Bhaidas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

HEMANT BHAIDAS et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:25cv242 DRL-SJF

KRISTI NOEM et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

In October 2021, Hemant Bhaidas (a United States citizen) and son Jash Bhaidasna (a

non-citizen) filed immigration forms with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service

(USCIS). Nearly four years later, their petitions remain pending. They sued Secretary Kristi Noem

of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Acting USCIS Director Jennifer

Higgins, and Attorney General of the United States Pam Bondi under the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA). They also seek a writ of mandamus to compel the government to

adjudicate their petitions. The government moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(6). The court grants

the motion in part.

BACKGROUND

The court takes the well-pleaded allegations and reasonable inferences from the complaint

as true in deciding this motion. Hemant Bhaidas is a United States citizen, his son Jash Bhaidasna

is an Indian citizen, and both live in Marshall County, Indiana [1 ¶ 6-7]. On October 11, 2021,

Mr. Bhaidas filed a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with USCIS that named Mr. Bhaidasna

as a beneficiary [id. ¶ 16]. On the same day, Mr. Bhaidasna filed a Form I-485 Application to

Adjust Status with USCIS [id. ¶ 17]; and on June 26, 2023, he completed the required biometrics

at the designated USCIS Application Support Center [id. ¶ 18]. Though Messrs. Bhaidas and

Bhaidasna have made numerous requests to USCIS to decide their requests, both the I-130 and

I-485 petitions have been pending with USCIS for more than 43 months (as of briefing) [id. ¶ 19-

20]. These gentlemen say they have endured significant financial and emotional burdens because

of the delay [id. ¶ 25-28].

On February 5, 2025, Messrs. Bhaidas and Bhaidasna brought this action to compel

adjudication of their petitions in the Central District of Illinois. On March 20, 2025, and in

response to their unopposed motion to transfer, the case was transferred here. The government

moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, and the parties completed

briefing this past summer.

STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion “can take the form of a facial or a factual attack on the plaintiff’s

allegations.” Bazile v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 2020). When evaluating

a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court must accept alleged factual matters as

true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See id.; Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d

169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015). On the other hand, a plaintiff facing a factual attack doesn’t enjoy the

treatment of his allegations as true. See Bazile, 983 F.3d at 279. In a factual attack, “the court may

consider and weigh evidence outside the pleadings to determine whether it has power to

adjudicate the action.” Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the jurisdictional

requirements. Ctr. for Dermatology and Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir.

2014). The parties seem to argue this motion as a facial attack.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Reynolds v. CB

Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A

“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). It need not plead “detailed factual allegations.” Id. A claim

must be plausible, not probable. Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th

Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a claim is sufficiently plausible is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” McCauley v.

City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows a United States citizen to file a Form

I-130 petition for classification of a child as an immediate relative for immigration purposes. 8

U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). The Attorney General is responsible for

investigating the petition and generally will approve it if the facts in the petition are true and the

beneficiary is eligible. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). For a beneficiary living in the United States, approval

of the Form I-130 enables him to apply concurrently for permanent resident status by filing a

Form I-485. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(2)(i)(B), (a)(3)(ii). The Attorney General may

grant, “in [her] discretion and under such regulations as [she] may prescribe,” permanent resident

status to any eligible applicant for whom an immigrant visa is immediately available. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1255(a).

Messrs. Bhaidas and Bhaidasna seek a writ of mandamus or alternatively relief under the

APA for the government’s alleged inaction and for unreasonably delaying the adjudication of

their I-130 and I-485 petitions. The government seeks to dismiss the complaint, which it says

insufficiently alleges unreasonable delay, asks for mandamus relief that is foreclosed by law, and

fails to allege the Attorney General’s individual role in the purported harms. The court concludes

that it has jurisdiction in part, dismisses the mandamus claim, finds the complaint states a claim

for unreasonable delay as to the I-130 petition, and declines to dismiss the Attorney General.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The first question is whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. The government

seems to say there is no jurisdiction because mandamus and APA relief are unavailable based on

these allegations.1 The government explains its position vis-à-vis mandamus, but it merely cites

the general rule under the APA—when a statute precludes judicial review—before promptly

moving on to discuss the merits under a six-factor test. In a respect, this conflates jurisdiction

with the merits. Messrs. Bhaidas and Bhaidasna argue that the United States waived sovereign

immunity for their claims and that they have adequately alleged unreasonable delay. But

susceptibility to suit isn’t the same as jurisdiction. All told, the court isn’t so sure that either side

quite has it right.

The court isn’t limited to the parties’ jurisdictional arguments, for it has an independent

obligation to ensure its subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Smith v. Am. Gen.

Life & Accident Ins., 337 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2003). At the outset, the court is wary of treating

a statutory prerequisite as a jurisdictional requirement. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568

1 Accordingly, the court construes the 12(b)(1) motion as a facial challenge. See Bazile, 983 F.3d at 279.

U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (courts shouldn’t “classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional” unless

“Congress has clearly stated that the rule is jurisdictional.”) (citation modified).

The court has jurisdiction only as to the I-130 petition. The APA authorizes suit by any

person suffering a legal wrong because of an agency’s action or failure to act, including the

agency’s failure to act within a reasonable time. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 555(b), 702, 706(1); Norton

v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 61-62 (2004); Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council,

Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “Failures to act are sometimes remediable

under the APA, but not always.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 61. The APA allows a reviewing court to

“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); SUWA,

542 U.S. at 62; Mashpee Wampanoag, 336 F.3d at 1099.

Agency action includes all or part of an agency order, sanction, or relief, as examples (all

defined in the APA), or the failure to act in these regards. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (defining “agency

action”). Judicial review is limited—§ 706(1) permits a claim only when a plaintiff “asserts that

an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take,” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64,

or asserts “a failure to take one of [these discrete] agency actions” defined by statute, id. at 62; see

also id. at 63; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (6), (10), (11), (13) (defining such actions).2 Though § 706(1)

authorizes the court to compel agency action “unreasonably delayed,” by definition “a delay

cannot be unreasonable with respect to action that is not required.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63 n.1.

The law is careful to distinguish between the court’s power to adjudicate an issue and the

court’s ability to grant relief—the first jurisdictional, and the latter not. Ahmed v. DHS, 328 F.3d

2 For instance, the failure to act in granting “relief”—a term defined by the APA as the granting of a privilege or

acting on an application or petition beneficial to a person—may trigger judicial review. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(11), (13).

383, 386 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 2017)

(“jurisdiction means a tribunal’s adjudicatory competence, not whether a litigant has an ironclad

defense”) (quotations omitted). The APA doesn’t grant subject matter jurisdiction; instead, so

long as another statute has not foreclosed it, jurisdiction exists by way of a federal question under

28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1977); Dhakal v. Sessions, 895 F.3d

532, 538 (7th Cir. 2018).

Impulsively, just at a glance, this statement might seem incomplete given the APA’s

broader language. After all, the APA applies except when “(1) statutes preclude judicial review;

or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (emphasis

added). The first exception indeed precludes judicial review because another statute deprives the

court of jurisdiction, see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); Soni v. Jaddou, 103 F.4th 1271, 1272-73 (7th Cir.

2024) (affirming dismissal under 12(b)(1) when immigration statute barred review), but the

second has been interpreted by our circuit as a decision on the merits when judicial review merely

has been stymied, “unless a particular statute designates the subject as jurisdictional,” Builders

Bank, 846 F.3d at 274; see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907, 917 (7th Cir.

2010) (“This is not a question of whether this court has the authority to review, but rather whether

the lack of any judicially manageable standard makes any review within our power, as a practical

matter, impossible.”) (quotations and citation omitted). After all, it would be an odd twist to

interpret a statute like the APA—and it alone, to be clear—to limit jurisdiction when it never

confers jurisdiction in the first place.

The government walks through none of this in opening and really none in reply. For Mr.

Bhaidas’s I-130 petition, the government merely nods to § 701(a) but stops short of arguing that

a statute bars judicial review or that USCIS retains unilateral discretion to adjudicate such a

petition. The government only contends that it has not unreasonably delayed its decisionmaking.

That isn’t a jurisdictional point. Indeed, the government cites Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v.

FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984), as its framework for evaluating unreasonable delay,

and TRAC explicitly treated the question of delay as a merits issue and not a jurisdictional one,

see id. at 79; accord United Afr. Org. v. Biden, 620 F. Supp.3d 756, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2022); Patel v.

Rodriguez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140155, 6-12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2015).

The government returns only in reply to cite a string of cases that hold that judicial review

was precluded when discretion was statutorily reserved to the agency. More particularly, for Mr.

Bhaidasna’s I-485 application, the government cites out-of-circuit cases holding that 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Attorney General or

Secretary of Homeland Security to delay adjudication of status adjustment applications under 8

U.S.C. § 1255(a) (the statute implicated by an I-485 application) due to shifts in policy stemming

from the unavailability of visas (sometimes called the Adjudication Hold Policy). See Geda v. Dir.

United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 126 F.4th 835, 842-45 (3d Cir. 2025); Kanapuram v. Dir.,

United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 131 F.4th 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2025); Cheejati v. Blinken,

106 F.4th 388, 393-96 (5th Cir. 2024); Thigulla v. Jaddou, 94 F.4th 770, 774-76 (8th Cir. 2024). How

these cases might translate to this one is a nuanced question. And somewhat frustratingly, the

government makes nothing of it; instead, the government cites these cases amid its discussion of

the merits rather than jurisdiction, and, even then, just as support for the idea that the I-485

petition has not been stalled indefinitely.

Awaiting a reply, and then without real development, might well result in a waived point—

but not if the point is jurisdictional. An inspected and admitted alien’s status “may be adjusted

by the Attorney General, in [her] discretion and under such regulations as [she] may prescribe, to

that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” if he applies for an adjustment, is

eligible, and a visa is immediately available. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B),

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law . . . , and regardless of whether the judgment,

decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review—

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title, or (ii) any other

decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the authority for which is specified under this

subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (emphases

added). “Read harmoniously, both clauses convey that Congress barred court review of

discretionary decisions only when Congress [] set out the Attorney General’s discretionary

authority in the statute.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 247 (2010).

This isn’t a “judgment” regarding the granting of relief, even if “any” and “regarding” are

given their expansive meaning. See Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2022) (“any” means that

“the provision applies to judgments of whatever kind under § 1225,” and “regarding” “in a legal

context generally has a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only

its subject but also matters relating to that subject”). Instead, it comes down to whether the

agency’s choice of prerequisites for an I-485 petition or its choice of priorities in deciding such

petitions qualify as a “decision or action” for which the Attorney General has been conferred

statutory discretion that, through the operation of § 1252(a)(2)(B), strips the court of jurisdiction.

And they do, and she does, and it does. This petition cannot even be adjudicated until the I-130

petition has been processed—something these applicants acknowledge. See Calma v. Holder, 663

F.3d 868, 878 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)) (“Without the successful I-130 petition,

he cannot adjust his status.”). In a plain manner of speaking, the I-485 petition isn’t even “on the

clock.” So Mr. Bhaidasna cannot be said to have perfected judicial review when he cannot show

that USCIS failed to take one of the discrete agency actions that the agency is required to take.

See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62, 64.

The Attorney General “may” (not “must”) adjust an alien’s status “in [her] discretion.” 8

U.S.C. § 1255(a). What makes an applicant eligible for relief under an I-485 petition, whether an

applicant’s status will be adjusted, and what sequence and resources are in priority put to its

resolution are matters that, by statute, are not just confined to the Attorney General’s discretion

but removed from judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B), 1255(a); Soni, 103 F.4th at 1272-

73 (same interpretation of “decision or action” as bar to jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) when petitioner asked court to order State Department to decide an I-601A

application after it was pending 17 months). When the statute says the court cannot review this

discretionary petition, that is exactly what it means—the court lacks jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); Builders Bank, 846 F.3d at 274 (“the extent of agency

discretion concerns the merits, not jurisdiction—unless a particular statute designates the subject

as jurisdictional”). And it would be an altogether illogical, not just extra-jurisdictional, exercise

for the court to order USCIS to decide a petition when the applicant admittedly has not even met

a necessary predicate that is within the Attorney General’s discretion to set. See also Lobatos v.

Noem, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110757, 9-10 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2025) (reaching similar result under

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) for Homeland Security Secretary’s discretionary decision to rule on a U-Visa

petition, also unreasonably delayed). In short, the timing is intrinsically caught up in his eligibility.

Another case, Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2002), seems not to change this result.

Recounting longstanding principles of statutory construction, the need for congressional intent

in limiting federal jurisdiction to be clear and convincing, and the general presumption favoring

judicial review of administrative acts, id. at 496-97, the court of appeals held that the court could

review an agency’s denial of an expired application for a permanent resident visa under its lottery

program, id. at 497-98. But there wasn’t anything discretionary about the denial of an expired

application (one deemed expired by regulation) to fairly call it either a “judgment” or a qualifying

“decision or action.” Id. at 498. Today’s discretionary “action” to hold on the I-485 petition

qualifies in ways the one in Iddir did not. See Soni, 103 F.4th at 1272-73. In short, the court has

jurisdiction vis-à-vis the I-130 petition but lacks jurisdiction vis-à-vis the I-485 petition. The claim

by Mr. Bhaidasna (under any theory) must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B) (“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law . . . ”).

For the I-130 petition, the government offers no explanation why the court lacks

mandamus jurisdiction. Federal law provides mandamus jurisdiction for actions against a federal

officer or agency to perform a duty owed to a plaintiff, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and, under the All Writs

Act, allows federal courts to issue writs “necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective

jurisdictions,” without enlarging such jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see In re Campbell, 264 F.3d

730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001). A mandamus action loses its jurisdictional mooring when it is frivolous;

if not, the court evaluates the claim on its merits. See Ahmed, 328 F.3d at 386-87 (“unless the claim

is so frivolous that it fails the [federal] test, the [] court has jurisdiction under § 1361 to determine

whether the prerequisites for mandamus relief have been satisfied”); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

678, 682-83 (1946) (“suit may sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the alleged

claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely

for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and

frivolous”). The assertion that USCIS’s now-47-month delay in reviewing the I-130 constitutes

an unreasonable delay isn’t frivolous, so the court has jurisdiction over this mandamus request.

See, e.g., Lubega v. Mayorkas, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168727, 7 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 11, 2024) (26-month

delay decided on merits rather than on jurisdiction). The court thus turns to the Rule 12(b)(6)

motion in these sole remaining respects.

B. Mandamus.

Mandamus “is a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary

causes,” like “judicial usurpation of power . . . or a clear abuse of discretion.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist.

Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quotations and citations omitted). “Mandamus relief will

be granted if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the three enumerated conditions are present: (1)

a clear right to the relief sought; (2) that the defendant has a duty to do the act in question; and

(3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272, 275 (7th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Iddir, 301 F.3d at 499). The government says Mr. Bhaidas (the sole plaintiff

now remaining) can’t satisfy the third element, as a matter of law, because relief is available under

the APA. Mr. Bhaidas responds that he is entitled to plead alternative theories of relief.

Because injunctive relief is possible under the APA, the third element isn’t satisfied. See

Lubega, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168727 at 2 (dismissing mandamus claim to compel adjudication

of Form I-130 and collecting cases). The court is well aware of the difference between claims and

legal theories in the context of Rule 12(b)(6), see, e.g., Signal Funding, LLC v. Sugar Felsenthal Grais

& Helsinger LLP, 136 F.4th 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2025); Bilek v. Fed. Ins., 8 F.4th 581, 587 (7th Cir.

2021); BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015), but as a matter of law and

conceivably as a matter of operative fact there must not be another adequate remedy to obtain

mandamus relief. When there is one, and there is no reasonable debate that there is one available

under the APA, a mandamus action cannot proceed in the alternative. See Ebrahimi v. Blinken, 732

F. Supp.3d 894, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (collecting cases). The mandamus action will be dismissed.

C. Unreasonable Delay under the APA.

The government says the complaint fails to allege a plausible claim of unreasonable delay.

Though not formally adopted in this circuit, many courts consider six factors from TRAC, 750

F.2d at 80, as useful guidance in evaluating unreasonable delay for immigration decisions under

the APA, though these factors are not intended to be exclusive. See, e.g., Afghan & Iraqi Allies v.

Blinken, 103 F.4th 807, 816-820 (D.C. Cir. 2024); Gonzalez v. Cuccinelli, 985 F.3d 357, 375 (4th Cir.

2021); Garcia v. DHS, 25 F.4th 430, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2022); Irshad v. Johnson, 754 F.3d 604, 607-08

(8th Cir. 2014); Ebrahimi, 732 F. Supp.3d at 911-14; see also Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. EPA,

947 F.3d 1065, 1075 (7th Cir. 2020) (Hamilton, J., concurring) (TRAC provides a “general

framework for deciding claims of agency delay”).

These factors include (1) whether the agency followed a rule of reason governing the time

it takes to make a decision, (2) whether Congress provided a timetable it expects the agency to

follow in the enabling statute that might inform this rule of reason, (3) whether human health

and welfare are at stake such that a delay would be less tolerable than what might be reasonable

in the sphere of economic regulation, (4) what effect expediting delayed action would have on

agency activities of a higher or competing priority, (5) the nature and extent of the interests

prejudiced by the delay, and (6) whether any impropriety lurks behind the agency’s lassitude,

though such a finding isn’t necessary to hold that agency action has been unreasonably delayed.

See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. “The central question in evaluating a claim of unreasonable delay is

whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus [or injunctive relief].” In re

Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quotations and citation omitted).

The parties employ the TRAC framework to assess this complaint, and the court follows

suit. The court does so with a healthy reminder—an applicant need only allege a plausible claim,

not a probable one or even now prove one. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts commonly use the

TRAC framework at the pleading stage to assist with assessing a pleading’s plausibility, see

Ebrahimi, 732 F. Supp.3d at 910 (citing cases), though a claim of unreasonable delay is “necessarily

fact dependent” and often “sits uncomfortably at the motion to dismiss stage and should not

typically be resolved at that stage.” Gonzalez, 985 F.3d at 375; accord Garcia, 25 F.4th at 451

(repeating same); Mashpee Wampanoag, 336 F.3d at 1100 (“Resolution of a claim of unreasonable

delay is ordinarily a complicated and nuanced task requiring consideration of the particular facts

and circumstances before the court.”).

1. Factors One and Two: Rule of Reason and Timetable.

The first two factors concern “the extent of and reasons for the agency delay.” Afghan &

Iraqi Allies, 103 F.4th at 816. They often walk hand-in-hand because together they assess whether

the government has a “sufficient rhyme and reason” that explains its response time. Ebrahimi,

732 F. Supp.3d at 910 (quotations and citations omitted). The first—one of the “most important”

factors, In re Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d at 855—more particularly concerns whether the time the

agency takes to make its decisions is governed by a rule of reason, TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. The

court must assess “whether the agency’s response time . . . is governed by an identifiable

rationale,” Palakuru v. Renaud, 521 F. Supp.3d 46, 50-51 (D.D.C. 2021) (quotations and citation

omitted), or whether this pleading plausibly suggests the opposite.

The government posits that USCIS employs a “first in, first out” rule, merely addressing

a petition in the order it is received. Mr. Bhaidas acknowledges that such a policy might suffice

to offer something neutral and reasonable as a rule, except that he pleads something altogether

different. He pleads that USCIS lacks a reason for not making a decision on the I-130 petition by

now [1 ¶ 36]—an allegation that, at the pleading stage, the court must accept as true. He adds

some context to this; this isn’t just a bald conclusion. He alleges that USCIS has all the

information, has completed its initial investigation, and has but a ministerial (nondiscretionary)

task to perform [id. ¶ 2, 32, 34], thereby suggesting its ease; and he alleges that, despite inquiry,

USCIS has never offered a reason in over 39 months (now 47 months) for the delay [id. ¶ 19, 24].

Of course, an agency need not confirm that it is already doing what it has been tasked by law to

do, and such inquiries might merely add to the delay if they came en masse and pull personnel and

resources from the important work of the day. The point is simply that no one need assume that

the allegation that USCIS lacks a reason should be viewed as something less than plausible, taking

all inferences in favor of Mr. Bhaidas as the court must at this stage. In briefing, he says the I-

130 petition was assigned to a specialized team trained to handle this ministerial type of petition,

so he consistently augments the complaint with a fact that, together with the other allegations,

plausibly counter the assumption that the mere reason for the delay must just be the number of

applications pending before theirs. See United States ex rel. Hanna v. City of Chi., 834 F.3d 775, 779

(7th Cir. 2016).

Now the government may well have a sound rationale for the delay, and that may be as

simple as “first in, first out.” There is fairness in everyone waiting his or her turn. And these

decisions are important and worthy of the agency’s conscientiousness. One cannot use litigation

as a means of jumping the line to the detriment of other patiently-waiting applicants. The

government cites other cases that have recognized this rule of reason for USCIS’s processing of

other types of matters, but this time the government provides the court no law or regulation, or

even a judicially noticeable source, for this “first in, first out” protocol for these petitions, as

often appears in these other cases about other petitions. Nor does the government explain why

the mere existence of a rule must mean that the agency is following that rule—two separate

questions, and at least the one is not answerable at this pleading stage. Nor does the government

cement this rule as though it works without exception; indeed, the government says “many

factors may affect how long it takes USCIS to complete an application”—leaving one to muse

what those might be. See Garcia, 25 F.4th at 453 (“the machinery of the U-visa and prewaitlist-

work-authorization adjudication processes is known only to USCIS”); Gonzalez, 985 F.3d at 375

(“we do not know enough about how the agency implements its rules and exceptions”). The

court might surmise, even then sympathize, with the likely number of petitions that USCIS must

decide or process (not least when now faced with a government shutdown), but that would be

mere guesswork today when the court must assess this pleading alone and when the government

offers no adjudicative facts on which to understand the queue. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Gonzalez,

985 F.3d at 375-76 (no record of agency’s constraints); cf. Aljabari v. Mayorkas, 2022 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 103212, 9 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2022) (citing number of applications).

The second factor considers whether Congress has established a timetable for the agency’s

action to “supply content” to the rule of reason. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Mr. Bhaidas observes

that Congress has adopted aspirational guidance for processing his petition, restating Congress’s

“sense” that “the processing of an immigration benefit application should be completed not later

than 180 days after the initial filing of the application.” 8 U.S.C. 1571(b). The government presses

that there is no statutory timeline for processing visa applications, but it also cites Da Costa v.

Immig. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2023), which treats Congress’s aspirational

guidance, albeit “insufficient to set a deadline,” as a “ruler against which the agency’s progress

must be measured.” See also Garcia, 25 F.4th at 454 (considering the same 180-day aspiration).

Time alone typically won’t support a claim of unreasonable delay. INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14,

18 (1982). Still, these applications are nearing the four-year mark—far beyond the 180-day target

articulated by Congress—appreciating that the target is more hope than decree.

From there, the parties exchange and battle over published wait times from USCIS. Mr.

Bhaidas alleges an historical average processing time of 10.2 months to adjudicate I-130 petitions

from 2021, the same year he filed his petition, and even during the headwinds of the COVID-19

pandemic [1 ¶ 22]. If an appropriate measure, he has waited more than four times as long. The

government responds by citing statistics for a 53-month turnaround for 80 percent of petitions

(as of June 2025), which would seem to suggest that work has become heavier over the years. Mr.

Bhaidas points out a different statistic, a median from fiscal year 2021 of only 28 months for I-

130 petitions (for adoptions rather than alien relatives). By definition, this means that half of

cases were adjudicated less than 28 months and half over 28 months.

Some courts have found delays of two years up to four years plausible enough; some have

not ultimately concluded that such a delay was unreasonable. See e.g., Lubega, 2024 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 168727 at 4 (citing cases); Brzezinski v. DHS, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175006, 11-13

(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (citing cases); Sarlak v. Pompeo, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101881, 16-17

(D.D.C. June 10, 2020) (collecting cases). The court has no record of whether a bona fide

adjudication of an I-130 petition is an extremely complex or labor-intensive task, and Mr. Bhaidas

at least pleads that it isn’t. The court has no record of the resources available to handle a so-called

ministerial task among all that the USCIS must address. These statistics from the parties might

just as easily hold the agency in critique than justify a four-year delay. Whether they ultimately do

inform the statutory question of “unreasonable delay” or prove irrelevant, see Garcia, 25 F.4th at

453, or whether they might inform the operation of any “first in, first out” rule that may be

adopted, the court cannot say the complaint has not alleged a plausible theory of delay when

these two factors, to some measure, favor this applicant at this stage.

2. Factors Three and Five: Human Health and Welfare or Interests Prejudiced by Delay.

Courts often evaluate the third and fifth factors together, see, e.g., Afghan & Iraqi Allies,

103 F.4th at 817-18; Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344-45; Barrios Garcia, 25 F.4th at 452, and it is

convenient to do so here. The third considers that “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere

of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake.” TRAC,

750 F.2d at 80. The fifth factor is similar but broader, accounting for “the nature and extent of

the interests prejudiced by delay.” Id.; see Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344.

These factors weigh in an applicant’s favor when his wellbeing is imperiled by the delay.

Examples include Afghan and Iraqi special-immigrant visa applicants who helped the United

States “at great personal risk” during armed conflict and faced “a substantial risk of retribution,”

Afghan & Iraqi Allies, 103 F.4th at 811, 812, or non-citizen victims of serious crimes who

cooperated with law enforcement and, because their immigration applications were in limbo,

couldn’t obtain identification cards, healthcare, insurance, or lawful employment, risked removal

from the United States, and couldn’t reunite with family abroad because they couldn’t lawfully

travel to and from the United States, Barrios Garcia, 25 F.4th at 437, 452. In contrast, generalized

welfare risks, moderate financial harms, and the personal and familial strain sourced in uncertainty

are often insufficient. See Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344-45.

Mr. Bhaidas largely faces the latter sorts. The complaint alleges he has incurred costs and

attorney fees and has been denied the right to petition for his son to become a permanent resident

[1 ¶ 40]. As a father, he may also experience some measure of prejudice due to the uncertainty

and inconvenience faced by his son while their applications pend. These include limits on his

son’s ability to pursue his desired career with the United States Air Force [id. ¶ 27], though he

acknowledges his son is authorized to remain in the United States and seek lawful employment

in the meantime. Any greater concerns aren’t before the court. Mr. Bhaidas alludes in briefing to

“humanitarian concerns” without providing explanation. And it’s difficult to imagine what they

might be given his and his son’s presence in the United States and seeming ability to remain and

subsist. Frustrating as instability may be, father and son are inhibited, not imperiled. At the same

time, the court cannot say on this pleading that Mr. Bhaidas has pleaded no prejudice beyond just

money and inconvenience, even if slight.

3. Factor Four: Effects on Competing Priorities.

The fourth factor concerns the impact of expediting these applications on competing

priorities at USCIS. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. The government says the plaintiffs offer no

justification other than the fact of their lawsuit to allow them to “skip the line” and suggests that

rushing their applications would encourage other suits, producing no efficiency gains but

burdening the judiciary and indeed proving a draw on USCIS resources. Mr. Bhaidas says the

government doesn’t show that processing his petition now would disrupt other priorities and

presses that he doesn’t seek preferential treatment, only timely resolution.

Both arguments are somewhat speculative—hence the very reason that their resolution

today proves ill-suited to a motion to dismiss. The court can’t say based on the complaint (or

arguments) whether granting the relief sought would result in lawsuits or be nondisruptive.

Precedent focuses on what is concrete. In a comparable context, the court of appeals asked

whether an applicant had “a right to skip ahead of other petitioners who filed an application

before [him], but who are also waiting for adjudication.” Calderon-Ramirez, 877 F.3d at 275

(evaluating unreasonable delay claim for U-visa petition). Here, Mr. Bhaidas offers no reason why

he should be entitled to leapfrog others in his same position, but he also clarifies that he isn’t

trying to do that. The complaint alleges that USCIS’s task is not just ministerial but so plainly

prescribed as to be clear and free from doubt [1 ¶ 32]. And it further says USCIS lacks a reason

for delaying adjudication of his petition [id. ¶ 36]. Though slight, this suggests not only that

adjudication of his petition would not impact other competing obligations, but also that

competing obligations simply do not exist. This may be altogether wrong when the facts are

known, but that is for proof not pleading.

4. Factor Six: Impropriety.

The sixth factor concerns whether delay is the product of impropriety, though an

affirmative finding isn’t needed to identify unreasonable delay. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 345-46 (citing

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). Mr. Bhaidas calls the agency’s action arbitrary and capricious in the

complaint, but he offers nothing untoward in the USCIS’s conduct to date.

Considering all factors together, Mr. Bhaidas has plausibly alleged enough to proceed on

his APA claim—the only one over which the court has jurisdiction. Affording him all reasonable

inferences as the court must, at this early stage of the pleading, the first, second, fourth, and fifth

factors weigh to some degree in his favor, whereas the third and sixth factors trend against him.

Only the facts will determine whether this analysis changes or whether the near four-year delay

is “so egregious” that it could warrant relief. The court must deny the motion to dismiss.

D. Attorney General Bondi.

The government says Attorney General Pam Bondi should be dismissed because the

complaint fails to make any specific allegations about her role in an alleged harm. A defendant is

properly dismissed when the complaint “alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the

defendant.” Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974). But the complaint alleges

unjustified delay in an action that is the Attorney General’s responsibility—an I-130 petition is

filed with the Attorney General, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). This implicates the Attorney General

at the pleading stage. The government also says the Attorney General should be dismissed

because the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation; though no constitutional violation

is asserted, and hence the reason the court has not discussed 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), see Cevilla

v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 658, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2006), the government doesn’t explain why the

Attorney General is an improper defendant for an APA claim. Outside jurisdiction, the court

cannot craft arguments the parties have not developed. The court must deny the motion in this

regard too.

CONCLUSION

The court hopes USCIS can soon provide closure to Messrs. Bhaidas and Bhaidasna by

adjudicating their petitions in the normal course. For today, the court dismisses the claim

concerning Mr. Bhaidasna (thereby terming him as a plaintiff) and his I-485 petition as well as

the separate claim for a writ of mandamus, but denies the motion to dismiss Mr. Bhaidas and his

claim for an unreasonably delayed I-130 petition as the court cannot say the complaint lacks a

plausible basis to proceed on an APA claim. Accordingly, the court GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART the government’s motion to dismiss [14].

SO ORDERED.

October 22, 2025 s/ Damon R. Leichty

Judge, United States District Court