Dawson

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 AMANDA JEANE DAWSON, Case No. 25-cv-01923-JSC

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS

v.

9

Re: Dkt. Nos. 63, 64, 71

10 NAPA COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

11

12

13 Amanda Dawson, proceeding without attorney representation, sues Defendants for

14 “official misconduct and abuse of power in Napa County.” (Dkt. No. 62 ¶ 1.)1 Now pending

15 before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by the City of Napa (“City Defendants”) (Dkt. No.

16 63); and Napa County and its Child Welfare Services (“CWS”), Public Defender’s, District

17 Attorney’s (“DA’s”), Probation, and Counsel’s offices (“County Defendants”), (Dkt. No. 64).

18 City Defendants move in the alternative for a more definite statement. (Dkt. No. 63.) Ms.

19 Dawson also moves for leave to file an additional opposition brief out of time. (Dkt. No. 71.)

20 Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, and with the benefit of oral argument on

21 October 23, 2025, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss and DENIES Ms.

22 Dawson’s motion.

23 In summary, as to her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, Ms. Dawson does not include sufficient

24 facts to plausibly allege any individual Defendant violated her First Amendment, Fourth

25 Amendment, or Fourteenth Amendment rights, and she has not identified a municipal policy,

26 practice, or custom to allege Monell liability. As to her other claims, Ms. Dawson has not alleged

27

1 sufficient facts to state a conspiracy to violate her rights based on animus under 42 U.S.C. § 1985;

2 a qualifying disability under the ADA and Rehabilitation Acts; an involuntary proceeding and

3 violations of the Indian Child Welfare Act Sections 1912(a) and 1912(d); or a “racketeering

4 activity” under RICO.

5 BACKGROUND

6 I. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

7 Amanda Dawson lives in Napa County, California, and is the mother of an infant O.M., an

8 Indian child of Cherokee heritage, and the fiancé of Erik Milner. (Dkt. No. 62 at 5-6, 16.) She is

9 also “a qualified individual with a disability (traumatic brain injury).” (Id. at 6.)

10 On August 31, 2023, Napa Police officers, including Officers Velasquez, Toscani, Ulitin,

11 Lipscomb, Rohrer, Gilbert, and others, “initiated a traffic stop on Mr. Milner, claiming he was

12 involved in a domestic dispute and minor collision.” (Id. at 14.) Using “extreme force –

13 effectively beating and tasing him,” the officers forced Mr. Milner to undergo a warrantless blood

14 draw, seized and impounded Mr. Milner’s pickup truck without a warrant, “fabricated a narrative

15 that he had committed a hit-and-run and was the aggressor in a domestic violence incident with

16 Ms. Dawson,” and arrested him on felony charges. (Id. at 14-15.) The same day, Ms. Dawson

17 “suffered a traumatic serious head injury (a brain bleed) during an altercation – but that injury was

18 caused by an accidental fall or by another individual, not by Mr. Milner.” (Id.)

19 For two months after Mr. Milner’s trial, and after his conviction and sentencing, Napa

20 Police officers and the DA’s office later withheld body-worn camera footage “caputur[ing]

21 conversations and observations indicating that Mr. Milner had not committed the alleged crimes,”

22 as well as “at least one surveillance or cellphone video from the scene.” (Id. at 15.) The withheld

23 video “conclusively rebutted the ‘hit-and-run’ narrative” and, by withholding it, “Defendants

24 ensured Mr. Milner was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned” in a “calculated move by Napa DA

25 personnel . . . to win the case at any cost and protect Napa PD from embarrassment.” (Id. at 15-

26 16.)

27 On October 24, 2023, CWS social workers Catalina Chavez, Martha Jimenez-Ramirez,

1 child O.M. from her arms without a warrant or court order.” (Id. at 16.)2 “They cited vague

2 ‘safety concerns,’ but no exigent circumstance justified their actions.” (Id.) Ms. Dawson was

3 “placed on a 5150 psychiatric hold without medical evaluation, preventing her from attending the

4 first dependency hearing.” (Id.)

5 On January 18, 2024, at a “disposition hearing in the dependency case,” Juvenile Court

6 Judge Joseph Solga “ordered a plan aimed at reunification,” but “CWS (through Bogarin and

7 others) disregarded these orders and unilaterally limited or withdrew certain services, effectively

8 overriding the court’s directives without permission.” (Id. at 17.) In addition, in August and

9 September 2024, after a judge had approved “thrice-weekly overnight visits for Ms. Dawson with

10 O.M.,” and shortly after Ms. Dawson “filed a grievance” against Ms. Bogarin, Ms. Bogarin

11 “unilaterally reversed this progress, cutting overnight visits entirely.” (Id.) Although “[t]here was

12 no new incident or safety issue,” the court “acquiesced to this reversal without a hearing.” (Id.)

13 Around October 6, 2024, Ms. Dawson “briefly took [O.M.] out of sight of the visitation

14 supervisor (to get ice cream nearby) and then promptly returned.” (Id. at 18.) DA Michelle

15 Roberts then “charged Ms. Dawson with multiple felonies, including child abduction” and

16 “requested – and Judge Patricia Tisher set – an exorbitant bail with onerous conditions.” (Id.)

17 “[]DA Roberts painted Ms. Dawson as a menace, referencing her mental health and twisting facts

18 from the dependency case . . . to argue she should be kept in jail,” and Ms. Dawson was

19 incarcerated. (Id.) “All of this occurred because Ms. Dawson had been vocal in Mr. Milner’s

20 defense.” (Id.) “This malicious prosecution caused Ms. Dawson severe emotional distress,”

21 harmed her health and finances, and “served to intimidate her from further exposing Napa’s

22 misconduct. (Id. at 19).

23 The following month, although Ms. Dawson had completed court-ordered services, CWS

24 officials Ms. Bogarin and Ms. Jimenez-Ramirez “reversed her visitation progress,” “imposed

25 duplicative case plan requirements,” “cut back her contact with O.M.,” and “demanded she redo

26

27

2 Napa Police Officer Matt Liscomb was also present on October 24, 2023, and “involved in the

1 programs.” (Id. at 16-17.) “This appears to have been retaliation for her increasingly vocal

2 complaints about their conduct, rather than any genuine concern for the child’s safety or well-

3 being.” (Id. at 17.)

4 On January 28, 2025, Ms. Dawson “filed a sealed declaration in court” detailing evidence

5 of Napa Police misconduct in Mr. Milner’s case, as “protected speech, part of her court defense”

6 in her criminal case. (Id. at 19.) However, Napa officials “reacted with immediate retaliation:”

7 DA Roberts and DA Investigator Kelly sought an ex parte Criminal Protective Order (“CPO”),

8 claiming Ms. Dawson’s declaration was harassment or a threat to them, and a judge issued a CPO,

9 which severely restricted Ms. Dawson’s movements. (Id.) “The real purpose was to frighten Ms.

10 Dawson and impede her ability to access the courthouse,” and the CPO was unfounded “personal

11 retaliation.” (Id.)

12 In late 2024 and 2025, Ms. Dawson “encountered unprecedented obstruction by Napa

13 court judges,” including limiting her discovery rights by only allowing her to review evidence

14 under supervision at the DA’s office, because she did not have a lawyer. (Id. at 20.) Judges also

15 ignored or denied her requests for ADA accommodations “such as a note-taker, extended time to

16 review evidence, and a support person,” which she had requested because of her “cognitive

17 disability from her head injury,” which deprived her of “meaningful” court proceedings. (Id. at

18 21.)

19 In mid-late 2024, Judge Scott Young, who sentenced Mr. Milner, admitted he was taking

20 Ms. Dawson’s dependency case “into account” in deciding Mr. Milner’s sentence. (Id. at 22.) DA

21 Roberts also cited details from the dependency case in Ms. Dawson’s bail hearing. (Id.) “By law,

22 Ms. Dawson’s dependency case records were supposed to be confidential and certainly not used in

23 criminal proceedings without proper authorization,” and “show coordination between CPS and the

24 DA/judges.” (Id. at 22-23.)

25 On May 2, 2025, Ms. Dawson filed an emergency TRO in federal court. (Id. at 24.) The

26 next day, Napa County Probation officers and Napa Police officers arrived at Ms. Dawson’s home,

27 “claim[ing] to be conducting a ‘probation compliance check’” on Mr. Milner, but “this was a

1 officers did not have a warrant, broke down the front door, and “stormed into the residence with

2 guns drawn,” terrifying Ms. Dawson and seizing Mr. Milner. (Id.) They brought new “fabricated”

3 charges against Mr. Milner, treated Ms. Dawson roughly, and damaged property. (Id.)

4 Since May 2025, Ms. Dawson has been separated from O.M., Napa County has continued

5 to prosecute her, and the dependency case is still not closed, so “O.M. has been in foster care or

6 with relatives for nearly two years.” (Id. at 26.) Ms. Dawson “continue[s] to experience

7 surveillance and harassment.” (Id.) In addition, “[j]udges funneled Ms. Dawson into endless

8 counseling, classes, and supervised visitation provided by county contractors (like Aldea, NEWS,

9 and COPE), which then billed the County and received grant funds for each session.” (Id. at 3.)

10 “CWS social workers continuously found pretexts to delay reunification and extend court

11 overnight – ensuring that the cash flow (and state/federal funding) continued.” (Id.) “This

12 enterprise’s participants – including certain judges, CWS officials, and nonprofit staff – acted in

13 concert to defraud the system and trample Plaintiffs’ rights in the process.” (Id. at 4.)

14 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

15 On February 24, 2025, Ms. Dawson filed a complaint alleging (1) the Napa County Public

16 Defender’s office and individual attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation

17 of her Sixth Amendment rights; (2) Napa County and CWS violated her Fourteenth Amendment

18 Due Process and Equal Protection rights by unlawfully removing her child and denying her a fair

19 hearing; and (3) the Napa Police Department violated her Fourth Amendment rights by using

20 excessive force. (Dkt. No. 1.) In May 2025, Ms. Dawson sought a temporary restraining order,

21 which the Court denied. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 18.) The day after the Court denied Ms. Dawson’s

22 temporary restraining order, she filed a motion for disqualification, which the Court also denied.

23 (Dkt. Nos. 19, 32.) Napa County Superior Court, City Defendants, and County Defendants moved

24 to dismiss Ms. Dawson’s complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 20, 22, 29.) The Court granted Defendants’

25 motions to dismiss with leave to amend, except as to Ms. Dawson’s claims against Napa County

26 Superior Court, which were dismissed without leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 45.)

27 Ms. Dawson then filed a motion to consolidate cases and requested permission to file on

1 cv-1923, Dawson v. Napa County; (2) 25-cv-3350, Milner v. Dodd; (3) 25-cv-3428, Milner v.

2 N.E.W.S.; and (4) 25-cv-6193, Milner v. Napa County. (Dkt. No. 65 at 1.)3 The Court denied both

3 motions and specifically informed Ms. Dawson she “cannot litigate any motions in Mr. Milner’s

4 case” or “file motions on his behalf” in this case. (Id. at 6.)

5 Ms. Dawson also filed an amended complaint with causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §

6 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment due

7 process violations, including Monell claims; 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiracy; the Americans with

8 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act; the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”); and

9 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”). (Dkt. No. 62 at 27, 34.) Ms. Dawson

10 seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 4.) The

11 City Defendants and County Defendants now move to dismiss Ms. Dawson’s amended complaint.

12 (Dkt. Nos. 63, 64.)

13 DISCUSSION

14 The City Defendants move to dismiss all claims against the Napa Police Department,4 Jose

15 Velasquez, Officer Medina, Sergeant Medina, Sean Ulitin, Kevin King, Matt Lipscomb, Sean

16 Rohrer, Adam Gilbert, Adam Davis, Pete Peirsig, Dustin Dodd, and Bill Hernandez.5 (Dkt. No.

17 63 at 7.) The County Defendants seek to dismiss all claims against Napa County; Napa County

18 CWS and employees Jasmine Bogarin, Martha Jimenez-Ramirez, Catalina Chavez, and Lori

19 Grisham; Napa County Counsel’s Office and employees Joann Iwasaki Parker, Douglas Parker,

20 Corey Utsurogi, and Sheryl Bratton; Napa County DA’s Office and employees Michelle Roberts

21 and Melissa Kelly; Napa County Probation; and Napa County Public Defender’s Office and

22 employees Allison Wilensky and Aric Bright. (Dkt. No. 64 at 2.) Because the City Defendants

23

3 On February 6, 2025, Plaintiff also brought a related action and asked the Court to “remove the

24

criminal prosecution against [her] from the state court system to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §

1455[] and remove the [j]uvenile dependency case against [her] and [her] family.” (25-cv-01288,

25

Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) The Court dismissed and remanded the case to state court for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. (25-cv-01288, Dkt. No. 10 at 1.)

26

4 Because Plaintiff sues the Napa Valley Police Department, City Defendants clarify “[t]o the

extent Plaintiff means the City of Napa Police Department (“NPD”), the NPD is not a separate

27

legal entity, but rather, a department of the City,” and “[t]he City’s response thus includes

1 and County Defendants make similar arguments in support of dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, the

2 Court addresses their motions together.

3 I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

4 A. The Addition of Mr. Milner to the Amended Complaint

5 Defendants argue any claims asserted on Mr. Milner’s behalf should be dismissed. The

6 Court agrees. First, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its

7 pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8 15(a)(2). Ms. Dawson was the only plaintiff in her initial pleading, and Ms. Dawson has not

9 obtained Defendants’ written consent or the Court’s leave to join Mr. Milner as a plaintiff.

10 Second, Mr. Milner asserts the same claims against the same defendants in Milner v. Dodd et al.,

11 No. 25-CV-03350-JSC, and Milner v. Napa Emergency Women’s Services et al., No. 25-CV-

12 03428. See Adams v. California Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007)

13 (“Plaintiffs generally have ‘no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject

14 matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendants.’” (citation omitted)),

15 overruled in part on other grounds, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). The Court

16 therefore strikes from Ms. Dawson’s amended complaint any claims brought on behalf of Mr.

17 Milner. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or

18 any redundant, immaterial, or impertinent, or scandalous matter . . . on its own.”)

19 In addition, as the Court has previously stated, Ms. Dawson is not a licensed attorney and

20 cannot represent Mr. Milner in this Court. (Dkt. No. 65 at 6.) See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc.,

21 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654) (describing “general rule prohibiting

22 pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity”). So, Ms.

23 Dawson’s opposition brief is only on behalf of her own claims, and Mr. Milner has not filed an

24 opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Therefore, all claims in this case on Mr. Milner’s

25 behalf are dismissed without prejudice to Mr. Milner’s pursuit of his claims in the other cases in

26 which he is a plaintiff.

27 B. New Allegations in Ms. Dawson’s Opposition Brief

1 and exhibits. (Dkt. No. 66.) “Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the

2 pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).” Khoja v. Orexigen

3 Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). “There are only a few limited exceptions to

4 this rule. A court may consider: (1) documents attached to the complaint; (2) documents

5 incorporated by reference in the complaint; and (3) matter that is judicially noticeable under

6 Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” City of Royal Oak Retirement Sys. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 880

7 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08

8 (9th Cir. 2003)). Because Ms. Dawson’s brief introduces facts not alleged in her amended

9 complaint, incorporated by reference in her amended complaint, or judicially noticeable, the Court

10 cannot consider them in deciding Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports

11 (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing to consider new allegations raised in

12 briefing and noting plaintiff instead could amend complaint to include allegations).

13 The day before oral argument, Ms. Dawson also moved for leave to file an additional

14 opposition brief. (Dkt. No. 71.) The Court DENIES Ms. Dawson’s motion as prohibited by the

15 Local Rules. See N.D. Cal. L. R. 7-3(d) (“Once a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, papers,

16 or letters may be filed without prior Court approval, except . . . [i]f new evidence has been

17 submitted in the reply, the opposing party may file and serve an Objection to Reply Evidence . . .

18 not more than 7 days after the reply was filed.”). To the extent Ms. Dawson has additional facts

19 supporting her claims, she may include such facts in her amended complaint.

20 II. LEGAL STANDARD

21 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must include a “short and plain

22 statement of [each] claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

23 While the Rule 8 pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” “it demands

24 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

25 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). On a motion to dismiss, the court “must take all of the factual

26 allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. However, this presumption does not apply to

27 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

1 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” in other words, to

2 “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

3 alleged.” Id. (cleaned up). When a plaintiff files a complaint without representation by a lawyer,

4 the Court must “construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any

5 doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

6 III. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

7 “42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of

8 state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution.” Jones v. Williams, 297

9 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; rather it is the

10 vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by government officials.” Id. To state a Section

11 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege a government official (1) acted “under color of state law,” and

12 (2) “the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” Id.

13 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In order for a person acting under color of state law to be

14 liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights

15 deprivation.” Id. Therefore, a plaintiff must allege a specific government official’s “actions were

16 both the actual and proximate cause” of her injuries. See White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505

17 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The inquiry into

18 causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

19 defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”). A

20 plaintiff cannot “hold an officer liable because of his membership in a group without a showing of

21 individual participation in the unlawful conduct.” Jones, 297 F.3d at 935 (citation omitted).

22 A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

23 “[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to

24 retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019)

25 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff must allege an official “acted with a retaliatory

26 motive” to cause a plaintiff’s injury, meaning “the adverse action against the plaintiff would not

27 have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. at 398-99 (explaining retaliatory motive must

1 cause or non-retaliatory motives for an official’s actions. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250,

2 265-66 (2006).

3 Ms. Dawson’s First Amendment retaliation claims fail because she has not alleged facts

4 supporting a plausible inference Defendants acted in retaliation for her speech. First, Ms. Dawson

5 alleges after she filed a “federal removal petition and ADA-related complaint,” Judge Stamps, Ms.

6 Bogarin, and Ms. Jimenez-Ramirez “abruptly revoked Ms. Dawson’s overnight visits with O.M

7 and halted her reunification services.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 28.) Although Ms. Dawson alleges their

8 stated grounds of “risk” were “pretextual,” she does not provide any facts supporting the alleged

9 pretext or her conclusion they acted just to retaliate. (Id. at 29.) So, at a minimum, she has not

10 plausibly alleged the absence of probable case.

11 Ms. Dawson also alleges DA Kelly and DA Roberts “patently retaliat[ed]” when they

12 sought a CPO and “escalat[ed] the charges against” her to “‘teach her a lesson’ and impede her

13 ability to assist in Mr. Milner’s defense.” (Id. at 29-30.) These allegations are similarly

14 conclusory. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

15 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Ms. Dawson relies on the “timing” of

16 Defendants’ actions, and their “disproportionate nature” in relation to Defendants’ stated reasons,

17 but these circumstantial allegations do not “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference”

18 Defendants would not have acted but for their retaliatory motives. (Dkt. No. 62 at 30.) See Iqbal,

19 556 U.S. at 678.

20 Ms. Dawson also alleges Napa County Probation and Napa Police Department officers

21 retaliated against her for her federal filings by raiding her home. (Dkt. No. 62 at 25, 31.)

22 However, Ms. Dawson fails to identify the individual officials who raided her home, and why

23 each of their motives were retaliatory. See Jones, 297 F.3d at 935.

24 So, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims against individual defendants are

25 dismissed with leave to amend.

26 B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

27 “[A] section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process [] has three elements: (1) a

1 government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th

2 Cir. 1993). So, a plaintiff must first allege a “recognized liberty or property interest at stake” in

3 the official’s failure to provide process. See Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 953 (9th Cir. 2009)

4 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

5 Ms. Dawson alleges CWS employees violated the Due Process Clause by taking O.M.

6 from her “without a warrant or court order.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 16.) “The Fourteenth Amendment

7 guarantees that parents will not be separated from their children without due process of law except

8 in emergencies.” Rogers v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation

9 marks and citation omitted). “Officials violate this right if they remove a child from the home

10 absent information at the time of the seizure that establishes reasonable cause to believe that the

11 child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is

12 reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

13 Ms. Dawson alleges the CWS employees “cited vague ‘safety concerns,’ but no exigent

14 circumstances justified their actions.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 16.) However, because Ms. Dawson’s

15 amended complaint does not include any facts supporting her conclusory allegation “no exigent

16 circumstances justified” taking O.M. from her, she does not state a plausible claim officials lacked

17 reasonable cause and therefore violated the Due Process Clause.

18 Ms. Dawson also alleges she was “placed on a 5150 psychiatric hold without medical

19 evaluation, preventing her from attending the first dependency hearing.” (Id.) But she does not

20 identify the individuals who placed her on the hold, see Jones, 297 F.3d at 935, or allege facts

21 supporting a reasonable inference the officials’ decision was baseless and did not include any

22 process.

23 In addition, Ms. Dawson alleges judges’ denial of her ADA accommodation requests

24 violated the Due Process Clause by preventing her from having “meaningful” court proceedings.

25 (Dkt. No. 62 at 21.) These claims fail because Ms. Dawson does not explain the nature of these

26 court proceedings or the “recognized liberty or property interest at stake” in them. See Guzman,

27 552 F.3d at 953. But, in any event, the judges are entitled to absolute immunity for denial of ADA

1 537 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The district court properly dismissed Goldblatt’s claims regarding

2 defendant’s alleged denial of ADA accommodations because they arose out of defendant’s rulings

3 in his capacity as a judge presiding over a state court family law proceeding, and, therefore, were

4 barred by absolute judicial immunity.”).

5 So, Ms. Dawson’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims against individual

6 defendants are dismissed with leave to amend, except her claim regarding judges’ denial of ADA

7 accommodation requests is dismissed without leave to amend as the judges are entitled to absolute

8 immunity.

9 C. Fourth Amendment Claim

10 Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment “protects children from removal

11 from their homes absent” a warrant or “reasonable cause to believe that the child is likely to

12 experience serious bodily harm in the time that would be required to obtain a warrant.” See

13 Rogers, 487 F.3d at 1294. Ms. Dawson argues CWS employees removed her child from her home

14 without a warrant, court order, or exigent circumstances, but, as explained in addressing her

15 Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim, Ms. Dawson does not allege facts supporting a

16 plausible inference the CWS employees lacked reasonable cause. Ms. Dawson’s other Fourth

17 Amendment claims, including those arising from Napa County Probation and Napa Police

18 Department officers’ warrantless raid of her home on May 3, 2025, fail because she does not

19 identify the individual defendants who raided her home. See Jones, 297 F.3d at 935. So, Ms.

20 Dawson has not stated a Fourth Amendment claim against individual defendants.

21 The Court therefore dismisses all of Ms. Dawson’s Section 1983 claims against individual

22 defendants with leave to amend.

23 IV. SECTION 1983 MONELL CLAIMS AGAINST LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

24 The Court previously dismissed Ms. Dawson’s claims against City and County Defendants

25 because she had failed to state a claim for Monell liability. (Dkt. No. 45 at 7, 12.) City and

26 County Defendants again move to dismiss claims against municipal Defendants for failure to state

27 a Monell claim.

1 employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts

2 the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

3 Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must

4 first show her constitutional rights were violated by an individual defendant who was a local

5 government employee. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person

6 has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the

7 departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite

8 beside the point.”) As explained above, Ms. Dawson has alleged any individual officer violated

9 her constitutional rights, so she cannot allege a Monell claim.

10 However, a plaintiff must also “establish that the local government had a deliberate policy,

11 custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [she] suffered.”

12 AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).

13 “[G]enerally, a single instance of unlawful conduct is insufficient to state a claim for municipal

14 liability,” but it may be sufficient “where fault and causation were clearly traceable to a

15 municipality’s legislative body or some other authorized decisionmaker.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of

16 San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). The Court previously dismissed

17 Ms. Dawson’s Monell claims because “even if [her] complaint contained sufficiently detailed

18 factual allegations to allege unlawful arrest or excessive force, [Ms. Dawson] fail[ed] to plausibly

19 allege a [] Napa policy, custom, or practice was the moving force behind such constitutional

20 violations.” (Dkt. No. 45 at 7.) In her amended complaint, Ms. Dawson alleges only “[t]he

21 unconstitutional acts of Napa PD officers described herein were done pursuant to City policy or

22 with the City’s ratification, giving rise to Monell liability,” and “the County (through its officials)

23 established or permitted the policies and customs that led to the violations herein.” (Dkt. No. 62 at

24 6, 10.) However, to state a Monell claim, Ms. Dawson must identify a particular Napa County or

25 Napa City policy, custom, or practice and explain how it led to the constitutional violations. Her

26 conclusory allegations the individual Defendants’ actions were taken pursuant to a City or County

27 policy are insufficient. Furthermore, at oral argument, Ms. Dawson explained her Monell claims

1 accommodations. However, a Monell claim does not exist when officials violate constitutional

2 rights by not following a municipal policy; instead, a Monell claim arises when officials violate

3 constitutional rights while following a municipal policy.

4 So, the Court dismisses the Monell claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without leave to amend.

5 In her amended complaint, Ms. Dawson may only bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against

6 individual officers and not local government entities.

7 V. SECTION 1985 CONSPIRACY CLAIM

8 “Section 1985 proscribes conspiracies to interfere with certain civil rights.” Karim-Panahi

9 v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a Section 1985(3) claim,

10 Plaintiffs must allege “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or

11 indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges

12 and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a

13 person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen

14 of the United States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation

15 marks and citation omitted). As to the first element, “[a] mere allegation of conspiracy without

16 factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626; see also Frazier v. Int’l

17 Longshoremen’s Union Local No. 10, 116 F.3d 1485 (Table), 1997 WL 349139, at *3 (9th Cir.

18 June 24, 1997) (requiring facts supporting “an inference either of racial animus or a ‘meeting of

19 the minds’”). A plaintiff must also allege “a deprivation of [a] right motivated by some racial, or

20 perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.”

21 Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

22 Ms. Dawson does not allege facts to support her Section 1985 claim. Ms. Dawson alleges

23 “certain judges, CWS officials, and nonprofit staff – acted in concert” to keep her “entangled in

24 legal proceedings,” including by extending her case and “funnel[ing] Ms. Dawson into endless

25 counseling, classes, and supervised visitation provided by county contractors.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 3-

26 4.) However, because Ms. Dawson alleges Defendants retaliated against her specifically, she does

27 not allege any deprivation of her rights was “motivated by some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-

1 omitted). Ms. Dawson also does not include the “factual specificity” necessary to allege a

2 conspiracy, such as the specific individual Defendants involved, the agreement they made, or how

3 they aimed to deprive her of “equal protection” or “equal privileges and immunities under the

4 laws.” See id.; Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626.

5 Further, Ms. Dawson has not identified any racial animus or other class-based

6 discriminatory animus. When asked at oral argument what she could allege, she referred to

7 government agents interviewing while she was in the hospital, suggesting discriminatory animus

8 perhaps based on disability status. However, while all of her voluminous filings suggest she

9 contends certain defendants violated disability laws in how they treated her, nothing suggests she

10 could plausibly and in good faith allege a conspiracy motivated by her disability status. So, leave

11 to amend this claim will not be granted.

12 Ms. Dawson’s Section 1985 claim is therefore dismissed without leave to amend.

13 VI. ADA AND REHABILITATION ACT CLAIMS

14 “Title II of the ADA, the title applicable to public services, provides that ‘no qualified

15 individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or

16 be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

17 discrimination by any such entity.” K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d

18 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12134). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

19 Act “bars the exclusion of individuals with disabilities from any program or activity receiving

20 federal funds.” Id. at 1098 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). “[T]here is no significant difference in the

21 analysis of rights and obligations created by” Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of

22 the ADA. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

23 To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege: “‘(1) he is a qualified

24 individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits

25 of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the

26 public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his

27 disability.” Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and

1 additional requirement that the plaintiff prove that ‘the program receives federal financial

2 assistance.’” Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 738 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation

3 omitted).

4 Ms. Dawson does not allege facts to support her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. As

5 to the first prong, an individual is a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA and

6 Rehabilitation Act if she “(1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

7 more of the individual’s major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is

8 regarded as having such an impairment.” See Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d

9 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Although Ms. Dawson alleges she has a “cognitive

10 disability from her head injury” and “severe memory and processing issues,” she does not include

11 facts in her amended complaint to infer an impairment which has “substantially limit[ed]” her

12 “major life activities,” so she has not alleged the type of disability required to state an ADA or

13 Rehabilitation Act claim. (Dkt. No. 62 at 21.) See Coons, 383 F.3d at 884.

14 Defendants summarily argue Ms. Dawson has not alleged Defendants denied services

15 “because of a disability.” (Dkt. No. 68 at 5; Dkt. No. 63 at 18.) But the ADA’s prohibition

16 against discrimination “is universally understood as a requirement to provide ‘meaningful

17 access.’” Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2009). It therefore requires

18 “reasonable modifications necessary to correct for instances in which qualified disabled people

19 are prevented from enjoying ‘meaningful access’ to a benefit because of their disability.” Mark H.

20 v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted): see also Payan, 11 F.4th at 738

21 (explaining claim may be based on “failure to make a reasonable accommodation”). However,

22 Ms. Dawson only alleges the judicial proceedings she participated in were “fundamentally unfair”

23 because she “often could not comprehend the fast-paced legal arguments or recall what had been

24 said,” she “had a cognitive disability,” and she was denied “a note-taker, extended time to review

25 evidence, and a support person.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 21.) Ms. Dawson therefore fails to plausibly

26 allege she did not have meaningful access to participate in or benefit from the court proceedings

27 because of her qualifying disability and was denied reasonable accommodations.

VII. ICWA CLAIM

1

Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, in

2

response to “rising concern . . . over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and

3

Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of

4

Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in

5

non-Indian homes.” Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 642 (2013). Under ICWA,

6

“[a]ny party who initiates an ‘involuntary proceeding’ in state court to place an Indian child in

7

foster care or terminate parental rights must ‘notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian

8

child’s tribe,’” and “‘satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial

9

serves and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that

10

these efforts have proved unsuccessful.’” See Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 266 (2023)

11

(quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(a), 1912(d)).

12

Ms. Dawson has not alleged enough facts to state an ICWA claim. Ms. Dawson references

13

a “dependency case,” (Dkt. No. 62 at 16, 17), but she does not allege any Defendants initiated an

14

“involuntary proceeding in a State court . . . seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of

15

parental rights to,” O.M. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). Ms. Dawson also does not allege the State

16

court in her dependency case “knows or has reason to know” O.M. is an Indian child of Cherokee

17

heritage, such that Section 1912(a)’s notice requirements apply. Id. Instead, Ms. Dawson only

18

alleges CWS social workers Ms. Chavez, Ms. Jimenez-Ramirez, Ms. Grisham, and Ms. Bogarin

19

violated ICWA because they removed O.M. without “providing tribal notice and employing

20

‘active efforts’ to avoid family breakup.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 16.) Because Ms. Dawson merely states

21

the legal requirements of ICWA Sections 1912(a) and 1912(d) without any specific facts to

22

support them, she does not plausibly state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare

23

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

24

suffice.”).

25

So, Ms. Dawson’s ICWA claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

26

VIII. RICO CLAIM

27

Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§

1 1961-1968, a civil claim must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of

2 racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s ‘business or

3 property.’” See Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th

4 Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To conduct or participate directly in the

5 conduct of such an enterprise, one must participate in the operation or management of the

6 enterprise.” Flores v. Emerich & Fike, 416 F. Supp. 2d 885, 912 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Reves

7 v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993)) (cleaned up). To show a pattern of racketeering

8 activity, a plaintiff must show “the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or

9 pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1535 (cleaned up). Furthermore,

10 a plaintiff must allege a “racketeering activity” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which include:

11 “[A]ny act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,

robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a

12 controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in Section 102 of

the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State Law

13 and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” §

1961(1)(A). Also included are any of more than twenty types of

14 conduct indictable under enumerated provisions of the United States

Code, ranging from mail fraud and wire fraud, through robbery and

15 extortion, to white slave trade. § 1961(1)(B). Finally, a “predicate

act” may also be established by any offense involving fraud

16 “connected with” a bankruptcy case, “fraud in the sale of securities,”

or any act related to a controlled substance or listed chemical

17 “punishable' under federal law.” § 1961(1)(C).

18 See Flores, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 911.

19 Ms. Dawson has not plausibly alleged a RICO claim because she has not alleged facts to

20 support each of the five required elements. First, Ms. Dawson alleges “certain judges, CWS

21 officials, and nonprofit staff – acted in concert” to keep her “entangled in legal proceedings,”

22 including by extending her case and “funnel[ing] Ms. Dawson into endless counseling, classes,

23 and supervised visitation provided by county contractors.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 3-4.) However, none

24 of these actions are predicate acts which qualify as “racketeering activities” under the RICO

25 statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

26 Second, Ms. Dawson identifies Napa County as the “enterprise,” and claims “certain

27 judges, CWS officials, and nonprofit staff – acted in concert,” but she does not identify the

1 involved in the enterprise. (Dkt. No. 62 at 3-4, 6.) See Franco v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

2 No. C 10-04768 WHA, 2012 WL 1980799, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (“A plaintiff is

3 required under RICO to allege for each particular defendant the specific ‘racketeering activity’

4 committed by the defendant.”).

5 So, Ms. Dawson’s RICO claim is dismissed. The dismissal is without leave to amend as it

6 is apparent she cannot plead a viable RICO claim.

7 CONCLUSION

8 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the City Defendants’ and the County

9 Defendants’ motions to dismiss with leave to amend except as to Ms. Dawson’s claims (1)

10 regarding judges’ denial of her ADA accommodation requests, (2) her section 1985(3) claim, (3)

11 her RICO claim, and (4) her Monell claims against local government Defendants. The City

12 Defendants move in the alternative for a more definite statement of Ms. Dawson’s pleading. See

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a

14 responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot

15 reasonably prepare a response.”). Because the Court has granted City Defendants’ motion to

16 dismiss, it does not grant their alternative motion. However, if Ms. Dawson files an amended

17 complaint, she must specify each legal claim she asserts, the facts supporting each claim, and

18 against which defendants she asserts each claim.

19 Ms. Dawson may file a second amended complaint consistent with this Order.

20 Specifically, in her amended complaint, Ms. Dawson may not assert claims in this case on behalf

21 of anyone besides herself, including on behalf of Mr. Milner or O.M. Ms. Dawson also may not

22 add additional claims or parties without leave of Court. Ms. Dawson’s deadline to file an

23 amended complaint is November 22, 2025. If she does not file an amended complaint by that

24 date, judgement will be entered in Defendants’ favor and against Ms. Dawson on all claims.

25 Finally, as Ms. Dawson is proceeding without counsel, the Court directs her attention to

26 the Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which is available along with further information for the

27 parties on the Court’s website located at http://cand.uscourts.gov/proselitigants. Ms. Dawson may

1 free assistance regarding her claims.

2 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 63, 64, and 71.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 Dated: October 23, 2025

5 ’

ne

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7 JACMUELINE SCOTT CORLE

United States District Judge

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