Opinion

Sivi

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Oct 27, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.9%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MEREDITH SIVI,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:24-cv-4191

Judge James L. Graham

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

FRANKLIN COUNTY GUARDIANSHIP

SERVICE BOARD, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court are seven motions filed by Plaintiff Meredith Sivi in the span of two

weeks: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions Regarding Defendant Franklin

County Board of Developmental Disabilities’ Discovery (Doc. 53); (2) Plaintiff’s Urgent Motion

to Strike Filings and For Robust Sanctions Against Upreach, LLC Due to Failure of Service and

Non-Compliance with Court Order (Doc. 56); (3) Plaintiff’s Urgent Motion to Strike Defendant

Franklin County Guardianship Service Board’s (FCGSB) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Due to Deficient and Malicious Service (Doc. 57); (4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Intervention

of Systemic Conduct and Mandate Global Settlement Conference (Doc. 59); (5) Plaintiff’s Report

of Failed Conferral & Request for Immediate Judicial Relief (Doc. 61); (6) Motion for Protective

Order and Sanctions Against Opposing Counsel for Vexatious Conduct (Doc. 65); and (7)

Plaintiff’s Urgent Motion for Default Judgment as Sanction, Reply to Doc #60 and #63, and

Motion to Reconsider Order Procured by Fraud (Doc. 68). Also before the Court is Defendant

Franklin County Guardianship Board’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 67).

For the following reasons, discovery in this case is STAYED. Plaintiff’s Motion for a

Protective Order and Sanctions (Doc. 53) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff’s

Motions to Strike Filings (Docs. 56, 57) are DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for leave to respond to

Franklin County Guardianship Board’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 57 at 5) is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Intervention and Mandate Settlement Conference

(Doc. 59) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Request for Immediate Judicial Relief (Doc. 61) is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions Against Opposing Counsel for Vexatious

Conduct (Doc. 65) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Status Report, Reconsider Previous

Orders, and Issue Default Judgment (Doc. 68) is DENIED. Franklin County Guardianship

Board’s Motion (Doc. 67) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the mother of an adult with disabilities and developmental delays, who,

according to Plaintiff, was previously adjudicated as legally incompetent by the Franklin County

Probate Court. (Doc. 19 at 1). Plaintiff filed this action on November 22, 2024, against Defendants

Upreach, LLC (“Upreach”), Franklin County Guardianship Service Board (“FCGSB”), and

Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities (“FCBDD”). (Doc. 1). Her claims concern

Defendants’ roles as her child’s care services provider and guardian, as well as one of the

Defendant’s roles in a Major Unusual Incident (“MUI”) investigation. (Id. at 1–2; see also Doc.

1 at ¶¶ 10–82). For several months, the parties have been engaged in discovery efforts. (Doc. 19

at 2 (setting the discovery deadline to December 31, 2025)).

In August 2025, FCGSB moved for judgment on the pleadings because “(1) this Court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over [Plaintiff’s] claims; (2) [Plaintiff’s] state law claims are

barred by governmental immunity; and (3) [Plaintiff’s] remaining federal claims independently

fail to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.” (Doc. 50 at 1). This Motion

remains pending.

In October 2025 alone, Plaintiff filed thirteen (13) documents with the Court. (Docs. 53,

55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70). Some are motions, others are merely notices, reports,

and affidavits. (Id.). But they all share the thread that Plaintiff would like judicial relief from what

she perceives to be injustices on the part of Defendants in this case. Plaintiff’s motions are ripe

for review.

Additionally, FCGSB filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff’s First

Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production. (Doc. 67). They seek an extra thirty days to

meet Plaintiff’s discovery requests because the requests “call for a wide range of documents, many

of which seek privileged information.” (Id. at 2). And FCGSB claims they are “simultaneously

addressing [Plaintiff’s] growing number of motions filed against it.” (Id.). FCGSB’s motion is

also ripe for review. (See Docs. 69, 72).

II. DISCUSSION

The Court considers Plaintiff’s three Motions to Strike (Docs. 56, 57, 68); Plaintiff’s two

Motions for a Protective Order and Sanctions (Docs. 53, 65); Plaintiff’s two motions asking for

Court intervention (Docs. 59, 61); and Defendant FCGSB’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc.

67). But before turning to these motions, the Court considers whether discovery should be stayed

in this case.

“A district court has the inherent power to stay proceedings based on its authority to

manage its docket efficiently.” Ohio Valley Bank Co. v. MetaBank, No. 2:19-CV-191, 2019 WL

2170681, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 20, 2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). And questions

of whether to stay discovery routinely arise while a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on

the pleadings is pending. See Shanks v. Honda of Am. Mfg., No. 2:08-CV-1059, 2009 WL

2132621, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 2009) (noting that, “[t]his Court has had many occasions, over

the years, to address the question of whether a stay of discovery should be imposed during the

pendency of a motion to dismiss”).

“[A]s a general rule, this Court is not inclined to stay discovery while a motion to dismiss

is pending[.]” Id.; see also Ohio Valley Bank, 2019 WL 2170681, at *2 (quotation marks and

citation omitted) (noting that “the Court has frequently found that the fact that a party has filed a

case-dispositive motion is usually deemed insufficient to support a stay of discovery”). But “[t]rial

courts have broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that

may dispose of the case are determined.” Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 719 (6th Cir. 1999).

And in “special circumstances,” a court may find that a discovery stay is appropriate. Shanks,

2009 WL 2132621, at *1. A discovery stay may serve the interests of judicial economy, for

example, where “the defendant has raised a defense, such as absolute or qualified immunity, which

must, as a matter of law, be addressed before discovery appears” or where “it appears that the

complaint will almost certainly be dismissed.” Id. (citations omitted).

A. Discovery Stay

Special circumstances justify staying discovery here. Defendant FCGSB moves for

judgment on the pleadings on both immunity and jurisdictional grounds. (Doc. 50 (moving to

dismiss because “(1) this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims; (2) her state law

claims are barred by governmental immunity; and (3) her remaining federal claims independently

fail to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.”)). Specifically, FCGSB raises a

defense of governmental immunity, “which must, as a matter of law, be addressed before discovery

appears.” Shanks, 2009 WL 2132621, at *1.

FCGSB further claims that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to alter the Probate

Court’s guardianship orders based on the Probate Exception and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

(Doc. 50 at 5). They argue Plaintiff’s complaint asks the Court to alter guardianship orders, and

that this Court does not have jurisdiction to do so. (See, e.g., id. at 7 (citing Doc. 1 at 17–26)

(“[Claims 5 through 11] are all collateral challenges to the discretionary decisions made by

FCGSB, acting under the direct authority and supervision of the Probate Court. Ms. Sivi’s

allegations therefore seek to undermine the Probate Court’s grant of sole guardianship to FCGSB

by using this Complaint as an attempt to relitigate guardianship authority.”)). As FCGSB states,

“[b]ecause only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments,

this Court cannot act as a court of appeals for the state probate court's decisions.” (Doc. 50 at 5–

6 (citing Kennedy v. Benson, 749 F. Supp. 3d 810, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2024)). But this Motion is still

pending. It is unclear at this juncture which claims will be dismissed, and which remaining claims

(if any) the Court would then be able to adjudicate.

Moreover, some of the claims that FCGSB says are not covered by this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction are also asserted against other Defendants. (See e.g., Doc. 1 at 23 (Plaintiff’s

unjust enrichment claim asserted “Against All Defendants.”)). Thus, if Plaintiff’s claims against

FCGSB are dismissed on these grounds, they may also be dismissed against other Defendants for

the same reason. It is unclear which Defendants will remain after the Court rules on the Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Accordingly, it is necessary to utilize the Court’s “broad discretion” to pause discovery

while the Court decides the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 50); Hahn, 190 F.3d, at

719. Discovery is STAYED until such a disposition. Because discovery is stayed, FCGSB’s

Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Discovery Requests (Doc. 67) is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Once the stay has been lifted, Plaintiff and FCGSB are ORDERED

to confer and to file a status report within seven (7) days of the Court’s Order on the Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings, if any claims against FCGSB still proceed.

B. Plaintiff’s Miscellaneous Motions

The Court will next review Plaintiff’s motions in turn.

1. Plaintiff’s Motions to Strike Filings

Plaintiff makes two motions, one to strike Upreach’s response in opposition to Plaintiff’s

Motion to Compel Compliance and its response in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction (Doc. 56), and one to strike FCGSB’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 57).

Plaintiff bases her motions on the assertion that neither Defendant sent these documents to her in

the mail despite the Court’s order to resend them. (See, e.g., Doc. 57 at 4 (citing Doc. 52)). The

Court is unmoved.

Plaintiff cites various Rules of Civil Procedure to support her motions. (Doc. 56 at 2 (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5, 16(f), 37(b)(2)(A); Doc. 57 at 2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b), 12(f)). But none of

these rules provide that filings may be struck on the basis that a party does not receive that motion

in the mail. Tellingly, Plaintiff cites no case law to support her motion. She also presents no

evidence of bad faith on the part of Upreach or FCGSB, other than her unsubstantiated suspicions.

(See e.g., Doc. 56 at 3 (noting that because Upreach sent a letter to Plaintiff’s new address on June

30, they knew how to send documents to the correct address and willfully refused to do so in

accordance with the Court order); see also Doc. 57 at 3 (claiming FCGSB and their attorneys knew

Plaintiff’s correct address because they previously sent other filings to that address)). Moreover,

the Court previously denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance (Doc. 45), so striking

Upreach’s response to that motion serves no purpose here.

Thus, Plaintiff’s Motions to strike filings by Upreach and FCGSB are DENIED. Although

the Court declines to strike these documents, Defendants Upreach and FCGSB are nevertheless

REMINDED that they should mail Plaintiff their filings using the address on file with the Court,

in compliance with the Court’s Order (Doc. 52), and the Federal and Local Rules.

Plaintiff notes that in the event the Court denies her Motion to Strike FCGSB’s Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 57), she would like a new deadline “for Plaintiff to file her

substantive opposition brief” to this motion. (Doc. 57 at 5). This request is GRANTED. Plaintiff

is ORDERED to file her response within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protective Order and Sanctions

Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Protective Order and Sanctions against FCBDD (Doc. 53). In

it, she requests a protective order sustaining her objections to FCBDD’s interrogatories and

allowing her not to answer questions 6–34 because it exceeds 25 questions. (Id. at 7). She also

alleges that FCBDD’s requests for production are overbroad and abusive. (Doc. 53 at 6).

In addition to the protective order, she moves for sanctions such as a requirement that

FCBDD be precluded from introducing “evidence, documents, or testimony at trial that relates to

the subject matter of the procedurally barred Interrogatories.” (Doc. 53 at 8). And she asks for an

adverse inference sanction against FCBDD, instructing the jury “to assume that the facts sought in

the improperly barred Interrogatories would have been favorable to the Plaintiff.” (Id.).

Because the Court is staying discovery in this case, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protective

Order and Discovery Sanctions is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. When the stay is lifted,

the Court will revisit discovery matters.

3. Plaintiff’s Duplicative Motions for Miscellaneous Judicial Intervention

Plaintiff makes several duplicative motions. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judicial

Intervention of Systemic Conduct and Mandate Global Settlement (Doc. 59), a Request for

Immediate Judicial Relief (Doc. 61), and a Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 65). All three

documents are duplicative of her Motion for a Protective Order she previously filed with this Court.

(Doc. 53). In fact, her second Motion for a Protective Order (Doc. 59) requests nearly the same

relief as her first. She even goes so far as to move for the Court to rule on that previous Motion.

(Doc. 61 at 7; Doc. 68 at 8). Again, Plaintiff’s duplicative requests for a protective order are

DENIED.

Plaintiff also repeats her request for a “global settlement conference” with all Defendants

(Doc. 59 at 8; Doc. 61 at 7). But the Court previously denied this motion as well (Doc. 37). The

Court again DENIES this motion.

Plaintiff even moves for monetary sanctions in multiple motions to compensate her time

working on these motions. (Doc. 53 at 7, Doc. 56 at 4; Doc. 57 at 5; Doc. 59 at 7). As a pro se

plaintiff, however, Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S.

432, 435, 437 (1991). Plaintiff’s requests for these fees are DENIED. Plaintiff may not ask for

attorney fees in any future motions for sanctions while she proceeds pro se.

4. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions Against Defendant FCBDD

Finally, Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant FCBDD’s Status Report, to reconsider granting

FCBDD’s motion for extension of time, and to impose Rule 11 and “default judgment” sanctions

against FCBDD. (Doc. 68). Alleging “harassment, non-compliance, systemic abuse, and malice”

against counsel for FCBDD, Plaintiff moves to strike FCBDD’s status report under Rule 11 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for default judgment under Rule 37. (Id. at 7). Though

Plaintiff apparently disagrees with Defendant FCBDD’s discovery strategies and dislikes the

adversarial nature of a federal lawsuit, those are not reasons to impose the serious sanctions she

wants. Additionally, the Court declines to reconsider FCBDD’s motion for extension of time.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 68) is DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, discovery is STAYED. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protective Order

and Sanctions (Doc. 53) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, Plaintiff’s Motions to Strike

Filings (Docs. 56, 57) are DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for leave to respond to Franklin County

Guardianship Board’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 57 at 5) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Intervention and Mandate Settlement Conference (Doc. 59) is

DENIED. Plaintiff’s Request for Immediate Judicial Relief (Doc. 61) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s

Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions Against Opposing Counsel for Vexatious Conduct

(Doc. 65) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Status Report, Reconsider Previous Orders,

and Issue Default Judgment (Doc. 68) is DENIED. Franklin County Guardianship Board’s

Motion (Doc. 67) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff may file her response in opposition to FCGSB’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings within fourteen (14) days. Plaintiff is REMINDED that she must comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Local Rules. In the future, the Court will not

hesitate to strike improper filings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: October 27, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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