In the Matter Of: The Honorable Elizabeth Boso, Magistrate of Nicholas County and Former Magistrate Candidate of Kanawha County

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

September 2025 Term

FILED

October 24, 2025

No. 24-436 released at 3:00 p.m.

C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA

In the Matter Of:

THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH BOSO, Magistrate of Nicholas County and

Former Magistrate Candidate of Kanawha County,

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

SUSPENDED

AND OTHER SANCTIONS

Submitted: September 16, 2025

Filed: October 24, 2025

Teresa A. Tarr, Esq. Honorable Elizabeth Boso

Brian J. Lanham, Esq. Summersville, West Virginia

Judicial Disciplinary Counsel Self-Represented

Charleston, West Virginia

Attorneys for the West Virginia

Judicial Investigation Commission

JUSTICE BUNN delivered the Opinion of the Court.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “The Supreme Court of Appeals will make an independent evaluation

of the record and recommendations of the Judicial [Hearing] Board in disciplinary

proceedings.’” Syllabus Point 1, W. Va. Jud. Inquiry Comm’n v. Dostert, 165 W. Va. 233,

271 S.E.2d 427 (1980).

2. “The purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is the preservation

and enhancement of public confidence in the honor, integrity, dignity, and efficiency of the

members of the judiciary and the system of justice.” Syllabus, In re Gorby, 176 W. Va. 16,

339 S.E.2d 702 (1985).

3. In judicial disciplinary matters, the Court is not bound by admissions

or stipulations to facts or violations of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and may

employ its independent, de novo review to determine whether such stipulations are both

legally and factually supported.

4. “Under Rule 4.12 of the Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure

[1998] the Judicial Hearing Board may recommend, or this Court may impose, one or more

of the following sanctions for each violation by a justice, judge, or magistrate of the Code

of Judicial Conduct: (1) admonishment; (2) reprimand; (3) censure; (4) suspension without

pay for up to one year; (5) a fine of up to $5,000; or (6) involuntary retirement in limited

circumstances. Additionally, this Court can assess the cost of the disciplinary proceedings

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against a justice, judge, or magistrate.” Syllabus Point 6, In re Watkins, 233 W. Va. 170,

757 S.E.2d 594 (2013).

5. “Always mindful of the primary consideration of protecting the honor,

integrity, dignity, and efficiency of the judiciary and the justice system, this Court, in

determining whether to suspend a judicial officer with or without pay, should consider

various factors, including, but not limited to, (1) whether the charges of misconduct are

directly related to the administration of justice or the public’s perception of the

administration of justice, (2) whether the circumstances underlying the charges of

misconduct are entirely personal in nature or whether they relate to the judicial officer’s

public persona, (3) whether the charges of misconduct involve violence or a callous

disregard for our system of justice, (4) whether the judicial officer has been criminally

indicted, and (5) any mitigating or compounding factors which might exist.” Syllabus Point

3, In re Cruickshanks, 220 W. Va. 513, 648 S.E.2d 19 (2007).

ii

BUNN, Justice:

The Judicial Investigation Commission (“JIC”) charged respondent

Elizabeth Boso, Magistrate of Nicholas County (“respondent”), with falsely claiming that

she resided in Kanawha County for purposes of obtaining appointment to a magistrate

vacancy there. In the proceedings below, respondent admitted to all the facts and rule

violations alleged in the Statement of Charges and reached an agreement with Judicial

Disciplinary Counsel (“JDC”) as to the appropriate discipline. The West Virginia Judicial

Hearing Board (“Board”) accepted respondent’s admissions and recommends respondent

be suspended without pay for two months, censured, and required to pay costs for six

violations of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct. This Court placed the Board’s

recommendation on the argument docket for further consideration.

Based on our de novo review, we find that five of the six violations alleged

in the Statement of Charges were based on rules not applicable to respondent at the time

of the underlying conduct as she was neither a “judge” nor a judicial candidate “subject to

public election.” We agree that respondent violated Rule 4.1(A)(9) of the West Virginia

Code of Judicial Conduct and conclude that the Board’s recommended discipline of

suspension without pay for two months, censure, and payment of costs, remains appropriate

for the misconduct resulting in that violation.

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I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent is currently an elected magistrate in Nicholas County, West

Virginia, winning that seat in 2024 shortly after the events underlying this proceeding.

Prior to her election, she was a longtime magistrate assistant in both the Nicholas and

Kanawha County magistrate court systems. She began her employment as a magistrate

assistant in Nicholas County in November 2005. That same year she established a

residential address in Summersville, Nicholas County, where she lived with her husband.

In 2019, respondent accepted employment as a magistrate assistant in

Kanawha County, West Virginia, but continued to reside in Summersville, commuting to

her workplace in Charleston, Kanawha County. In 2021, she bought a condominium in

Charleston to minimize hotel stays during weekend court or inclement weather but

maintained the Summersville residence where her husband continued to reside. In March

2023, respondent left the magistrate assistant position in Kanawha County to return to work

in Nicholas County as an assistant to then-Magistrate Sarah Brown. She sold her

Charleston condominium on June 9, 2023.

Later that year, in November 2023, respondent sent two text inquiries to

Kanawha County Magistrate Court personnel about renting from them because she

“need[ed] an address in Kanawha County[]” for purposes of her anticipated candidacy for

2

an open Kanawha County magistrate seat.1 The appendix record contains text exchanges

confirming these discussions. One of those inquiries was to a Kanawha County magistrate

assistant who had a rental property in Clendenin, West Virginia; respondent testified she

declined that rental because a one-year lease was requested.

The second inquiry was to Kristie Trabert, magistrate assistant to then-

Kanawha County Magistrate Mike Ferrell. Ms. Trabert owned and lived alone in a home

in Dunbar in Kanawha County, West Virginia. On November 16, 2023, respondent texted

Ms. Trabert, stating that she wanted “to see if I could rent a room from you for an address

until the election is over” and that she preferred to “keep it way on the down low.” 2

Respondent stated she would pay “[$]150 a month to use your address for my purpose.”

Ms. Trabert responded, “that would be totally fine with me[.]” In early January 2024,

respondent texted Ms. Trabert to inquire whether she was “still ok” with being

“roommate[s] for a while”; respondent stated that she needed to get her “paperwork in[,]”

and asked “[w]hat is our address?” On January 11, 2024, respondent texted Ms. Trabert

that she would be in Charleston and would “leave your check” on Ms. Trabert’s desk. No

written lease agreement was prepared.

1

The Legislature created three additional magistrate seats in Kanawha County in

2023.

2

Respondent contended that she meant that she wanted to keep her job in Nicholas

County and did not want news of her intentions to run in Kanawha County to spread there.

3

On January 19, 2024, Magistrate Ferrell resigned and Ms. Trabert texted

respondent that day to advise of this development. The two discussed the necessary

vacancy appointment and respondent indicated that she believed a senior status magistrate

would be appointed because the election was so close. The next day, however, Ms. Trabert

texted respondent encouraging her to apply for the vacancy; on January 22, 2024,

respondent texted Ms. Trabert stating, “I’m applying for [Magistrate Ferrell’s] position. . . .

I’m using our address.”

That same day, respondent emailed Kanawha County Circuit Judge

Maryclaire Akers—who was serving as Chief Judge of the circuit and responsible for

making the magistrate vacancy appointment—asking that she be considered for

appointment to Magistrate Ferrell’s vacancy. Outlining her work history as a magistrate

assistant, respondent’s email stated: “I had moved to Kanawha County in 2021 and, after

transferring to Nicholas, I have maintained a residence in Kanawha due to wanting to run

in the upcoming election for one of the new Magistrate seats.” On January 23, 2024,

respondent filed an application for appointment to Magistrate Ferrell’s vacancy using Ms.

Trabert’s Dunbar address as her “home address”; under the application’s blank for “home

county” respondent wrote “Working in Nicholas.” The application was not sworn but

included an attestation that “the answers given herein are true and complete to the best of

my knowledge.” An accompanying resume included only the Dunbar address.

4

On January 26, 2024, Judge Akers appointed Earl Whittington to the

vacancy. Ms. Trabert texted respondent to advise of this development stating that the “only

thing I think she [Judge Akers] could have tried to make an issue was your renting from

me[.]” That same day, respondent filed candidacy papers in Nicholas County for the

magistrate position held by then-Magistrate Brown and listed her “legal residence” as her

longtime address in Summersville, West Virginia.

On January 29, 2024, Judge Akers emailed JDC stating that respondent

“used” Ms. Trabert’s address to apply for the vacancy, and JDC opened a disciplinary

complaint on January 31, 2024. Shortly after respondent received the complaint, she texted

Ms. Trabert, indicating that the complaint “allude[d] to the notion that I was somehow

aware of Ferrell quitting and trying to use your address to get the appointment[]” but that

“when I paid my January rent to you we had absolutely no clue about Ferrell.”

Respondent’s text to Ms. Trabert also stated that she had been “actively looking for an

apartment for several months to move back down there” and that she had all of her “emails

to apartment places[.]”

On February 12, 2024, respondent responded to the complaint explaining that

she reached an agreement to rent a room from Ms. Trabert in 2023 “because I had every

intention of running for Magistrate in Kanawha County[.]” She further stated that “by the

time I realized I wanted to be back in Charleston, the condo was gone[]” and that she “ha[d]

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been scouting out a new home in Charleston for months now.” She explained that she chose

to rent “for the time being due to interest rates being so high.”

On May 23, 2024, JDC took respondent’s sworn statement. Respondent

readily admitted that, apart from the time she owned the Charleston condominium, she

lived continuously at the Summersville address since 2005. She took the position that due

to her rental agreement with Ms. Trabert, she had two residences in January 2024 when

she applied for the magistrate vacancy but that her “primary residence was Nicholas

County.” She admitted that she had never been to Ms. Trabert’s home but was adamant she

intended to utilize that location for campaigning during the election season. She admitted

that her driver’s license, voter registration, utilities, and property taxes all reflected a

Nicholas County address. She justified the use of the Dunbar address on her application

and resume, explaining

I thought if I had a rental property that, you know, the way I

read it was that you have to reside in the county to which you

are elected, and that was an appointment. I had applied for [a

different] appointment. I had applied for many jobs down here,

you know. So that was totally on me, and that was my fault.

Respondent also explained her text message to Ms. Trabert that she was renting the room

“for the address”:

In order to file for down here, I felt that I had to have like an

address, a mailing address in Kanawha to run. I had been

looking at rental property and stuff like that and everything was

like crazy . . . . So I was just going to rent it, and I’m not going

to lie, I was going to use her address as a rental property as my

address in Kanawha County.

6

Respondent further explained her understanding that the magistrate eligibility requirements

required her “[t]o have a residence, to have a residential address was my understanding.”3

She testified that she intended to find something “more permanent” if appointed or elected,

“but I had to have an address to run. That was my thought process.” Respondent stated that

she “probably” should have used her Summersville address, but “just put the address that

I was going to use if I ran here.” Respondent admitted that her email to Judge Akers stating

that she had “maintained a residence” in Kanawha County since 2021 was “incorrect. Yes,

that was a misstatement.”

The JIC filed formal charges against respondent on August 7, 2024, alleging

six violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Rule 1.14 (requiring judges to comply with

3

When asked to admit she was “not eligible to be a magistrate in Kanawha County

at the time of the appointment,” respondent replied:

My understanding of the way that it [was] worded, I thought

that I could. I clearly misinterpreted, you know, where the

canon said that you shall reside in the county in which you are

elected. It does not say appointed. I know other people have

been appointed that have not resided, technically, in the county

that they were appointed to, and that address came later. So I

should have checked on it. I did not. That was on me.

But see infra n.10.

4

Rule 1.1 provides: “A judge shall comply with the law, including the West Virginia

Code of Judicial Conduct.”

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the law); Rule 1.25 (requiring judges to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in

judiciary and avoid impropriety); Rule 2.16(A)6 (requiring judges to be candid with judicial

disciplinary agencies); Rule 4.1(A)(9)7 (prohibiting judicial candidates from knowingly

making false or misleading statements); and Rules 4.2(A)(1) and (A)(2)8 (requiring judicial

candidates subject to public election to act in a manner consistent with the integrity of the

judiciary and comply with all applicable election laws and regulations).

Respondent and JDC then entered into an agreement in which respondent

admitted to the entirety of the allegations contained in the Statement of Charges and the

charged rule violations. 9 JDC and respondent further agreed that respondent was

5

Rule 1.2 provides: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public

confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”

6

Rule 2.16(A) provides: “A judge shall cooperate and be candid and honest with

judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies.”

7

Rule 4.1(A)(9) provides: “Except as permitted by law, or by Rules 4.2, 4.3, and

4.4, a judge or a judicial candidate shall not[] . . . knowingly, or with reckless disregard for

the truth, make any false or misleading statement[.]”

8

Rule 4.2(A)(1) and (2) provides: “A judge or candidate subject to public election

shall: (1) act at all times in a manner consistent with the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary; [and] (2) comply with all applicable election, election

campaign, and election campaign fund-raising laws and regulations of this jurisdiction[.]”

9

Respondent’s factual admissions included: 1) at the time she applied for the

vacancy “her residence/domicile was clearly in Nicholas County[]”; 2) she “was not a

resident of Kanawha County[]”; and 3) she “was clearly not domiciled in Kanawha County

at the time she applied for the Magistrate appointment.” She further admitted that her email

to Judge Akers about maintaining a residence “was . . . a lie[.]”

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cooperative during the investigation, admitted her wrongdoing, and that the appropriate

discipline was a “public censure,” suspension without pay for two months, and payment of

costs in the amount of $618.45. On October 25, 2024, the Board held a hearing

acknowledging respondent and JDC’s agreement, including respondent’s admissions to the

factual allegations and rule violations contained in the Statement of Charges. The Board

permitted respondent to make a statement during which she expressed that she was

“immensely sorry[]” and wanted to be an “asset to the Court . . . and not a stain.” The Board

then unanimously recommended adoption of the parties’ agreement, including the agreed

discipline, and both JDC and respondent filed their consent to the recommendation.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is well-established that in judicial disciplinary proceedings, “[t]he Supreme

Court of Appeals will make an independent evaluation of the record and recommendations

of the Judicial [Hearing] Board in disciplinary proceedings.” Syl. Pt. 1, W. Va. Jud. Inquiry

Comm’n v. Dostert, 165 W. Va. 233, 271 S.E.2d 427 (1980); see also In re Starcher, 202

W. Va. 55, 60, 501 S.E.2d 772, 777 (1998) (“The independent evaluation of the Court shall

constitute a de novo or plenary review of the record.”). In this case, respondent and JDC

entered into an agreement in which respondent admitted to all the factual allegations and

rule violations contained in the Statement of Charges. The Board accepted this agreement

wholesale, as well as the parties’ agreed discipline, and recommended its adoption to the

Court. Although we believe it well understood that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the

9

particular sanction to be imposed, we take this opportunity to clarify the import of our de

novo review in judicial disciplinary matters where the Court is presented with stipulated or

admitted facts or rule violations.

“The purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is the preservation and

enhancement of public confidence in the honor, integrity, dignity, and efficiency of the

members of the judiciary and the system of justice.” Syl., In re Gorby, 176 W. Va. 16, 339

S.E.2d 702 (1985). To effectuate that purpose, we have observed that it is part of our

“constitutional duty under Section 8 of Article VIII of the West Virginia Constitution to

make a completely independent evaluation of the record.” In re Browning, 192 W. Va. 231,

233, 452 S.E.2d 34, 36 (1994) (footnote omitted). Although the Board is authorized to

conduct hearings and issue findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended

decision for our consideration, it is not uncommon for the parties to present negotiated

admissions or stipulations to the Board.

With respect to stipulated facts, we have held that those facts “will be

considered to have been proven as if the party bearing the burden of proof has produced

clear and convincing evidence to prove the facts so stipulated.” Syl. Pt. 4, Starcher, 202

W. Va. at 56-57, 501 S.E.2d at 773-74. However, nothing in this syllabus point purports to

obligate the Court to accept such admissions or stipulations for purposes of our independent

evaluation of the underlying conduct or charges. Rather, Starcher clarifies only that the

parties are bound by these stipulations and may not later argue that those facts were not

10

proven to the requisite degree of proof: “[I]t is clear that a party who stipulates facts is

bound by those stipulations, . . . and that the facts stipulated are considered to have been

proven to the requisite standard of proof[.]” Id. at 62, 501 S.E.2d at 779.

And while the Court has not expressly addressed the impact of stipulated

facts or rule violations on our de novo review, the Court’s constitutional obligation to

oversee judicial discipline makes clear that we may not subordinate our review to

agreements between the parties. Admissions or stipulations as to facts or rule violations

may be prompted by personal or professional objectives or influenced by myriad factors

including the presence or absence of counsel, real or perceived risk of additional charges,

or simply a desire to appear cooperative or remorseful—factors that weigh heavily in

recommended and ultimate sanctions. As the Supreme Court of Utah observed,

“stipulations often represent compromises and bargains.” In re Christensen, 304 P.3d 835,

839 (Utah 2013). As a result, our blind acceptance of those admissions or stipulations may

undermine the integrity and consistency of the disciplinary process where they are not well-

founded.

As to the Board’s factual determinations generally, the Court has recognized

that they should be given “substantial weight.” Browning, 192 W. Va. at 234 n.4, 452

S.E.2d at 37 n.4. Despite this deference, “[t]here is nothing in the constitution or rules that

requires us to give any conclusive weight to findings or recommendations of the [B]oard[.]”

Dostert, 165 W. Va. at 236, 271 S.E.2d at 429 (emphasis added). Likewise, there is nothing

11

in the Constitution or our rules that requires us to conclusively accept agreements reached

by JDC and involved parties regarding facts or violations committed. See Syl. Pt. 1, in part,

In re Baughman, 182 W. Va. 55, 385 S.E.2d 910 (1989) (“In all cases arising under the

Judicial Code of Ethics, the Supreme Court of Appeals reserves the prerogative to make

an independent factual inquiry[.]”).

Other courts agree that stipulations to facts or rule violations do not constrain

a court’s plenary review of disciplinary proceedings. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary

Bd. v. Lynch, 901 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Iowa 2017) (“Although stipulations of fact are binding

on the parties, ‘[a]n attorney’s stipulation as to a violation is not binding on us[.]’ ‘Even if

an attorney’s stipulation concedes a rule violation, we will only find that a violation

occurred if the facts are sufficient to support the stipulated violation.’” (citations omitted)

(alterations in original)); Christensen, 304 P.3d at 839 (“[B]ecause of our plenary authority

over judicial disciplinary matters, and our constitutional duty to impose sanctions that we

find to be ‘just and proper,’ we are not bound to enforce the Stipulation.” (citations

omitted)); In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Ziegler, 750 N.W.2d 710, 716 (Wis. 2008) (“A

stipulation does not bind the Judicial Conduct Panel as to either the facts or proposed

appropriate discipline.” (footnote omitted)); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. McGee,

48 P.3d 787, 792 (Okla. 2002) (“Although respondent has stipulated to violating Rule 1.2,

ORPC, we have a duty to review the evidence de novo to determine if the allegations of

misconduct are established by clear and convincing evidence. Stipulations of the parties

12

and findings of fact and recommendations of the Tribunal are advisory, being neither

binding nor persuasive.”).

We therefore now expressly hold that in judicial disciplinary proceedings,

the Court is not bound by admissions or stipulations to facts or violations of the West

Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and may employ its independent, de novo review to

determine whether such admissions or stipulations are both legally and factually supported.

III.

DISCUSSION

We turn now to the charged rule violations and recommended sanctions. We

first observe that the Statement of Charges alleges that “[a]t all times relevant to the

proceedings set forth below” respondent was “either a candidate for appointment to the

position of Magistrate of Kanawha County, a candidate for election to the position of

Magistrate of Nicholas County, or the Magistrate-Elect of Nicholas County.” (Emphasis

added). It then sets forth a narrative of underlying facts and summarily alleges that those

facts support the charged rule violations. However, nowhere does the Statement of Charges

or JDC’s briefing address the applicability of each Rule relative to respondent’s variable

status at the time of each alleged violation. Because the Code of Judicial Conduct applies

only to specified individuals, an examination of respondent’s defined status at the time of

the underlying conduct is a necessary step in analyzing each alleged violation.

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A. The “Judicial Candidate” Violations—Rules 4.1 and 4.2

Rule 4.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is entitled “Political and Campaign

Activities of Judges and Judicial Candidates in General” and Rule 4.2 is entitled “Political

and Campaign Activities of Judicial Candidates in Public Elections.” (Emphasis added).

The factual premise of these charges is respondent’s alleged lack of qualifying residency

and misrepresentation of her residency at the time she sought appointment to the magistrate

vacancy in Kanawha County in January 2024.

Although respondent briefly argues that she was merely a “job applicant,”

we find that she plainly qualified as a “judicial candidate” under our Rules. The

“Terminology” section of the Code of Judicial Conduct defines “[j]udicial [c]andidate” as

“any person, including a sitting judge, who is seeking selection for or retention in judicial

office by election or appointment.” W. Va. Code of Jud. Conduct, “Terminology”

(emphasis added). That definition further provides that a person becomes a “judicial

candidate” “as soon as he or she . . . declares or files as a candidate with the election or

appointment authority[.]” Id. Because respondent sought selection for the magistrate

vacancy by appointment, she was a “judicial candidate” as of January 22, 2024, when she

declared her intention to seek the vacancy appointment via email to Judge Akers.

Rule 4.1(A)(9) provides that “a judge or a judicial candidate shall not[] . . .

knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, make any false or misleading

statement[.]” Therefore, Rule 4.1(A) was applicable to respondent as a “judicial

14

candidate,” and we agree that the record supports her violation of this Rule. In her

application and resume, respondent attempted to create the impression that she was residing

in Dunbar, Kanawha County, despite never having even visited the listed address.10 While

respondent may have reached some agreement with Ms. Trabert to utilize her Dunbar

address in exchange for “rent” payment—and arguably intended to utilize that location in

the future for campaign purposes—at the time of her application in January 2024 she did

not live or “reside” in Dunbar under any definition of those terms. Respondent’s email to

Judge Akers to the same effect was, as admitted in her sworn statement, plainly false: she

did not “maintain” a residence in Kanawha County since returning to work in Nicholas

County, having sold her condominium in June 2023.11

However, in contrast to Rule 4.1’s application to judicial candidates

generally, Rule 4.2 governs the “[p]olitical and [c]ampaign [a]ctivities” of “[j]udicial

[c]andidates in [p]ublic [e]lections.” (Emphasis added). The charged Rules provide that

10

In support of its Rule 4.2(A)(2) allegations requiring compliance with “election

. . . laws and regulations” JDC devotes a portion of its brief to arguing that respondent, as

an appointive candidate, was nonetheless required to comply with West Virgina Code § 50-

1-4 (requiring a magistrate to “reside in the county of his election[]”), as well as our

caselaw regarding candidacy “residence.” Because the underlying misconduct was not

alleged to have occurred while respondent was a candidate for public election, as discussed

infra, we need not address the applicability of this statute to candidates for vacancy

appointments. Further, respondent’s violation of Rule 4.1 implicates only the truthfulness

of her representations about residency, rather than the necessity of that residency to be an

appointive candidate.

11

Consistent with her sworn statement, respondent’s admission to the entirety of the

Statement of Charges includes the specific allegation that “[t]his statement was . . . a lie[.]”

15

“[a] judge or candidate subject to public election shall: (1) act at all times in a manner

consistent with the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary; [and] (2)

comply with all applicable election, election campaign, and election campaign fund-raising

laws and regulations of this jurisdiction[.]” (Emphasis added). While respondent was a

“judicial candidate” at the time of her alleged misrepresentations in January 2024, she was

not a candidate “subject to public election” for purposes of violating the provisions of Rule

4.2.12 All of the conduct in the Statement of Charges alleging misrepresentation of her

residency occurred while she was a layperson judicial candidate for appointment to a

magistrate vacancy. The record contains no allegations that respondent misrepresented her

residency after she filed her candidacy papers for election to Nicholas County magistrate.

Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected a judge’s stipulation to a

violation of the judicial code “because it [was] based in part on a legally incorrect reading

of the Code of Judicial Conduct.” In re Flynn, 397 So. 3d 39, 39 (Fla. 2024). The Judicial

Qualifications Commission charged Judge Flynn with violating a canon concerning

attendance at “‘political party function[s],’” and Judge Flynn stipulated to that violation.

Id. at 39-40. However, the Flynn Court found that the Commission characterized the host

of the event as a “‘political organization’” and erred by interpreting the canon “in a way

12

Rule 4.2’s inclusion of the specific reference to judicial candidates “subject to

public election” is significant, as evidenced by the distinction made in Rule 4.3 governing

“Activities of Candidates for Appointive Judicial Office.” (Emphasis added). Rule 4.3,

however, contains no additional prohibitions applicable to respondent’s misrepresentations

as those are adequately covered by the broader language of Rule 4.1 governing “judicial

candidates.”

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that ignores the difference between those terms.” Id. at 40 (emphasis added). The court

rejected the stipulation and remanded, reasoning that it could not “overlook a legal error

like this just because both parties agreed to it.” Id. Similarly, because the Statement of

Charges in this matter identifies no residency misrepresentations that occurred while

respondent was a judicial candidate subject to public election, we find that Rule 4.2 was

not applicable to her at the time of the alleged misconduct despite her admission to two

violations of the Rule.

B. Rule 1.1 and 1.2 Violations

Rule 1.1 provides that “[a] judge shall comply with the law, including the

West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.” Similarly, Rule 1.2 provides that “[a] judge shall

act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity

and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety.” Although respondent is currently a judge, she was a “judicial candidate” at

the time of the misrepresentations regarding her residency as established above; neither the

Statement of Charges nor JDC’s briefing addresses the applicability of these Rules to a

judicial candidate. At oral argument, JDC urged that these provisions are simply “catch-

alls” generally applicable as concurrent violations of the Rules. We reject that

indiscriminate reading of the plain language of the Rules.

The terms “judge” and “judicial candidate” are not interchangeable under our

Code of Judicial Conduct, nor are the rules that apply those terms. Each term is separately

17

defined and individually referenced throughout the Code. The “Application” section of the

Code purports to “establish[] when the various Rules apply to a judge or judicial

candidate.” W. Va. Code of Jud. Conduct, “Application.” It then provides that “[a]nyone,

whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system and who performs judicial

functions . . . is a judge within the meaning of the Code[,]” including but not limited to

Justices of this Court, circuit and family court judges, and magistrates. Id. at I.(A), in part.

Critically, the next provision states that “[a]ll judges shall comply with this Code except as

provided below. All judicial candidates for judicial office shall comply with the applicable

provisions of this Code.” Id. at I.(B) (emphasis added).

While a judge may also be a “judicial candidate,” being a judicial candidate

obviously does not make respondent a “judge” at the time of her misconduct.13 Respondent

was a layperson judicial candidate and did not become a “judge” under the Code until she

was sworn into office as Nicholas County magistrate. JDC offers no authority for the

13

To the extent that these violations purport to stem from the alleged Rule 2.16(A)

violation, we note that respondent’s sworn statement was given on May 23, 2024—after

her election to magistrate but before she was sworn into office. We find no authority for

the extension of the term “judge” to judges-elect. See discussion supra. In fact, we have

noted that the former Judicial Code of Ethics tethered the obligations of incumbent judges

to judicial candidates, rather than judges. In re Callaghan, 238 W. Va. 495, 507 n.11, 796

S.E.2d 604, 616 n.11 (2017). (“‘[A] candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial

office . . . should not . . . misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other

fact.’”).

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extension of Rules 1.1 and 1.2 to judicial candidates and we find none.14 We therefore find

Rules 1.1 and 1.2 were also inapplicable to respondent at the time of the underlying

misconduct despite her admission to those violations.

C. Rule 2.16(A) Violation

Rule 2.16(A) is the remaining violation asserted in the Statement of Charges

and, like Rules 1.1 and 1.2, is applicable to “judge[s],” requiring them to “cooperate and

be candid and honest with judicial . . . disciplinary agencies.” The Statement of Charges

does not specify which of respondent’s statements to JIC or JDC were not candid; however,

the record reveals only two potential statements: respondent’s February 12, 2024, response

to the complaint or her May 23, 2024, sworn statement. Neither of these statements was

made after respondent was sworn in as magistrate; therefore, she was not a “judge” for

14

As further evidence that judicial candidates who are not also judges are not subject

to the Rules applicable to “judges,” Rule 4.2(A)(1) contains its own independent

requirement that judicial candidates subject to public election must “act at all times in a

manner consistent with the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary[]”—

an obligation nearly identical to that contained in Rule 1.2 Were all judicial candidates

tantamount to a “judge” for purposes of Rule 1.2, this separate provision of Rule 4.2(A)(1)

would be superfluous. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 162 W. Va. 579, 582, 251

S.E.2d 505, 508 (1979) (rejecting construction of authority that renders other provisions

“redundant, superfluous and without meaning[]”). However, as previously discussed,

respondent was not a judicial candidate subject to public election and therefore we cannot

substitute this Rule in place of the inapplicable Rule 1.2 violation.

We note further that in the most recent reported judicial disciplinary case involving

a non-judge’s conduct during judicial candidacy—unlike the instant case—the

inapplicability of Rules 1.1 and 1.2 appears to have been well understood. See Callaghan,

238 W. Va. at 505, 796 S.E.2d at 614 (charging lawyer/judicial candidate with false

statements violative of Rules 4.1 and 4.2, along with Rule 8.2 of the Rules of Professional

Conduct, but no Rule 1.1 or 1.2 violations).

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purposes of any alleged Rule 2.16(A) violation. See supra n.13. However, as discussed

previously, Rule 4.1(A)(9)’s prohibition on “false or misleading” statements is applicable

to judicial candidates; therefore, we find it appropriate to further examine these allegations

to determine if respondent committed an additional violation of that rule.

JDC’s brief claims that respondent “lied to the JIC about when she reached

the rental agreement with Trabert and about her search for a place to live in Kanawha

County.” At another point in its brief, JDC claims respondent lied “about having attempted

to consistently find lodging in Kanawha County in violation of Rule 2.16(A).” However,

the only discussion of “consistently” searching for lodging in the Statement of Charges is

an excerpt of a text respondent sent to Ms. Trabert, which is obviously not a statement

made to the JIC or JDC. As to when she reached the rental agreement with Ms. Trabert,

the Statement of Charges reiterates respondent’s response to the complaint stating that the

agreement was reached “last year,” or 2023. As previously discussed, text messages

produced by respondent reveal that she did in fact reach an agreement with Ms. Trabert in

2023 to rent from her and that she had made at least one other inquiry seeking a rental

around the same time. Respondent’s testimony during her sworn statement was consistent

with these representations.

We have established that we are not constrained by respondent’s factual

admissions to the allegations in the Statement of Charges, yet even those admissions do

not support a conclusion that she lied about either issue. Instead, the Statement of Charges

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merely quotes a text to Ms. Trabert stating respondent had been “actively looking for an

apartment for several months to move back down there” and that she had “emails to

apartment places[.]” The charges then allege that she did not produce any such emails.

Admission to having sent these texts or not producing emails in support is not an admission

to lying about the content of the texts and we find nothing in the record demonstrating that

either representation was false. Therefore, we find no additional violation of Rule

4.1(A)(9).

In sum, following our de novo review, we find that respondent did not violate

Rule 1.1, Rule 1.2, Rule 2.16(A), Rule 4.2(A)(1), or Rule 4.2(A)(2) of the Code of Judicial

Conduct, as alleged in the Statement of Charges. The record, however, does support

respondent’s violation of Rule 4.1(A)(9), based upon her residency representations, as

discussed above.

D. Sanctions

Having found one violation of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct,

we turn now to the appropriate sanction.

Under Rule 4.12 of the Rules of Judicial Disciplinary

Procedure [1998] the Judicial Hearing Board may recommend,

or this Court may impose, one or more of the following

sanctions for each violation by a justice, judge, or magistrate

of the Code of Judicial Conduct: (1) admonishment; (2)

reprimand; (3) censure; (4) suspension without pay for up to

one year; (5) a fine of up to $5,000; or (6) involuntary

retirement in limited circumstances. Additionally, this Court

can assess the cost of the disciplinary proceedings against a

justice, judge, or magistrate.

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Syl. Pt. 6, In re Watkins, 233 W. Va. 170, 757 S.E.2d 594 (2013). The sanction agreed to

by the parties and recommended by the Board for respondent’s underlying misconduct is

suspension without pay for two months, censure, and payment of costs.

In considering suspension of a judicial officer, the Court should evaluate

(1) whether the charges of misconduct are directly related to

the administration of justice or the public’s perception of the

administration of justice, (2) whether the circumstances

underlying the charges of misconduct are entirely personal in

nature or whether they relate to the judicial officer’s public

persona, (3) whether the charges of misconduct involve

violence or a callous disregard for our system of justice, (4)

whether the judicial officer has been criminally indicted, and

(5) any mitigating or compounding factors which might exist.

Syl. Pt. 3, in part, In re Cruickshanks, 220 W. Va. 513, 648 S.E.2d 19 (2007). Although

respondent’s misconduct does not involve criminality, violence, or a “callous disregard”

for our justice system, her misconduct was undertaken to secure appointment to a position

of public trust in the judiciary, making the first two Cruickshanks factors our predominant

considerations.

There can be little doubt that the public’s perception of the administration of

justice is affected by respondent’s misconduct. The Court’s obligation to enhance public

confidence in the judiciary “must, at a minimum, begin by regulating the conduct of those

who seek to become members of the judiciary[.]” Callaghan, 238 W. Va. at 507, 796

S.E.2d at 616. Whether elected or appointed, dishonesty by judicial officials or those who

seek to hold judicial office is particularly troubling because this type of misconduct “strikes

22

at the very heart” of judicial officials’ authority and their expectation that those who appear

before them “will be truthful and candid in adherence to their oath and in deference to

[their] authority over the proceedings.” In re Rock, 249 W. Va. 631, 643, 900 S.E.2d 57,

69 (2024). Because “the public has a rightful expectation of scrupulous honesty from its

judiciary[,]” it is understandably wary of judicial officials who engage in misconduct in

their efforts to obtain a position of authority over them. Id. at 644, 900 S.E.2d at 70; see

also Callaghan, 348 W. Va. at 521, 796 S.E.2d at 630 (discussing seriousness of judicial

candidate’s use of falsehoods in an “effort[] to achieve professional gain[.]”).

And although respondent’s misconduct did not occur while she held judicial

office, we cannot ignore the implications of her misconduct on the public office she now

holds and the resulting effect on her public persona under the second Cruickshank factor.

We have acknowledged that

“[i]t matters not that the complained of conduct occurred

before assumption of judicial office or was otherwise unrelated

to the performance of judicial duties. When a person known to

have engaged in unprofessional conduct is allowed without

reproach to exercise his judicial function, the integrity of the

entire judiciary is put in question and its ability to perform

impaired.”

Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Karl, 192 W. Va. 23, 34, 449 S.E.2d 277,

288 (1994) (quoting In Re Ryman, 232 N.W.2d 178, 184 (Mich. 1975) (Levin, J.,

dissenting, in part, and concurring, in part)). It is equally immaterial that respondent’s

misconduct did not result in her obtaining the vacancy appointment in Kanawha County.

She now sits as an elected Nicholas County magistrate and the citizens she currently serves

23

deserve no less reassurance that their judicial officials will be held to account for their

misconduct.

That said, we agree that respondent was cooperative in the underlying

proceedings and has demonstrated genuine and appropriate remorse. We recognize

respondent’s many years of service to our magistrate court system and the apparent absence

of any allegations of prior misconduct. While respondent does herself credit by

acknowledging her wrongdoing, we are also mindful that “[a]ny sanction must be designed

to announce publicly our recognition that there has been misconduct; it must be sufficient

to deter the individual being sanctioned from again engaging in such conduct and to prevent

others from engaging in similar misconduct in the future.” Karl, 192 W. Va. at 34, 449

S.E.2d at 288 (quoting In re Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1174 (Me. 1985)) (citation modified).

While serving the goals of punishment and deterrence, our sanction must also be tempered

by consistency and fairness.

To that end, we find the two judicial misconduct cases most instructive are

Callaghan and Rock. In Callaghan, we reprimanded and suspended a lawyer/judicial

candidate without pay for two years for violations of Rules 4.1 and 4.2, as well as a

concurrent violation of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, resulting from a

false campaign flyer. 238 W. Va. at 528, 796 S.E.2d at 637. In Rock, we reprimanded a

family court judge for two violations of Rule 2.16(A), as well as concurrent Rule 1.1 and

1.2 violations, for serially misrepresenting her involvement with a critical letter written by

24

a fellow family court judge. 249 W. Va. at 646, 900 S.E.2d at 72. The instant case falls

somewhere in the expanse between the reprimand in Rock and the two-year suspension

Callaghan, their disparity being attributable to the seriousness of the underlying facts.

Judge Rock falsely attempted to distance herself from the fallout of an incendiary letter by

denying under oath to JDC having “‘seen or heard’” of it despite having proofread and

offered edits to it. Id. at 640, 900 S.E.2d at 66. Judge Callaghan, on the other hand,

distributed a false campaign flyer shortly before a judicial election in which he narrowly

defeated his opponent and offered “extremely limited remorse.” Callaghan, 238 W. Va. at

522, 796 S.E.2d at 631. We find that while the scale of the misrepresentation in this case

more closely approximates that in Rock, the attempted professional gain and potential

impact on the integrity of the judicial appointment process is more akin to the motive and

elective process disrupted in Callaghan.

In consideration of these factors, we find that respondent’s admitted

misrepresentation to garner a vacancy appointment is serious misconduct warranting

suspension and formal condemnation. 15 And despite our reduction of the number of

established Rule violations, the essence of respondent’s underlying misconduct remains.

Accordingly, we adopt the Board’s recommended sanction and order that respondent be

15

“A censure constitutes formal condemnation of a judge who has engaged in

conduct which violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.” W. Va. R. Jud. Disciplinary Proc.

4.12.

25

suspended without pay for two months, censured, and required to pay costs in the amount

of $618.45.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court imposes the following discipline:

1. respondent is suspended for two (2) months without pay for her

violation of Rule 4.1(A)(9) of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct;

2. respondent is hereby censured for this violation; and

3. respondent is ordered to pay costs in the amount of $618.45.

The Clerk of this Court is ordered to issue the mandate forthwith.

Suspended and other sanctions ordered.

26