Klein

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

HENRY L. KLEIN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 25-1047

JENNIFER M. MEDLEY DIVISION “5”

ORDER AND REASONS

This is a suit for damages – compensatory and punitive – against a sitting state-court

judge for decisions she made in a still-pending case. It is the latest episode in a years-long

crusade undertaken by Plaintiff in multiple state and federal courts seeking relief related to

numerous complicated transactions resulting from the failure of First NBC Bank.

The pleadings and documents filed by Plaintiff in this case are no less byzantine than

the underlying transactions giving rise to this (and a lot of related) litigation. Those

pleadings and their accompanying exhibits – awash in different fonts, typefaces and sizes

(and even different colors) – are often quite hard to follow, as they bounce from one case to

another and back again, only occasionally touching upon what appear to be Plaintiff’s

complaints about what the Defendant-Judge did in this case. And no matter how these

1

documents are styled, they all are painfully repetitive and continuously argue about legal

1

Plaintiff has filed a bizarre collection of heretofore un-heard of (at least to this judge) documents in this record,

including a “Request for Guidance” and “Supplemental Request for Guidance” (rec. docs. 3, 4); “Ex Parte Motion

to Appoint U.S. Marshall [sic] to Serve Summons and Thereupon to Appoint Magistrate-Judge KWR to Conduct

a Chambers v. NASCO Investigation of Fraud Upon the Courts” (rec. doc. 6); “Ex Parte Request for Order to

Protect Records and Expedited Production” (rec. doc. 15); “Response to Correction” (rec. doc. 16); “Popsrto-

asergument Observations” (rec. doc. 28); and a response to a deficiency notice entered by the Clerk’s office that

runs some 480 pages with exhibits. (Rec. doc. 31). This is all too much. And while Plaintiff is proceeding

and factual issues that are not part of this case, but pertain to the various injustices he and

2

his clients allegedly suffered in the underlying case(s).

This case is now before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

(Rec. doc. 17-1). Currently pending are two motions filed by Defendant, Judge Jennifer M.

Medley (“Judge Medley”). First is the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Entry of Prefiling

Injunction, which seeks (1) dismissal of Plaintiff’s Henry L. Klein’s (“Klein”) claims against

her, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and (2) an order

that Klein be enjoined from filing pleadings in this Court unless and until he obtains leave of

Court from the Chief Judge. (Rec. doc. 13). Second is a Motion to Stay Discovery. (Rec. doc.

18). Klein filed an opposition memorandum to the Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc. 22) but not

3

as to the Motion to Stay. Medley filed a reply to the Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. doc. 25). The

Court held oral argument on the motions, and Klein has filed a number of post-hearing

documents that will be discussed below.

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the pleadings and substantial exhibits in the record

and, based upon that review, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, rules as

fIo. llowsB. A CKGROUND

On May 27, 2025, Klein filed his Complaint naming Judge Medley of the Civil District

Court for the Parish of Orleans (“Civil District Court”) as the sole defendant. (Rec. doc. 1).

2

A perfect exHamenpsolen –v .j uSsatn dtaanysd earg o PTlahien tSifufp frileemda ac yp lCelaaduisneg osft ythleed U “nMitoetdio Snt atote Rs eCsounmsteit uOtriaoln P. r esentation,” in

which he argues that “[i]n the last few days, the Docket in 2022-03662 has been inundated with pleadings that

can't survive or Resuming oral

argument will allow each item of evidence (A-W) filed on August 14 to be introduced for Rule 57 purposes.”

(Rec. doc. 32). This is not case number 2022-03662 and whether that case can survive Plaintiff’s arguments is

Klein alleges that Judge Medley is part of a long-running conspiracy against him and his

clients. He claims that Judge Medley has violated his constitutional rightsG ainrodd tLhoea nriCgoh,t Ls LoCf

ov.t hHeernsr yu nLd. Kerle 4in2. U.S.C. § 1983 based on her rulings in the matter entitled

, Docket No. 2021-5090, currently pending in the Civil District Court for the

Parish of Orleans (the “Underlying Matter”). (Rec. doc. 13). Klein claims that the Underlying

Matter arises out of a June 15, 2021 suit by GirodLoanCo against him “as a commercial

guarantor on a Levy Gardens promissory note dated September 26, 2008.” (Rec. doc. 1).

Chief Judge Vitter previously summarized the factual and procedural background of

the Underlying MatterG iinro tdh eL OoarndCeor avn. dK lReienasons she issued remanding the case to state court

in Case No. 25-1127, . Because the details of that case are not of great

importance in deciding the jurisdictional issues raised by the pending motion to dismiss,

Chief Judge Vitter’s summary of those proceedings suffices for present purposes.

It is clear that Klein wants very badly to have his various complaints adjudicated in

this Court rather than state court. He twice removed the Underlying Matter to this Court: on

October 1, 2024, after which the case was remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

and then again on June 4, 2025, a, fter his Motion to recuse Judges eMeedley was denied in state

court. (No. 24-2366, Rec. doc. 1 30; No. 25-1127, Rec. doc. 1; Id. Klein’s Exhibits H, I, J, K,

and L). That case was remanded as well by Chief Judge Vitter. ( , rec. doc. 51).

Klein claims that Judge Medley violated his rights as secured by the First, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by denying him access to courts

and “threaten[ing] sanctions for free speech and expression.” (Rec. doc. 1). According to

Klein, Judge Medley committed these wrongs when she “engaged in a pattern of summary

subpoena to Klein’s wife as part of post-judgement discoverIyd .regarding Klein’s assets, and

threatened sanctions against him if he violated her orders. ( ).

As his remedy, Klein requests that Judge Medley be fouIdn.d liable and that she be

ordered to pay him damages, both compensatory and punitive. ( ).

It is worth noting that Klein’s license to practice law in Louisiana was suspended in

2023, largelyp froor hseis actions in the litigation underlying this case. He has elected to represent

himself asId a. litigant in the current matter rather than seek reinstatement of his law

license. ( ).

On August 27, 2025, Judge Medley filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against

her under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Rec. doc. 13). Judge Medley asserts that this Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Kleins’ claims based on the following legal defenses:

(1) she is entitled to ElevenRtho oAkmere-nFdelmdmenatn immunity and is not a “person” for purposes of a

Section 1983 claim; (2) the Younger doctrine applies; (3) the Court may abstain from

hearing the claims based on the Id.)a. b stention doctrine; and (4) that Judge Medley is

entitled to absolute judicial immunity. ( These are the jurisdictional arguments currently

before LthEeG CAoLu SrtT. ANDARDS

II. A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Federal RuleP roifc eC viv. iIlr oPnrsocedure 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a court's subject

matter jurisdiction. , No. CV 19-11451, 2020 WL 1638376, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 2,

2020). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdHiocmtioen B wuihldeenr tsh Aes sc'onu ortf

lMaicskss., tIhnec .s tva. tuCtitoyr yo fo rM caodnisstointutional power to adjudicate the case.” Nowak v.

Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund

, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). Because a 12(b)(1)

motion is jurisdictional, a court considers such a motion “before addressing any attack on

the merits” in order to “ pInr ervee FnEt[M ]A a Tcroauirlet rw Fiothrmouatl djuerhiysddeic Ptiroond f. rLoimab p. Lreitmiga.turely dismissing

a case with prejudice.” Ramming v. United States (Miss. Plaintiffs),

668 F.3d 281, 286-87 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting , 281 F.3d 158, 161

(5th Cir. 2001)). Nevertheless, a court uses “the saSmeee D sotoalnedya vr. dP”r iwnchiepni analyzing a Rule

12(b)(1) motion as it would a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. , 250 F. App'x 114,

115-16 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

Unlike in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, though, “[c]ourts may dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction on any one of three bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the Ccloamrkp vl.a Tinatr rsaunptp Clteym.,ented by

undisputed facts plus the court's rWesilolilaumtiosonn o vf .d Tisupcukteerd facts.” 798 F.2d

736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing , 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Importantly, the party invoking federal jurisdiction – inS eteh iCse cleasstein Kel ev.i nT r–a hnasWs tohoed burden of

demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists.R amming , Inc., 467

F. App'xB .3 1F7e,d 3e1r8a l( 5Rtuhl eC ior.f 2C0iv1i2l )P (rpoecre dcuurriea m12) ((bc)it(i6n)g , 281 F.3d at 161).

To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a party must plead “suffiAcisehnctr ofaftc vtu. Iaqlb malatter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claBimel lt oA trle. lCieofr pth. av.t Tisw polmaubsliyble on its face.’” , 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the couIrdt. to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” A court

Lormand v. US Unwired

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” , Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232

(5th Cir. 2009).

A legally sufficienSet ec oImqbpallaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the

party's claim is true. , 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain “‘detailed factual

allegations,’” but it must go be”y o Snede “i‘dla.bels and cTownoclmubsiloyns’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action.’ (quoting , 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,

“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to

raise a reasonable hope oLr oerxmpaenctdation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of

each element of a claim.” , 565 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted). The claim must be

dismissed if thereT awroem inbslyufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level,” , 550 U.S. at 55S5ee, o Jro nife ist vis. Bapocpkarent from the face of the complaint

that there is an insuperable bar to relief. , 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a disCtorlilcitn sc ovu. Mrto mrguasnt

lSitmanitl eitys eDlfe taon t hWe ictotenrtents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.”

, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). “The court may also consider

documents attached to either a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion wheBnra tnhde

dCooucupomne Nntest waroer kr, eLf.eLr.Cre. vd. Ctoa tianl itnhae Mpkletagd. Cinogrsp .and are central to a plaintiff's claims.”

, 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). Otherwise,

if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion

must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint does not indicate clearly whether he is suing Judge Medley in her

official capacity or individual capacity. Defendant thus moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against herA o. nO bfofitchi aglr-oCuanpdasc. i ty Claims

In support of her motion, Judge Medley first contends that Klein’s claim for damages

against her in her official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Rec. doc. 13). In

opposition, Klein argues in purely conclusory fashion, that “[n]o aspect of the Eleventh

Amendment protects [Judge Medley] from the consequences of her actions in the case at bar”

and that “[s]ection 1983 plaintiffs seeking damages for constitutional violations are entitled

to compensatory damages and punitive damages, a fact-intensive issue too early to decide.”

(Rec. doc. 22). Because tSheies Jqeuffeesrtsioonn vis. L oan. eS toaf tseu Sbujepcrte mmae tCteoru rjutrisdiction, the Court considers

it under Rule 12(b)(1). , 2002 WL 1973897, at *1 (5th

Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[E]leventh amendment immunity deprivMecsD tohnea cldo uvr. tB odf. osuf bMjiescst.

mLeavtetee rC ojumrimsd'risction of the action.” (alteration in origiYnsalle)t a(q dueolt Sinugr Pueblo v. Texas

, 832 F.2d 901, 906 (5th Cir. 1987))); , 36 F.3d

1325, 1336 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment operates as a jurisdictional bar.”).

The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any

suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

State.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This language expressly encompasses not only suits brought agaiSneset

Ha astnast ev. b Lyo cuiitsiizaennas of another state, but suPitasp aagsaainn svt. Aa lslatainte by citizens of that same stasetee. a lso

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman ); Edelman v. Jordan

, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 (1984 ,

415 U.S. 651, 663, 694 (1974). Under the Eleventh Amendment, “anE udne-lcmoannsenting State is

immune from suits brought in federal courts by her owSene cCiotizzzeon vs.. ”T angipaho,a 4 P1a5r .U C.oSu. 6nc5i1l-,

P6r6e3s i(d1e9n7t4 G)o. vL'touisiana is such an un-consenting state.

, 279 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (“By statute, Louisiana has refused any

such waiver of its Eleventh Amendment sosevee raelsigon H oimllimdauyn vit. yB dr.e ogfa Srudpinegr vsisuoirtss oifn L SfeUd Aergarl.

c&o Muretcsh.”. (Ccoiltli.ng La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5106(A)));

, 149 So. 3d 227, 229 (La. 2014) (“While Louisiana may have waived sovereign

immunity with respect to some claims, La. Const. art. 1 § 26 makes it clear the State has not

waived its sovereignty within the federal system.”).

PGreincee rva. lIlryo, ntsherefore, Louisiana enjoys immunity against suits brought in federal

court. , No. CV 19-11451, 2020 WL 1638Se3e7 R6,i cahta *r3d (sEo.nD v. .L Sa. .U Anpivr.. 2, 2020). This

immunity extends to suits brought under state law. , 118 F.3d 450,

453 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that state-law claim is barred where “the plaintiff's claim was

against the State of Louisiana and not the named defendant acting in his individSueael

Ccaopzzaocity”). Importantly for present purposes, it also applies to suits under Section 1983.

, 279 F.3d at 281 (stating that “Congress may only abrogate a state's Eleventh

Amendment immunity by ‘unequivocally’ expresFslian. gP rietsp aiindt ePnots ttsoe cdonod saory aEnddu cb. yE xapcetninseg

‘Bpdu. rvs.u Caonltl. tSoa va. vBaalnidk exercise of power,’” (quoting

, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999)), and “that in enacting § 1983, Congress did

‘not explicitly and by clear langQuaugeern i vn.d Jiocradtaen on its face an intent to sweep away the

immunity of the States’” (quoting , 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979))).

The Eleventh Amendment bar ePxetennndhsu rtost suits against state officials when “the state

is a real, substantial party in interest.” , 465 U.S. at 101–02. Thus, the general rule

is that relief sought againstH aanll ovf. fLicoeuri siisa nina fact against the sovereign if the decree would

operate against the latter. , 974 F. Supp. 2d 964 (M.D. La. 2013). And, as

when the state itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a

Psueintn ahguarisntst a state is barred rseegea ardlsloesOsk opfa lwobhie vth. Feor sitte rseeks damages or injunctive relief.

, 465 U.S. at 101–02; , 244 F.3d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 2001)

(holding that plaintiff cannot evade Eleventh Amendment immunity by naming an individual

state officer as a defendant in lieu of the state itself).

Therefore, this immunity extends not only to suits against Louisiana itself, but also to

Psuriictse avg. Iarionnsst Louisiana officials acting in their official capacity, including state-court judges.

, 2020 WL 1638376, at *3. Indeed, “[s]uit.”s aHgaafienrs vt. sMtaetloe officials in their official

cseaep aaclsitoy W. . .i lslh vo. uMldic bhe. Dtreepa'tte odf aSst sauteit sP aogliacienst the State , 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991);

, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against

the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”).

Here, Judge Medley, as a Louisiana state district court judge, is a state actor and is being

sued as such. Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Judge

Medley as Soenee D aagvaiisn vs.t T haerrr ainnt h Cetry .o, Tffeicxial capacity; the Eleventh Amendment therefore bars

the claim. ., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Texas judges are

entitled to Eleventh AmendmCeanint ivm. mCiutyn oitfy N foerw c Olarilmeasn assserted against them in their official

capacitiCesa ians vs.t aWteh aitcetors.”); , 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646 (E.D. La.

immunity would applyS utmo ma esrus ivt . fLooru irseiatrnoaspective relief against Orleans Parish Criminal

District Court judges); , No. 13-4573, 2013 WL 3818560, at *4 (E.D. La.

July 22, 2013) (finding that “an official-capacity claim against [a Louisiana judge] would in

reality be a claim against the state itself, and any such claims would be barred by the Eleventh

Amendment”).

As best as the Court can glean from the pleadings and statements made at oral

argument, Klein urges that the Eleventh Amendment does not shield Judge Medley’s conduct

here because her acts were “administrative,” not “adjudicative.” The argument is that Judge

Medley’s “unconventional and unprecedented practice of summary denials of all Klein

Motions . . . without a hearing were not ‘adjudications’ but administrative abberations.” (Rec.

doc. 22). There is nothing of substance offered in support of this conclusory argument, save

for citation to a Louisiana Supreme Court decision that bears no factual resemblance to the

underlying facts of this case. Palowsky v. Campbell ,

4

Klein relies heavily on a Louisiana case involving allegations

that the judge’s law clerk had a history of intentionally destroying or concealing court

documents, that she destroyed multiple court documents related to plaintiff’s underlying

suits, and that all of the jIudd.ges ofP tahloawt csokuyrt conspired with the clerk to cover-up her alleged

document destruction. The Court consIdid.ered these to be “highly unusual and

specific allegations” meriting further investigation. at 467.

Here, Klein (again in purely conclusory fashion and only in his opposition

memorandum) claims that Judge Medley’s clerk, non-party Chelsea Hale, committed the

Palowsky v. Campbell rev’d by Palowsky v. Campbell

4

, 22-589 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/23), 378 So.3d 212, 216, ,

Palowsky

“exact misconduct” in this case as was alleged in by making a handwritten caption

correction on a document whose importance is never described or alleged by Klein. Even

after oral argument, the Court still has no idea what the significance of this alleged caption

correction is or was or how Klein was in any way prejudiced bPy aitlo. wTshkey argument is a classic

red herring, made solely in an attempt to align this case with . It does not align at

all – even taking Klein’s allegations as true.

It is worth noting again here that it is Klein’s burden to establish subject matter

jurisdiction, meaning it is his burden to establish to the Court’s satisfaction that the Eleventh

Amendment does not apply here to bar his official-capacity claims. His conclusory and

confusing arguments do not satisfy that burden. The Court is convinced that the Eleventh

Amendment bars his official-capacity claims against Judge Medley and that dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate. Given that the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

claims against Judge MReodolkeeyr i-nF ehldemr oafnficial capacity, the Court does not pYrooucnegeedr to consider

the application of the doctrine or to consider whether abstention

would otheBr.w Iisned bivei dapuparl-oCparpiaatcei.t y Claims

Judge Medley also argues that any claims against her in her individual capacity or any

claims arising under state law (the existence of which are unclear), also fail because she is

entitled to absolute juSdeiec iBaal lilmarmd uvn. Witya.l l (Rec. doc. 13). The Court considers this argument

under Rule 12(b)(6). , 413 F.3d 510, 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming a

district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity).

“Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity fro.m” B colaydim vs. Bfoigrg dearsmages arising

284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Such absolute immunity Smeee aMnisr ethleast v j.u Wdgaecso are “immun[e]

from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” , 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991). Indeed, “[j]udicial immunity can be overcome only by showing that the actions

complained of were nonjudicial in natBuoryed or by showing thcaitt itnhge M aicrteiolenss were taken in the

complete absence of all jurisdiction.” , 31 F.3d at 284 ( , 502 U.S. at 11-12).

Actions are “judicial in nature if they are ‘normally peIrdf.ormed by aM jiurdelgees’ and the parties

affected ‘dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.’” (quoting , 502 U.S. at 12).

Accordingly, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in

error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, heP whailnl bv.e H saunbejenct to

liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”M ays v. Sudderth, No.

23-20598, 2024 WL 3593902, at *1 (5th Cir. July 31, 2024) (quoting , 97

F.3d 107, 111 (5thId C.ir. 1996 S)t)u. m “pJu vd. iScpiaalr ikmmmanunity is also applicable in caPsieesr saosns evr. tRinayg civil

rights violations.” (citing , 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); , 286

U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967)). ThereforeS, eeev eMni raellleesging that a judge acted with “bad faith or

malice” d oMesc Anloets tperre cvl.u Bdreo iwmnmunity. , 502 U.S. at 11.

In , the Fifth Circuit relied upon the following four factors to

determine whether a judge was acting within his judicial jurisdiction: (1) whether the

precise act complained of, use of the contempt power, is a normal judicial function; (2)

whether the events involved occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy

centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) whether the confrontation

arose directly and immediately out oMf ac Avliessitte tro the judge in his official capacity. 469 F.2d

1280, 1282 (5th Cir.1972). The four factors are to be broadly construed in favor

of immunity, and immunity should not be denied where the denial carries the potential of

raising more than a frivolous concAedrna mins av . juMdcgIelh'sa nmyind that to take proper action might

expose him to personal liability. , 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985)

(emphMasciAsl aedstdeerd). In some situatioInds., immunity is to be afforded even though one or more

of the factors is not met.

In this case, Klein essentially argues that the first factor – whether the precise act

complained of is a normal judicial function – is not met. The relevant inquirMy irreegleasrding this

is an examination of the “nature and function” of the act, not the act itself. , 502 U.S.

at 288. The Court is toI dlo. ok to the particular act's relation to a general function normally

performed by a judge.

The acts that Klein complains of are clearly judicial in nature. Klein contends that

Judge Medley “engaged in a pattern of summary denials of rules to show cause without

hearings,” denied a motion to enroll, issued a subpoena to Klein’s wife as part of post-

judgment discovery regarding Kleins assets, and threatened him with sanctions if he violated

her orders. (Rec. doc. 1). His claims arise out of judicial acts occurring during, or arising

from, state-court matters over which she has presided and is currently presiding. Any ruling

that Plaintiff may seek to disturb, revisit, or derive money damages from arose directly out

of Judge Medley’s official-capacity duties in light of a motion or other proceeding held in her

chambers or respective courtroom – all related to the Underlying Matter. The acts

complained of here are inescapably judicial. Palowsky

As he does in addressing the Eleventh Amendment argument, Klein relies on

to argue that Judge Medley was not acting in her adjudicatory role during the

“unconventional and unprecedented practice of SUMMARY DENIALS of all [his] motions” in

the Underlying matter. (Rec. doc. 22). As noted earlier, he argues that Judge Medley’s “serial

denials without a hearing wIde.re not ‘. . . adPjuadloicwastkioyn vs. .C .a .m ’ pbbuet laldministrative aberrations,”

not entitled to immunity. ( ). However, is not applicable here. The

Court in that case found that judicial immunity did not extend to a judge’s supervision and

Iind.vestigation of a law clerk’s activities, considering these acts to be administrative functions.

at 467. Here, the thrust of Klein’s claims arises from issuance of orders and the

management andP rciocentrol of Judge Medley’s docket—actions that are core aspects of judicial

administration. , 2020 WL 1638376, at *4. Subpoenas and summary denials without

hearings pertain to judicial acts inherent in case management and procedural oversight,

duties that lie within the authority of judges to control the orderly progression of litigation.

And Ms. Hale’s name isn’t even mentioned in the Complaint, so tethering his case against

Judge Medley to a non-articulated claim for failing to supervise her law clerk is unavailing.

Furthermore, Klein doesn’t bother to explain the nature of any the various summary denials

– what relief did the motions or rules seek and under what circumstances were they denied?

And finally, even if Plaintiff’s allegations could be read as suggesting that Judge

Medley acted with malice, it nonetheless involves Judge Medley acting in her judicial capacity

of presiding over Plaintiff’s proceedings. Based on the substance of Plaintiff’s claims, the

judge enjoyCs. aRbesoqluuetest i mfomr Purneit-yfi.l Tinhgu sIn, djuisnmctisiosanl under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

In her Motion to Dismiss, Judge Medley also seeks an order of this Court directing that

Klein be enjoined from filing any additional pleadings or complaints in this Court, unless and

until he has obtained leave of Court from the Chief Judge. As I noted at the hearing on the

motion, while such relief is available under certain circumstances, I do not believe it

litigant’s rights cross the entire Court for the foreseeable future. That portion of the motion

will be denDie. dD wisitmhoisusta pl rWejiutdhi coer tWo iDthefoeuntd Parnet jtuod riecfei le before a District Judge.

OrHdainlea vri. lKyi, n“ga court should grant a pro se party every reasonPaebñlae vo. pUpnoitretdu nSittayt etso

amend,” , 642 F.3d 492, 503 n.36 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting ,

157 F.3d 984, 987 n.3 (5Idt.h Cir. 19s9e8e) a),l s“ou nPlreiscse it is obvious from the record that the plaintiff

has pled his best case.” at 503; , 2020 WL 1638376, at *5. Klein filed with his

Complaint twelve (12) exhibits thOaptp toostiatilo 1n2 t1o Mpaogteiosn. t(oR Decis. mdioscs. 1). He then filed ten (10)

exhibits that total 82 pages in his . (Rec. doc. 22). He has had

the benefit of oral argument and thereafter filed two more pleadings totaling some 480

pages. (Rec. doc. 28, 31). Despite these prolix filings, the precise bases for his claim for

damages against Judge Medley remain in turns vague, conclusory, and rambling. Moreover,

Klein spends most of his Complaint and other filings complaining about the actions of

GirodLoanCo and its counsel, as well as his representation of non-parties in other related

litigation, Regina Heisler and the Pittmans, neither of whom are parties even toP otshte-

AUrngduemrleynint gO bMsaetrtveart.i o nEsven after the presentation of oral argument and the filing of

, Klein does not suggest how he could ever amend the substance of

his allegations to cure the jurisdictional defects discussed above. These are not curable

defects in tEh.e CMooutrito’ns vtioe wSt.a y Discovery

Because the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims and is

dismissing this matter, the Motion to Stay Discovery will be denied as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For reasons known only to him, Mr. Klein has decided to forego the appellate

processes in state court and resort to this Court to redress his grievances against a state-

court judge who did no more than rule against him in her court. Following oral argument, it

is clear he seeks to substitute this Court’s jurisdiction for a state-court appeal of the rulings

he objects to. These statements are telling:

THE COURT: I'm going to ask you a question again: Why didn't

you appeal any of these orders?

Henson v. Santander

MR. KLEIN: I have seen -- I've been before 50 state judges who

have not -- who have not enforced . I've

been before 50 state court judges.

THE COURT: You're going to tell me that you think it was a waste

of time.

MR. KLEIN: Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes, I am. I have told you.

. . . .

MR. KLEIN: I am seeking what the United States Supreme Court

called prompt succor in a court that is capable of giving me

prompt succor. I have said often -- and I have said to you, Your

Honor -- filing matters in the Fourth Circuit – state court of

appeals is a vain and useless thing.

. . . .

MR. KLEIN: I do not have to tilt at windmills, Your Honor. I

don't.

(Rec. doc. 35 (Transcript) at 13, 19-20)(emphasis added).

Klein’s belief – no matter how sincerely held – that his appellate efforts would be

unsuccessful is not an excuse to run to federal court with a lawsuit against the state district

5

judge who ruled against him. This is an inappropriate and unavailing gambit, which should

come as no surprise to any lawyer with even a basic understanding of the concepts of

federalism and comity. His words reveal that Klein is apparently not one of those lawyers:

Comity and federalism are, of course, very important. But NOT

when the state court proceedings are NOT " . . . judpiaciraeln . s. .p" aatnrdia ae

multibillion dollar fleecing of Louisiana citizenry is taking place

unchecked. This Court of law and order has a

responsibility to take command and protect the vulnerable.

(Rec. doc. 22 at 8). The Court begs to differ. Comity and federalism are bedrock principles

and are always important – and they do not allow or require this Court to “take command”

of an ongoing state-court proceeding to protect a litigant who won’t even avail himself of

available state appellate processes. What they require is dismissal of this case.

FITo rI Sth OeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons,

GRANTED that the Motion to DDisImSMissIS oSnE SB eWhaITlf HoOf JUuTdg PeR JeEnJUniDfeIrC EM6edley (rec.

doc. 13) is IN PART. The Court DISMISSES WITH PR pElJaUinDtiIfCf’Es

claims against Judge Medley in her official capacity and DENIES

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Medley in her indiviDdEuaNlI EcaSp AacSi tMy.O OThTe Court the

request for pre-filing injunction (rec. doc. 13) and the Motion to Stay

Discovery. (Rec. doc. 18).

5

The Court does not doubt that Klein sincerely believes that he and his clients have been wronged by the

various parties in the related cases and it’s clear that his lack of success in state court has both frustrated him

and fueled his increasingly overzealous efforts to seek redress for those alleged wrongs. But too much is too

much and suing a presiding state-court judge in federal court rather than using the state appellate process is

s6imply beyoMnidtc thheell pv.a Blea. i l ey see also Taylor v. Owens

The Fifth Circuit has made clear that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must bHe ammapdteo nw vit. hPoauct.

pInrve.j uMdgimcet.. Co. LLC , 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020); , 990 F.3d 493, 496 (6th

Cir. 2021) (explaining dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice);

, 869 F.3d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . .

23rd October

New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2025.

MICHAEL B. NORTH

UNIT ED ST ATES M AGIST RATE JUDGE