Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

BILLY NAVARRE CERTIFIED USED CAR CASE NO. 2:24-CV-00085

IMPORTS L L C ET AL

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

CLAREMONT PROPERTY CO MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is a Motion to Reconsider [doc. 57 ] filed by

defendant/counterclaimant Claremont Property Company (“Claremont”).

Plaintiffs/counter-defendants Billy Navarre Certified Used Car Imports, LLC; Billy

Navarre Imports, Inc.; Lake Charles Auto Plaza, Inc. d/b/a Louisiana Direct Auto; Navarre

Chevrolet, Inc.; Navarre Management, LLC; and Navarre Nissan LLC (collectively,

“Navarre”) oppose the Motion to Reconsider. Doc. 65. The motion relates to the court’s

recent ruling on Navarre’s Motion to Dismiss [doc. 47] and Claremont’s Motion to Strike

[doc. 51]. See doc. 55.

I.

BACKGROUND

The factual and legal backgrounds for the two motions under reconsideration are

provided in the court’s prior rulings and incorporated here by reference. In sum, the court

dismissed some of Claremont’s counterclaims based on the fact that it lacked a Louisiana

commercial contractor’s license at the time it entered into work authorization contracts for

repairs and renovations relating to Navarre’s Hurricane Laura damage. Such contracts were

thus an absolute nullity under Louisiana law, limiting Claremont’s recovery to actual costs

with no allowance for profit or overhead. Doc. 55.

In its Motion to Reconsider, Claremont raises a new “interest of justice” argument

under Louisiana Civil Code article 2033 and objects to the fact that the court took judicial

notice of information on a government licensing website. Doc. 57. Navarre opposes the

motion on both fronts, asserting that Claremont is improperly raising arguments that should

have been raised on first consideration and that such arguments fail at any rate on the

merits. Doc. 61.

II.

LAW & APPLICATION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs reconsideration of interlocutory

orders, like the rulings at issue, and leaves “the trial court [] free to reconsider and reverse

its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an

intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., LP,

864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc.,

910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)). The approach under this rule to consideration of new

arguments is more flexible than the one applied to reconsideration of final judgments,

“reflecting the inherent power of the rendering district court to afford such relief from

interlocutory judgments as justice requires.” Id. at 336–37 (quoting Cobell v. Jewell, 802

F.3d 12, 25–26 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (internal quotations omitted).

B. Application

1. Judicial notice

In the Motion to Dismiss, Navarre requested judicial notice of information from the

Louisiana State Licensing Board for Contractors (“LSLBC”) pertaining to the issuance and

effective dates of Claremont’s license. Claremont offered no reason to dispute the accuracy

of the information in the LSLBC’s records but instead argued that judicial notice of such

an adjudicative fact was improper. The court stated in its original ruling:

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court may take judicial

notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can

be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). This applies to

adjudicative facts, and the court may take such notice at any stage of the

proceeding provided the opposing party is given adequate opportunity to

respond. Id. at 201(d), (e). On a 12(b)(6) motion, the court’s scope of review

thus extends to matters “including public records and government websites”

of which it might take judicial notice. Durr v. GOL, LLC, 393 F.Supp.3d 476,

483 (E.D. La. 2019). Accordingly, a court may also “take judicial notice of a

license that is available on a governmental website without converting a

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Cicalese v. Univ. of

Tex. Medical Branch, 456 F.Supp.3d 859, 871–872 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (citing

Bombet v. Donovan, 2015 WL 65255, at *6 (M.D. La. Jan. 5, 2015)).

Doc. 55, p. 6 (emphasis added). After independently verifying the information from the

LSLBC site, which Navarre had provided in print-outs attached to its motion, the court

agreed that judicial notice was proper. Id. at 6–7. It thus rendered judgment based on a

determination that Claremont first obtained its Louisiana commercial contractor license on

July 20, 2022, well after it contracted with Navarre for the subject work in August and

September 2020.

Claremont insists that this judicial notice is improper, because “the doctrine of

judicial notice cannot be utilized to prove the truth of the matter contained in any

documents or public records, and the LSLBC’s online website cannot be judicially noticed

to prove the matters it allegedly contains regarding Claremont’s Louisiana licensing

status.” Doc. 69, p. 10 (emphasis added). To this end it relies on two Fifth Circuit cases,

PNC Bank, N.A. v. 2013 Travis Oak Creek, L.P., 136 F.4th 568 (5th Cir. 2025) and Giles v.

City of Dallas, 539 F. App’x 537 (5th Cir. 2013). Both cases, however, concern judicial

notice of factual findings in other adversarial proceedings. In PNC Bank the court noted

that it had “previously taken judicial notice of jurisdictional facts drawn from public

records,” but that factual findings from other court proceedings—even related cases—were

of a different species. 136 F.4th at 574–75. Similarly, Giles involved records from the Texas

Commission for Lawyer Discipline. The court extended judicial notice to the fact that

plaintiff’s counsel was permitted to resign in lieu of discipline and that certain allegations

were pending against him, but not to the truth of the matters asserted in the disciplinary

records. 539 F. App’x at 542 n. 1. These rulings reflect the court’s longstanding

consideration that adjudicative facts from adversarial proceedings are inherently subject to

challenge. Because “it would be difficult to ‘conceiv[e] of an adjudicative fact found in a

court record that is not [the] subject of reasonable dispute,” such a fact must “‘obtain its

‘indisputable’ status from some source other than a court’s imprimatur . . . .’” PNC Bank,

136 F.4th at 574–75 (quoting Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 830 n. 18 (5th

Cir. 1998)) (alterations in PNC Bank).

The other two appellate cases relied on by Claremont, Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm

Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) and Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d

634 (7th Cir. 2008), fare no better in showing error to the undersigned’s prior ruling. In

Hennessy, a sex and pregnancy discrimination case, damages were subject to a cap based

on the defendant’s number of employees. 69 F.3d at 1354–55. The court affirmed the

district court’s refusal to take judicial notice of an SEC form for the purpose of determining

this number, because of reasonable disputes over the form’s contents and its significance.1

In Doss, the court likewise held that judicial notice of a public record was improper based

on “reasonable dispute”—this time from plaintiff’s allegations2 that the subject deed was

a forgery. 551 F.3d at 639–40.

Here, on the other hand, Claremont has never made any allegation or presented

evidence from which the court could determine that the information on the LSLBC site is

subject to reasonable dispute. And in its amended counterclaims, it concedes “the fact that

Claremont, the entity itself, was not licensed.” Doc. 59, ¶ 84. Additionally, the LSLBC’s

determinations are not the result of adversarial proceedings inviting inherent dispute.

Instead, they are records of a state board kept in the ordinary course of business and

1 The parties had introduced conflicting testimony regarding the company’s size, with plaintiff speculating that the

company had over 200 employees while a defense witness, who acted as director of employee services, stated that the

number was 186. Id. at 1354. The 10-K form indicated that the company had 398 employees, but it covered two other

units not involved in the suit in addition to the one that employed the plaintiff. Id. at 1354–55.

2 Plaintiff made more than a cursory assertion. In his response to the subject motion to dismiss, he:

asserted that he had not sold or otherwise transferred his property, and that the deed attached to the

defendants' motion was a forgery. Indeed, Doss continued, he had filed a quiet title claim in the

Circuit Court of Cook County and had caused a lis pendens notice to be recorded with the Cook

County Recorder of Deeds. Doss attached a copy of both his state court complaint and his lis pendens

notice to his response.

Doss, 551 F.3d at 637.

maintained for the public to verify the license status of contractors. The Fifth Circuit has

repeatedly affirmed that the court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts contained

in government websites and/or records. See, e.g., Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418

F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of approval by the National Mediation

Board published on the agency's website); Coleman v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 665, 667 (5th Cir.

2005) (per curiam) (judicial notice of Texas agency's website). Thus, there is no basis for

reconsideration of this issue.

2. Interests of justice

In its Motion to Reconsider Claremont admits that it has performed “additional

research” and raises, for the first time, the “interests of justice” exception to damages

available for an absolutely null contract under Louisiana Civil Code article 2033. Doc. 57,

att. 1. Navarre asserts that, under binding precedent, reconsideration cannot be used to

advance new theories or arguments that could have been raised in the first instance. As

noted above, Rule 54(b) provides a more flexible approach to consideration of new

arguments. But “[j]udicial economy counsels against reconsidering an issue each time

someone presents a new argument.” CIT Bank, N.A. v. Howard Transp., Inc., 2019 WL

3322725, at *1 (E.D. La. Jul. 24, 2019) (quoting Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc. v.

Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F.Supp.2d 471, 480 (M.D. La. 2002)). “The discretion to

modify an interlocutory order does not eliminate the policy reasons behind discouraging

motions for reconsideration which rehash the same arguments or, without justification,

raise new arguments for the first time.” Grand Famous Shipping Ltd. v. Port of Houston

Auth., 572 F.Supp.3d 307, 316 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (internal quotations omitted).

Rather than express any regret for its failure to adequately raise and brief this issue

in the first instance, Claremont contends that the court “erred factually and legally when it

declared Claremont’s contract null but failed to proceed through the ‘interest of justice’

analysis.” Doc. 69, p. 4. But in the only contractor cases on which Claremont relies, it is

clear that the party seeking damages raised the exception it believed applicable rather than

hoping that the issue would be considered sua sponte by the court.3 See Command

Construction, LLC v. Parish of Jefferson, 392 So.3d 638, 646 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2024);

Maroulis v. Entergy Louisiana, LLC, 20-226 314 So. 3d 1002, 1008 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.

2021), writ granted, judgment rev'd, 317 So. 3d 316 (La. 2021). To the extent Claremont

believed that the issue should only be raised after a determination of nullity, it is still

puzzling that Claremont would have made no mention of it throughout the briefing of a

12(b)(6) motion seeking dismissal of its counterclaims. The court is not Claremont’s

advocate and has no duty to raise arguments that it failed to uncover.

Claremont has not justified the delay in raising this issue, beyond its attempt to shift

the blame. Nevertheless, the court is mindful of the fact that this matter is still stuck at the

pleading stage. This brief detour will not derail trial preparations or ongoing discovery.4

3 In Kimball v. HEALTHCAREfirst, Inc., 2013 WL 4782139 (M.D. La. Sep. 5, 2013), the plaintiff sought damages

under Article 2033 and moved for reconsideration of the court’s finding that the article did not apply because the

contract was not an absolute nullity. Id. at *1. Claremont relies on this case most heavily for the proposition that this

court erred by refusing to consider “interest of justice,” but that exception is not raised or considered in Kimball.

Additionally, it is clear from the original opinion that plaintiff raised her entitlement to damages under Article 2033 in

the first place. See Kimball v. HEALTHCAREfirst, Inc., 2013 WL 12239550, at *2 (M.D. La. June 6, 2013), on

reconsideration, 2013 WL 4782139 (M.D. La. Sept. 5, 2013) (“Kimball argues that Louisiana Civil Code articles 2030

and 2033 invalidate the agreement as a whole, and would allow her to acquire damages.”).

4 The court’s decision to allow reconsideration at this juncture is no guarantee that reconsideration will be allowed in

the future, even if this case remains stuck at the pleading stage for the next several months. The parties are cautioned

to present their best arguments and research on the first attempt.

Additionally, the issue is a somewhat novel one that may prove relevant to future cases

involving out-of-state contractors. Accordingly, the court will consider whether the interest

of justice exception applies.5

Louisiana Civil Code article 2030 provides that “[a] contract is absolutely null when

it violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral.” La.

Civ. Code art. 2030. As discussed in the court’s prior opinion, this has been applied to

contracts that violate prohibitory laws such as the contractor licensing statute at issue.

Article 2033 discusses the effects of null contracts. It provides, in relevant part:

Nevertheless, a performance rendered under a contract that is

absolutely null because its object or its cause is illicit or immoral may not be

recovered by a party who knew or should have known of the defect that

makes the contract null. The performance may be recovered, however, when

that party invokes the nullity to withdraw from the contract before its purpose

is achieved and also in exceptional situations when, in the discretion of

the court, that recovery would further the interest of justice.

La. Civ. Code art. 2033 (emphasis added). Unless this exception applies, the contractor or

vendor on an absolutely null contract is limited to recovery of actual costs without

allowance for profit or overhead. E.g., Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So.2d 444, 445–47

(La. 1974); Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So.2d 914, 917–18 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.

1974).

5 In its reply Claremont attempts to expand the scope of its motion to reconsider by pointing to new allegations in its

proposed amended complaint, indicating that it acted as a single business entity with a Louisiana contractor it hired

for the project. On the original motion to dismiss, the court rejected Claremont’s allegation that it had complied with

the licensing statute by hiring a Louisiana contractor. Doc. 55, pp. 9–10. Navarre maintains that Claremont’s

allegations should be stricken because they exceed the limited leave to amend granted by the court. To the extent

Claremont believes its new allegations revive any of its counterclaims, the court will address these under Navarre’s

Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. See doc. 63.

Claremont chiefly relies on Command Construction6, supra, another matter in which

a construction contract was subject to nullification due to its violation of a prohibitory law.

The defendant (Jefferson Parish) had violated the Public Bid Law by failing to accept the

lowest responsible bidder, as determined in a separate proceeding. See Boh Bros.

Construction Co., LLC v. Parish of Jefferson, 325 So.3d 500 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2021).

While that appeal was pending the Parish contracted with the second-lowest bidder,

Command Construction, for the same work. Command Constr., LLC, 392 So.3d at 641–42.

Even after the appellate court determined that the Public Bid Law had been violated, the

parish never ordered Command Construction to stop working on the project. Id. at 643.

After completion of the project, however, the Parish asserted for the first time that the

contract was a nullity and that Command Construction was only entitled to recover costs.

Id. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled and the appellate court

affirmed that Command Construction had shown an issue of fact as to whether Article

2033’s “interest of justice” exception applied:

We further conclude, as did the trial judge, that even if the contract is

a nullity, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Command is

limited to recovery of costs. As an exception to the general rule that only

costs may be recovered for a contract which is a nullity due to violation of a

prohibitory law, La. C.C. art. 2033 permits that profit and overhead may also

be recovered in exceptional situations when, in the discretion of the court,

that recovery would further the interest of justice. In the instant case, the

Parish evidently allowed Command to continue work on the project after this

6 The only other construction case cited by Claremont is Maroulis v. Entergy La., LLC, 317 So.3d 316 (La. 2021), a

short per curiam in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a contractor was not entitled to invoke the contract’s

nullity to avoid liability to a third party. The court did not discuss exceptional circumstances and instead emphasized

1984 Revision Comment (c), which states in relevant part that “a party who knew or should have known at the time

of contracting of a defect that made the contract absolutely null may not avail himself of the nullity when the purpose

of the contract has been accomplished.” Id. (emphasis added). Here there is no allegation that Navarre knew of

Claremont’s license status at the time of contracting.

court's ruling in Boh Bros. and after the Supreme Court denied writs;

requested additional work on the project; and put the project into use after

completion, then contended that the contract is a nullity. These and other

related allegations of fact may well constitute “exceptional situations.”

Further, the question of whether, in the discretion of the trial court, such

exceptional circumstances as these are in the interest of justice, so as to

justify recovery of more than only costs, is also material and remains, at the

least, genuinely at issue.

Id. at 650 (emphasis in original; footnotes removed).

Here, however, there is no allegation that Navarre became aware of the defect during

the life of the contract, persisted in its relationship with Claremont, and then invoked the

nullity defense. Instead, Claremont points to the fact that Navarre accepted and paid for

millions of dollars in work and used Claremont’s invoices to resolve its insurance dispute.7

But this is hardly an “exceptional circumstance,” as required by Article 2033. Indeed, it

would be true for most disaster repair cases involving unlicensed contractors—a subset of

cases that the licensing law was likely designed to address, given the high demand and

resulting opportunities for corner-cutting that the widespread devastation of hurricanes and

floods can create. Had the legislature desired to create an exception to nullification when

there is evidence that the customer accepted the work or received insurance coverage for

it, it might have done so. As it stands, however, the court finds no basis to effectively

exempt these cases from the effects of the contractor licensing requirements.

7 Claremont complains that Navarre only took issue with its licensure status after Claremont learned of Navarre’s

settlement with its insurer and made demand for the outstanding balance in January 2024, well after the work was

completed. Doc. 57, att. 1, p. 16.

II.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Reconsider [doc. 57] is hereby

DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on the 24th day of October, 2025.

< JAMES D. CAIN, TR C .

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 11 of 11