The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-1679
Filed: October 28, 2025
GALT AUTOMOTIVE WAREHOUSE,
INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
Lindsay S.C. Brinton, with Meghan S. Largent, Michael Armstrong, and Marlee L. Rowe, Lewis
Rice, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.
Alexis E. Smith, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Natural Resources Section, with
Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TAPP, Judge.
Plaintiffs seek damages for the United States’ uncompensated taking related to their New
York properties. They now move for partial summary judgment as to liability. (Pls.’ Mot., ECF
No. 23). The United States objects in part and cross-moves for partial summary judgment.
(Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 30). The United States first argues that genuine issues of material fact
exist for two (2) of the four (4) properties because Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate ownership of
property adjacent to and underlying the rail line; it also argues that none of the Plaintiffs can
establish causation. The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the two
properties and therefore GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Additionally, the United States’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
I. Background
This rails-to-trails case concerns a 41.1-mile section of rail line running from the
Connecticut/New York State Line to Beacon, New York across Dutchess and Putnam Counties
(the “Line”):
(Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1; Pls.’ Mot. at 1). In 1995, the Line was acquired by the Metro-North
Commuter Railroad Company (“MNR”). (Pls.’ Mot. at 1). Years later, MNR petitioned the
Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) for permission to abandon the Line. (Id. at 1–2). MNR
sought to preserve the Line for use as a recreational trail through 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) of the
National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (the “Trails Act”). (Id. at 2).
Under the Trails Act, a railroad may initiate abandonment proceedings of a rail line
before the STB. 49 U.S.C. § 10903; see 16 U.S.C. § 10502. The Trails Act permits intervention
by qualified private organizations or public agencies to preserve the corridor before
abandonment is consummated by agreeing to serve as a trail operator in the interim; this process
is known as “railbanking.” 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). The railbanking intervention process allows a
railroad to negotiate with the intervening entity, which assumes financial and managerial
responsibility for the corridor by operating it as a recreational trail. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6
(citing Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 6–7, (1990) (“Preseault I”)). To allow for this process, the
STB may issue a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (“NITU”). 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29. If
the railroad and trail sponsor agree, then the parties notify the STB, the corridor is railbanked,
the STB retains jurisdiction, and “interim trail use is thereby authorized.” Preseault I, 494 U.S. at
7 n.5 (1990); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(h). If an agreement is not
reached, the railroad may exercise its STB-granted authority to abandon the line. 49 C.F.R. §
1152.29(d)(1), (e)(2); see also Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. STB, 267 F.3d 1144, 1150–53
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
In December 2023, MNR filed a Verified Notice of Exemption of Abandonment
(“Abandonment Application”) with the STB. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. II, ECF No. 23-35). MNR also
formally requested to assume financial responsibility for the Line and requested a NITU, (id., Ex.
KK, ECF No. 23-37), which the STB issued on February 8, 2024, (id., Ex. MM, ECF No. 23-39).
2
Per the NITU, MNR was required to notify STB of a trail use agreement prior to its expiration on
February 8, 2025. (Id., Ex. MM at 3). MNR filed for and was granted an Extension of the Interim
Trail Use Negotiation Period, which is now set to expire on February 8, 2026. (Def.’s Mot. at 5
(citing Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 30-1)). According to the United States, MNR is currently
considering a trail use agreement, though none has been reached. (Def.’s Mot. at 6 (citing Def.’s
Mot. Ex. 2 at 5, ECF No. 30-2)). 1
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The parties each move for summary judgment. The Court may “grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Facts are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine factual dispute exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id.
While “inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,
655 (1962), summary judgment may still be granted when the party opposing the motion submits
evidence that “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251 (internal citation omitted). However, the moving party “need not produce evidence showing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact but rather may discharge its burden by
showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Dairyland Power Co-op. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). Courts may only grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party[.]” Matsushita, Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v.
Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). A trial court is permitted, in its discretion, to deny
even a well-supported motion for summary judgment if it believes the case would benefit from a
full hearing. Lowery v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 28, 37 (2023) (citing United States v. Certain
Real & Pers. Prop. Belonging to Hayes, 943 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1991)).
B. Discussion
In Trails Act cases, a taking occurs when “government action destroys state-defined
property rights[,]” either “by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is
1
Plaintiffs note that MNR has communicated its intentions of creating a public trail across the
former railroad easement and operating as both owner and trail sponsor in its filings with the
STB. (Pls.’ Mot. at 2–3). MNR recently stated that it is negotiating with the State of New York
to have the State operate as a trail sponsor for the trail. (Id. at 3).
3
Popova”), and Galt Automotive Warehouse, Inc. (“Galt”), the United States does not contest that
these Plaintiffs own land adjacent to a segment of the railroad corridor acquired as an easement.
(Id. at 11). However, it continues to dispute liability with respect to all four properties. The Court
examines each area of dispute in turn.
i. Causation
Because no trail use agreement has been reached, MNR’s intent to abandon is pivotal to
causation. The United States argues the Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that MNR would have
consummated abandonment of the rail line during the NITU period absent the NITU and thus
cannot establish liability for a taking. (Def.’s Mot. at 27–31). Furthermore, the United States
contends that the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Sauer West resolves the causation issue in
this case. (Hearing Transcript (“Hr’g Tr.”) at 4:15–6:11, ECF No. 46 (citing Sauer West LLC v.
United States, 151 F.4th 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2025)). The Court disagrees.
In Sauer West, the Circuit explained that determining whether plaintiffs have met their
burden to establish causation requires examining the totality of the circumstances. Sauer West
LLC, 151 F.4th at 1346. The Circuit discussed Caquelin, in which it found five factors were
sufficient to show plaintiffs had met their burden, including: (1) the railroad requested
abandonment; (2) the railroad refused to consent to an extension of the NITU; (3) the railroad
abandoned the line within three months of the NITU's expiration; (4) the NITU authorized
removal of tracks during the pendency of the NITU period; and (5) the railroad did in fact
remove tracks. Id. (citing Caquelin III, 959 F.3d at 1373; Memmer, 50 F.4th at 145 (comparing
different factors considered in Caquelin and Memmer)). The Circuit, however, pointed out how
in Sauer West, the Claims Court considered factors that went beyond those listed in Caquelin, to
include: (1) six one-year extensions to negotiate the trails agreement; (2) improvements to the
Line; (3) no removal of tracks; (4) railcar storage on the line; (5) negotiations with other parties
to reopen the Line, and (6) the eventual decision not to abandon. Id. (citing Sauer West v. United
States, 168 Fed. Cl. 49, 68 (2023)). In Sauer West, the trial court found that the plaintiffs had not
shown the railroad would have abandoned the line, and thus failed to establish causation. Sauer
West, 168 Fed. Cl. at 72–73. However, the Circuit’s holding in Sauer West does not stand for the
narrow proposition the United States advocates for; rather, it affirms that causation must be
assessed based on the totality of the circumstances. Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346. Ultimately,
the Circuit stressed that the cases discussed in no way establish a “multi-factor test[,]” but rather
illustrate examples of evidence the Court may consider. Id.
In Dimarino, a case centered on the same rail line, the United States’ arguments against
causation at the summary judgment stage were similar to the present case. Dimarino v. United
States, 2025 WL 2985487 (Fed. Cl. May 13, 2025). There, the United States also argued against
causation premised on the fact that MNR had not consummated abandonment, but the Court
explained that the purpose of the Trails Act is to “preserve the right-of-way for future use, and,
in the interim, convert the corridor into a recreational trail[;]” a railroad acting in accordance
with the Act’s stated purpose does not preclude the Court from finding a taking occurred. Id. at 3
(quoting Chicago Coating Co. LLC v. United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(internal citation omitted)). Stated differently, MNR’s failure to consummate abandonment stems
from its continued efforts to negotiate a trail use agreement, but this is a contemplated part of the
railbanking process and therefore not dispositive of whether a taking has occurred.
5
The United States argues the Court must look to the NITU period to determine when the
railroad would have abandoned, and not when the NITU issued. (Hr.’g Tr. at 13:11–20). In
Dimarino, the Court held that the “railroad’s intent at the time of the NITU is the focus of the
Court’s inquiry[.]” Dimarino, 2025 WL 2985487, at *2 (citing Sauer West, 168 Fed. Cl. at 63–
64, aff’d, 151 F.4th 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2025)). The Circuit has since clarified that while “the
railroad’s intent at the time of the NITU’s issuance is probative as to . . . whether it would have
consummated abandonment in the absence of the NITU, it does not establish causation[.]” Sauer
West, 151 F.4th at 1346. The Circuit’s explanation aligns with the Court’s analysis in Dimarino.
In Dimarino, the railroad had also taken additional steps that informed the Court’s decision. For
example, MNR filed an Abandonment Application, which the Court found demonstrated an
“affirmative intent to abandon[.]” Dimarino, 2025 WL 2985487, at *3 (quoting Caquelin, 959
F.3d at 1372). The Court also noted that MNR had repeatedly stated that it chose to abandon the
line due to a decreased demand for freight services. Id. The Court explained that MNR’s self-
expression of its intent to abandon, and the United States’ failure to rebut the presumption of
abandonment, left no doubt that a taking had in fact occurred. Id.
This case has facts very similar to those in Dimarino. First, MNR has filed an
Abandonment Application, reflecting its intent to abandon the rail corridor. Caquelin, 959 F.3d
at 1360. Second, MNR has, on several occasions, stated its intent to abandon the line to pursue
recreational trail use to the STB. (See Pls.’ Mot. Exs. KK, BBB, ECF Nos. 23-37, 34-2). Third,
when responding the United States’ Request for Production of Documents, MNR stated that it
“chose to abandon the line” due to diminished demand for freight services. (Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2 at
12, ECF No. 30-2). 2 While MNR has sought and obtained a one-year extension, the United
States acknowledges that MNR has also discontinued service of the rail line. (Hr.’g Tr. at 6:18–
7:10 (The Court: “It just seemed like you were sort of qualifying perhaps that, well, there’s some
type of service, but not another, but there’s no service.” Def.’s Counsel: “No service. Correct,
Your Honor”). Additionally, the United States has neither argued nor produced any evidence that
the rail line is being used for any purpose or undergone any sort of maintenance or
improvements, despite Plaintiffs’ allegations that the line has not been utilized in over twenty
years. (Hr.’g Tr. at 11:13–14 (Pls.’ Counsel: “They haven’t used it in [twenty]-plus years.
There’s no traffic.”)).
The Court finds that the United States has failed to present “any evidence at all
affirmatively indicating the railroad would have delayed abandonment . . . had there been no
NITU[.]” Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have shown that MNR
would have abandoned the rail line in absence of the NITU. MNR’s intent to abandon the rail
line is evident from its own representations. (See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2 at 12). The United States
failed to rebut this presumption and failed to advance any significant argument addressing
liability during the hearing. For this reason, on the element of causation, the Court rules against
the United States and in favor of Plaintiffs Bernard R. Liegel, Irene Popova, and Galt
Automotive Warehouse, Inc. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by these Plaintiffs is
granted as to causation. However, as discussed below, because the issue of interest remains
2
The United States’ Exhibit 2 contains two documents with varying page numbers, thus this
citation refers to those assigned by CM/ECF.
6
(Def.’s Mot. at 14–16). Therefore, the United States argues that it is impossible for the Kelly
property to be adjacent to the railroad unless Plaintiffs can prove that “they [also] own the land
on which Main Street is located[.]” (Id. at 14–15).
Plaintiffs reject this argument and claiming the original valuation map shows that, in
1868, Main Street “terminated and curved” just short of the Kelly property, as illustrated below:
(Pls.’ Reply. at 6, ECF No. 34 (indicating the Kelly property with a yellow star); Hr.’g Tr. at
15:18–20). Based on the valuation map, Plaintiffs argue that Main Street could not possibly
intervene between the railroad and the Kelly property, and that it confirms Plaintiffs acquired
“land on both sides of where modern-day Main Street now runs[.]” (Pls.’ Reply. at 6–7).
Despite Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, the United States maintains that the Kelly
Plaintiffs’ focus on whether Main Street curved in 1868 distracts from the more important
point—that a road existed at that time, even if its name later changed. (Compare Hr’g Tr. at
27:5–7 (Def.’s Counsel: “[W]hat matters here is that there was a road, not the name of said
road.”), with Hr’g Tr. at 29:18–21 (Pls.’ Counsel: “[T]here is no road delineated in that area . . .
that’s just a part of the parcel moving forward and a part of the tracks.”)). Furthermore, the
parties utilized different versions of modern map overlays to support their respective positions.
(See Pls.’ Reply at 7; Def.’s Reply at 7, ECF No. 41). Clearly, the existence of an intervening
road is a disputed fact in this case that cannot be definitively resolved from the evidence
currently before the Court. These types of factual inquiries are plainly better suited for resolution
at trial. See Lowery, 167 Fed. Cl. at 37.
Second, the United States argues that the deed by which the Kelly Plaintiffs acquired the
property at 590 Main Street defines the boundaries as running “along the northernly lines of
Main Street . . . which is the edge of the road nearest to the house on the Kelly [p]roperty.”
(Def.’s Mot. at 15 (citing Pls.’ Mot. Ex. PP (John Kelly and Zoe Markwalter-Kelly Deed, dated
8
July 1, 2009 (“the Kelly Deed”)), ECF No. 23-42)). The United States claims that this language
clearly establishes that the Kelly property abuts Main Street. (Id.). To that end, the United States
further highlights that the Kelly Deed specifically states that “TOGETHER with all right, title
and interest, if any, of the party of the first part in and to any streets and roads abutting the above
described premises to the center lines thereof . . . .” (Id. (quoting Pls.’ Mot. Ex. PP) (emphasis in
original)). On the other hand, Plaintiffs argue that the Kelly Deed is largely immaterial because it
attempts to impose modern street layouts onto an 1868 condemnation. (Pls.’ Reply at 8). Even if,
as the United States suggests, the Court were to consider the language seemingly defining the
property as running along the “northernly lines of Main Street[,]” this deed is dated
“09/18/2009[,]” thus it is unclear what version of Main Street the deed contemplates. (See Pls.’
Mot. Ex. PP). Again, these assertions raise factual issues that the Court is unable to resolve at
this stage.
The United States’ final argument requests that the
Court again examine the 1868 valuation map and the
condemnation proceedings description of the boundaries.
(Def.’s Mot. at 17 (citing Pls.’ Mot. Ex. J and Def.’s Mot.
Ex. 3)). As previously discussed, the 1868 valuation
map’s implications remain a disputed issue requiring
further factual development. Additionally, the
condemnation proceedings document accompanies the
valuation map and describes the boundaries of the
condemnation. (Def.’s Mot. at 17; Pls.’ Reply at 7–8).
However, this document presents its own unique issues,
namely that significant portions of it are largely illegible.
(See Def.’s Mot. Ex. 3). The Court asked, and the United
States confirmed, that the Parties have not reached any
agreement regarding the proper translation of this
document. (Hr.’g Tr. at 24:23–25:1 (The Court: “[D]o you
all have an agreement about what this document, how it
translates into modern prose?” Def.’s Counsel: “I don’t
believe so.”)). This document does little more than present Example of Def.’s Mot. Ex. 3
additional questions that the Court is not postured to resolve on summary judgment. (Hr.’g Tr. at
24:18–20 (The Court: “[U]nless the Plaintiff agrees with you that your translation is correct, I
can’t make a determination from this document.”)). Because there are genuine issues of material
fact regarding the Kelly property’s adjacency to the railroad and ownership interest, the Court
cannot find summary judgment for either party at this time.
Turning now to the Church property, there is no dispute regarding the Church’s
adjacency to MNR’s property. (Def.’s Mot. at 19). Instead, the United States disputes the nature
of MNR’s ownership, asserting that the land was acquired in fee, instead of an easement for
railroad purposes. (Id.). The United States bases this argument on the theory that the railroad
acquired the land for “rail depot purposes[,]” and that land acquired by a railroad for depot
purposes is necessarily acquired in fee under New York law. (Id. at 19–21). The natural question
following such an assertion is how does one know for certain that the railroad did in fact acquire
the land for depot purposes? The United States asserts that this can determined by three factors:
9
(1) the rail corridor’s irregular shape; (2) the proximity of the rail corridor to a rail depot; and (3)
language in the condemnation proceedings. (Id. at 21).
First, the United States claims the rail corridor is irregular because it “bulges
approximately [thirty] feet from the width of the rest of the corridor.” (Def.’s Mot. at 21).
(Id. at 21–22 (including image 2a as depicting the “bulge” in question.). The United States
asserts that, because other portions of the rail line do not contain a similar bulge, this supports
the conclusion that the “extra land” was acquired for depot purposes. (Id.). The Court is not
persuaded by this reasoning. Based on the evidence currently before the Court, there is no clear
standard for what constitutes a “regular” versus “irregular” shape in the context of a rail corridor.
While the images provided may depict a “bulge,” they represent only a small segment of a rail
line that extends over forty miles. The Court also notes that similar protrusions—such as the one
shown—may occur throughout the line and may simply reflect the established property
boundaries, rather than serving as evidence of a depot or other special use. Accordingly, the
Court is not convinced, on these facts alone, that the images demonstrate the land is irregularly
shaped—let alone that the land was acquired in fee.
Next, the United States argues that the land originally
acquired by the railroad, within the vicinity of the Church
property, was used for a depot. (Def.’s Mot. 23). The United
States bases much of this argument on the existence of a
building known as the Matteawan Railroad Station Depot.
(Id.). This building, of which the United States provides
several historical photographs, supposedly constitutes proof
that the land was condemned for rail depot purposes. (Id. at
22–23 (Def.’s Mot. Ex. 6, ECF No. 30-6)). The United States
goes on to claim that the valuation map shows the Church
property was “less than 50 feet” from Matteawan Railroad
Station, which supports their conclusion that the railroad
“condemned all of this additional land outside of the strip
where its rail line was located for rail depot and related infrastructure purposes.” (Id. at 23–24).
10
The United States provided the following images to “depict the Church outlined in yellow and
Matteawan Railroad Station Depot outlined in orange:”
(Id. at 24 (citing Pls.’ Mot. Ex. O, ECF No. 23-15).
These assertions—like the irregularly shaped rail corridor theory—suffer from the same
flaw: they ask the Court to accept the United States’ claims as fact, despite credible evidence to
the contrary. While the photographs of the Matteawan Railroad Station Depot confirm that the
building existed, the Court does not agree that its mere presence proves the surrounding land was
condemned for depot purposes. Furthermore, the United States’ suggestion that the Church’s
proximity to the depot necessarily means all adjacent land was condemned for depot use is a
stretch. In fact, Plaintiffs point out that the very valuation map relied upon by the United States
identifies “the depot and its supporting infrastructure” as parcels of land separate from that of the
Church. (Pls.’ Reply at 9). Plaintiffs also point out that the valuation map indicates that the
Church property was acquired through condemnation, while the depot and surrounding land were
acquired by quitclaim deed—almost a decade and a half later. (See Pls.’ Reply at 9 (citing Pls.’
Mot. Ex. O)). Plaintiffs’ objections raise additional unanswered questions that necessarily
preclude summary judgment in this regard for either party.
Finally on this prong, the United States encourages the Court to observe other
surrounding buildings as historical evidence in support of its theory, to include what it claims are
four cement silos to the south of the property. (Id. (citing Def.’s Ex. 8, ECF No. 30-8)). The
United States’ argument that surrounding buildings support a finding that the land was
condemned for depot purposes is unconvincing. In its briefing, the United States represented that
there were four silos located near the church. (See Def.’s Mot. at 24 (“[T]here are four large
cement silos located . . . just south of the Church property.”). During a hearing on this matter, the
United States presented aerial imagery and stated that there were only two silos reflected, in
contradiction to their briefing:
Def.’s Counsel: “[T]here are kind of two round circular cylinder-like
structures. There's a structure with two kind of, almost looks like a blob.”
11
The Court: “Yes, blob is a good description.”
Def.’s Counsel: “Yes, sorry, I apologize. That is the coal silos.”
The Court: “I thought there were three.”
Def.’s Counsel: “No, there are two. Two coal silos.”
(Hr.’g Tr. 34:20–35:2). Even still, the Court was unable to clearly identify the silos. (Hr.’g Tr. at
41:22–25 (The Court: “I can’t tell from looking at the photographs, those may be silos, best
described in the photographs as a blob, your original word.”)). Plaintiffs objected, claiming the
silos were constructed almost 70 years after the condemnation with the purpose of heating homes
and businesses. (Hr.’s Tr. at 44:20–45:1). While the United States attempts to frame these issues
as questions of law, significant questions of fact remain—factual conflicts that must be resolved
before summary judgment can be granted.
Finally, the United States argues that the condemnation proceedings do not contain any
language indicating that the railroad acquired only a right-of-way in the rail corridor. (Def.’s
Mot. at 25 (citing Pls.’ Mot. Exs. P, ECF No. 23-16 and O)). However, like the Kelly property,
the document cited by the United States contains a mixture of typed and handwritten text. (See
Pls.’ Mot. Ex. P). Much of the handwritten portion is difficult, if not impossible, to read. The
parties have not indicated any agreement regarding the proper interpretation or translation of this
document, and the Court declines to undertake that task on its own. In short, the illegibility of the
document and the lack of consensus between the parties underscore that material factual disputes
remain.
The United States raises one final argument
disputing ownership of the paved parking lot behind the
Church. (Def.’s Mot. at 26). Based on certain images,
the United States argues that the lot appears to be on
MNR’s land adjacent to the rail corridor, which
precludes summary judgment in the Church Plaintiffs’
favor. (Id. at 26 (providing overhead photo, Figure 4,
showing the subject parking lot)). Additionally, the
United States argues that Plaintiffs failed to produce a
license, lease, or other written document authorizing
them to utilize the paved area, and if no such document
exists, the existence and use of the lot implies that if
MNR acquired an easement to operate the rail corridor,
that easement is not an exclusive use easement.” (Id. at 26–27). In their Reply, Plaintiffs first
argue that Figure 4 comes from county tax parcel data that also includes disclaimers stating the
12
information therein is not accurate for legal purposes. (Pls.’ Reply at 10). Plaintiffs also attach a
licensing agreement. (Pls.’ Reply (citing Pls.’ Reply Ex. AAA, ECF No. 34-1)). 4
There is a clear disagreement regarding the accuracy of the information obtained from the
county tax parcel data, this is problematic for the United States, as its argument relies primarily
on this data. On the other hand, as the United States points out, the license produced by the
Plaintiffs lacks indicia of a properly executed agreement. Neither Plaintiff nor the United States
has provided proof of ownership such that there can be no genuine issue of material fact. The
Court is unable to determine ownership of the lot. Ownership of the parking lot by the Church
remains a disputed issue not amenable to resolution on summary judgment.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Bernhard R. Liegl, Irene
Popova, and Galt Automotive Warehouse, Inc. have established both a property interest and
causation. However, Plaintiffs John Kelly, Zoe Markwalter-Kelly, and the Spanish Pentecostal
Church, The Tabernacles of Christ Beacon NY, Inc., have not proven a property interest and thus
cannot establish causation. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF
No. 23), is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. Additionally, the United States’
Cross-Motion, (ECF No. 30), is DENIED.
Recognizing that the two groups of Plaintiffs will be in different procedural postures, the
Court hereby ORDERS the Parties to meet and confer, and to submit a Joint Status Report by
November 18, 2025, outlining a proposed schedule for pretrial proceedings, including a site visit
and trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ David A. Tapp
DAVID A. TAPP, Judge
4
The United States disputes the authenticity of this license, pointing out that it is neither signed,
dated, nor notarized and therefore unexecuted. (Def.’s Reply at 12–13, ECF No. 41). The United
States also argues that the purported license weakens the Church’s ownership claims because if
the Church owned the lot in fee, a license would be unnecessary. (Id.). Allegedly, during
depositions, the Church maintained it did not have a signed copy of the license. (Id.). Therefore,
the United States believes the Church concedes it does not have title to the parking lot. (Id.).
13