The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 ----oo0oo----
11
12 TAYLOR SMART AND MICHAEL HACKER, No. 2:22-cv-02125 WBS CSK
Individually and on Behalf of
13 All Those Similarly Situated,
14 Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR FINAL
15 v. APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
16 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AND COSTS
ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated
17 association,
18 Defendant.
19
20 ----oo0oo----
21 Plaintiffs Taylor Smart and Michael Hacker brought this
22 putative class action against defendant National Collegiate
23 Athletic Association (“NCAA”), alleging violations of section 1
24 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Unfair
25 Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (See
26 (Docket Nos. 1, 29.) This court granted plaintiffs’ motion for
27 preliminary approval of a class action settlement. (Order
28
1 Granting Prelim. Approval.) Plaintiffs now move for final
2 approval. (See Docket No. 83.)
3 The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy
4 favoring settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City
5 of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
6 Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009)
7 (“We put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length,
8 non-collusive, negotiated resolution[.]”) (citation omitted).
9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he
10 claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled
11 . . . only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
12 “Approval under 23(e) involves a two-step process in
13 which the Court first determines whether a proposed class action
14 settlement deserves preliminary approval and then, after notice
15 is given to class members, whether final approval is warranted.”
16 Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523,
17 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Manual for Complex Litig. (Third),
18 § 30.41 (1995)). This court satisfied step one by granting
19 plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class
20 action settlement on April 30, 2025. (Docket No. 80.) Now,
21 following notice to the class members, the court will consider
22 whether final approval is merited by evaluating: (1) the
23 treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2) the terms
24 of the settlement. See Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands,
25 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989).
26 I. Class Certification
27 The putative class consists of “[a]ll persons who,
28 pursuant to NCAA Division I Bylaw 11.7.6, served as a ‘volunteer
1 coach’ in college baseball at an NCAA Division I school from
2 November 29, 2018 to July 1, 2023.” (See Settlement Agreement
3 (Docket No. 73-1 at 27 ¶ 2.29) The class has approximately 1,000
4 members. (See Broshuis Decl. (Docket No. 73-1) ¶ 8.)
5 To be certified, the putative class must satisfy the
6 requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b).
7 Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013).
8 A. Rule 23(a)
9 Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: “(1)
10 the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
11 impracticable [numerosity]; (2) there are questions of law or
12 fact common to the class [commonality]; (3) the claims or
13 defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
14 or defenses of the class [typicality]; and (4) the representative
15 parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
16 class [adequacy of representation].” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
17 In the court’s order granting preliminary approval of
18 the settlement, the court found that the putative class satisfied
19 the Rule 23(a) requirements. (See Order Granting Prelim.
20 Approval at 4-10.) The court is unaware of any changes that
21 would affect its conclusion that the putative class satisfies the
22 Rule 23(a) requirements, and the parties have not indicated that
23 they are aware of any such developments.
24 Accordingly, the court finds that the class definition
25 proposed by plaintiffs meets the requirements of Rule 23(a).
26 B. Rule 23(b)
27 After fulfilling the threshold requirements of Rule
28 23(a), the proposed class must satisfy the requirements of one of
1 the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Leyva, 716 F.3d at 512.
2 Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides
3 that a class action may be maintained only if (1) “the court
4 finds that questions of law or fact common to class members
5 predominate over questions affecting only individual members” and
6 (2) “that a class action is superior to other available methods
7 for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed.
8 R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
9 In its order granting preliminary approval of the
10 settlement, the court found that both the predominance and
11 superiority prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) were satisfied.
12 (Order Granting Prelim. Approval at 10-12.) The court is unaware
13 of any changes that would affect its conclusion that Rule
14 23(b)(3) is satisfied. Because the settlement class satisfies
15 both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the court will grant final class
16 certification of this action.
17 C. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements
18 If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it
19 “must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable
20 under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
21 members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed.
22 R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and
23 content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D.
24 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
25 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice must be
26 “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff
27 class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d
28 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
1 Plaintiffs’ counsel provided the court with a proposed
2 email notice and proposed postcard notice to be sent to class
3 members. (See Docket No. 73-3 at 57-62.) The notices explain
4 the proceedings, define the scope of the class, and explain what
5 the settlement provides and the minimum amount each class member
6 can expect to receive in compensation. (See id.) The notices
7 further explain the opt-out procedure, the procedure for
8 objecting to the settlement, and the date and location of the
9 final approval hearing. (See id.) The content of the notices
10 therefore satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11 23(c)(2)(B); Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566,
12 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally
13 describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to
14 alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come
15 forward and be heard.’”) (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist.
16 No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980)).
17 The parties selected Kroll Settlement Administration
18 LLC to serve as the Settlement Administrator. (See Docket No. 83
19 at 12.) The class was notified by the Settlement Administrator
20 “via email, a postcard summary notice via first-class U.S. mail,
21 and the long-form notice posted on the settlement website.”
22 (Docket No. 83 at 7.) Emails were sent to 786 class members with
23 last-known email addresses, and first-class mail was sent to 893
24 class members with last-known physical addresses. (Id. at 13.)
25 The USPS returned 102 mailings as undeliverable. (Id.) Sixty-
26 seven mail notices were re-sent after contact information was
27 verified and updated. (Id.) Email notices were also re-sent
28 after follow-up communications with class members. (Id.)
1 Class Counsel further contacted class members to ensure
2 they knew about the settlement and encouraged them to submit
3 information via the settlement website. (Id. at 8.) Finally,
4 Class Counsel instructed the American Baseball Coaches
5 Association to notify its member-coaches about the settlement.
6 (Id.)
7 All told, the Settlement Administrator “has reason to
8 believe that approximately 98.82%” of the class received notice.
9 (Id. (citation modified).) The court appreciates the thorough
10 efforts taken by the parties to effectuate notice and is
11 satisfied that the notice procedure was “reasonably calculated,
12 under all the circumstances,” to apprise all class members of the
13 proposed settlement. See Roes, 944 F.3d at 1045–46.
14 II. Final Settlement Approval
15 Having determined that class treatment is warranted,
16 the court must now address whether the terms of the parties’
17 settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable. See Fed. R.
18 Civ. P. 23(e)(2). To determine the fairness, adequacy, and
19 reasonableness of the agreement, Rule 23(e) requires the court to
20 consider four factors: “(1) the class representatives and class
21 counsel have adequately represented the class; (2) the proposal
22 was negotiated at arm’s length; (3) the relief provided for the
23 class is adequate; and (4) the proposal treats class members
24 equitably relative to each other.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has
25 also identified eight additional factors the court may consider,
26 many of which overlap substantially with Rule 23(e)’s four
27 factors:
28 The strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk,
1 expense, complexity, and likely duration of
further litigation; the risk of maintaining class
2 action status throughout the trial; the amount
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery
3 completed and the stage of the proceedings; the
experience and views of counsel; the presence of
4 a governmental participant; and the reaction of
the class members to the proposed settlement.
5
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
6
A. Adequate Representation
7
The court must first consider whether “the class
8
representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the
9
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A). This analysis is
10
“redundant of the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . .” Hudson
11
v. Libre Tech., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-1371 GPC KSC, 2020 WL 2467060,
12
at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2020) (quoting 4 Newberg on Class
13
Actions § 13:48 (5th ed.)); see also In re GSE Bonds Antitr.
14
Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d 686, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting
15
similarity of inquiries under Rule 23(a)(4) and Rule
16
23(e)(2)(A)).
17
Because the Court has found that the proposed class
18
satisfies Rule 23(a)(4) for purposes of class certification, the
19
adequacy factor under Rule 23(e)(2)(A) is also met. See Hudson,
20
2020 WL 2467060, at *5.
21
B. Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement
22
This action was filed in 2022. (Docket No. 1.) The
23
court disposed of NCAA’s motions to dismiss and transfer venue in
24
2023. (Docket No. 29.) The parties attempted mediation in
25
summer 2024 but were unsuccessful in reaching a settlement at
26
that time. (Broshuis Decl. ¶ 11.) Following extensive
27
discovery, including several discovery motions (Docket Nos. 49-
28
1 50), and complex briefing on plaintiffs’ motion for class
2 certification (see Docket Nos. 63-67), the parties engaged in
3 settlement discussions and reached a settlement in January 2025.
4 (See Broshuis Decl. ¶¶ 6-11.) In its preliminary approval order,
5 this court instructed counsel to “provide additional information
6 concerning the settlement discussions to allow the court to fully
7 evaluate whether there are signs of collusion.” (Order Granting
8 Prelim. Approval at 16.)
9 Counsel represents that in light of the extensive
10 briefing, discovery, and knowledge gained from prior mediation,
11 the settlement discussion in January 2025 was conducted without a
12 mediator. (See Docket No. 83 at 17.) During that discussion,
13 the parties “talked and exchanged positions, offers, and
14 counteroffers several times over the course of a week.” (Id. at
15 18.) The discussions were informed by “expert analyses derived
16 from the subpoenaed school data” and “class certification
17 briefing.” (Id.) The parties ultimately reached an agreement on
18 January 31, 2025, which provided class members with over 90% of
19 their damages. (Id.)
20 Given the parties’ representation that the settlement
21 reached was the product of arms-length bargaining following
22 thorough informal discovery, the court finds that the proposed
23 settlement is the result of informed and non-collusive
24 negotiations between the parties. See La Fleur v. Med. Mgmt.
25 Int’l, Inc., No. 13-cv-00398, 2014 WL 2967475, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal.
26 June 25, 2014).
27 C. Adequate Relief
28 In determining whether a settlement agreement provides
1 adequate relief for the class, the court must “take into account
2 (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the
3 effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to
4 the class, including the method of processing class-member
5 claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees,
6 including timing of payment; and (iv) any [other] agreement[s]”
7 made in connection with the proposal. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
8 23(e)(2)(C); Baker v. SeaWorld Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-cv-02129-MMA-
9 AGS, 2020 WL 4260712, at *6-8 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2020).
10 The court notes that, in evaluating whether the
11 settlement provides adequate relief, it must consider several of
12 the same factors outlined in Hanlon, including the strength of
13 the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
14 duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class
15 action status throughout the trial; and the amount offered in
16 settlement. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
17 In determining whether a settlement agreement is
18 substantively fair to class members, the court must balance the
19 value of expected recovery against the value of the settlement
20 offer. See In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d
21 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007). When a settlement was reached prior
22 to class certification, it is subject to heightened scrutiny for
23 purposes of final approval. See In re Apple Inc., 50 F.4th at
24 782. The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel will not be
25 given a presumption of reasonableness, but rather will be subject
26 to close review. See id. at 782-83. The court will particularly
27 scrutinize “any subtle signs that class counsel have allowed
28 pursuit of their own self-interests to infect the negotiations.”
1 See id. at 782 (quoting Roes, 944 F.3d at 1043).
2 Plaintiffs’ expert calculated the total damages
3 suffered by class members to be $49,790,000. (Rascher Decl.
4 (Docket No. 73-2) ¶ 9.) The common settlement fund is
5 $49,250,000, approximately 99% of the estimated calculation.
6 (See Docket No. 83 at 19-20.) Plaintiffs propose to allocate
7 that amount as follows: (1) $32,917,797.61 in payments to class
8 members; (2) $14,775,000 for plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees and
9 $1,377,052.39 for costs and expenses; (3) $30,150 to pay the
10 settlement administrator and $35,000 to pay the economist for
11 work on the settlement administration; (4) $7,500 incentive
12 awards for the two named plaintiffs; and (5) a contingency fund
13 of $100,000. (See id. at 2-3.)
14 The portion of the settlement allocated to class member
15 payments -- $32,917,797.61 -- constitutes approximately 66.84% of
16 the maximum valuation. This represents a strong result for the
17 class and is comfortably within the range of percentage
18 recoveries that California courts have found to be reasonable.
19 See Cavazos v. Salas Concrete, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00062 DAD EPG,
20 2022 WL 2918361, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2022) (collecting
21 cases). Based on these figures, the average payment per class
22 member is $36,000. This five-figure payout also represents a
23 strong result for the class.
24 Payments to class members will be allocated according
25 to the number of years worked and the school for which each
26 member worked. (See Docket No. 83 at 3.) Plaintiffs will
27 calculate class member allotments using their expert’s
28 methodology, which estimates member entitlements based on actual
1 third assistant coach salaries in 2023, deflated according to
2 compensation changes for other assisted coaches over time. (Id.)
3 If a school has not provided data, plaintiffs’ expert uses data
4 from a comparable peer school, ensuring school-specific damages.
5 (Id.) The final calculation includes the value of unprovided
6 health benefits, which are also deflated in keeping with the
7 likely value of those benefits for the relevant year worked.
8 (Id. at 4.)
9 Plaintiffs faced numerous hurdles in this antitrust
10 litigation, including proving all elements of the claims,
11 obtaining and maintaining class certification, establishing
12 liability, and the costliness of litigation and potential appeals
13 on these issues. To begin with, plaintiffs’ motion for class
14 certification was contested. (Id. at 23.) Litigation and
15 probable appeal of certification alone would have meant onerous
16 delay and expense. Defendants alleged several procompetitive
17 justifications for their policy, any one of which, had it
18 succeeded, would have defeated plaintiffs’ case. (See Docket No.
19 63-10 at 20.) Defendants also challenged plaintiffs’ expert
20 methodology during certification; had they successfully brought
21 that challenge at a later stage it may well have barred recovery
22 of damages entirely. (See Docket No. 83 at 24-25.)
23 In light of the risks associated with further
24 litigation and the relative strength of defendant’s arguments,
25 the court finds that the value of the settlement counsels in
26 favor of granting final approval. The court further finds the
27 method of processing class member claims to be adequate. Each
28 class member’s individual share of the settlement is
1 proportional to the amount of time each member worked and the
2 school for which they worked. The court is also satisfied that
3 counsel’s requested fees are reasonable and support approval of
4 the settlement, which it will address in greater detail below.
5 D. Equitable Treatment of Class Members
6 Finally, the court must consider whether the Settlement
7 Agreement “treats class members equitably relative to each
8 other.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). In doing so, the court
9 determines whether the settlement “improperly grant[s]
10 preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of
11 the class.” Hudson, 2020 WL 2467060, at *9 (quoting Tableware,
12 484 F. Supp. at 1079).
13 Here, the Settlement Agreement does not improperly
14 discriminate between any segments of the class, as all class
15 members are entitled to monetary relief based on the amount of
16 time worked as a volunteer coach and the school for which the
17 class member worked. (See Docket No. 83 at 3.)
18 E. Remaining Hanlon Factors
19 In addition to the factors already considered as part
20 of the court’s analysis under Rule 23(e)(A)-(D), the court must
21 also examine “the extent of the discovery completed . . ., the
22 presence of government participation, and the reaction of class
23 members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
24 As explained above, counsel engaged in thorough
25 informal discovery. This factor thus weighs in favor of final
26 approval of the settlement.
27 The seventh Hanlon factor pertains to government
28 participation. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. As there is no
1 government participation in this case, this factor is neutral.
2 The eighth Hanlon factor, the reaction of the class
3 members to the proposed settlement, also weighs in favor of final
4 approval. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. The class has expressed
5 “overwhelming support,” responding to hundreds of phone calls and
6 emails and providing thankful and supportive comments. (See
7 Broshuis Final Approval Decl. ¶ 5.) None of the class members
8 have opted out or objected. (Id.)
9 In sum, the four factors that the court must evaluate
10 under Rule 23(e) and the eight Hanlon factors, taken as a whole,
11 weigh in favor of approving the settlement. The court will
12 therefore grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement.
13 III. Attorneys’ Fees
14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides, “[i]n a
15 certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s
16 fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the
17 parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). If a negotiated
18 class action settlement includes an award of attorneys’ fees,
19 that fee award must be evaluated in the overall context of the
20 settlement. Knisley v. Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th
21 Cir. 2002); Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443,
22 455 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.). The court “ha[s] an
23 independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the
24 settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have
25 already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prod.
26 Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). “Under the
27 ‘common fund’ doctrine, ‘a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a
28 common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his
1 client is entitled to a reasonable [attorneys’] fee from the fund
2 as a whole.’” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 969 (9th Cir.
3 2003) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478
4 (1980)). In common fund cases, the district court has discretion
5 to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees to be drawn from the
6 fund by employing either the percentage method or the lodestar
7 method. Id. The court may also use one method as a “cross-
8 check[ ]” upon the other method. See Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d
9 at 944.
10 Like other complex antitrust class actions, this case
11 presented both counsel and the class with a risk of no recovery
12 at all, as already discussed above. Plaintiffs’ counsel took on
13 this matter on a contingency basis. (See Broshuis Fee Decl. ¶
14 47.) The nature of contingency work inherently carries risks
15 that counsel will sometimes recover very little to nothing at
16 all, even for cases that may be meritorious. See Kimbo v. MXD
17 Group, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00166 WBS KNJ, 2021 WL 492493, at *7
18 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021).
19 Where counsel do succeed in vindicating rights on
20 behalf of a class, they depend on recovering a reasonable
21 percentage-of-the-fund fee award to enable them to take on
22 similar risks in future cases. See id. Plaintiffs’ counsel
23 argues that, in light of the result obtained and substantial risk
24 taken in this case, a $14,775,000 fee constituting 30% of the
25 fund is reasonable. (See Docket No. 82 at 4.) To support their
26 position, plaintiffs cite numerous antitrust class action cases
27 in this circuit -- awarding below and above $100 million --
28 wherein attorneys’ fees exceeded 30% of the common fund. (See
1 Docket No. 82 at 15-18.)
2 The Ninth Circuit has established 25% of the fund as
3 the “benchmark” award that should be given in common fund cases.
4 Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,
5 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). But as plaintiffs point out, “courts in
6 this circuit have approved fees that exceeded that benchmark in
7 many cases.” Osegueda v. Northern California Inalliance, No. 18-
8 cv-00835 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 4194055, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 21,
9 2020) (citation modified). “A fees award amounting to ‘33 1/3%
10 of the total settlement value’ is considered ‘acceptable.’” Id.,
11 at *6; see also Watson v. Tennant Co., No. 2:18-cv-02462 WBS DB,
12 2020 WL 5502318, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2020) (awarding 33.33%
13 of settlement fund). Given that the requested fee is in line
14 with the typical practice in the Ninth Circuit and in this
15 district, the court agrees that plaintiffs’ counsel’s requested
16 percentage of the common fund is reasonable.
17 “Calculation of the lodestar, which measures the
18 lawyers’ investment of time in the litigation, provides a check
19 on the reasonableness of the percentage award.” Vizcaino v.
20 Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). See In re
21 Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 941-42. As part of this lodestar
22 calculation, the court may consider factors such as the “level of
23 success” or “results obtained” by plaintiffs’ counsel. See id.
24 To determine whether counsel has employed a “reasonable
25 hourly rate” for purposes of calculating the lodestar amount, the
26 court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant
27 community.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1206
28 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 886, 895 (9th Cir.
1 2001)). “Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate,
2 the relevant community is the forum in which the district court
3 sits.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prison
4 Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir.2010)).
5 Within this geographic community, the district court should
6 “tak[e] into consideration the experience, skill, and reputation
7 of the attorney [or paralegal].” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800,
8 813 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9 Plaintiffs direct the court’s attention to an exception
10 to the local forum rule, whereby a non-local rate “may be used if
11 local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling
12 or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience,
13 expertise, or specialization to properly handle the case.”
14 Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). Counsel
15 argues “local counsel should be deemed de facto unavailable”
16 owing to the lack of “local attorneys who regularly litigate
17 large-scale, complex antitrust actions” in Sacramento. (Docket
18 No. 82 at 20 (citation modified).) They argue instead that
19 “national rates” should be applied “because of the specialized
20 nature of the work performed.” (Broshuis Fee Decl. ¶ 39.)
21 Counsel represents that they have dedicated a total of
22 8,045.35 hours of work to this case; they have submitted billing
23 records to confirm this number. (See Docket No. 82-1 at 34.)
24 Counsel states the typical hourly rates for the partners working
25 on this case were $900 and $1000, while the typical rates for the
26 non-partners ranged from $400 to $600. (See Broshuis Fee Decl.
27 at 10-11.) They further state that they have previously been
28 awarded fees at those amounts in this circuit. (See id. (citing
1 Senne v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv-00608 JCS
2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2022) ECF No. 1147-1).) Finally, counsel
3 cites several California fee awards in other sports antitrust
4 class action cases that are in line with their requested rates.
5 (See id.)
6 Counsel avows that their firm “regularly works on some
7 of the most complex cases in the country . . . and has been
8 appointed as class counsel in over 50 class actions.” (See id. ¶
9 3.) More pertinently, the firm “practices extensively in the
10 area of large antitrust class actions,” and its attorneys have
11 over 20 years of experience working on antitrust class actions
12 and on sports litigation in particular. (See id. ¶ 39.)
13 Counsel’s firm has been “repeatedly honored as one of the
14 country’s top plaintiff’s firms” and has “negotiated some of the
15 country’s largest class action settlements.” (Docket No. 82-1 at
16 21.) Finally, counsel represents that the result achieved in
17 this action –- nearly 100% of alleged damages -- supports the
18 requested fees. (See Docket No. 82 at 5-6.)
19 In light of the evidence presented of counsel’s
20 reputation in litigating matters of this kind, alongside the
21 skill and specialization put to use in achieving the exceptional
22 result in this case and the lack of available local counsel, the
23 court is satisfied that a non-local rate is appropriate and thus
24 that counsel’s requested rate is reasonable.
25 Counsel has provided a list of attorneys who worked on
26 the matter along with their rates and hours worked. (Docket No.
27 82-1 at 34.) Based on 8,045.35 hours billed at the stipulated
28 rates, the lodestar figure is $5,904,490.00. The requested
1 amount of $14,775,000 exceeds the lodestar figure by a factor of
2 2.5. However, this multiplier is “well within the acceptable
3 range in complex class action cases” and is therefore reasonable.
4 Ziegler v. GW Pharmaceuticals, PLC, No. 21-cv-1019 BAS MSB, 2024
5 WL 1470532 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2024) (affirming fee award with
6 lodestar multiplier of 2.87); see also Vizcaino v. Microsoft
7 Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (same, with 3.65).
8 Accordingly, the court finds the requested fees to be
9 reasonable and will grant counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees.
10 IV. Costs
11 “There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a
12 common fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to
13 reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.”
14 In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. 02-cv-1475, 2005 WL 1594403, at
15 *23 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005). Costs may be recovered where they
16 “have been adequately documented and reasonably incurred for the
17 benefit of the class.” Odrick v. UnionBancal Corp., No. C 10-
18 5565 SBA, 2012 WL 6019495 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012).
19 Counsel’s litigation expenses and costs total
20 $1,377,052.39. (See Broshuis Fee Decl. ¶¶ 44-46.) These
21 expenses include research fees, expert consultation fees, travel
22 expenses, transcript fees, service fees, and other court costs.
23 (See id.) Counsel has documented these costs and shown their
24 benefit to the class. (See id. ¶¶ 44-51.) The court finds these
25 are reasonable litigation expenses. Therefore, the court will
26 grant class counsel’s request for costs in the amount of
27 $1,377,052.39.
28 V. Representative Service Award
1 “Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action
2 cases.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958. “[They] are intended to
3 compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the
4 class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken
5 in bringing the action.” Id. at 958-59.
6 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that
7 “district courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive
8 awards to determine whether they destroy the adequacy of the
9 class representatives . . . .” Radcliffe v. Experian Info.
10 Solutions, Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013). In
11 assessing the reasonableness of incentive payments, the court
12 should consider “the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect
13 the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has
14 benefitted from those actions” and “the amount of time and effort
15 the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.” Staton, 327
16 F.3d at 977 (citation omitted). The court must balance “the
17 number of named plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the
18 proportion of the payments relative to the settlement amount, and
19 the size of each payment.” Id.
20 In the Ninth Circuit, an incentive award of $5,000 is
21 presumptively reasonable. Davis v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., No.
22 1:13-cv-01211 LJO BAM, 2015 WL 6697929, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3,
23 2015) (citing Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp., No. 08-cv-5198
24 EMC, 2012 WL 381202, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) (collecting
25 cases)).
26 Plaintiffs seek $7,500 incentive awards for the two
27 named plaintiffs, totaling $15,000. (See Docket No. 83 at 8.)
28 Plaintiffs identify specific efforts undertaken by named
1 plaintiffs in this litigation, including pre-complaint meetings
2 with counsel, routine calls and ongoing discussions with counsel,
3 assistance with document collection and review, and preparation
4 of discovery materials. (See id. at 37-39.) Moreover, the named
5 plaintiffs undertook significant risk in bringing this litigation
6 at the potential cost of their reputations and coaching careers.
7 (See id.)
8 In light of plaintiffs’ efforts and the risks incurred
9 in bringing this action, the court finds the requested incentive
10 awards to be reasonable and will approve the awards.
11 VI. Conclusion
12 Based on the foregoing, the court will grant final
13 certification of the settlement class and will approve the
14 settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement as fair,
15 reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement Agreement shall be
16 binding upon all participating class members who did not exclude
17 themselves.
18 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ unopposed
19 motion for final approval of the parties’ class action settlement
20 (Docket No. 83) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
22 (1) Solely for the purpose of this settlement, and
23 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the court hereby
24 certifies the following class: all persons who, pursuant to NCAA
25 Division I Bylaw 11.7.6, served as a “volunteer coach” in college
26 baseball at an NCAA Division I school from November 29, 2018 to
27 July 1, 2023;
28 (2) The court appoints Taylor Smart and Michael Hacker
1 as class representatives and finds that they meet the
2 requirements of Rule 23;
3 (3) The court appoints the law firm of Korein Tillery,
4 LLC as class counsel and finds that they meet the requirements of
5 Rule 23;
6 (4) The settlement agreement’s plan for class notice
7 satisfies the requirements of due process and Rule 23. The plan
8 is approved and adopted. The notice to the class complies with
9 Rule 23(c)(2) and Rule 23(e) and is approved and adopted;
10 (5) The court finds that the parties and their counsel
11 took appropriate efforts to locate and inform all class members
12 of the settlement. Given that no class member filed an objection
13 to the settlement, the court finds that no additional notice to
14 the class is necessary;
15 (6) As of the date of the entry of this order,
16 plaintiffs and all class members who have not timely opted out of
17 this settlement hereby do and shall be deemed to have fully,
18 finally, and forever released, settled, compromised,
19 relinquished, and discharged defendants of and from any and all
20 settled claims, pursuant to the release provisions stated in the
21 parties’ settlement agreement;
22 (7) Plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled to fees in the
23 amount of $14,775,000, and litigation costs in the amount of
24 $1,377,052.39;
25 (8) Plaintiffs Taylor Smart and Michael Hacker are
26 entitled to incentive awards in the amount of $7,500;
27 (9) $32,917,797.61 shall be paid to participating class
28 members in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement
en enn ee nnn nnn en ne EE OS EO
1 (Docket No. 73-1.); and
2 (12) This action is dismissed with prejudice. However,
3 | without affecting the finality of this Order, the court shall
4 retain continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation,
5 implementation, and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement with
6 respect to all parties to this action and their counsel of
7 record. ok tte th.
(LA.
8 Dated: September 15, 2025 WILLIAMB.SHUBB
9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
22