears that he takes issue with his side pain and that Brandt failed

to schedule him for a follow-up appointment concerning his test results and further treatment for

his side condition. Id. at p. 20. Plaintiff does not articulate the conduct he believes amounted to a

constitutional violation regarding treatment for his shoulder pain, and so, Count 2 is dismissed as

to Brandt.

Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Nurse Jane Doe 1. Plaintiff claims that Nurse Jane

Doe told him that the wait to be seen at sick call was three weeks or longer. (Doc. 1, p. 13). He

asserts that because Menard was understaffed nurses, including Nurse Jane Doe 1, would not

regularly “run sick call” resulting in his medical issues and ongoing side and shoulder pain not

being addressed. Id. The Court cannot infer from Nurse Jane Doe 1 telling Plaintiff that there were

long wait times for sick call and not regularly seeing inmates at sick call because of understaffing

that she knew of and disregarded an excessive risk specifically to Plaintiff’s health. Accordingly,

Counts 1 and 2 are dismissed as to Nurse Jane Doe.

Counts 1 and 2 will be dismissed against Dr. Ritz. Plaintiff claims that Dr. Ritz denied the

request for him to have an onsite kidney ultrasound in March 2020, and proposed an alternative

treatment plan in order to save costs, which resulted in further delaying necessary treatment. (Doc.

1-1, p. 21). He also claims that between 2020 and 2023 he had two ultrasounds and even after the

ultrasounds still did not receive adequate medical treatment from medical staff at Menard. Id. at p.

11. The few facts asserted in the Complaint do not support the inference that Dr. Ritz was

motivated by costs and acted with deliberate indifference in proposing to monitor Plaintiff’s renal

function onsite before performing an onsite ultrasound. Plaintiff ultimately received two

ultrasounds, and he does not allege any further interactions with or involvement in his medical

care by Dr. Ritz. There is no indication that Dr. Ritz was aware that Plaintiff’s medical conditions

affecting his side and his shoulder were going untreated. Accordingly, Counts 1 and 2 are

dismissed against Dr. Ritz.

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against Grievance Officers Pierce and Gutersloh

and Assistant Warden Reichert are also dismissed. These individuals were not personally involved

in Plaintiff’s medical care, and their only connection to Plaintiff’s claims is that they reviewed his

grievances. Reichert and Guetersloh reviewed and denied Grievance #K4-0424-1904 and Pierce

reviewed and recommended affirming Grievances #K4-1123-1780 and #K4-0224-1000. (Doc. 1-

1, p. 5, 10, 16). An administrative official who reviews an inmate’s grievances over the alleged

misconduct of another person is not “personally responsible” for the complained-of conduct and

does not incur liability in a civil rights case for reviewing or denying the grievance. Pierce,

Gutersloh and Reichert also cannot be held liable because of the length of time it took them to

respond to Plaintiff’s grievance. The Seventh Circuit instructs that the alleged mishandling of

grievances “by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states

no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson v. Anderson,

538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007);

Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). For these reasons, Counts 1 and 2 are

dismissed against Pierce, Guetersloh, and Reichert.

While a prison official cannot be subject to liability solely for denying or mishandling a

grievance, an official may be subject to liability if he or she is made aware of a specific

constitutional violation via detailed correspondences from the inmate and the individual declines

to take any action to address the situation. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781-82 (7th Cir.

2015). Simply put, a prison official may not escape liability by turning a blind eye to serious harms.

Id. at 781 (“deliberate indifference may be found where an official knows about unconstitutional

conduct and facilitates, approves, condones, or ‘turns a blind eye’ to it”).

Plaintiff claims that Warden Wills and Director of Nursing Connie Dolce were made aware

that he was not receiving medical treatment for his conditions causing side pain and shoulder pain

through both his grievances and letters. (Doc. 1, p. 29, 32). He informed Wills and Dolce that he

had not been seen by a medical provider, despite their memos/letters to him saying he would be

scheduled. Id. at p. 32. At this point, these allegations are sufficient for Counts 1 and 2 to proceed

against Wills and Dolce.

Plaintiff also sues Governor Pritzker and IDOC Director Hughes for deliberate indifference

to his serious medical needs. He states that he wrote them each two letters putting them on notice

that he was being denied care. A letter-writing campaign to high-ranking officials, however, is not

enough to hold them liable for discrete issues with a single inmate’s medical care. Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that writing letters to the governor and other

officials like the superintendent of prisons was insufficient to form a basis for Section 1983 liability

because they are entitled to delegate the provision of good medical care to prison medical staff).

See also Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s two letters to Governor

Pritzker and Director Hughes are not sufficient to establishing the level of knowledge of Plaintiff’s

complaints that could support a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical conditions.

Accordingly, Counts 1 and 2 are dismissed against Pritzker and Hughes.

In order to state a claim against a corporation, such as Wexford, for deliberate indifference,

a plaintiff must plead that the constitutional deprivation occurred as a result of [the corporation’s]

express policy or custom.” Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff claims that Wexford’s practice of understaffing the health care unit caused delays

in his care. (Doc. 1, p. 3-4). Plaintiff was told by Nurse Jane Doe 1 that he would have to wait to

three weeks or longer to be called to sick call because of understaffing. (Id. at p. 12). Plaintiff

asserts that he ended up waiting three to four months to be seen at sick call. Id. Plaintiff was also

told that he would have wait to see a doctor because there is not a full-time doctor at Menard. Id.

at p. 5. In addition to having insufficient nurses, there is only one doctor who comes to Menard

twice a month to provide medical care to over 2,000 inmates. Id. at p. 5, 12. Other than seeing

Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer when he first complained of side pain, it appears that Plaintiff did

not receive any follow-up appointments with a medical provider for his conditions, even after it

was determined there was a mass present near his stomach area. He also claims he never received

any follow-up care with a medical provider or nurse after his shoulder continued to hurt following

physical therapy. (Doc. 1, p. 32). Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against

Wexford in Counts 1 and 2 for understaffing the health care unit which caused unconstitutional

care for his side condition and shoulder pain.

Plaintiff will also be able to proceed on Counts 1 and 2 against Wexford for their practice

of instructing or training of medical staff to only prescribe over the counter pain medicine. (See

Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff claims that his pain continued to be treated with only Tylenol, despite its

ineffectiveness and that he was told that Wexford would not approve for him to have “anything

stronger.” Id. at p. 11. Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford based on

their medication policy that resulted in unnecessary prolongment his pain in his side and shoulder.

Plaintiff’s other policy claims against Wexford, however, are dismissed. Plaintiff states

that Wexford has several practices that result in delayed and deficient care. According to Plaintiff,

Wexford trains medical staff to engage in conduct that delays effective care such as treating

inmates as if they are lying and scheduling inmates for follow-up appointments that they know

will be delayed or canceled. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff also asserts that Wexford does not use

electronic medical records that would enable medical staff to easily track medical care such as

appointments, test results, and grievance responses. Id. at p. 4-5. Plaintiff states he was told that

Wexford has a policy in which they require inmates to see a nurse at sick call at least three times

prior to being seen by a doctor. (Doc. 1, p. 5). And finally, Plaintiff claims that Wexford’s collegial

review process is used to deny recommended treatment because of cost. Id. at p. 11.

Plaintiff does not provide “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference” that these practices or policies caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. McCauley

v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Plaintiff does

not allege that he specifically was treated as a malingerer during any of his interactions with

medical staff or that paper medical records were the reason he was not scheduled more quickly

with a nurse, provider, or specialist. He also does not present facts to support the conclusion that

Wexford’s three sick call policy contributed to his delayed care. He does not specify in the body

of the Complaint how many times he was seen at sick call prior to having an appointment with

Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer, but according to the exhibits, he was seen twice, not three times

(once for left side pain and then once of back pain). (Doc. 1-1, p. 4). Additionally, according to his

allegations, he later continued to be seen at sick call, more than three times, and still, he did not

have an appointment with a nurse practitioner or doctor, not because of a 3 sick call policy but

because of understaffing. (See Doc. 1, p. 9). Thus, he has not sufficiently pled facts connecting

how a 3 sick call policy caused his constitutional deprivation of inadequate medical care.

And finally, he does not connect the collegial review process to his own delay and/or denial

of care. As previously stated, through collegial review Dr. Ritz opted to “check [Plaintiff’s] renal

function onsite,” prior to performing an ultrasound. An ultrasound was performed later that year.

Id. at p. 11. Because Plaintiff’s assertions regarding these additional Wexford policies are

conclusory, they are improperly pled and dismissed.

Count 3

Plaintiff claims that Wexford, Wills, Hughes, Pritzker, Dolce, and Moldenhauer:

Turned a blind eye to the broken system of providing medical care to the inmates

housed at Menard and throughout IDOC have been made aware of the system being

broken with the class action lawsuit in Lippert v. Baldwin, that was originally filed

in 2010 and put these Defendants on notice that this environment existed and

instead of taking steps to fix these problems that are causing these breakdowns,

they have turned a blind eye to them and have allowed them to exist.

(Doc. 1, p. 35). He states that they knew that their inactions would cause him to suffer an

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at p. 6-7, 35.

Under Illinois law, to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff

must allege (1) the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the defendants

either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew there was a high probability that their

conduct would cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendants’ conduct in fact caused

severe emotional distress. McGreal v. Vill. Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 2017). See

also Bailey v. City of Chic., 779 F.3d 689, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2015); Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d

323, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (citing Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 761 N.E.2d 175 (Ill. 2001)).

Plaintiff’s assertions of intentional infliction of emotional distress are conclusory, and the

facts as pled do not describe any conduct on the part of Defendants that could be characterized as

“extreme and outrageous.” The Court cannot plausibly infer that because of a class action lawsuit

filed in 2010, Defendants knew there was a high probability that Plaintiff would receive deficient

care years later that would cause him severe emotional distress. For these reasons, Count 3 is

dismissed.

OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIM

Plaintiff brings his claims against Defendants in their official and individual capacities.

(Doc. 1, p. 36). To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief, Defendant Wills, the Warden

of Menard, is the most appropriate official capacity defendant. See generally Gonzalez v.

Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). Allowing Plaintiff to proceed with an official

capacity claim against the remaining Defendants would be redundant. Therefore, the official

capacity claims against these Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (state officials named in their official capacities may not be

sued for monetary damages).

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO ADD GRIEVANCE TO COMPLAINT

Plaintiff seeks to add an exhibit to the Complaint showing that he exhausted his

administrative remedies and placed Defendants on notice that he was not receiving adequate

medical care. (Doc. 12). The motion is DENIED. Plaintiff cannot amend the Complaint by adding

exhibits in a piecemeal fashion.

MOTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 2), which is DENIED.2 In

an attempt to find an attorney on his own, Plaintiff states that he wrote to over ten attorneys asking

for assistance, but he has not received any responses. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff provides copies of the

letters he wrote to four of the law firms. The Court, however, cannot determine that Plaintiff has

made sufficient efforts to find a lawyer based on this limited information. Thus, Plaintiff has failed

to meet his threshold burden of demonstrating attempts to recruit counsel on his own, prior to

seeking assistance from the Court.

The Court also finds that Plaintiff is capable of proceeding pro se, at least for now. Plaintiff

states that he needs an attorney to represent him because he does not know English well and is

relying on other inmates to draft his filings and explain court documents. He also does not have

access to an updated law library and the law library staff are not knowledgeable in researching,

civil procedure, or Eighth Amendment claims. Despite these obstacles, the Court will not recruit

Plaintiff counsel to represent him. This case is in the very early stages. Defendants have not been

2 In evaluating the Motion for Recruitment of Counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote, 503

F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) and related authority.

served, and extensive argument and legal research are not required. See Kadamovas v. Steven, 706

F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ntil the defendants respond to the complaint, the plaintiff’s

need for assistance of counsel... cannot be gauged.”). With the assistance of other inmates, Plaintiff

has demonstrated an ability to construct coherent sentences and relay information to the Court.

Plaintiff, therefore, appears competent to try this matter without representation at this juncture.

Once discover has commenced, if Plaintiff has significant difficulty, he may refile his motion.

Should Plaintiff choose to move for recruitment of counsel at a later date, the Court directs

Plaintiff to include additional information about his efforts, such as when he contacted each firm,

and also include supporting documentation, such as the letters from the attorneys who declined

representation or copies of his payment vouchers for postage.

MOTION TO CLARIFY

The Motion to Clarify is GRANTED. (Doc. 20). The case was reassigned to Magistrate

Judge Sison in error. The Notice Terminating Judge Assignment has been stricken, and this case

remains with the undersigned.

DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. COUNT 1 shall proceed against Wexford, Wills, Dolce, Brandt, and

Moldenhauer and is DISMISSED without prejudice against Hughes, Pritzker, Pierce, Reichert,

Guetersloh, Ritz, and Jane Doe 1. COUNT 2 shall proceed against Wexford, Wills, and Dolce and

is DISMISSED without prejudice against Hughes, Pritzker, Brandt, Pierce, Reichert,

Moldenhauer, Guetersloh, Ritz, and Jane Doe 1. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Because there are no surviving claims against Hughes, Pritzker, Pierce, Reichert, Guetersloh, Ritz,

and Jane Doe 1, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate them as defendants.

The Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 2) is DENIED. The Motion for Permission

to Add Grievance to Complaint (Doc. 12) is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Wexford, Wills, Dolce, Brandt, and Moldenhauer the

following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2)

Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy

of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as

identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons

(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take

appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant

to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his or her last

known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for

formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk.

Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Because this suit addresses medical claims, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the

standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability

Act.

Defendants are ORDERED to file an appropriate responsive pleading to the Complaint in

a timely manner and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants only need to respond to the issues stated in this

Merit Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs

under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, even though his

application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 28, 2025

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and

serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will

enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from

the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take

90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling

Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit

any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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