RUTALA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OSCEOLA WILLIAMS, CIVIL ACTION

SUSAN CARTER and

OSCEOLA PERDUE, as Co-

Administrators of the Estate of

ALEXANDER McCLAY WILLIAMS,

Deceased, NO. 24-2132

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOSEPH RUTALA, ESQUIRE, as the

Administrator of the Estate of OLIVER N.

SMITH, Deceased, and as the

Administrator of the Estate of MICHAEL

TRESTRALL; MARK HALPERN, as

Administrator of the Estate of LOUIS A.

BLOOM, Deceased; and DELAWARE

COUNTY,

Defendants.

HODGE, J. October 24, 2025

MEMORANDUM

As this Court has previously stated, this case arises out of tragic circumstances: a falsely

accused child, police misconduct, coerced confessions, and the Commonwealth’s undisputed

wrongs. In 1931, Alexander McClay Williams (“Alexander”1), a sixteen-year-old Black boy, was

wrongfully tried, convicted, and executed for the murder of a white woman. In 2022, due to tireless

advocacy of the Williams family and the great-grandson of Alexander’s trial attorney, Delaware

County and the Governor of Pennsylvania acknowledged the horror of what had happened, and

1 The Amended Complaint (ECF No. 25) and Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 26) refer to Alexander

McClay Williams as Alexander. The Court adopts this usage.

Alexander’s conviction was vacated. Now, Alexander’s estate (the “Estate”) seeks damages for

the constitutional violations he endured—as conceded by the Delaware County District Attorney—

and the harm his family suffered as a result. The Estate has brought claims against Delaware

County and three individual defendants (collectively “Defendants”) for civil rights violations

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state causes of action. Defendants now seek to dismiss

Counts I and II (against all Defendants), Counts III, V, VIII, and XI (against the three individual

defendants), and Count X against Delaware County. For the reasons that follow, Counts V and

VIII are dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Individual Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity for claims involving the Fourth Amendment and fabrication of evidence in

Counts III and IV. The Motion is otherwise denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background2

On October 3, 1930, Vida Robare (“Robare”) was fatally stabbed in her apartment at the

Glen Mills School3 in Delaware County. (ECF No. 25 at ¶ 28.) Robare was a 34-year-old woman

who worked as a school matron at the Glen Mills School. (Id.) There were no witnesses to the

stabbing, and no one was seen leaving the apartment building. (Id. ¶ 33.) Robare lived with her

husband, Fred, and her ten-year-old son, Dale, in Cottage Five at the Glen Mills School, where

2 The facts as pled in the Amended Complaint are the operative facts for the 12(b)(6) motion. The

Court declines to consider Defendants’ summary of the 1931 trial. While the Court may consider

an undisputed authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a 12(b)(6) motion if

plaintiff’s claims are based on the document, Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,

Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); Levins v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp. LLC, 902

F.3d 274, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2018), it is not necessary to consider the 1931 trial transcript at this

stage. Further, given the Estate’s allegations of false testimony at trial, the Court is reluctant and

therefore will not consider the entire trial transcript as factually accurate.

3 The Amended Complaint mistakenly identifies the school as the Glenn Mills School. The Court

has corrected the spelling of the school to the Glen Mills School. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 25-2, 25-3,

25-4 (identifying the school as the Glen Mills School).

forty-eight Glen Mills students also lived. (Id. ¶ 35.) The Glen Mills School housed 600 boys in

total; these boys were referred to as “inmates.” (Id.)

The murder prompted media attention. On October 4, 1930, the Chester Times quoted

Chief County Detective Oliver Smith (“Smith”) saying that the crime was committed by a strong,

full-grown man, and that the victim was fit enough to have fought off a boy. (Id. ¶ 36.) Another

witness stated that all 600 Glen Mills School students were accounted for at the time of the murder.

(Id.) On October 7, the Chester Times quoted the District Attorney as saying that the murderer

may have been a woman. (Id. ¶ 39.) Then, on October 10, the Chester Times reported that assistant

district attorneys and detectives had decided to question Alexander, a Glen Mills Student. (Id.

¶ 40.) Alexander initially denied involvement in the murder, but over the course of at least five

interrogations conducted over only a few days, each without an attorney or parent present, he

confessed to the crime. (Id. ¶¶ 40–41; ECF No. 25-3 at 12–13.)4 The newspaper wrote that

Alexander made three separate confessions: twice on October 7, 1930, and again on October 9,

1930. (ECF No. 25 at ¶ 40.) It appears that as of October 7, 1930, the only suspect the district

attorney was considering was Alexander. (Id. ¶ 50.)

The only evidence against Alexander was his confession; there was no physical evidence

tying him to the murder. (Id.) Smith, Detective Michael Trestrall (“Trestrall”), and Assistant

District Attorney Louis Bloom (“Bloom”) were personally involved in the investigation of

Alexander; Smith and Bloom also directly supervised investigative acts taken by detectives. (Id. ¶

139.) Smith, Trestrall, and Bloom knew not only that they had no evidence to reasonably believe

Alexander committed the crime (id. ¶ 42), but that there was no probable cause to arrest him or

charge him with murder (id. ¶ 43). Additionally, the three men withheld from Alexander’s counsel

4 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

all evidence of the circumstances of their interrogations of Alexander leading to his coerced, false

confessions. (Id. ¶ 44.) Alexander’s trial took place in January 1931. (Id. ¶ 45.) He was represented

by William H. Ridley, Esq. (“Ridley”), the first African American lawyer to join the Delaware

County Bar Association. (Id. ¶ 43.) During the trial, Trestrall falsely testified that Alexander had

admitted to him that he kicked Robare in the ribs during the assault. (Id. ¶ 46.)

On January 7, 1931, Alexander was found guilty and sentenced to death. (Id. ¶ 47.) His

attorney moved for a new trial, but the motion was denied. (Id. ¶ 48.) The Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania executed Alexander on June 8, 1931 in the electric chair. (Id. ¶ 49.) Alexander’s

death certificate was altered so that his age was recorded as eighteen—an adult—rather than the

sixteen-year-old child he actually was. (Id. ¶ 88.) Notably, Alexander remains the youngest person

ever put to death in Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 25-2 at 2.)

Alexander’s sister, Plaintiff Susie Carter, alongside Sam Lemon, Attorney Ridley’s great-

grandson, worked together to bring justice for Alexander. (ECF No. 25 at ¶ 76; ECF No. 25-2 at

5.) In 2017, Alexander’s record was expunged. (ECF No. 25-2 at 4.) On June 13, 2022—ninety-

one years after Alexander was put to death—the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas vacated

his conviction. (ECF No. 25 at ¶ 77; ECF No. 25-1 at 2; ECF No. 25-2 at 2 (“[T]oday’s decision

is an acknowledgement that the charges against him should never have been brought.”).) In a

statement from the District Attorney’s Office regarding their agreement to vacate the conviction

of Alexander, the District Attorney was quoted as stating that “this young man was entitled to the

protections of our Constitution, particularly the Fifth Amendment’s protections against self-

incrimination and the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. We believe that this young man’s

constitutional protections were violated in an irreparable way.” (ECF No. 25-2 at 4.)

On October 7, 2022, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf issued a proclamation declaring

that “Williams’ due process rights were violated: he was interrogated by police without a lawyer

or parent present, his confessions were inconsistent and likely coerced, and Vida Robare’s death

certificate was apparently doctored by authorities,” acknowledging that “the conviction and

execution of Alexander McClay Williams was an egregious miscarriage of justice,” and

apologizing to Susie Carter and the rest of Alexander’s family. (ECF No. 25-4 at 1–2.) Alexander’s

family now seeks accountability for his death at the hands of the Commonwealth.

B. Procedural History

On May 17, 2024, the Estate of Alexander McClay Williams, via its co-administrators

Susie Carter, Osceola Williams, and Osceola Perdue, filed their Complaint against Delaware

County and Smith, Trestrall, and Bloom (the “Individual Defendants”): Joseph Rutala, Esq. is

named as the administrator of the estates of Smith and Trestrall; Mark Halpern is named as

administrator of the estate of Bloom. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint

(ECF No. 7), which this Court granted in part and denied in part in May 2025 (ECF Nos. 22–23).

The Estate then filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 25), which Defendants now move to

dismiss. (ECF No. 26 (“Motion” or “Mot.”).)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, a

complaint must put forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requires more than

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). “To survive dismissal, ‘a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Applying the principles of Iqbal and Twombly, the Third Circuit has articulated a three-part

analysis to determine whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). See Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). This three-prong

inquiry involves the following: “(1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the

complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of

the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are

sufficiently alleged.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

The pleading standard does not require a plaintiff to establish the elements of a prima facie

case, but they must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d

Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). “[C]onclusory or ‘bare-bones’ allegations will [not] survive

a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 210. “To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out

‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

In their Motion, Defendants raise four arguments: (1) the Estate is not a party entitled to

bring claims under § 1983; (2) Counts I and II should be dismissed as being duplicative of other

§ 1983 claims; (3) Individual Defendants have qualified immunity for Counts III and XI, and other

alleged constitutional violations are not, in fact, constitutional violations; and (4) Counts V and

VIII fail to state a claim.

A. The Estate’s Ability to Bring Claims under § 1983

The Court first addresses Defendants’ argument that the Estate is not entitled to bring a

claim under § 1983. All but one of the counts in the Amended Complaint, specifically Count XI,

are brought under § 1983. Defendants cite a nine-page block quote from Cariveau v. Callwood,

No. CV 3:24-29, 2025 WL 1135096 (D.V.I. Apr. 17, 2025) in arguing that the present case is a

circumstance in which an estate should not be permitted to assert § 1983 claims because the

deprivation of rights occurred a hundred years ago and none of the co-administrators of the Estate

were alive at the time of Alexander’s arrest. (Mot. at 26.) The plaintiff in Cariveau, similar to the

Estate here, brought wrongful death and survival claims for a decedent’s constitutional violations.

Defendants, however, fail to note that the Cariveau court had previously disposed of the survival

claim on statute of limitations grounds, and thus, the opinion only addressed the wrongful death

claim. See Cariveau, 2025 WL 1135096, at *5 (“Lawyers may confuse the two claims following

a death. The claims are not the same.”).

It is well established that causes of action for violations of federal civil rights do not die

with the victim of the constitutional wrong. Baffa v. Black, 481 F. Supp. 1083, 1085–86 (E.D. Pa.

1979). Wrongful death and survival actions are statutory creations that provide vehicles for estates

to bring claims, including claims for constitutional violations under § 1983. See id. at 1086; Moyer

v. Berks Heim Nursing Home, No. 13-cv-4497, 2014 WL 1096043, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20,

2014); Becker v. Carbon Cnty., 177 F. Supp. 3d 841, 854 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Under Pennsylvania

law, an action to recover damages for a wrongful death may be brought by the estate to recover

specific expenses including “reasonable hospital, nursing, medical, funeral expenses, and expenses

of administration necessitated by reason of injuries causing death.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8301(d). As

such, a wrongful death cause of action asserts the rights of the estate rather than the decedent.5 See

Alexander v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 678 F. Supp. 3d 639, 648 (E.D. Pa. 2023); see also Massey

v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 881 F. Supp. 2d 663, 670 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“[the Pennsylvania

Wrongful Death Statute] does not compensate the decedent—it compensates the survivors for

damages which they have sustained as a result of the decedent’s death.”).

A survival action, on the other hand, allows an estate to pursue damages for injuries

sustained by decedent during his life. Moyer, 2015 WL 1096043, at *4. The statute provides that

“[a]ll causes of action . . . shall survive the death of the plaintiff.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8302. The

survival act “authorizes a decedent’s estate to assert claims that the decedent could have asserted

had he lived.” Ewing v. Potkul, 171 A.3d 10, 15 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017). The Estate therefore can

properly bring actions for constitutional violations pursuant to the wrongful death and survival

statutes.

B. The Estate’s Wrongful Death and Survival Claims

Defendants argue that the Estate’s wrongful death and survival claims (Counts I and II)

cannot be asserted as claims under § 1983 because they are not deprivations of constitutional rights.

Rather, Defendants assert that “the Estate must plead a single survival count alleging a § 1983

claim for malicious prosecution, a survival count alleging a § 1983 claim for deprivation of liberty,

5 The Wrongful Death Act provides that the decedent’s spouse, children, or parents can recover

damages, which includes the “present value of the services the deceased would have rendered to

the family, had he or she lived.” Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. 1993); 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8301(b).

The Estate is co-administered by Susie Carter and two nieces of the decedent, Osceola Carter and

Osceola Perdue. (ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 15–18.) Because this case is brought by the Estate, and the co-

administrators of the Estate do not include the specified beneficiaries in § 8301(b), the Estate’s

ability to recover under a wrongful death claim is limited to the expenses identified in the statute

at § 8301(d). See Miller v. Philadelphia Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266, 284 (3d Cir. 2006) (Smith,

J., dissenting).

a wrongful death claim alleging a § 1983 claim for cruel and unusual punishment, et cetera.” (Mot.

at 26–27.)

Pennsylvania’s Wrongful Death and Survival Act do not create independent causes of

action, but rather they serve as vehicles through which legal claims can be asserted. Cappel v.

Aston Twp. Fire Dep’t, 693 F. Supp. 3d 467, 496 (E.D. Pa. 2023); Donahue v. Borough of

Collingdale, 714 F. Supp. 3d 504, 508 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2024). As discussed above, § 1983 claims can

be properly brought by the Estate through these vehicles. The Estate therefore can maintain

wrongful death and survival claims so long as it has a cognizable § 1983 claim. There should be

no duplicative burden in discovery and motions practice that Defendants fear because these claims

are intertwined. Furthermore, there is no risk of duplicative recovery because the Estate cannot

recover, for example, under both a survival claim under § 1983 and a direct § 1983 claim for the

same constitutional violation.

C. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that is pled by a defendant government

official sued in their individual capacity. Government officials performing discretionary functions

are generally shielded from liability for civil damages. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815

(1982). This immunity from liability is qualified—if an official knew or reasonably should have

known that the action they took would violate the constitutional rights of a plaintiff, they are not

entitled to immunity. Id. at 817–18. “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the

need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to

shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Id. at 818. A government official is not protected from suit or civil liability if their

conduct violates some clearly established statutory or constitutional right and a reasonable person

would have known their conduct was unlawful. Id.

Courts apply a two-step approach in evaluating claims of qualified immunity. First, “a court

must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has shown make out a violation of a constitutional

right.” Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotations

omitted). A plaintiff has “no duty to plead facts relevant to a qualified immunity defense in order

to state a claim.” Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other

grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639–40

(1980)). In Gomez, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally that “two—and only two—allegations

are required in order to state a cause of action under [§ 1983]. First, the plaintiff must allege that

some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has

deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” 446 U.S. at 640. However,

the Third Circuit noted in Thomas that the Rule 8 pleading standard may be insufficient for meeting

the fact-specific inquiry required for analyzing a qualified immunity standard. 463 F.3d at 299.

Accordingly, this Court gave the Estate leave to amend its complaint to provide additional facts to

determine precisely what rights were violated and how. (ECF Nos. 22–23.)

Second, “the court must determine whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at

the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Spady, 800 F.3d at 637 (internal citations omitted);

see also Penna v. City of Lancaster, 690 F. Supp. 3d 494, 506 (E.D. Pa. 2023). The Individual

Defendants have the burden to establish they are entitled to qualified immunity. See E.D. v.

Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2019). A defendant demonstrates they are entitled to qualified

immunity “only if they can show that a reasonable person in their position at the relevant time

could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that their conduct comported with

recognized legal standards.” Id. “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

Defendants argue that the Estate fails to allege sufficient facts that Alexander’s coerced

confession was a constitutional violation. (Mot. at 17–18.) Even if sufficient facts were alleged

regarding the coerced confession, Defendants argue that the Fourth Amendment had not yet been

incorporated against the states at that time. (Id. at 18–19.) Defendants further argue that the Estate’s

additional constitutional violations are not protected by the Constitution: (1) “There is no

constitutional requirement that law enforcement only question suspects after they obtain evidence

that leads them to reasonably believe the suspect has committed a crime”; (2) “there is no

constitutional requirement that law enforcement only question suspects on a single occasion”; and

(3) Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), was not applicable in 1931, and the Estate failed to

explain what evidence was withheld. (Mot. at 20.) Defendants seek to dismiss Counts III and XI

on grounds of qualified immunity. (ECF No. 26 at 1.) While not identified in the Motion or

proposed order, Defendants’ arguments that three additional constitutional violations are not

protected by the Constitution relate to Counts III and IV.6

1. Facts Alleging Constitutional Violations

In the Amended Complaint, the Estate alleges the following facts in support of

constitutional violations caused by the Individual Defendants:

1. Bloom7 and Smith were both personally involved in the investigation of Alexander

and directly supervised the investigative acts taken by the homicide detectives.

6 Defendants do not address qualified immunity in connection with Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, or IX.

7 The Estate’s claims against Bloom are based solely on his investigatory actions and/or

administrative actions, and not his duties as a prosecutor. (ECF No. 25 at ¶¶ 21–22.)

(ECF No. 25 at ¶¶ 34, 139.) Trestrall assisted in the investigation of the Robare

murder (id. ¶ 34) and testified against Alexander at trial (id. ¶ 46.)

2. The Individual Defendants interrogated Alexander at least five times when they

knew they had no evidence to reasonably believe that he committed the crime. (Id.

¶ 42.)

3. Each interrogation was conducted without an attorney or parent present on

Alexander’s behalf. (Id. ¶ 41.) The Individual Defendants isolated Alexander, failed

to inform him of his rights, ignored his requests to have a lawyer present,

interrogated him for hours, and verbally and physically abused him. (Id. ¶ 125.)

4. Through the interrogations, the Individual Defendants coerced Alexander into

falsely confessing to committing the crime. (Id. ¶ 43.) His confession was later

misrepresented as voluntary. (Id. ¶ 124.)

5. The Individual Defendants knew Alexander had no involvement in the crime and

there was no probable cause to arrest or charge him with murder. (Id. ¶ 43.) The

Individual Defendants, knowing that probable cause did not exist, intentionally

caused Alexander to be arrested, charged, and prosecuted for the murder in

violation of his constitutional right to be free of prosecution absent probable cause.

(Id. ¶ 108.)

6. The Individual Defendants withheld from Alexander’s counsel all evidence of the

circumstances in which they obtained the coerced, false confessions. (Id. ¶ 44.) The

Individual Defendants withheld fabricated, exculpatory and impeachment

evidence. (Id.) The Individual Defendants withheld material evidence about Fred

Robare which deprived Alexander of his constitutional right to investigate an

alternative suspect. (Id. ¶ 71.)

7. Detective Trestrall testified that Alexander admitted to him that he kicked Robare

in the ribs, and the Detective knew that his testimony was false. (Id. ¶ 46.)

8. The Individual Defendants altered Robare’s death certificate to state that Alexander

killed her. (Id. ¶¶ 72–73.)

9. The Individual Defendants conducted a constitutionally inadequate investigation,

including without limitation by failing to fully investigate the alternative suspect

Fred Robare. (Id. ¶ 116.)

The Estate has set forth sufficient facts that, taken together, allege violations of the Fourth,

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. While Defendants assert that Plaintiff is required to plead with

more specificity because, for instance, the law clearly prohibits confessions obtained by threats,

but the law permits police to offer false information to deceive a suspect into a confession, that

analysis falls under the second prong of qualified immunity. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120,

151 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (“The dispositive question is ‘whether the

violative nature of the particular conduct is clearly established.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).

Defendants’ argument that the Estate’s alleged violations in addition to coercion are not

constitutional violations mischaracterizes and limits the allegations. The Estate does not allege a

constitutional violation specifically for detectives questioning without evidence to reasonably

believe the suspect committed a crime, nor that it is a constitutional violation to question a suspect

more than once. Rather, they allege Alexander was interrogated at least five times, for several

hours, without an attorney or parent present, during which he was verbally and physically abused,

without any evidence to reasonably believe that he committed the crime.8 These facts sufficiently

allege violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Regarding the potential Brady claim, the Estate alleges that the Individual Defendants

fabricated evidence and intentionally withheld and misrepresented exculpatory evidence. A claim

for violation of due process rights to a fair trial caused by the detectives’ deliberate deception is

distinct from a Brady claim. Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 290–91 (3d Cir. 2021).

The deliberate deception that the Estate alleges against the Individual Defendants states sufficient

facts to allege a constitutional violation separate from Brady.

2. Clearly Established Rights at the Time of Defendants’ Misconduct

Having established that the Estate sufficiently alleged violations of constitutional rights,

the analysis turns to whether the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. The

investigation of Robare’s murder occurred in October 1930. (Id. ¶ 40.) The constitutional right

therefore must have been clearly established at that time. “A clearly established right is one that is

so apparent that ‘every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.’”

Dennis, 19 F.4th at 288 (quoting James v. N.J. State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2020)).

However, it is not necessary that the specific action in question has previously been held unlawful.

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 151. Defendants assert that the Fourth Amendment right, the constitutional

violations alleged regarding the number of interrogations without evidence, and the claim for due

8 Defendants also assert that the Estate does not allege that Alexander requested an attorney during

the interrogations. However, the Estate alleges that Alexander’s requests for an attorney during the

interrogation were ignored. (ECF No. 25 at ¶ 125.) Defendants similarly argue that the Amended

Complaint does not allege physical beating in connection with the interrogation—apparently by

conducting a keyword search solely for the word “beat” (ECF No. 28 at 2)—but the Amended

Complaint alleges that Alexander was subject to verbal and physical abuse during the

interrogations. (ECF No. 25 at ¶ 125.)

process rights to a fair trial caused by the detectives’ deliberate deception—mischaracterized by

Defendant as a Brady claim—were not clearly established constitutional violations in 1930.

Section 1983 is a landmark statute from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provides a

right to sue officials who, under color of state law or custom, deprive another person of rights

secured by the Constitution or federal law. It was enacted because many states enforced their own

laws selectively and discriminatorily, and states did not adequately protect individual rights. See

Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Williams

v. Washington, 144 S. Ct. 679 (2024) (No. 23-191). The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,

as plainly stated in the title, was “to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.

(citing 17 Stat. 13, 13 (Apr. 20, 1871)); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171

(1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978) (discussing origins of § 1983).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of rights secured by the U.S.

Constitution or federal law. The constitutional right must be federally protected—thus, the

violation of a clearly established right maintained under the Pennsylvania Constitution, for

instance, cannot bring about liability under § 1983. See Robinson v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 722

F. App’x 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2018); Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 (3d Cir. 1992). To determine

if the Individual Defendants violated a clearly established right, that right must have been under

the U.S. Constitution or federal law, and that right must have been clearly established in 1930

when the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred.

The first eight Amendments to the U.S. Constitution initially applied only to the federal

government and not to the states. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Fox v. Ohio,

46 U.S. 410 (1847); Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. 321 (1868); see also Twining v. State of

N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (“[I]t is possible

that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against national action

may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due

process of law. If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight

Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due

process of law.”) (internal citation omitted). In 1930, the Supreme Court had not yet incorporated

the Fourth Amendment against the states. A state official in 1930 would therefore not reasonably

or necessarily understand that their conduct as non-federal government officials could violate the

Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for alleged

violations of the Fourth Amendment. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (stating

that the limitations on government conduct imposed by the Fourth Amendment “is not directed to

individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal government and its

agencies”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment

protects against “police incursion into privacy”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending

the exclusionary rule to the states).

But focusing merely on when the Supreme Court explicitly stated that a certain

Amendment applied to the states would invite the Court to ignore the main inquiry which the Court

will not do. While it is true that the process of incorporation of the Bill of Rights and subsequent

Supreme Court case law both provide a much clearer picture of established rights in the modern

era, that does not mean that rights could not have been clearly established in 1930. Whether a right

is clearly established does not require that “there had been a precise preview of the applicable legal

analysis underlying the defense.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 295 (3d Cir. 2014). See also

Dennis, 19 F.4th at 290 (“[M]ore general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of

giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified

in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even

though the very action in question has not previously been held unlawful.”) (quoting United States

v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).

What is relevant to this Court’s inquiry is whether the rights that the Estate alleges were

violated were “consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the

base of all our civil and political institutions and not infrequently are designated as ‘law of the

land.’ Those principles are applicable alike in all the states, and do not depend upon or vary with

local legislation.” Herbert v. State of La., 272 U.S. 312, 316–17 (1926). This inquiry determines

whether the right is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, which was applicable to the states

in 1930. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 45 (1894); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166

U.S. 226, 233–34 (1897). This is the same inquiry the Supreme Court engages in when determining

whether an Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See,

e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665–66 (1925) (finding that freedom of the press is a

fundamental right and liberty protected by the due process clause under the Fourteenth

Amendment).

a) Coerced Confession

The common law dating back to 18th century courts of England recognized that “coerced

confessions are inherently untrustworthy.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432–33

(2000). English courts excluded confessions that were not voluntary. Id. (citing King v. Rudd, 168

Eng. Rep. 160, 161, 164 (K.B. 1783); King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783);

King v. Parratt, 172 Eng. Rep. 829 (N.P. 1831)). In 1884, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the

delineation between a voluntary and involuntary confession, stating that the latter “deprive[s] him

of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the

meaning of the law.” Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1884). The Hopt Court found the

confession there should not be excluded because it was given within three minutes of questioning,

and there was no suggestion of any threats or promises inducing the statement. Id. at 585.

The Supreme Court in Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) found that

confessions obtained by coercion and brutality constitute a clear violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See also Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942) (“[O]ffensive to the

Constitutional guarantees of liberty are confessions wrung from an accused by overpowering his

will, whether through physical violence or more subtle forms of coercion commonly known as ‘the

third degree.’”).

Subsequently, the Supreme Court has identified confessions elicited under conditions

highly similar to Alexander’s as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Haley v. Ohio, 332

U.S. 596, 597–98 (1948).9 The holding in Haley arose from a series of cases identifying conditions

of interrogations that constitute Fourteenth Amendment violations. See Chambers v. Florida, 309

U.S. 227, 238–40 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.

143 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). While these cases, as well as Brown and

Hysler, postdate the alleged constitutional violations in this case, they stem from a historical

understanding at common law that confessions made under onerous circumstances were

questioned for voluntariness in court and could violate due process. The fact that subsequent case

9 The interrogation of John Harvey Haley, a fifteen-year-old Black boy, lasted over five hours,

involved several police officers questioning him, and occurred without a friend or counsel present

for him. The Supreme Court explained: “What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry

if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is

before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age

for a boy of any race. . . . He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of

fear, then of panic.” 332 U.S. at 599–600.

law further defined what constitutes a voluntary confession in later times does not imply that the

Individual Defendants would have considered their conduct lawful.10

Alexander, at just sixteen years old, was questioned for hours on at least five occasions. He

was subject to verbal and physical abuse, and he was denied his request to have a lawyer present.

The fundamental principles of liberty and justice since the common law in 18th century England

have found coerced confessions such as these to violate due process. A reasonable official would

have known this conduct was unlawful.

b) Detectives’ Deliberate Deception

Separate from the coerced confession, the Estate alleges that the Individual Defendants

violated Alexander’s right to due process and to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment by

fabricating inculpatory evidence and deliberately using coercion and/or suggestion to obtain

inculpatory witness statements in violation of constitutional rights. This alleged constitutional

violation, as discussed above, is distinct from a Brady claim.

In Halsey, the Third Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that they were entitled to

qualified immunity because that court had not held that fabrication of evidence violated the

Fourteenth Amendment in 1985. The Halsey court found that such a right was clearly established

by analogous case law. 750 F.3d at 295–97. In Dennis, the Third Circuit concluded that framing

10 A 1930 Harvard Law Review Note discussed increased use of so-called third degree methods

by police to extort confessions. Note, The Third Degree, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (1930). The author

found that police methods across the United States were shifting over the decade prior to 1930

from those in England—with new tactics including whipping, a mild use of the electric chair,

forcing a suspect to stand in the morgue for an hour, solitary confinement, and more. Id. at 619.

While five federal circuits declined to exclude evidence of confessions obtained through such

coercive means, the Third Circuit did not address this question. Id. at 618 n.3. This shift could

suggest an evolution in common law to finding such tactics not in violation of due process.

However, there was no clearly established legal authority over Defendants in 1930 in the Third

Circuit or Supreme Court allowing third degree methods to extort confessions.

criminal defendants through use of fabricated evidence “violates their constitutional rights [] with

such obvious clarity that it is unreasonable for us to conclude anything other than that the detectives

were on sufficient notice that their fabrication of evidence violated clearly established law.” 19

F.4th at 290. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit relied on Mooney v. Holohan, 294

U.S. 103, 112 (1935), which held that use of perjured testimony was “inconsistent with the

rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation” and thus violates

the Fourteenth Amendment. The Dennis court also relied on Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216

(1942) which extended Mooney. In 1967, the Supreme Court stated that the Fourteenth

Amendment “cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false

evidence” and that this principle has been established for more than 30 years. Miller v. Pate, 386

U.S. 1, 7 (1967).

Unlike the common law of coerced confessions, Mooney is not as clearly rooted in

fundamental principles of liberty and justice. Rather, the Mooney Court compared obtaining a

conviction through presentation of evidence known to be perjured to obtaining a conviction by

intimidation, which is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 294 U.S. at 112. While a right

can be clearly established by analogous case law, the comparison here serves as an extension to a

different type of conduct that results in the same constitutional violation. It is unclear whether there

was a clear constitutional right against the use of fabricated evidence prior to Mooney, and thus,

this ambiguity yields the conclusion that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity for this violation.11

11 Defendants’ Motion does not argue that Trestrall is entitled to qualified immunity for false

testimony. Thus, the Court’s determination of qualified immunity does not apply to that allegation.

3. Malicious Prosecution

Defendants state in their proposed order that Count XI should be dismissed because the

Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 26 at 1.) Count XI of the

Amended Complaint is a state law claim for malicious prosecution.12 Defendants’ briefs contain

no argument supporting qualified immunity for the allegations that the Individual Defendants

“initiated or continued proceedings against Alexander, without probable cause, with malice or

specific intent to injure.” (ECF No. 25 ¶ 149.) Defendants therefore have not met their burden and

are not entitled to qualified immunity.

It was well established by 1930 that “[p]rosecution of an innocent person, without using

reasonable care to ascertain the facts, is not justifiable.” Emerson v. Cochran, 4 A. 498, 501 (Pa.

1886). See also id. at 502 (“if the prosecutor has knowledge of facts which will explain the

suspicious appearance, and exonerate the accused from a criminal charge, he cannot justify a

prosecution by putting forth the prima facie circumstances, and excluding those within his

knowledge which tend to prove innocence.”)

Moreover, it is fundamental to our principles of liberty that “every person who puts the

criminal law in force maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause, commits a

wrongful act.” Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 550 (1860); see also id. (“[I]t is unquestionably

true that want of probable cause is evidence of malice.”); Brown v. Selfridge, 224 U.S. 189, 191–

92 (1912). The Fourteenth Amendment protected Alexander from this violation, and this right was

clearly established. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigration, 273 U.S.

103 (1927) (finding deportation on charges “unsupported by any evidence” as a denial of due

process); cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (stating that constitutional rights are violated

12 This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

in state criminal prosecutions in which “the whole proceeding is a mask”). Probable cause is a

foundational basis and prerequisite to a valid criminal arrest and to criminal jurisprudence. A

reasonable law enforcement officer in the Individual Defendants’ position could not have believed

that they could proceed as they did with no probable cause to do so.

D. Whether Counts V and VIII State a Claim

1. Count V

The Estate alleges that the Individual Defendants violated Alexander’s Eighth Amendment

right by imposing the death penalty. Defendants argue that Count V fails because Defendants did

not impose or carry out the death penalty, and there is no standalone claim for the imposition of

the death penalty. (Mot. at 27.)

The Supreme Court stated that “[b]ecause the death penalty is the most severe punishment,

the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568

(2005). In Roper, the Court held that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for

offenders under the age of eighteen. The Supreme Court has applied the Eighth Amendment in

other cases to assess the use of the death penalty itself, rather than merely the means by which the

execution was caused. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that the

execution of a person under the age of sixteen at the time of their offense violates the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executions of

defendants with diminished mental capacity violates the Eighth Amendment). A standalone claim

for imposition of the death penalty may therefore be stated.

However, the Amended Complaint does not address the connection between the Individual

Defendants and the imposition of the death penalty. A defendant “cannot be held responsible for

a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” Baraka v.

McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198,

201 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Personal

involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and

acquiescence”). There are no allegations that the Individual Defendants sought the imposition of

the death penalty or that they conducted the execution. While there is a nexus between the alleged

conduct by Individual Defendants and ultimate imposition of the death penalty, no allegations

show personal involvement by the Individual Defendants in that nexus. The Estate therefore fails

to meet its burden of pleading that the Individual Defendants, acting under color of law, imposed

this constitutional deprivation on Alexander. Thus, the Court dismisses Count V for failure to state

a claim.

2. Count VIII

Count VIII asserts that Individual Defendants violated the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments by failing to intervene on behalf of Alexander to prevent his false arrest, malicious

prosecution, false imprisonment, and deprivation of liberty and life without due process. (ECF No.

25 ¶ 133.) The Third Circuit has not recognized failure-to-intervene liability in the context of false

arrests, neither at the time of the killing of Alexander in 1931 or now. Lozano v. New Jersey, 9

F.4th 239, n.4 (3d. Cir. 2021); Ogrod v. City of Philadelphia, 598 F. Supp. 3d 253, 273 (E.D. Pa.

2022). Thus, the Court dismisses Count VIII for failure to state a claim. See Hughes v. City of

Philadelphia, No. CV 23-2186, 2023 WL 4852294 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2023) (dismissing for failure

to state a claim that the officer failed to intervene “to prevent [plaintiff’s] false arrest, malicious

prosecution, false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty without due process of law.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Counts V and

VIII for failure to state a claim, and the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

for Count III as it relates to the Fourth Amendment and for Count IV as it relates to use of

fabricated evidence at trial. As to all the other Counts enumerated in Defendant’s Motion, the

Motion to Dismiss is otherwise denied. An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Hon. Kelley B. Hodge

HODGE, KELLEY B., J.