Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 17 C 194

CREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC, )

MICHAEL BROWN, DANNY PIERCE, )

and ANDREW LLOYD, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

In 2017, the Federal Trade Commission sued Credit Bureau Center, LLC,

Michael Brown, Danny Pierce, and Andrew Lloyd for participating in a deceptive

marketing campaign. CBC offered free credit scores on its websites and, without

consent, enrolled over 150,000 consumers in a monthly credit monitoring service for a

fee, defrauding them of almost seven million dollars. Lloyd, a subcontractor who

generated traffic to CBC's websites through Craigslist posts, was represented by

counsel and signed a consent judgment in 2017. The Court imposed an agreed-upon

injunction and a monetary judgment. Lloyd now seeks relief from that agreed-upon

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(6). For the

reasons below, the Court denies Lloyd's motion.

Background

The Court summarizes the facts and procedural history, which are presented in

greater detail in previous opinions from both this Court and the Seventh Circuit.

CBC was a credit-monitoring business owned by Michael Brown that, via its

websites, offered free credit reports. Consumers requesting a free report were also

enrolled in a $29.94 monthly credit monitoring service, which was disclosed only in

small print. Lloyd was a subcontractor for Danny Pierce, an affiliate marketer for CBC.

Lloyd posted Craigslist ads for nonexistent rental properties to lure individuals to CBC

websites. Pierce, assisted by Lloyd, generated about three million visits to CBC's

sites and approximately seven million dollars in revenue.

In 2017, the FTC brought the present civil case under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 41–58, the Restore Online Shoppers' Confidence Act, id. §§ 8401–05, and the Fair

Credit Reporting Act, id. §§ 1681–1681x. The FTC sought an injunction and

restitution. Lloyd and Pierce, each of whom was represented by counsel, signed

consent judgments. Under section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), the Court

ordered a monetary judgment of $6.8 million against both Lloyd and Pierce, which was

suspended after Lloyd paid $645,000 and Pierce paid $117,000. Lloyd (and Pierce)

additionally "waive[d] all rights to appeal or otherwise challenge or contest the validity

of this Order." Dkt. 146 at 2.

The FTC's case against CBC and Brown continued. In 2017, the Court granted

the FTC's motion for summary judgment and entered a monetary judgment of

approximately five million dollars against CBC and Brown under section 13(b) of the

FTC Act. After the Seventh Circuit and then the Supreme Court held that section

13(b) did not allow equitable monetary relief, the Court reimposed the same judgment

terms under other statutory provisions, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. See FTC v.

Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019); AMG Capital Management,

LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67 (2021); FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 81 F.4th 710 (7th

Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2671 (2024). Lloyd's settlement was not modified

by CBC and Brown's appeals.

The defendants also faced criminal prosecution following the initial judgments

in the present case. Brown was indicted in 2020 in the Southern District of New York,

and in 2022, a superseding indictment named Lloyd as a co-defendant. Both were

charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and wire fraud, 18

U.S.C. § 1343. At the recommendation of the pretrial services officer in the criminal

case, Lloyd had a psychiatric evaluation in November 2022. The evaluator stated that

she had a suspicion of autism spectrum disorder and diagnosed Lloyd with several

other mental health conditions, stating that in her view, Lloyd had a serious need for

treatment. By January 2023, Lloyd was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and

was in treatment. Around June 2023, the government provided Lloyd with discovery,

including agent reports and FTC and government interview notes. Lloyd contends that

this material revealed that his actions were directed by Pierce and that the FTC had

relied on misleading statements from Pierce about Lloyd's role in the CBC scheme.

Lloyd's criminal case was resolved through an order of nolle prosequi in July 2024.

In November 2024, the FTC issued refunds to over 40,000 consumers from just

under two million dollars recovered from the defendants. Lloyd filed the present

motion in July 2025.

Discussion

Lloyd has moved for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b)(4) and (6). Rule 60(b) provides six grounds upon which a court may relieve a

party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. These include "(4) the judgment is

void; . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule

60(b)(6) applies only if the grounds relied upon for relief do not fall under one or more

of the more specific subsections of Rule 60. See Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d

651, 658 (7th Cir. 2013).

Given the importance of finality of judgments, "Rule 60(b) relief is an

'extraordinary remedy' granted only in 'exceptional circumstances.'" In re Cook Med.,

Inc., 27 F.4th 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d

806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009)). Additionally, Rule 60(b) motions "must be made within a

reasonable time—and for [Rule 60(b)](1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the

entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c).

There are several threshold problems with Lloyd's motion. First, he stipulated

to entry of an order in which he expressly "waive[d] all rights to appeal or otherwise

challenge or contest the validity of this order." Dkt. 146 at 2. But that is exactly what

Lloyd's Rule 60(b) motion does. He argues that the order was the product of fraud or

misconduct by the FTC, specifically its failure to disclose the existence of a criminal

investigation. He claims the order is invalid because it awarded equitable monetary

relief pursuant to section 13(b) of the FTC Act, but the Supreme Court held in AMG

that section 13(b) does not authorize equitable monetary relief. Lloyd also argues that

the order violates due process, claiming that the FTC concealed evidence that would

have minimized his culpability and secured his agreement to the order "under extreme

duress to a severely mentally ill person amidst an active, secret criminal

investigation[.]" Def.'s Mem. of Law at 16. Each of these points amounts to a

"challenge or contest [to] the validity of" the consent judgment.

Lloyd expressly waived his right to assert these challenges. He identifies no

authority allowing Rule 60(b) relief despite his waiver. FTC v. Elite It Partners, Inc., 91

F.4th 1042, 1046–47 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 150 (2024) (holding that

defendants who signed a stipulation with language identical to Lloyd's waived a Rule

60(b)(6) challenge that equitable monetary relief was invalid after AMG). Lloyd signed

a broad waiver that encompassed challenges under Rule 60, and he "cannot be

relieved of such a choice merely because [his] assessment of the consequences was

incorrect." McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting

United States v. Bank of New York, 14 F.3d 756, 759 (2d Cir.1994)).

Even if Lloyd had not waived his Rule 60 challenge, it would fail. Lloyd

primarily rests his motion on Rule 60(b)(6), a catch-all provision that applies only

where the challenge does not fall within one of the other subsections of Rule 60. See

Mendez, 725 F.3d at 658. A court independently assesses the basis for a Rule 60

motion to ensure a party has labeled its claim under the proper provision. See, e.g.,

Brandon v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 293, 295–96 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a

Rule 60(b)(6) motion was appropriately considered as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion and was

untimely). Lloyd argues that the FTC engaged in fraud or misconduct by withholding

significant evidence and by not disclosing the existence of a criminal investigation,

which, he contends, resulted in "bad faith settlement negotiations." Def.'s Reply at 8.

This contention falls within Rule 60(b)(3), which provides for relief based on "(3) fraud

(whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by

an opposing party[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Lloyd also argues for relief based on the

discovery later produced in his criminal case (which he characterizes as Brady

material). This assertion falls squarely within Rule 60(b)(2)'s provision for relief based

on "newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

Lloyd may not employ Rule 60(b)(6) to seek relief that actually falls within Rule

60(b)(2) and (3), as he brings his motion far outside the one-year period after the entry

of judgment under which challenges under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3) must be made. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(c); Pearson v. Target Corp., 893 F.3d 980, 984 (7th Cir. 2018).

Even if Lloyd's request for relief properly fell within Rule 60(b)(6), he failed to

move for relief within a "reasonable time[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Eight years have

passed since the Court entered its stipulated order, and the FTC has already awarded

consumers the money that Lloyd now seeks to have returned. Lloyd began mental

health treatment and was given a preliminary diagnosis of autism in 2022, and the

allegedly exculpatory documentation that he obtained via discovery in his criminal

case was produced in 2023. Lloyd does not provide a viable excuse for why his

motion, which primarily rests on the claimed severity of his autism and the discovery

material, was not filed until 2025, nor does he marshal "extraordinary circumstances"

that would warrant disturbing the FTC's award to 40,000 consumers or an eight-year-

old consent judgment. O'Neal v. Reilly, 961 F.3d 973, 975 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Grover, 792 F.3d 753, 754 (7th Cir. 2015)). Lloyd contends

that his mental condition and need for treatment justify equitable tolling of Rule 60's

time limitations, but Rule 60 contains "[m]andatory claim-processing rules, [that] if

properly invoked, must be enforced." In re Cook Med., 27 F.4th at 543 (quoting

Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 897 F.3d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 2018)).

Finally, Lloyd seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(4), arguing that the judgment is

void. But "Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is

premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process

that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard." United Student Aid

Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010). The jurisdictional error must be

"egregious" and "involve a clear usurpation of judicial power, where the court

wrongfully extends its jurisdiction beyond the scope of its authority." United States v.

Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 2000). Lloyd suggests that there was a

jurisdictional error because section 13(b) of the FTC Act, on which his stipulation was

based, does not permit equitable monetary relief, as the Supreme Court held in AMG.

But at the time Lloyd agreed to the entry of judgment, every court of appeals to

consider this issue had agreed that section 13(b) permitted courts to award equitable

monetary relief. See FTC v. Ross, 74 F.4th 186, 192–93 (4th Cir. 2023) (collecting

cases). Several other courts have held that the award of equitable monetary relief

under section 13(b) was not an egregious jurisdictional error under Rule 60(b)(4) and

have rejected challenges under Rule 60(b)(6) based on the same argument, as a

change in law is generally not considered an "extraordinary circumstance" meriting

relief. See id. at 191–95; FTC v. Hewitt, 68 F.4th 461, 466, 470 (9th Cir. 2023).

Finally, Lloyd does not present a due process argument based on notice or the

opportunity to be heard, the other basis that authorizes relief under Rule 60(b)(4).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Lloyd's motion for relief from

judgment under Rule 60 [dkt. 312].

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY

United States District Judge

Date: October 27, 2025