SUTPHIN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

GREGORY ALLEN SUTPHIN, SR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24CV985

)

KING N.C. POLICE DEPARTMENT )

and COUNTY OF STOKES, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application

for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 2). The Court

will grant the instant Application, for the limited purpose of

recommending dismissal of this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

INTRODUCTION

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because

his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the

costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). However,

that statute also provides, inter alia, that “the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . .

(B) the action . . . is frivolous or . . . fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

As to the first of those grounds for dismissal, “a complaint . . .

is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To make

that assessment, the Court “appl[ies] common sense.” Nasim, 64

F.3d at 954. The second, above-quoted ground for dismissal

attaches if a complaint fails “to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff purports “to bring forth a 42 U.S.

Code [§] 1983 Civil TORT Action against King N.C. Police Department

[(the “KPD”)] and the County of Stokes.” (Docket Entry 1 (the

“Complaint”) at 1; see also id. at 4 (“seeking $150,000 from the

[KPD] for their [sic] unlawful violations of [Plaintiff’s

c]onstitutional [r]ights” and “also seeking $150,000 from [t]he

County of Stokes for . . . hindering [Plaintiff’s c]onstitutional

[r]ights”).) The Complaint begins by recounting Plaintiff’s

experience with the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles

(“NCDMV”) beginning on August 12, 2024, when he attempted “to renew

[his] drivers license” (id. at 1), but could not “because of a 2019

DUI & Civil Revocation in King N.C. [as to which he] had to pay a

restoration fee” (id.). According to the Complaint, when Plaintiff

“informed the NCDMV Agent that the case was dismissed due to the

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KPD[’s] refus[al] to appear and provide evidence that would have

proven [the KPD] had no ‘Probable Cause’ to approach [Plaintiff]”

(id.), the “NCDMV Agent informed [Plaintiff that] ‘No Probable

Cause’ was needed on the court records before [Plaintiff] can renew

[his] drivers license and have the Civil Revocation fee removed”

(id.). The Complaint further alleges:

One of the NCDMV Agents also called [the] Stokes County

Courthouse and explained the issue to them [sic], but the

Stokes County District Attorney said they [sic] will not

make any changes to correct the record. . . .

[Plaintiff] also went to the Stokes County Courthouse to

explain the issue with them [sic]. The Stokes County

District Attorney and the Clerk of Court said they will

not make any changes to the record . . . . [The] Stokes

County District Attorney and Clerk of Court informed

[Plaintiff that he] would have to hire an attorney to

correct this issue. [Plaintiff] was also refused to be

allowed to record [his] personal business with the Stokes

County Courthouse to gather their words and information

in the case . . . .

(Id.; see also id. (describing Plaintiff’s inability “to hire a

lawyer to correct problems that have arisen from the[] unlawful

actions that prevent [him] from renewing [his] drivers license,” as

well as hardships he has suffered due to loss of drivers license).)

Next, the Complaint shifts to a discussion of the underlying

incident from 2019 that resulted in the civil revocation of

Plaintiff’s drivers license. (See id. at 1-2.) Specifically, the

Complaint alleges that, in the aftermath of Plaintiff’s near-

collision with a KPD police cruiser at a convenience store caused

by the KPD officer’s negligence (see id.), that officer (later

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joined by a second KPD officer) arrested Plaintiff for DUI and

roughly handled him, in a manner “violating [his c]lonstitutional

[rJights” (id. at 2), with the harm “hav[ing] reappeared five years

later” (id.), as “their unlawful actions [have] prevent[ed

Plaintiff] from renewing [his] drivers license” (id.).!

' The Complaint additionally describes a prior incident from

“early 2014” (Docket Entry 1 at 2), in which the same KPD officer

who caused Plaintiff’s arrest in 2019 “attempted to accuse [him] of

a DUI” (id.) and, due to “negligen[ce] in [that officer’s]

knowledge of CDLs and the NCGS, Chapter 20 Article 2C” (id.), “took

[Plaintiff’s] license” (id.), after which that officer “pulled

[Plaintiff] over again and refused to let [him] go to work” (id.;

see also id. (“[Plaintiff] went the next day to get [his] drivers

license and [the same KPD officer] had [Plaintiff] pulled over

again that same week without doing his due diligence ... . [T]he

situation escalated into another harsh verbal altercation. [That

KPD officer] admitted to harassing [Plaintiff] by calling on

another KPD [o]fficer to pull [Plaintiff] over. After several

minutes of [that] tense interaction, [the KPD officers] left the

scene and [Plaintiff] went to work.”)). According to the

Complaint, “[i]n 2016, [Plaintiff also] video recorded [the same

KPD o]fficer [] and four or five other KPD [o]fficers violating

[Plaintiff’s] [c]lonstitutional [r]lights.” (Id. at 3.) On that

occasion, Plaintiff allegedly “was at the Stokes County Fair

speaking with a group of people at a political tent” (id.), when,

“[s]luddenly, [that KPD o]fficer [] approached [Plaintiff] and told

[him that he was] banned and ha[d] to exit the premises under

threat of arrest without consulting the property owner” (id.; see

also id. at 3-4 (describing events (A) from “February of 2019”

which led Plaintiff to conclude that no ban prevented his presence

at fairgrounds, and (B) from “September of 2019, after the DUI case

was dismissed,” when (while at “the King Fair”) Plaintiff

encountered second KPD officer involved in Plaintiff’s DUI arrest

earlier that year, who “told [Plaintiff that he would] be arrested

if [he] d[id] not leave,” after which Plaintiff “tried to inform

[that officer] that [Plaintiff] was not banned” but nonetheless

“complied and started walking to the parking lot,” whereupon “four

or five [KPD o]fficers violently attacked [Plaintiff] in front of

hundreds of witnesses and arrested [him] for being drunk and

disorderly and trespassing,” which charges eventually got

“dismissed by the [j]udge”)).

Subsequently (per the Complaint):

During the 2019 DUI court case, . . . [Plaintiff]

subpoenaed all of the [p]olice [b]ody cam footage and for

[the KPD o]fficer [who instigated Plaintiff’s arrest] to

appear. [The two KPD officers involved in the arrest]

did not appear at any of the court dates, and failed to

provide the subpoenaed body cam footage to prove they had

no probable cause in th[at] matter. The judge also

paused the court session and ordered the Stokes County

District Attorney to call [one of those KPD o]fficer[s ].

His phone was seemingly turned off . . ., [and] the

[j]udge ordered the Stokes County District Attorney to

call the KPD to inquire about [that o]fficer[’s ]

whereabouts. The District Attorney was informed by [the]

KPD that the[ KPD] seemingly had no idea where [that

o]fficer [] was and why he was not in court.

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also attached to the Complaint a copy of a

dismissal form dated September 10, 2019, in which a state

prosecutor in Stokes County dismissed charges against Plaintiff for

“DWI” and “Intox & Disrupt.” after the “State’s motion[, presumably

for a continuance, was] denied[ when a KPD officer was] not

present/training.” (Id. at 5.)

The Complaint asserts that, “[i]f the Stokes County District

Attorney had handled the 2019 DUI case properly, and KPD would have

produced all evidence, [Plaintiff] would have been proven innocent

and [would have proven] the KPD had no probable cause in the

matter.” (Id. at 3.) In particular, Plaintiff has alleged that

the subpoenaed body cam footage “would have shown the[ KPD

officers’] actions [were] unlawful with no basis to approach

[Plaintiff] and commit an injustice.” (Id.; see also id. at 2

(“[The] Stokes County Courthouse has enabled [the] KPD to conceal

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the evidence that would have proven [Plaintiff’s] innocence in the

matter. They [sic] chose to cover up and allow the case to be

dismissed due to [the] KPD not appearing and help[ed] in keeping

the police body cam footage concealed.”), 4 (contending, in

connection with request for damages against Stokes County, that

Stokes County District Attorney “is upholding the injustices

committed by the [KPD]”).)

DISCUSSION

In reviewing this case under Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court

should note first that Section 1983 “applies, by its terms, only to

a ‘person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory[,]’ deprives a person

of a constitutional or statutory right, privilege, or immunity.”

White Coat Waste Project v. Greater Richmond Transit Co., 35 F.4th

179, 189-90 (4th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983). The United States Supreme Court has held “that Congress

did intend municipalities . . . to be included among those persons

to whom [Section] 1983 applies.” Monell v. Department of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (emphasis omitted). However, “a

municipal agency is not an entity that may be sued. Furthermore,

under North Carolina law, a police department is not an independent

legal entity with the capacity to sue and be sued.” Baker v.

Durham Cnty. S.W.A.T. Team, No. 1:14CV878, 2016 WL 2621972, at *4

(M.D.N.C. May 5, 2016) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.) (emphasis

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added) (internal brackets, citation, and quotation marks omitted),

recommendation adopted sub nom., Baker v. Durham S.E.T., No.

1:14CV878, 2016 WL 3747615 (M.D.N.C. July 11, 2016) (unpublished)

(Osteen, C.J.). The Court thus should dismiss the Section 1983

claim(s) against the KPD “because th[at] entit[y] .. . is simply

a component of the municipality, and, therefore, lacks the capacity

to be sued.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, e.g.,

Scott v. City of Durham, No. 1:20CV558, 2021 WL 3856168, at *1

(M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2021) (unpublished) (Eagles, J.).

On the other hand, Plaintiff could have pursued Section 1983

claims “against the legal entity operating the [KPD], the City of

[King].” Scott, 2021 WL 3856168, at *1; see also, e.g., Franklin

City of Charlotte, 64 F.4th 519, 535 (4th Cir. 2023)

(“Municipalities are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.”).

But, “[t]o hold a municipality liable for a constitutional

violation under [Section] 1983, [ P]Jlaintiff must show that the

execution of a policy or custom of the municipality caused th[at]

violation,” Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg, 139 F.4th 378, 384 (4th

Cir. 2025); “[t]his is referred to as Monell liability,” id.

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Under Monell, “a municipality

cannot be held liable simply for employing a tortfeasor,” Riddick

v. School Bd. of City of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir.

2000) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691), as “[S]ection 1983 was not

designed to impose municipal liability under the doctrine of

respondeat superior,” id. at 523. Moreover, “not every decision by

every municipal official will subject a municipality to [S]ection

1983 liability.” Id. “Therefore, to impose municipal liability

. . ., [P]laintiff[] must identify municipal officials with final

policymaking authority to implement the alleged policy [or custom

that caused the constitutional injury].” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d

708, 712 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that “official policy” does

not arise from “episodic exercises of discretion in the operational

details of government” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Applying those legal principles, even if Plaintiff had sued

the City of King (rather than the KPD), the Court should “find that

[any] Monell claim [still would] properly [be] dismissed.” Blair

v. Appomattox Cnty. Sch. Bd., 147 F.4th 484, 493 (4th Cir. 2025).

Simply stated, the Complaint does not allege the existence of any

policy or custom of the City of King that caused any alleged

constitutional harm (see Docket Entry 1), and thus the Complaint

“fail[s] to establish Monell liability even at th[e pleading]

stage,” Blair, 147 F.4th at 493. Put another way:

Critically lacking is any support for the proposition

that [any KPD o]fficer . . . implemented an official

government policy or custom. As the Supreme Court has

recently explained, “threadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice” to plead a claim. And

“[courts] are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

[Plaintiff’s] allegations “do not permit [this Court] to

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct [by

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the City of King].” This mere possibility is inadequate

to subject the [City of King] to [Plaintiff’s Section

1983] suit for monetary damages.

Walker v. Prince George’s Cnty., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009)

(emphasis added) (internal brackets, citations, and some quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79) .°

Likewise, Plaintiff can pursue a Section 1983 claim against

Stokes County only where the conduct “that is alleged to be

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by [Stokes County],” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, or a

* Any Section 1983 claim(s) against KPD officers in their

individual capacities for conduct alleged in the Complaint would

fail as time-barred. “The statute of limitations for all [Section]

1983 claims is borrowed from the applicable state’s statute of

limitations for personal-injury actions . .. .” Tommy Davis

Const., Inc. v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807 F.3d 62, 66-67 (4th

Cir. 2015). As a result, “[Section] 1983 claims arising in North

Carolina are limited by the three-year period for personal injury

actions set forth in [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 1-52(5).” Id. at 67

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The limitations period for a

[Section] 1983 claim begins to run when the plaintiff has a

complete and present cause of action - in other words, when [the

plaintiff] could have filed suit and obtained relief.” Id.

(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). Given the

Complaint’s allegations (detailed in the Introduction) that the KPD

officers’ conduct occurred in 2019 (at the latest) and that

dismissal of all resulting charges occurred no later than 2020,

i.e., more than three years before Plaintiff filed this action on

November 21, 2024 (see Docket Entry 1 at 1), a Section 1983 claim

against the KPD officers would face dismissal for frivolousness, as

“it appear[s] on the face of the [C]lomplaint . . . that the

applicable statute of limitations bars [any such claim],” Todd _v.

Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Nasim, 64

F.3d at 956 (“[T]he [district] court found that [the plaintiff’s

claim] was barred by the applicable .. . statute of limitations.

In these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that the action was frivolous ... .”).

Stokes County “‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received

formal approval through [Stokes County’s] official decisionmaking

channels,” id. at 691; see also id. (holding that local government

unit “cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior

theory” (italics omitted)). The Complaint states no claim against

Stokes County because it makes no allegation that a policy or

custom of Stokes County “cause[d anyone] to violate [Plaintiff’s]

constitutional rights,” id. at 692. (See Docket Entry 1.) In that

regard (as the Introduction shows), the Complaint seeks to impose

liability on Stokes County for actions (or inactions) of the Stokes

County District Attorney’s Office and the Stokes County Clerk of

Court’s Office. Yet, those offices constitute arms of the State of

North Carolina (not of Stokes County). See, e.g., Morris-Wilkins

v. Joyner, No. 5:24CV462, 2025 WL 2399241, at *12 (E.D.N.C. July 7,

2025) (unpublished) (“[Court c]lerks are state officials under []

North Carolina law, not county officials.” (citing N.C. Const. art.

IV, S 9(3) and N.C. Gen. Stat. $§ 7A-40 & T7A-102(a))),

recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2798504 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2025)

(unpublished); N.C. Const. art. IV, § 18(1) (“The District Attorney

shall . . . be responsible for the prosecution on behalf of the

State of all criminal actions in the Superior Courts of his

district, perform such duties related to appeals therefrom as the

Attorney General may require, and perform such other duties as the

General Assembly may prescribe.” (emphasis added)).

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That fact not only (A) defeats Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claim(s) against Stokes County, see, e.g., In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d

505, 3514 (4th Cir. 1990) (describing “assertion that the district

attorney ‘serves as the criminal prosecution arm of [North Carolina

cJounty and as such makes policy in . . . criminal prosecution

matters for [that c]Jounty’” as “misstatement[] of fact” because,

“Ti]n fact, [North Carolina law] indicates that the [d]istrict

[a]ttorney is an officer of the state, not an agent nor an employee

of the county”); Wiley v. Buncombe Cnty., 846 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487

(W.D.N.C.) (“To the extent that [the p]laintiff argues that [a

North Carolina c]ounty is responsible for the actions of [a county

c]llerk [], this claim must also fail.”), aff’d, 474 F. App’x 285

(4th Cir. 2012), □□□ also (B) precludes any such claim(s) against

the Stokes County District Attorney’s Office or the Stokes County

Clerk of Court’s Office, as “Will [v. Michigan Department of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989),] prohibits a [Section] 1983 action

against [such arms of the state],” Manning v. South Carolina Dep’t

of Highway & Pub. Transp., 914 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1990); see

also Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (“conclu[ding] that a State is not a

‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”), 70 (extending that holding

to “arms of the State” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bright

v. McClure, 865 F.2d 623, 626 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The action against

the [clerk of court] in his official capacity is clearly one

against the state of North Carolina. . . . Congress has made no

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move to impose § 1983 liability upon states . .. .”); Grady v.

Vickory, Civ. No. 5:11-CT-3212, 2013 WL 12121997, at *1 (E.D.N.C.

May 8, 2013) (unpublished) (citing Will and dismissing as frivolous

Section 1983 claims against district attorney’s office), appeal

dismissed, 544 F. App’x 191 (4th Cir. 2013).°

> “Of course a state official in his or her official capacity,

when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under [Section]

1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are

not treated as actions against the State.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71

n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Complaint, however,

does not seek injunctive relief. (See Docket Entry 1.) In any

event, Plaintiff could not maintain a Section 1983 claim for

injunctive relief against a state official here, because the

Complaint does not allege facts showing that “execution of a

[state] policy or custom... inflict[ed any] injury,” Collins v.

City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992) (internal

quotation marks omitted); “instead[, the Complaint] recounts only

[Plaintiff’s] own personal experiences,” Harris v. Guice, No.

1:13CV268, 2015 WL 1401549, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2015)

(unpublished) (Peake, M.J.) (recommending, even as to “request

[for] injunctive relief,” that “official capacity claims against

[state officials] should be dismissed”), recommendation adopted,

2015 WL 2089691 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2015) (unpublished) (Beaty, S.J.).

(See Docket Entry 1.) Nor could Plaintiff succeed on a Section

1983 claim for damages against the Stokes County District Attorney

or the Stokes County Clerk of Court in their individual capacities,

in light of applicable immunity doctrines. See, e.g., Briscoe v.

LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983) (“The [Supreme] Court has already

addressed the question whether § 1983 permits damages recoveries

from judges, prosecutors, and other persons acting ‘under color of

law’ who perform official functions in the judicial process.

Again, [it] ha[s] found that, in light of common-law immunity

principles, § 1983 did not impose liability on these officials.”);

Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[A] court

clerk is generally entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.” (citing

Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 334-35)).

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s claims suffer from obvious, fatal, legal defects.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the instant Application (Docket

Entry 2) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT

TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed under Section

1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

October 27, 2025

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