Anderson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

RYAN MART ANDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-01309

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

CHEATHAM COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF TIM )

BINKLEY, CHEATHAM COUNTY )

JAIL, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT )

OF CHEATHAM COUNTY, )

DEPUTY ZACHARY ROESLER, )

DEPUTY MICHAEL D. MEALER and )

DEPUTY JOHN DOE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Cheatham

County, Tennessee (the “County”), Sheriff Tim Binkley, Deputy Zachary Roesler, and Deputy

Michael D. Mealer (collectively, the “moving defendants”). (Doc. No. 31.) For the reasons set

forth herein, the motion will be granted.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, any party “may move for summary judgment,

identifying each claim or defense . . . on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. That

is, even if the nonmoving party fails to respond, or responds inadequately, summary judgment is

appropriate only if the moving party meets its burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law based on the undisputed material facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Delphi

Auto. Sys., LLC v. United Plastics, Inc., 418 F. App’x 374, 380–81 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] district

court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has

not responded. The court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant’s motion for summary

judgment to ensure that he has discharged that burden.” (quoting Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451,

454–55 (6th Cir. 1991)).

By its very terms, Rule 56 anticipates “that the mere existence of some alleged factual

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary

judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original). In other words, even if genuine,

a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary under applicable law is of no value in defeating

a motion for summary judgment. On the other hand, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute

about a material fact is ‘genuine.’” Id. at 248.

“[A] fact is ‘material’ within the meaning of Rule 56(a) if the dispute over it might affect

the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law.” O’Donnell v. City of Cleveland, 838 F.3d

718, 725 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A dispute is “genuine” “if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Peeples v. City of

Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2018).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is not the judge’s function to make

credibility determinations, “weigh the evidence[,] and determine the truth of the matter, but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In determining

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court generally must assume as true the

evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Id. at

255; Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014). However, the “mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence in support of the” nonmoving party is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “There must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for

the [nonmoving party].” Id. The inquiry, therefore, “asks whether reasonable jurors could find by

a preponderance of the evidence that the” nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict. Id.

It is well accepted that, when video evidence is available, the court may consider such

evidence. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (establishing the value of video

footage in resolving factual disputes between the parties). In this context, “[w]hen opposing parties

tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a

motion for summary judgment.” Id.; see also Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2017)

(“To the extent that videos in the record show facts so clearly that a reasonable jury could view

those facts in only one way, those facts should be viewed in the light depicted by the videos.”

(citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380)). On the other hand, if the “facts shown in videos can be interpreted

in multiple ways or if videos do not show all relevant facts, such facts should be viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Latits, 878 F.3d at 547 (citing Godawa v. Byrd,

798 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2015)). The central issue remains “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party

must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Ryan Mart Anderson filed this lawsuit on December 12, 2023 against the County,

Sheriff Binkley, and Deputies Roesler and Mealer. (Doc. No. 1.) Also named as defendants are an

unidentified Deputy John Doe, the Cheatham County Sheriff’s Department, and the Cheatham

County Jail. (Id.) On December 13, 2023, the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, adding only

the plaintiff’s Verification, swearing to the truth of the statements in the Amended Complaint.

(Doc. No. 5, Am. Compl. 9.) The plaintiff’s claims arise from an incident that occurred on

December 13, 2022, when he was arrested by Cheatham County Sheriff’s Department deputies.

He asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) the use of excessive force during his arrest; (2)

false arrest and malicious prosecution; and (3) deliberate indifference to his serious medical

conditions while he was confined at the Cheatham County Jail. The plaintiff also appears to bring

a supplemental state law claim for personal injury. (See Am. Compl. 1.)

The moving defendants now seek summary judgment on all claims against them, and they

also argue that the claims against defendants John Doe, the Cheatham County Sheriff’s

Department, and the Cheatham County Jail should be dismissed. Along with their motion (Doc.

No. 31), the moving defendants filed a Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 34-1), Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”) (Doc. No. 32), and evidentiary support for their motion,

including deposition transcripts and the plaintiff’s jail medical records, among other things. In

addition, they manually filed a flash drive containing videos from the body worn cameras

(“BWCs”) worn by the three deputies involved in the plaintiff’s arrest and two videos from

cameras positioned at the Cheatham County Jail. (See Manually Filed Doc. No. 36.)

After having been granted leave to extend the filing deadline, the plaintiff filed his

Response to the SUMF on August 13, 2025. (Doc. No. 41.)1 His Response to the Motion for

Summary Judgment, along with another Motion for Extension of Time, was filed on August 26,

1 The Response to the SUMF is not compliant with Local Rule 56.01(e)(2) or (3), insofar as

each numbered response does not start with “Undisputed,” “Undisputed for Summary Judgment

purposes Only,” or “Disputed,” and the disputed statements do not contain evidentiary citations to

support the plaintiff’s position. The plaintiff does, however, “admit” many of the statements, and

he refers generally to the videos filed by the defendants in disputing most of the non-admitted

statements.

2025 (Doc. Nos. 44, 45). The court granted the motion and accepted the delayed filing, but did not

grant the plaintiff’s counsel’s additional request for an extension until September 2, 2025 to file

an Amended Response that would be “truly completed with legal references and citations and the

exhibit of her Expert’s opinions and statements.” (Doc. No. 45 at 2; Doc. No. 46.) The defendants

filed a timely Reply on September 8, 2025. (Doc. No. 47.) Three weeks later, on September 29,

2025, and nearly six weeks after the original due date, the plaintiff filed another Motion for

Extension of Time to Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 48), requesting a

deadline of October 6, 2025 to file an Amended Response “along with evidence that should have

supported the first Response” and a “more detailed response to the statement of undisputed

material facts, and a memorandum along with the Response.” (Doc. No. 48 at 1.) The defendants

opposed the motion, and the court denied it. (Doc. Nos. 49, 50.) The plaintiff has never attempted

to file the expert report cited in his Response or to correct obvious errors in his Amended Response.

The court finds, however, that correcting these deficiencies would not have made a difference in

the court’s ruling herein.

III. FACTS

On December 13, 2022 at around 10:10 p.m., the Cheatham County dispatch received a 9-

1-1 call requesting a welfare check at a particular address in Ashland City, Tennessee (hereinafter,

the “Property”). (Cheatham County CAD Operations Report, Doc. No. 33-5 at 1.) Specifically,

Melissa Monnin called 9-1-1, claiming that her boyfriend, plaintiff Ryan Anderson, was

threatening to kill himself, had destroyed the house while threatening to kill himself, and had been

drinking for eight days straight while taking Xanax. (See id. at 2.) In response to Monnin’s 9-1-1

call, defendants Roesler and Mealer— along with Deputy Adam Simon (who is not named as a

defendant)—were dispatched to the Property. 2

The deputies arrived at the Property around 10:27 p.m. (Doc. No. 33-5 at 3.) Roesler

approached and knocked on the door of the house, and Anderson opened the door. Roesler asked

Anderson if the deputies could come inside, and Anderson voluntarily consented to the deputies’

entering the house. Once inside, Roesler had a conversation with Anderson regarding his mental

state. Because Anderson denied the intent to commit self-harm or suicide, the deputies exited the

home. Monnin, the original caller, and Tammy Hackett, the plaintiff’s mother, were also present

during the conversation with Anderson regarding his mental state. Although the plaintiff did not

express an intent to harm himself while the deputies were present, it was clear to the deputies that

he was “highly” intoxicated at the time. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 33-3, Roesler Dep. 53–54; Doc. No.

33-1, Anderson Dep. 111, 113 (confirming that he was “on a bad drinking spree,” “screwed up,”

and “under the influence drunk” on the night in question);3 see also Jail Medical Records, Intake

History, Doc. No. 33-11 at 1 (indicating that the plaintiff reported the use of “Xanax, 3 mg/daily”

and that he had consumed “1 1/2 pint whiskey” on December 13, 2022).)

After exiting the house, Roesler, Mealer, and Simon remained on the front porch to explain

to Monnin and Hackett their options moving forward. They informed the two women that there

was nothing the deputies could do at that point, because Anderson did not express any intention to

commit self-harm or suicide while in their presence, even though he had expressed such intentions

to Monnin and Hackett. (Doc. No. 36, Roesler BWC at 5:13–30.) While the deputies were speaking

2 Facts for which no citation is provided are drawn from the plaintiff’s Response to the SUMF

(Doc. No. 41) and are undisputed, at least for purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment.

3 The deposition transcripts in the record are in condensed form, with four transcript pages

per standard page. The court cites herein to the original transcript pagination.

with Monnin and Hackett, Anderson’s stepfather, Brian Hackett, arrived at the house and joined

the conversation on the front porch. During the front-porch conversation, Monnin, Ms. Hackett,

and Mr. Hackett told the deputies that Anderson was “very unstable,” that he had “destroyed the

upstairs” of Monnin’s house,4 that he was “taking everyone down with him,” that he was “just

going to be pissed” that they had called the cops, that he was “mad” that Monnin had poured out

his liquor, and that he was “dangerous for everybody,” among other things. (Id. at 5:45–10:15.)5

Monnin, however, denied that Anderson had ever hit or shoved her or threatened to hurt her. (Id.

at 8:26–29.)

After several minutes of speaking with the deputies, Ms. Hackett told the deputies she was

going back inside to talk with her son. Mr. Hackett told her to “be careful.” (Id. at 10:23.) Mr.

Hackett added, “He’s not going to be happy until he hurts her.” (Id. at 10:26–31.) Moments after

going inside, Ms. Hackett cried out, “Officers. . . . Officers!” in an obviously distressed tone of

voice. (Id. at 10:46–47.) At his point, all three deputies rushed inside—Roesler first, followed by

Mealer and then Simon.

Roesler’s BWC video shows Ms. Hackett running toward the front door and away from

Anderson, who appears to be running after her. (Id. at 10:48–49.) Roesler testified that when he

pushed open the door, although the camera did not capture it, “it looked like [Anderson] had

pushed [Ms. Hackett’s] shoulder (indicating) and was still walking towards her.” (Roesler Dep.

22.) Ms. Hackett gave a witness statement, signed at 10:55 p.m. the day of the incident, stating:

“He just grabbed my arms. He did not hurt me. He just pushed me as I tried to pull away. I yelled

4 During this conversation, Monnin also confirmed that the house was hers but that Anderson

had been staying there for several months. (Roesler BWC at 6:11–25.)

5 The plaintiff states that he “can not admit or deny” that these statements were made, “due

to several people talking” (Doc. No. 41, Resp. to ¶ 10), but these statements are clearly audible on

the BWC videos.

for the Officers to assist. That’s all.” (Doc. No. 33-10.) Anderson testified that his mother had

recently had surgery on one of her shoulders. (Anderson Dep. 49.) He denied grabbing her but

“think[s] [he] . . . put [his] hand on her hurt shoulder” and told her to leave him alone, that he was

going to bed. (Id. at 52, 138.)

Mealer’s body camera video shows that Ms. Hackett stepped to the side in the hallway to

allow Roesler to pass her. Roesler can be heard telling Anderson to “get on the ground right now”

as he pulled Anderson’s right arm toward the ground. (Doc. No. 36, Mealer BWC at 10:42–44.)

Anderson stepped backward and into a side table, knocking items off the table, and a confrontation

ensued, with all three officers trying to get Anderson to the ground, while Anderson struggled

against them. The officers told Anderson several times to put his hands behind his back; his mother

can be heard saying, “Ryan, please. Ryan, please calm down.” (Id. at 11:30–31.)6 During the

incident, Mealer tased Anderson twice. Mealer testified that he deployed the stun gun in “drive

stun” mode, which, as he explained, meant that he physically removed the cartridge with the

probes, “touch[ed] the connectors” to the plaintiff, and then depressed the trigger. (Doc. No. 33-4,

Mealer Dep. 14–16.) In this mode, no probes are discharged. The purpose of deploying a stun gun

in drive stun mode is to obtain compliance without “neuromuscular incapacitation.” (Id. at 16.) If

Mealer had not removed the cartridge, the plaintiff “would have been hit with the taser probes,

which are . . . a long metal bar that would penetrate the skin.” (Id.) Mealer also explained that, to

be effective, the taser has to make “solid contact” with the person. (Id. at 17–18.) He explained

that

6 Roesler’s body camera goes black at about 11:03, apparently because it fell off of him and

face down on the floor while he was interacting with Anderson. He turned the camera over so that

it began capturing events again, from the floor, at 11:41. The other deputies’ BWCs recorded the

interaction without disruption.

when you heard the loud popping noise from the taser [when his BWC video was

replayed], that is an incomplete circuit as far as the effectiveness of the taser. It’s

making the circuit between the two probes but not going through anything. Once it

quiets down in the video, that would be a successful application of the taser in the

sense that Mr. Anderson would have received the intended shock that would be,

you know, required for the pain compliance.

(Id. at 18.) Mealer testified that, when Anderson failed to comply after the first application of the

stun gun in “drive stun” mode, he applied it a second time. Once he was “able to get the left arm”—

i.e., put a handcuff on the plaintiff’s left wrist—he ceased deployment of the taser. (Id. at 22–23.)

By 11:44 on Mealer’s body camera, just over one minute from the time Ms. Hackett yelled

for the officers, the plaintiff was handcuffed and subdued. One of the officers said to him, “Now

you’re going to jail, partner.” (Roesler BWC at 12:10–11.) As soon as the plaintiff was handcuffed,

Mealer and Simon stood him up and walked him outside, while Roesler obtained identification

from each of the other individuals at the house with whom the officers had been talking. (Id. at

12:13–17.) Anderson was transported to the Cheatham County Jail.

The videos are jerky and recorded from close proximity, making it somewhat difficult to

ascertain from them exactly what transpired.7 However, the videos affirmatively show that no

officer ever kicked the plaintiff, and they show that the plaintiff did not comply with repeated

commands to get on the ground and actively resisted putting his hands behind his back. At

approximately 12:58 through 13:08 on Simon’s BWC video, just after the plaintiff had been

subdued, Monnin can be seen sitting calmly on the couch, expressing no distress over having just

seen her boyfriend handcuffed on the floor.

Following the incident, Anderson was charged with Domestic Assault (Tenn. Code Ann. §

39-13-111), Assault on an Officer (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-116), and Resisting Arrest (Tenn.

7 The court has reviewed all three videos repeatedly, at both full speed and half-speed.

Code Ann. § 39-16-602). According to the plaintiff, these charges were ultimately dropped or

expunged. (Anderson Dep. 80, 95.) The record does not indicate that they were resolved on the

merits.

Sheriff Binkley visited Anderson in jail a few days after his arrest to “check on him,” at

the request of Ms. Hackett. (Doc. No. 33-2, Binkley Dep. 29.) During this visit, Anderson did not

mention to him any injuries incurred during his arrest, though he did say that his ribs hurt. (Id. at

30–31.) Binkley made a request to the jail nurse that she look at him and “try to let him see a doctor

about getting an x-ray.” (Id. at 31–32.) According to Binkley, Anderson did not complain that the

arresting officers used excessive force, kicked him, or broke his back. (Id. at 44.) Although he

mentioned his ribs, he was “more concerned about [the sheriff’s] trying to get his bond lowered so

he could get out of jail.” (Id. at 58.)

The Jail Medical Records show that the plaintiff had an intake examination on the morning

of December 14, 2022, during which his only documented complaint was “R [right] arm pain from

arrest.” (Doc. No. 33-11 at 2.) On December 16, 2022, Anderson put in a medical request that

stated “need pain meds for broken ribs.” (Id. at 5.) According to a Nursing Protocol note for

December 17, 2022, Anderson reported that his “right side hurt[] after being tackled onto

hardwood floor” by a police officer during his arrest and that the pain began on December 14,

2022. (Id. at 4.) The same note indicates that the nurse contacted the nurse practitioner about a

“possible rib fracture” and that the nurse practitioner ordered an x-ray. (Id.) The Trident Care

Imaging Radiology Report from December 18, 2022 found “normal” “bony ossification of the

right ribs,” with “no fracture or costovertebral dislocation” or pneumorthorax. (Id. at 6.) The

conclusion was “[n]ormal right rib series.” (Id.) No record evidence indicates that the plaintiff

complained of back pain during this time frame.

On December 19, 2022, Anderson complained of a right eye contusion from being in a

fight with another inmate. (Id. at 3.) The two jail videos of the fight clearly show that the plaintiff,

aside from getting a black eye and bloody nose, was thrown into a metal bench attached to a metal

table, striking it hard with his right lower back and ribs. (See Doc. No. 36, Cheatham County Jail

video recordings 1 and 2 at 4:02.)8

While incarcerated at the jail, Anderson received orders from a physician who contracted

with the jail but was not a County employee for Acetaminophen, Ibuprofen, Clonidine,

Escitalopram, and Librium; these medications were administered consistent with the physician’s

orders by the jail nurse, who also was not a County employee. (Doc. No. 33-11 at 19–21.)

Lt. Chris Gilmore reviewed the arrest incident on behalf of the County and determined that

the actions taken by the deputies were “appropriate and within the policy and procedure” of the

Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. No. 33-7; see also Binkley Dep. 46 (asked whether he had “any concerns

. . . that any of the deputies had used improper force against Mr. Anderson,” responding “I think

they – it was textbook. I think they [did] . . . what they were trained to do.”).)

The plaintiff testified that he believed the officers broke his ribs and his back. He denied

injuring his back and ribs in the fight at the jail. The day he got out of jail, he had x-rays and a CT

scan done at the Skyline Medical Center emergency room; these allegedly showed a compression

fracture in his back and a broken rib. (Anderson Dep. 58–60.) The plaintiff also claims that he was

denied treatment after his nose was broken in the fight with another inmate. (Id. at 65–67.) The

8 The plaintiff testified during his deposition, upon viewing the same videos, that it “look[ed]

like [he] sat down beside” the bench and that the bench was “movable” and would have “move[d]

if [he] hit it.” (Anderson Dep. 164.) This testimony is clearly contradicted by the video of him

hitting the bench and bouncing off of it. (Cheatham County Jail video recordings 1 and 2 at 4:02.)

plaintiff conceded that he was seen by a nurse at the jail five times while he was in jail for nine

days. (Id. at 67–68.) He denies receiving proper treatment. (Id.)

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Sheriff’s Department and the Jail

As an initial matter, the moving defendants argue that the claims against the Cheatham

County Sheriff’s Department and the Cheatham County Jail should be dismissed on the grounds

that these are not proper parties suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, in any event, that the claims

against them are redundant to the claims against the County. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 2–3.)

The plaintiff does not respond to this argument, and the moving defendants are clearly

correct. Neither the Sheriff’s Department nor the jail is a “person” suable as a separate entity under

§ 1983. Accord, e.g., Fisher v. Longtin, No. 3:19-cv-00769, 2019 WL 5694011, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.

Nov. 4, 2019) (Richardson, J.) (“[A] sheriff’s department is not a ‘person’ that can be sued under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994))); Ragan v.

Tennessee, No. 3:14-0392, 2014 WL 648287, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2014) (Campbell, J.) (“A

county jail or workhouse . . . is not a ‘person’ that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (citing

Rhodes v.McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991))). The motion for summary judgment will

be granted as to these defendants.

B. Deputy John Doe

The moving defendants also argue that the claims against “Deputy John Doe” must be

dismissed, on the grounds that the deadlines for discovery and to amend pleadings expired months

ago, but the plaintiff has never sought to amend his pleading to name and properly identify the

John Doe defendant. In addition, the statute of limitations has now run as it pertains to the unnamed

deputy, because the plaintiff did not comply with Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

to effect service upon the unnamed defendant. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 3.)

The plaintiff does not respond to this argument either, and, again, the defendants are

correct. Under Rule 4(m), “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed,

the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without

prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time,” unless the

plaintiff “shows good cause for the failure” to effect timely service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The

plaintiff—who clearly has known for some time that Deputy Adam Simon was the third deputy

involved in his arrest—has never sought to obtain service of process on Simon, did not request an

extension of the deadline for doing so, and has not shown cause for his failure to effect timely

service. The defendant’s motion will be granted with respect to Deputy John Doe, but the dismissal

will be without prejudice, in compliance with Rule 4(m).

C. Claims Against Roesler and Mealer

1. These Defendants Are Sued in Their Individual Capacities

These defendants argue, in somewhat of an aside, that the Amended Complaint fails to

specify whether the claims are brought against them in their individual or official capacity and,

therefore, that the court should presume that they are being sued in their official capacity only. The

defendants state that they also address “any potential claims against [them] in their individual

capacities” “out of an abundance of caution.” (Doc. No. 34-1 at 17.)

In the Sixth Circuit, “[w]hen a complaint is ambiguous over whether a plaintiff has sued

state defendants in their personal or official capacities, [the court] will construe it as raising

official-capacity claims unless the ‘course of proceedings’ has clarified that the plaintiff seeks to

hold the defendants personally liable.” New Albany Main St. Props. v. Watco Cos., 75 F.4th 615,

632 (6th Cir. 2023) (collecting cases). In this case, the Amended Complaint does not expressly

state in what capacity Roesler and Mealer are sued, but the Sixth Circuit has never applied a “per

se rule requiring § 1983 plaintiffs to affirmatively plead ‘individual capacity’ in the complaint.”

Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Wells v. Brown,

891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989)). Instead, “‘[a]ll a [§ 1983] complaint need do is afford the

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id. (some internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991)).

The Sixth Circuit has explained the “course of proceedings” test as requiring

consider[ation of] such factors as the nature of the plaintiff’s claims, requests for

compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature of any defenses raised in

response to the complaint, particularly claims of qualified immunity, to determine

whether the defendant had actual knowledge of the potential for individual liability.

The test also considers whether subsequent pleadings put the defendant on notice

of the capacity in which he or she is sued.

Id. at 772 n.1.

The plaintiff does not respond to this argument either, but it is clear that Roesler and Mealer

are sued in their individual capacities. The Amended Complaint identifies them as “individuals”

employed by the Cheatham County Sheriff’s Office; it sues them for excessive force and false

arrest—claims that typically lie against individuals rather than a municipality; and the claims

against the individual defendants are distinct from the claims against the County based on an

unconstitutional “custom and official policy” of the County and “inadequate training or

supervision.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) In addition, the plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive

damages. As the defendants point out, it is well established that punitive damages are not available

against a municipality. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); Ctr. for

Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 818 (6th Cir. 2007); Stacy v.

Clarksville Police Dep’t, 771 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1034 (M.D. Tenn. 2025). Summonses were issued

to both the deputy defendants, and they do not contend that they were not properly served. And

finally, Roesler and Mealer both raise the defense of qualified immunity based on their “good faith

in discharging their duties and act[ing] reasonably under the circumstances” (Doc. No. 9, Answer

¶ 27.) These circumstances establish unambiguously that Roesler and Mealer were sued in their

individual capacity and that they had “actual knowledge of the potential for individual liability.”

Moore, 272 F.3d at 772 n.1.

2. False Arrest Claim

To prove a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a

right, privilege, or immunity secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law by a person acting

under color of state law. Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Flagg

Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1978)); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th

Cir. 2005). Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest without probable cause is “unreasonable,”

U.S. Const. amend IV, and, as such, may support a false arrest claim under § 1983. Voyticky v.

Vill. of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005). Conversely, where probable cause supports

an arrest, the seizure of a person is reasonable under the Constitution. See Devenpeck v. Alford,

543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being

committed.”). Because the absence of probable cause is a necessary element of a false arrest claim

under § 1983, the existence of probable cause dooms the claim. Parnell v. City of Detroit, 786 F.

App’x 43, 47 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677).

Probable cause to arrest is “not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338

(2014). “It ‘requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual

showing of such activity.’” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983)). When the facts are undisputed, “the ultimate question of probable

cause . . . in a civil case . . . is a question of law for the court.”

“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment permits officers to

warrantlessly arrest—that is, to seize, a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the

suspect has committed a misdemeanor in his presence.” United States v. Jones, 55 F.4th 496, 500

(6th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases). The first charge at issue here—the one that led to the plaintiff’s

arrest—is the misdemeanor charge of domestic assault in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-

111. Under Tennessee law, a person commits domestic assault if that person “commits an assault

as defined in § 39-13-101 against a domestic abuse victim.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b)

(effective July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2023). “Domestic abuse victim” is defined to include “[a]dults

or minors related by blood or adoption.” Id. § 39-13-111(a)(4). Under § 39-13-101:

A person commits assault who:

(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;

(2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily

injury; or

(3) Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a

reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative.

Id. § 39-13-101(a). Assault under any of these subdivisions is a misdemeanor. Id. § 39-13-101(b).

The record establishes as a matter of undisputed fact that, while the three deputies were

talking on the front porch with the plaintiff’s family members, those family members expressed

their concerns that Anderson, among other things, was “very unstable,” had “destroyed the

upstairs” of Monnin’s house, was “taking everyone down with him,” would be “pissed” that they

had called the police, was “mad” that Monnin had poured out his liquor, and was “dangerous for

everybody.” (Roesler BWC at 5:45–10:15.) When Ms. Hackett went inside to speak again with

Anderson, her husband advised her to “be careful.” (Id. at 10:23.) He added, to the officers, that

Anderson was “not going to be happy until he hurts her.” (Id. at 10:26–31.) Within seconds after

she went inside, the officers heard Ms. Hackett cry out in a tone of distress and alarm. (Id. at 10:46–

47.) The Roesler BWC video does not explicitly show Anderson touching Ms. Hackett, but it

shows her running away from him, toward the front door, while Anderson appears to be pursuing

her. (Id. at 10:49–10:50.) These circumstances—including Ms. Hackett’s and the others’

statements about Anderson’s mental state, Ms. Hackett’s distressed cry, and her running away

from Anderson—were sufficient to create probable cause to believe that Anderson had

“[i]ntentionally or knowingly cause[d] [Ms. Hackett] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury,”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a)(2), irrespective of whether he, in fact, had the requisite mens rea

and irrespective of whether he had actually made physical contact with Ms. Hackett or caused

bodily injury.9 Ms. Hackett is his mother, so she qualifies as a domestic abuse victim under § 39-

13-111(a)(4). Accordingly, Roesler had probable cause to charge Anderson for domestic assault

in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b).

Because probable cause existed for the arrest, the plaintiff’s false arrest claim fails as a

matter of law, irrespective of whether probable cause existed to support the other two charges. As

the Sixth Circuit has explained:

If the facts known to the officers support probable cause in any form, then an

individual may lawfully be arrested. So it follows that when an officer arrests

someone based on multiple charges, it is not relevant whether probable cause

existed with respect to each individual charge. What matters is the validity of the

arrest (the seizure) and not the validity of every charge (the potential justifications

for the seizure). As long as the arrest is supported by probable cause on one charge,

then a false arrest claim cannot move forward.

Howse v. Hodous, 953 F.3d 402, 409 (6th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (internal citations

omitted); see also Howell v. McCormick, 148 F.4th 834, 849 (6th Cir. 2025) (“[A] claim alleging

an unconstitutional false arrest will fail as long as the officers had probable cause for one of these

offenses.” (citing Howse, 953 F.3d at 409)).

Roesler and Mealer are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s false arrest claim.

9 The court reiterates here that Anderson admitted in his deposition that he “put [his] hand

on her hurt shoulder.” (Anderson Dep. at 52.)

3. Malicious Prosecution Claim

The defendants, apparently giving the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, construe the

Amended Complaint as stating, or possibly stating, a claim for malicious prosecution. (See Doc.

No. 34-1 at 25.) To defeat summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must

present facts sufficient to establish four elements: (1) the defendant officer “made, influenced or

participated in” the prosecutorial decision; (2) there is a “lack of probable cause” for the challenged

charges; (3) the prosecution caused a “deprivation of liberty . . . apart from the initial arrest”; and

(4) “the prosecution ended without a conviction.” Howell, 148 F.4th at 852–53 (citations omitted).

Moreover, “the Supreme Court has now clarified that courts must take a charge-by-charge

approach to malicious prosecution (unlike false arrest).” Id. at 853 (citing Chiaverini v. City of

Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 562 (2024)).

In this case, as discussed above, the officers had probable cause for the domestic assault

charge, which defeats any malicious prosecution claim related to that charge. There was also

probable cause to support the charge of resisting arrest, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-

602. Under that statute, an individual commits the offense of resisting arrest where the “person

intentionally prevent[s] or obstruct[s] anyone known to the person to be a law enforcement officer

. . . from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person, including the defendant, by

using force against the law enforcement officer or another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(a).

Except in the case of self-defense, an unlawful arrest is not a defense to resisting arrest. State v.

Forkpa, No. E2019-01605-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 6707659, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Nov.

16, 2020) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(b)). “Force” is defined as “compulsion by the use

of physical power or violence and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of this

title.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a); State v. Forkpa, No. E2019-01605-CCA-R3-CD, 2020

WL 6707659, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 2020). Under Tennessee law, the element of

force is construed “broadly,” and courts have “consistently held that a defendant’s efforts in

preventing an officer from handcuffing him are sufficient to support the element of force.” Id. at

*7 (collecting cases).

The court has reviewed the videos and finds that no reasonable juror could view these

videotapes and conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was

attempting to avoid being handcuffed. Anderson himself testified that he “did resist” being

handcuffed, purportedly to “keep [his] arm from getting dislocated.” (Anderson Dep. 86.) The

videos establish that Anderson bucked and squirmed while the deputies were trying to handcuff

him, and he refused to place his hands behind his back despite repeated commands to do so. Even

after the officers had hold of his left hand, Roesler visibly was required to use a significant amount

of strength to pull the plaintiff’s right hand behind his back. (See, e.g., Mealer BWC at 11:24–29;

Doc. No. 36, Simon BWC at 12:41–45.) Roesler, in other words, had probable cause to charge the

plaintiff with resisting arrest under Tennessee law, and the malicious prosecution claim arising

from that charge necessarily fails.

Finally, the plaintiff was charged with assaulting a police officer in violation of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-13-116. The video does not affirmatively show that the plaintiff assaulted a police

officer, and the plaintiff denies doing so. (Anderson Dep. 80.) However, irrespective of whether

probable cause existed for this charge, the plaintiff must also establish that prosecution on this

particular charge caused a “deprivation of liberty . . . apart from the initial arrest.” Howell, 148

F.4th at 853. Here, the plaintiff has not alleged or shown that he spent any additional time in jail

solely because of the § 39-13-116 charge.

In addition, as the Sixth Circuit also concluded in Howell, even if the defendants lacked

probable cause for the § 39-13-116 charge and even if that charge resulted in additional jail time,

the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity. If a defendant raises the defense of qualified

immunity, “the plaintiff must show that a defendant’s probable-cause finding violated clearly

established law.” Lester, 986 F.3d at 612 (citing Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62–63). In 2022, at the time

Anderson was arrested, Chiaverini had not yet been decided, and, prior to Chiaverini, it was well

established in the Sixth Circuit that “probable cause on one charge categorically forecloses

malicious-prosecution claims in multicount cases.” Howell, 148 F.4th at 854.

In sum, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s malicious

prosecution claim.

4. Excessive Force

“The Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures encompasses a

protection against use of excessive, or unreasonable, force ‘in the context of an arrest or

investigatory stop.’” King v. City of Rockford, 97 F.4th 379, 393 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). “The reasonableness of a use of force is assessed from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene without the benefit of ‘20/20 vision of hindsight.’”

Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). “Determining whether the force used is ‘reasonable’

under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion

on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests

at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In the context of a

motion seeking summary judgment on an excessive force claim, the court must consider the

“totality of the circumstances, including, but not limited to: (1) the severity of the crime at issue;

(2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and

(3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” King,

97 F.4th at 393 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In light of these factors, Sixth Circuit law is clear that the gratuitous use of force on a

suspect who has already been subdued and placed in handcuffs is unconstitutional. McDowell v.

Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that multiple blows with a nightstick were

unneeded and excessive where suspect was handcuffed and not trying to escape or hurt anyone);

see also Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 772 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven minor

uses of force are unconstitutionally excessive if they are ‘totally gratuitous.’”). Thus, for example,

using a stun gun or pepper spray on a suspect who is already handcuffed and no longer poses a

threat to the safety of the officers or others constitutes excessive force. Hagans v. Franklin Cnty.

Sheriff’s Off., 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases).

At the same time, “it is not excessive force for the police to tase someone (even multiple

times) when the person is actively resisting arrest.” Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 641 (6th

Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). The Sixth Circuit has defined “active resistance” as “physically

struggling with, threatening, or disobeying officers” and actions involving “physical resistance.”

Id.

And, as set forth above, when the best evidence available is video recordings, if the “facts

shown in videos can be interpreted in multiple ways or if videos do not show all relevant facts,

such facts should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Latits, 878 F.3d

at 547. However, “[t]o the extent that videos in the record show facts so clearly that a reasonable

jury could view those facts in only one way, those facts should be viewed in the light depicted by

the videos.” Id. (citations omitted).

Where, as here, an interaction allegedly involves “multiple uses of force” by multiple

individuals, the court must view each officer’s actions individually and must “analyze[] the subject

event in segments.” King, 97 F.4th at 393 (citations omitted). The plaintiff’s first excessive force

argument is premised upon his claim that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him in the

first place, as a result of which any use of force was excessive. As discussed above, however, the

arrest was supported by probable cause.

Second, the plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was “assaulted” by the officers and

“tackled” “[f]rom behind,” with no warning or notice that he was being arrested, aside from one

officer stating, “that’s an assault.” (Anderson Dep. 57–58.) This allegation is clearly refuted by

BWC videos, which show that the plaintiff was advancing toward his mother when the officers

opened the door and ran inside and that Anderson was still facing Roesler with his arm out when

Roesler demanded that he “get on the ground.” (Roesler BWC at 10:48–51; see also Mealer BWC

at 10:42–44.)

The plaintiff next claims that he did not resist but that the officers “got on top of him” after

“wrestl[ing] him to the ground.” (Doc. No. 44 at 2.) Although all of the videos are unclear, if any

of the officers did get on top of Anderson to push him to the ground, they did so very briefly. After

the plaintiff was on the ground, the officers can be seen kneeling on either side of him. (See, e.g.,

Mealer BWC at 11:03–07; Simon BWC at 12:40.) The plaintiff claims that, after the officers had

gotten his left hand cuffed, he “could not get the other one out from under his body” and therefore

“could not follow their commands to pull the other hand up with their weight on top of him.” (Doc.

No. 44 at 2; see also Anderson Dep. 58 (“The other arm was stuck up under me with them sitting

on top of me and them saying, get your arm out. I couldn’t get my arm out.”).) This allegation,

too, is clearly contradicted by the videos, which show that Roesler and the other officers were at

Anderson’s side (not on top of him), with Roesler trying to pull Anderson’s right arm behind his

back, while Anderson resisted. (Mealer BWC at 11:24–29; Simon BWC at 12:41–45.) In addition,

the plaintiff admitted that he resisted being handcuffed. (Anderson Dep. 86.) The plaintiff’s claim

that the “large dark bruise” that he observed on his side after his arrest must have been caused by

an officer’s boot (see Doc. No. 5-4; Anderson Dep. 80) is also belied by the videos, which show

that no officer ever kicked him or was in position to have placed a boot against his side.

The plaintiff’s excessive force claim rests, finally, on the fact that Deputy Mealer used a

taser while the deputies were attempting to handcuff him. During his deposition, the plaintiff

expressed his belief that Mealer pressed the taser into his back so hard that it broke his back.10

(Anderson Dep. 81–82.) The defendants argue both that (1) Mealer’s use of the taser in “drive

stun” mode was objectively reasonable under the circumstances; and (2) they are entitled to

qualified immunity, because it was not clearly established as of 2022 that “using a taser repeatedly

on a suspect actively resisting arrest and refusing to be handcuffed amounted to excessive force,”

Hagans, 695 F.3d at 509 (6th Cir. 2012).

The defense of qualified immunity presents two questions: (1) whether Mealer violated

Anderson’s Fourth Amendment rights by repeatedly tasing him whileAnderson actively resisted

arrest; and, if so, (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established in December 2022,

when the tasing occurred. See id. at 508. As to the first question, as set forth above, the Sixth

Circuit has affirmatively stated that “it is not excessive force for the police to tase someone (even

10 Although the plaintiff alleges that an x-ray performed after he was released from jail

showed a vertebral compression fracture (Anderson Dep. 58–59), he has presented no competent

medical evidence that the pressure of a stun gun under the circumstances presented here could

have fractured a vertebra. Even if the plaintiff’s allegation, standing alone, were sufficient to prove

causation, “[i]n determining whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, [the

court must] consider not the extent of the injury inflicted but whether an officer subjects a detainee

to gratuitous violence.” Hagans, 695 F.3d at 511 (quoting Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240,

252 (6th Cir. 2010)). In other words, the question presented is whether the use of the stun gun was

constitutionally permissible.

It also bears noting that, the plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, the jail

videos clearly show the plaintiff striking his lower back and right side quite hard against the metal

bench during the jail fight.

multiple times) when the person is actively resisting arrest.” Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at 641. In that case,

the plaintiff had “locked up his body (‘ball [ed] up’) and admittedly refused to give [the defendant]

his hands. And, pivotally, he admitted at his deposition that he tried to prevent [the officer] from

handcuffing him—i.e., he conceded that he resisted arrest.” Id. at 642. Because the plaintiff had

“‘actively resist[ed] arrest and refus[ed] to be handcuffed,’” the officers’ use of a taser was

constitutionally reasonable. Id. (quoting Hagans, 695 F.3d at 509). District courts within the Sixth

Circuit have reached similar conclusions under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Alexander v. City

of Shelby Twp., No. 07-cv-14741, 2009 WL 3241974, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 8, 2009); Wylie v.

Overby, No. 05-CV-71945-DT, 2006 WL 1007643, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2006); Devoe v.

Rebant, No. 05-71863, 2006 WL 334297, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb.13, 2006).

Likewise in this case, the court finds that Mealer’s use of the taser in drive-stun mode twice

was objectively reasonable, given that the plaintiff was actively bucking and squirming while the

deputies were trying to handcuff him, ignored repeated commands to place his hands behind his

back, and admittedly resisted while Roesler tried to pull his right arm behind his back. The police

were also aware that the plaintiff was highly intoxicated, and they had been told by his family

members that he posed a danger and had been behaving erratically. Moreover, there is no dispute

that, once the deputies had hold of his left hand, Mealer put the taser away and did not use it again.

This is not a situation in which a taser was deployed on an arrestee who was already subdued and

passive. The defendants did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and

the plaintiff’s supplemental state law “personal injury” claim (see Am. Compl. ¶ 5), which depends

on the validity of the excessive force claim, also fails on the undisputed facts.

Finally, even if the plaintiff had succeeded in creating a material factual dispute as to

whether the degree of force used was excessive, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

unless their conduct violated clearly established law regarding the use of a taser. The plaintiff bears

the burden of proof on this issue, and to carry it he must “identify a case where an officer acting

under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Wesby, 583

U.S. at 64 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). As of the time of the plaintiff’s arrest,

it was not clearly established that “using a taser repeatedly on a suspect actively resisting arrest

and refusing to be handcuffed amounted to excessive force.” Hagans, 695 F.3d at 509. Instead, the

Sixth Circuit had by then repeatedly acknowledged that, when a close call is presented, “[t]he

essence of qualified immunity . . . is to give government officials cover when they resolve close

calls in reasonable (even if ultimately incorrect) ways.” Id. at 511. And, as of 2022 (as in 2009,

when the incident underlying Hagans occurred), the Sixth Circuit had never held that “officers

used excessive force by tasing suspects who were actively resisting arrest,” even when the arrestees

were “suspected of innocuous crimes, posed little risk of escape and had not yet physically harmed

anybody.” Id. The plaintiff has not pointed to any clearly established law that would have alerted

the defendants that the use of a taser in drive-stun mode against a plaintiff who was actively

resisting being handcuffed violated his constitutional rights. Accord King, 97 F.4th at 397 (“Under

the circumstances faced by [the defendant], we cannot say that ‘every reasonable official would

have understood’ that [the plaintiff’s] behavior did not rise to active resistance and thus that the

takedown violated the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 465 (6th

Cir. 2022)).

For this reason, too, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive

force claim. For the same reasons, they are also entitled to qualified immunity from the “personal

injury” claim under Tennessee law. Accord Hux v. Williams, 751 F. Supp. 3d 885, 898 (E.D. Tenn.

2024) (citing City of Mason v. Banks, 581 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tenn. 1979)).

D. Claims Against the County and Sheriff

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action against any “person” acting under color of

state law who deprives another person of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipality is

considered a “person” subject to liability under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978). Under Monell, a municipality is liable for a constitutional violation if “execution

of the municipality’s policy or custom inflicts the alleged injury.” Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521

F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th

Cir. 2005) (“To prevail in a § 1983 suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that the

alleged federal right violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.”). Axiomatically,

a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 unless the plaintiff establishes an underlying

constitutional violation. Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., 975 F.3d 554, 581 (6th Cir. 2020). And even if

the plaintiff establishes a constitutional violation, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983

simply because it employs a tortfeasor, nor can it be liable “for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 403 (1997) (“We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of

respondeat superior.”). Instead, a municipality may be held liable “only for ‘[its] own illegal

acts.’” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S.

469, 479 (1986)).

Thus, a plaintiff asserting a municipal liability claim under Monell “must connect the

employee’s conduct to a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom.’” Gambrel v. Knox Cnty., 25 F.4th 391,

408 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 403). To do so, a plaintiff must establish at least

one of the following: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that

an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy

of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence

of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff

then “must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving

force’ behind the injury alleged.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404.

Anderson brings Monell claims against the County11 based on allegations that the County

has “tolerated a custom of officers engaging in excessive force to the injury of members of the

public with exaggerated and false charges and physical harm.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) In support of

this claim, he asserts that “[t]his is just the third time in about half a dozen years that [the County

has] been sued for such excessive force and false arrest.” (Id.) However, because the plaintiff has

failed to establish that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, he cannot pin liability for any

such violation upon the County. And even if he had established a Fourth Amendment violation,

the plaintiff has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that a

municipal policy or custom was the moving cause behind that violation. The only purported

“evidence” to which he points consists of two excessive force claims against other Cheatham

County officers based on completely dissimilar incidents that took place in 2016 and 2018. These

two dissimilar incidents, even if the court accepts them as true, do not qualify as sufficient evidence

of any kind of a municipal policy or custom that may have existed in 2022.

The plaintiff also asserts that the County is liable for the jail’s deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. Pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to be free from deliberate

11 The Sheriff is named as a defendant as well, but the plaintiff clearly sues him in his official

capacity only. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 12, Initial Case Management Order 3.) A claim against the

Sheriff in his official capacity is equivalent and redundant to a claim against the County. See

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As long as the government entity receives notice

and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be

treated as a suit against the entity.”); id. at 167 n.14 (“There is no longer a need to bring official-

capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, local government units can

be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.”). Accordingly, the court

dispenses with reference to the official-capacity claims in this analysis.

indifference to serious medical needs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Griffith, 975 F.3d at 566 (6th Cir. 2020). “To survive summary judgment on a deliberate

indifference claim, a plaintiff must ‘present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that

(1) that [the detainee] had an objectively serious medical need; and (2) that [the defendant’s] action

(or lack of action) was intentional (not accidental) and she either (a) acted intentionally to ignore

[the detainee’s] serious medical need, or (b) recklessly failed to act reasonably to mitigate the risk

the serious medical need posed to’ the detainee.” Greene v. Crawford Cnty., 22 F.4th 593, 607

(6th Cir. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 597 (6th

Cir. 2021)).

Here, the court assumes for purposes of summary judgment that the injuries the plaintiff

allegedly sustained during his arrest and during the fight with another inmate constitute objectively

serious medical needs. The plaintiff, however, does not present any evidence suggesting that the

Sheriff or any jail employee or contractor knew about and deliberately or recklessly ignored those

needs. Instead, when the plaintiff and his mother complained to the Sheriff that the plaintiff’s ribs

hurt, the Sheriff made a request to the jail nurse that she examine Anderson and “try to let him see

a doctor about getting an x-ray.” (Binkley Dep. 31–32.) “[A] non-medically trained officer does

not act with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs when he ‘reasonably deferred to

[a] medical professionals’ opinions.’” Greene, 22 F.4th at 608. And Anderson admits that he was

seen by a nurse—who is not named as a defendant—four or five times while he was in jail for nine

days. (Anderson Dep. 67–68.) While in jail, he received an x-ray, which provided no evidence of

a fracture, and he also received Ibuprofen and Acetaminophen for pain. The plaintiff has presented

no evidence that he needed different or more intensive treatment, that the jail medical personnel

29

(or the County) knew or should have known that he needed more intensive treatment, or that jail

medical personnel (or the County) should have known that the x-ray results were incorrect.

The County is entitled to summary judgment, and the official-capacity claims against the

Sheriff are likewise subject to dismissal.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be

granted, and this case will be dismissed in its entirety. An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

United States District Judge