TORRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

LYNN TORRE, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs )

)

v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00429-LEW

)

STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT )

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN )

SERVICES, et al., )

)

Defendants )

ORDER ON OBJECTION AND RESTRAINING FUTURE PLEADINGS

In this action, Plaintiffs Lynn Torre and Vincent Torre, Jr., a married couple, and

Louann Maffei and James Maffei, mother and step-father of Vincent Torre, Jr., who all

proceed pro se, complain of, among other things, compelled family separation due to the

removal of the Torres’ children from the family home, allegedly unjustified criminal

proceedings currently pending against Vincent Torre, Jr., and allegedly unjustified and

unfavorable determinations concerning parental rights and responsibilities made in the

Maine District Court. Verified Compl. (ECF No. 1). The primary objectives of the

litigation, according to the Complaint, are to nullify the ongoing state court criminal

proceedings (awaiting trial) and an adverse ruling concerning the Torres parental rights

(currently on appeal in state court). However, the Complaint also presses claims against

numerous individuals, and some of the claims seek damages based on alleged conduct that,

if proven, would not interfere with or call into question ongoing state proceedings. This

case also involves a plea for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and an objection from an

order denying such leave. Finally, Plaintiffs object to my prior order that denied them

emergency injunctive relief. This Order is issued to parse out those components of the

Complaint that are not barred by jurisdictional principles, review those components to see

if they state a claim for which relief may be granted, and to address the question of whether

Lynn Torres deserves a refund of the filing fee she paid under protest. It also overrules

Plaintiffs’ objection to the denial of emergency injunctive relief.

BACKGROUND

The allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and supporting exhibits are

accepted as true, except where the allegations are contradicted by documents attached to

the Complaint that are susceptible to judicial notice, as indicated below. Better Way Ford,

LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.4th 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2025); Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc.,

589 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2009); see also O’Brien v. Wilmington Tr. Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. to

CitiBank, N.A., 506 F. Supp. 3d 82, 90 (D. Mass. 2020) (“When such [a] document

contradict[s] an allegation in the complaint, the document ‘trumps the allegation.’”

(quoting Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir.

2000)).

On October 10, 2023, agents or officers of the State of Maine and the Cumberland

County Sheriff’s Office removed the Torres’ two minor children from their home.

Reunification has not been achieved since that date. Rather, an adverse parental rights

determination that terminates the Torres’ parental rights to their shared minor children is

on appeal. Compl. ¶ 149; Lynn Torre Aff. ¶ 33 (ECF No. 1-32); Order on Pet. to Terminate

Parental Rights (partial copy of only first and last page) (ECF No. 13-11); Lynn Torre

Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 13-13). The Court takes judicial notice of the excerpt of the

Maine District Court’s Order on Petition to Terminate, to the extent it is informative, as

explained below.

According to the Complaint, the apparent justification for the removal of the

children from the home relates to alleged criminal conduct by Vincent Torre, Jr. (hereafter

Vincent Torre), of a sexual nature, evidently based on a report provided by his 16-year-old

stepdaughter (Lynn Torre’s daughter) (“the reporting minor”), which report she made to a

relative, either Sharon Leighton Meredith (not a defendant) or Defendant Jessica Leighton

(or both), while temporarily staying in Leighton Meredith’s home. The Plaintiffs do not

relate the substance of the allegations made by the reporting minor against Vincent Torre,

but state that the allegations were false.

Plaintiffs allege that the resulting disruption of their family and the associated

criminal prosecution have deprived them of their constitutional rights. Evidently, the

reporting minor made her report on or about October 4, 2023, because on that day agents

or officers of the State of Maine Department of Health and Human Services Child

Protective Service appeared at the Torres’ then residence in temporary, transitional housing

and required that Vincent Torre no longer reside with the Torres’ two minor children (who

were then approximately ages 13 and 3).

Thereafter, Plaintiff Lynn Torre evidently advocated on behalf of her husband,

informing CPS that the reporting minor had mental health issues and was not a reliable

reporter. Lynn Torre also moved in with Vincent’s parents, the Maffei Plaintiffs, on

October 8 or 9, 2023 (Vincent allegedly found housing elsewhere). On October 10, 2023,

CPS conducted a family team meeting at which several family members were present,

including Sharon Leighton Meredith, Jessica Leighton, and others. On that day, CPS also

“filed for a preliminary protection order (PPO).” Compl. ¶ 27. The Maine District Court’s

Order on Petition to Terminate (ECF No. 13-11) memorializes this fact as well, and also

indicates that the Court granted the preliminary protection order that very day, effectively

authorizing the removal of the children from the parents’ custody.

Plaintiffs allege that the removal was “without court order [and] without exigent

circumstances,” Compl. ¶ 36, but they also acknowledge that the removal occurred after

Defendant Leanne Keenan-Nelson, a CPS Investigator, in concert with one or more CPS

supervisory officers, filed for a preliminary protection order. The Order on Petition to

Terminate also contradicts Plaintiffs’ allegations, reflecting that the children’s removal was

in fact court authorized.

On or about the day that CPS removed the children from the home, CPS also

presented Lynn Torre with a “preliminary plan” and, evidently, instructed her that she

would have to make other living arrangements to be reunited with her children, something

she did not do. The plan explained that she was “failing to protect [the children] from

threat of sexual abuse by their father, Vincent Torre,” and that CPS had informed Lynn

“that significant evidence was obtained regarding Mr. Torre sexually assaulting [the

reporting minor].” Prelim. Reunification and Rehabilitation Plan (ECF No. 1-30). The

state court held its first hearing on October 19, 2023. Jeopardy orders eventually entered

in September 2024 for Vincent and in November 2024 for Lynn. Order on Pet. to

Terminate (ECF No. 13-11).

Plaintiffs allege that the reporting minor falsely alleged criminal conduct on the part

of Vincent Torre and also that Defendant Jessica Leighton “manipulated [the reporting

minor] into believing horrible lies and spreading them as if they were fact.” Lynn Torre

Aff ¶ 8. Evidently, another of Lynn’s older children, a male, has also “betrayed” her, along

with “the rest of [her] extended family.” Id. ¶ 10. The Torres blame these individuals, the

CPS officers, and the guardian ad litem assigned in the parental rights matter with the

destruction of their family. Id. The Torres also allege that it was unlawful for agents of

the Child Advocacy Center to interview the reporting minor child outside the presence of

a parent without permission. Compl. Ex. R (ECF No. 1-39). The Plaintiffs allege that the

plan presented to Lynn was signed by her under compulsion and they also complain that

Lynn was the only member of the family whose interest in reunification was addressed by

a plan. Compl. Ex. M. (ECF No. 1-27).

The non-reporting teenage daughter (the 13-year-old) was placed for a time with

Jessica Leighton. After a period of time with Leighton, the daughter no longer wished to

return home. Plaintiffs do not know where the youngest child is.

Vincent Torre is presently subject to criminal charges arising out of the report of

abuse. Plaintiffs allege that the prosecution of Vincent Torre is unjustified and has

deprived him of constitutional rights related to his ability to mount a defense (alleging

suppression of exculpatory evidence) and his right to a speedy trial.

Vincent Torre alleges that he was wrongfully arrested on April 17, 2024, without

being shown a warrant, based on a protection from abuse order that was previously

dropped. Vincent Torre Aff. ¶ 24 (ECF No. 1-33). After Vincent Torre’s release on bail

in May 2024, Jessica Leighton sent an email to a local news station to complain of his

release. Id. ¶ 23. On October 4, 2024 (a year after he was removed from the home), State

Detective Victoria Knight-Lane and four Windham police officers arrested him without

cause at work and used excessive force in the process. Id. ¶ 25. Then again, on April 2,

2025, Cumberland County officers used excessive force to arrest Vincent Torre after

refusing to present him with a warrant that authorized his arrest. Id. ¶ 26.

Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment

(Procedural and Substantive Due Process), and First Amendment, as well as a civil

conspiracy among twenty-seven named defendants. Through their Complaint and

Emergency Motion, Plaintiffs ask for the “immediate reunification” of the family and

vacatur of “any prior Termination of Parental Rights orders”; “immediate release” of

Vincent Torre, Jr. from incarceration on state charges and elimination of all bail conditions;

dismissal of the state charges; expungement of all child protective records; an injunction

ordering defendants to cease and desists any interference with the family; and, if the state

criminal case persists, reassignment of “biased judges, assistant district attorneys, and

district attorneys in state proceedings,” among other relief. Compl. ¶ 141.

DISCUSSION

On September 9, 2025, I issued a summary order denying Plaintiffs’ Emergency

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. Order on Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order (ECF No. 18). At present, the matter requires an order of partial

dismissal and an order restricting the future filing of new federal cases against the State of

Maine and DHHS by the Torre Plaintiffs. As will be explained below, the partial dismissal

also resolves Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 22) to the denial of emergency relief.

Additionally, the matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ ongoing Objection (ECF No. 20)

concerning the Magistrate Judge’s assessment that none of the Plaintiffs qualifies to

proceed without prepayment of costs under the In Forma Pauperis Statute, 28 U.S.C. §

1915. Finally, it is necessary to evaluate the Complaint on a defendant-by-defendant basis

to determine whether the Complaint actually states a claim for which relief may be granted

that falls outside of the Younger abstention doctrine. As to the sua sponte review of the

Complaint, I do despite my denial of Plaintiffs’ Objection seeking to avoid payment of the

filing fee, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted.”).

A. Partial Dismissal, Denial of Objection 22, and Filing Restriction

On March 31, 2025, Vincent Torre filed a complaint in a prior case in which he

asserted claims against the State of Maine and a state prosecutor, and asked this Court to

enjoin his state court prosecution, restore his parental rights, and enjoin any interference

by the state or state officials with his relationship with his minor children. Torre v. Maine,

No. 2:25-cv-00118-NT. The Court dismissed the case based on a Recommended Decision

that explained, as I explained in the prior Order, that he could not sue the State of Maine

in this Court and that the relief he requested is not available here. Per the Recommended

Decision:

This Court cannot interfere with ongoing state criminal cases or custody

proceedings, and the State of Maine is immune from liability under the

doctrine of sovereign immunity. See In re Justices of the Superior Ct. Dep’t

of the Mass. Trial Cts., 218 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the

Younger abstention doctrine prevents federal courts from interfering with

ongoing state criminal proceedings “even where defendants claim violations

of important federal rights”); Wales v. Merrinvil, No. 2:24-cv-00338-NT,

2024 WL 4380195, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 3, 2024) (rec. dec.) (noting that federal

courts lack jurisdiction over actions pertaining to parental rights), aff’d, ECF

No. 8 (D. Me. Oct. 23, 2024); Parente v. Lefebvre, 122 F.4th 457, 461-62

(1st Cir. 2024) (“The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against states

and state officials in federal court.” (cleaned up)).

Case No. 2:25-cv-00118-NT (ECF No. 3). The Court affirmed the April 1, 2025

Recommended Decision and dismissed the case on April 28, 2025.

On April 4, 2025, Vincent and Lynn Torre filed a complaint in another case in which

they asserted civil rights claims against the Maine Department of Health and Human

Services (DHHS) and several DHHS Child Protective Services caseworkers. Torre v. Me.

DHHS, No. 2:25-cv-00127-NT. They requested, among other relief, a court order directing

DHHS to immediately return their minor children to their custody and refrain from any

further interference with their parental rights. The Court dismissed the case based on a

Recommended Decision that explained, as I explained in the prior Order in this case, that

they could not sue DHHS in this Court and that the primary relief they sought was not

available here. Per the Recommended Decision:

DHHS, as a state agency, is immune from suit. See Gilbert v. Maine Dep’t

of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 2:24-cv-00372-JAW, 2025 WL 953711, at *1

(D. Me. Mar. 31, 2025) (noting that the Maine DHHS “is immune from suit

in this Court under the doctrine of sovereign immunity”). Even with a liberal

reading of their complaint, the Torres have not alleged sufficient facts to state

a claim against the individual DHHS caseworkers. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Finally, this Court must abstain from

interfering with ongoing child protection proceedings and, in any event, lacks

the authority to return the Torres’ children to their custody. See Malachowski

v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 708-09 (1st Cir. 1986) (affirming a federal

district court’s “decision to abstain on the injunctive aspects” of a complaint

seeking return of a child from state custody “to avoid federal court

interference in an area of predominant state concern”); Ankenbrandt v.

Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (holding that the “domestic relations

exception . . . divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony,

and child custody decrees”).

Case No. 2:25-cv-127 (ECF No. 3). The Court affirmed the recommendation and

dismissed the case on May 2, 2025. Id. (ECF No. 4).

Undaunted, on June 30, 2025, Plaintiff Vincent Torre filed yet another complaint,

once again naming the State of Maine and DHHS in the caption and once more seeking

relief that is not available in this forum. Torre v. Me. DHHS, No. 2:25-cv-00342-NT. The

Court once more dismissed his case based on a Recommended Decision, which this time

explained:

[G]iven the nature of Plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court’s decision in

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), precludes Plaintiff from proceeding

in federal court. Younger requires abstention from the exercise of

jurisdiction when a plaintiff seeks relief in federal court from a pending state

criminal prosecution or analogous civil enforcement proceeding. Sprint

Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73, 78 (2013). Abstention

is mandatory absent “extraordinary circumstances,” such as: (1) an action

“brought in bad faith . . . for the purpose of harassment,” (2) “the state forum

provides inadequate protection of federal rights,” or (3) the challenged “state

statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional

prohibitions” or there is “a facially conclusive claim of [federal]

preemption.” Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192, 197 (1st

Cir. 2015).

In addition to state criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court and the First

Circuit have concluded that Younger applies to state government child

custody actions like the one Plaintiff describes. See Malachowski v. City of

Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 708 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing Moore v. Sims, 442

U.S. 415 (1979)). Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to permit a

plausible finding of extraordinary circumstances to overcome the abstention

mandated by Younger. For example, Plaintiff has not demonstrated through

nonconclusory allegations that the state court has refused to permit him to

raise his federal claims in that forum. See McLeod v. Maine Department of

Health and Human Services, 229 F.3d 1133, 2000 WL 869512 at *1, (1st

Cir. 2000) (“Appellant has not alleged facts showing that the state court is

somehow incapable of adjudicating this matter including the federal issues,

nor has she alleged an injury that is different than that incidental to every

child protection proceeding” where state officers act in good faith) (quotation

marks and modifications omitted). Abstention, therefore, would likely be

required on any claims that implicate pending state court matters.

To the extent that Plaintiff references state court proceedings which have

become final, Plaintiff’s claims are also barred. “[T]he domestic relations

exception to federal court jurisdiction . . . prohibits federal courts from

issuing or altering ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees,’” Mandel v.

Town of Orleans, 326 F.3d 267, 271 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Ankenbrandt v.

Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)), and “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine

prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases

brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546

U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) and discussing District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)). In general, “the proper forum for

challenging an unlawful state court ruling” is the state appellate system

followed by a petition for review by the United States Supreme Court.

Davison v. Gov’t of Puerto Rico—Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps., 471 F.3d

220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

Case No. 2:25-cv-00342-NT (ECF No. 21). The Court affirmed the July 31

recommendation and dismissed the case on September 2, 2025. Id. (ECF No. 24).

On August 22, 2025, Plaintiffs, who now include not only Vincent and Lynn Torre

but also Vincent’s parents, Louanne and James Maffei, filed the Complaint that gives rise

to this case. In complete disregard of repeated explanations that the relief they seek is not

available in this Court, Plaintiffs have once again named DHHS as a defendant and they

have once against demanded relief that this Court has repeatedly stated cannot be obtained

here. In addition to DHHS, Plaintiffs have named as defendants several individuals

associated with child protective investigations and proceedings and Vincent Torre’s

criminal prosecution. The claims against individuals are recounted in the discussion that

follows.

As I explained in the prior Order, and as explained repeatedly in the recommended

decisions issued in earlier related cases, injunctive relief (emergency or otherwise) is not

available. This Court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin state court proceedings or

overturn state court rulings under the circumstances alleged here, which do not involve

extraordinary circumstances that would warrant an exception to the abstention doctrine.

Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Lopez-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2008) (“In the absence

of extraordinary circumstances, interests of comity and the respect for state processes

demand that federal courts should abstain from interfering with ongoing state judicial

proceedings.”). Accordingly, the Objection is DENIED. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ claims

seeking injunctive relief pertaining to the criminal prosecution and parental rights ruling(s)

are DISMISSED, as are all claims against Defendant DHHS. Finally, based on the repeated

earlier dismissals, the Torre Plaintiffs are hereby subject to a filing restriction pertaining to

all future filings in this Court against the State of Maine, Maine DHHS, and official

capacity claims that seek relief designed to overturn or nullify state court criminal and

parental rights proceedings and rulings or to expunge related records while those

proceedings remain pending. United States v. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 101 (1st Cir.

2005) (power to curb abusive litigants “includes the ability to enjoin a party—even a pro

se party—from filing frivolous and vexatious [pleadings]”); see also Cok v. Family Court

of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1993) (approving of appropriately tailored

injunctions to curb abusive future litigation).

B. Defendant-by-Defendant Review

Given the nature of the Complaint in this matter and the several prior failed attempts

by the Torre Plaintiffs to bring similar cases in this Court, I find that it is appropriate to

evaluate the Complaint sua sponte and notwithstanding the payment of the filing fee, to

ensure that no Defendants are presently served with the Complaint unless it states a

plausible claim for relief against the Defendant in question. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

“Dismissals [under § 1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so

as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such

complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be

granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the

benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640

F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). However, as previously mentioned, allegations should not be

credited if there are documents of record susceptible to judicial notice that contradict the

allegations. Clorox Co., 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2000); O’Brien, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 90.

Ultimately, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is subject to “less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), this is

“not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a

claim,” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980). To allege a civil action in

federal court, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege that a defendant acted

unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that identify the manner by which the

defendant subjected the plaintiff to a harm for which the law affords a remedy. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

1. Leanne Keenan-Nelson and Michelle Freeman

Leanne Keenan-Nelson is a CPS Investigator. Plaintiffs allege that Keenan-Nelson

coerced Lynn Torre “into signing an illegible and unenforceable safety plan under duress

and intimidation” and “participated directly in the . . . removal of [the Torres’] minor

children without judicial authorization or probable cause, in violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments.” Compl. at 3. Michelle Freeman is a CPS supervisor. Plaintiffs

sue her “for authorizing and overseeing the unconstitutional removal of [the Torres’]

children and for ratifying the use of coercive safety plans without legal safeguards,

resulting in a deprivation of liberty and due process.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that Freeman

was directly involved in decisions pertaining to the initial removal of the children and the

presentation or preparation of the safety plan. Id. at 7.

The claims against Keenan-Nelson and Michelle Freeman are limited to the events

of October 4 and October 10, 2023, and to the questions of whether the initial removal of

the children was properly effectuated based on either a warrant or special circumstances

and whether the safety plan presented to Lynn Torre was enforceable. A failure to observe

proper procedures in connection with the removal of children would not call into question

the legitimacy of downstream court determinations related to parental rights and

responsibilities, and therefore could, in theory, evade the jurisdictional bar presented by

the Younger abstention doctrine. However, the Order on Petition to Terminate states

plainly that there was a preliminary protection order in place on October 10, 2023, when

the children were taken into DHHS custody. Accordingly, I find that the Plaintiffs fail to

state a claim for the illegal removal of the children from the home and this claim is,

therefore, DISMISSED.

As for the claim that the safety plan was unenforceable, this contention appears to

be asserted only to support relief in the form of an order that would call into question the

legitimacy of state court proceedings pertaining to the safety plan, assuming a failure to

conform to its requirements was in some way relevant to a downstream merits

determination in the context of terminating Lynn Torre’s parental rights. The claim will

not proceed and is DISMISSED, as this Court’s jurisdiction does not reach questions

involving the legitimacy of court determinations that might hinge on Lynn Torre’s

observation or non-observation of the requirements of the safety plan.1

1 If the Plaintiffs seek to assert that affidavits associated with the state court’s preliminary protection order,

these Defendants, “as witnesses at judicial proceedings, would be entitled to either absolute or qualified

2. Roxanne Zwaga, Natalie Anderson, Anthony Pizzo, and Lauren VanDine

These Defendants are identified as “permanency caseworkers” for DHHS. Plaintiffs

allege that they took actions that resulted in prolonged separation of the children from the

family, obstructed reunification, continued to enforce an unconstitutional safety plan,

interfered with family association, and suppressed reunification services. Compl. at 3-4.

The Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to making factual findings that would call into

question the legitimacy of the duration of the family separation, the safety plan, or the

adequacy of reunification services, while proceedings are ongoing. Nor do the sparse

allegations suggest the existence of any viable claim for which relief may be granted.

These defendants are all DISMISSED.

3. Elizabeth McCullum

Elizabeth McCullum was appointed by the state court to serve as guardian ad litem

for the children. Plaintiffs sue McCullum for “knowing suppression of exculpatory

evidence, her opposition to reunification, and her retaliatory conduct aimed at silencing the

Plaintiffs’ protected speech.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs’ allegations are meant to call into question

the legitimacy of state court proceedings and therefore succumb to the Younger abstention

doctrine. Furthermore, the allegations are entirely too sparse to state a claim for which

relief may be granted. Defendant McCullum is DISMISSED.

immunity from § 1983 liability as to this claim.” Piccone v. McClain, 586 Fed. App’x 709, 712 (1st Cir.

2014) (citing Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 9 & n. 8 (1st Cir. 1993)).

4. Erin Clough, Assistant Attorney General

Plaintiffs allege that AAG Clough participated in “retaliatory legal action,

suppression of due process, and . . . unconstitutional state proceedings targeting the

Plaintiffs’ protected activities.” Id. at 4. Claims challenging the institution or prosecution

of state court criminal proceedings fall within the jurisdictional restriction of the Younger

abstention doctrine. Furthermore, the allegations are too sparse to state a claim for which

relief may be granted. Defendant Clough is DISMISSED.

5. Carlos Diaz, Assistant District Attorney

Plaintiffs allege that ADA Diaz, the Assistant District Attorney conducting the

prosecution of Vincent Torre, has engaged in “retaliatory prosecution, abuse of process,

manipulation of bail, charging decisions, and suppression of exculpatory material.” Id. at

4. Again, Plaintiffs are attempting to assert a claim that would call on this Court to interfere

with or stand in judgment of ongoing state court proceedings. Plaintiff Vincent Torre can

and presumably has complained to the presiding state court judge of the alleged

improprieties associated with his prosecution. There is no factual content in the Complaint

that would allow this Court to conclude that the prosecution is proceeding in bad faith or

that the state court will not protect his federal rights against procedural deprivation.

Defendant Diaz is DISMISSED.

6. Detective Victoria Knight-Lane

Plaintiffs allege that Detective Knight-Lane unlawfully arrested Vincent Torre at

his workplace on October 4, 2024, without any legal justification. As alleged, he had a

work authorization associated with his bail but Detective Knight-Lane did not realize that

this was the case. Vincent Torre can proceed with this claim.

7. Windham Police Officers Joseph Cushman, Martin J. Royle, Time Denman,

and Alexander Brokos

Plaintiffs allege that these officers participated in the April 17, 2024, arrest, without

probable cause. Id. Allegedly, Vincent Torre was both arrested and charged on this day,

without a warrant. Id. at 16. Vincent Torre can proceed with this claim.

8. Cumberland County Sheriff’s Deputy Cole Gagnon

Plaintiffs allege that Deputy Gagnon participated in the forced removal of the

children in the absence of exigent circumstances or a court order. Like Defendants Keenan-

Nelson and Freeman, Defendant Gagnon is DISMISSED because materials attached to the

Complaint of which the Court may take judicial notice reflect that a court order authorized

the removal of the children from their parents’ custody.

9. Unknown Cumberland County Sheriff’s Deputies

Plaintiffs alleged that three or four unknown Cumberland County sheriff’s deputies

conducted an arrest of Vincent Torre on April 2, 2025, and caused unnecessary property

damage. Compl. at 5, 16 (¶ 62). They also allege the use of excessive force and that the

deputies refused to present a warrant. This claim can proceed with service on the

Cumberland County Sheriff’s Department, which may have a record of the deputies

involved.

10. Child Advocacy Center, Maine

As alleged, members of the Child Advocacy Center conducted an interview of the

reporting minor “without notifying or obtaining consent from her legal custodian and

mother, Lynn Torre.” Compl. at 5. According to Plaintiffs, this was a constitutional

violation.

A social worker must have reasonable and articulable suspicion of child abuse

before conducting an interview focused on such abuse. Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth

& Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2001). Where reasonable suspicion exists, the

interview process may involve taking temporary custody over the child without parental

consent. Id.

Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that would eliminate a finding of reasonable

suspicion of child abuse. To the contrary, Plaintiffs have alleged facts that compel the

inference that the investigation and related interference with the family relationship arose

from a report of abuse that a sixteen-year-old lodged against her mother’s cohabitating

spouse. Furthermore, the interview was coordinated by a family member who was, at the

time, serving as the child’s guardian. Because the allegations against the Child Advocacy

Center fail to negate any evidence-based assessment of a reasonable and articulable

suspicion of child abuse, or any improper coercion of the child by personnel of the Child

Advocacy Center, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted against the

Child Advocacy Center. Defendant Child Advocacy Center is DISMISSED.

11. Town of Windham

Plaintiffs allege that the Town of Windham is liable “for failing to train, supervise,

and discipline its officers, and for adopted customs and practices that directly led to the

constitutional violations.” Compl. at 6 ¶ 16. These allegations amount to nothing more

than conclusory recitals and as such fail to state a plausible claim for relief against the

Town of Windham. The Town of Windham is DISMISSED.

12. Cumberland County

Plaintiffs allege that Cumberland County “tolerat[ed] and ratif[ied] unconstitutional

conduct by its deputies, prosecutors, and agents, including destruction of property,

retaliation, and prolonged unlawful detention.” Id. ¶ 17. As with the claim against the

Town of Windham, the claim against Cumberland County is entirely a conclusory recital

without any supporting factual allegations. Cumberland County is DISMISSED on that

basis. Furthermore, to the extent that this claim seeks to interfere with the ongoing state

court prosecution, this also warrants dismissal in part on that additional basis.

13. Jessica Leighton

Plaintiffs alleged that Jessica Leighton improperly prepared evidence that she

presented to CPS, “without any chain of custody, forensic verification, or law enforcement

oversight.” Id. ¶ 18. “Leighton also exploited the medically documented mental health

vulnerabilities of [the reporting minor] . . . to manipulate her into believing and stating

false information about her mother.” Id. Leighton also corresponded with media outlets,

allegedly to the prejudice of Vincent Torre’s trial rights. Id.

The allegations against Jessica Leighton, who presumably is a material witness in

the state proceedings, fall within the jurisdictional restriction imposed by the Younger

abstention doctrine. This Court is not going to hear claims in this case that would call into

question the legitimacy of state proceedings and evidence. Jessica Leighton is therefore

DISMISSED.

14. Karen Majewski and John Majewski

The Majewskis were or are “kinship placement providers” to the Torres’ teenage

daughter. “Although initially selected by Lynn Torres as trusted kinship placements, the

Majewskis failed to support the reunification process and instead deferred entirely to CPS

directives.” Id. ¶ 19. The allegations against the Majewskis fail to state a claim for which

relief may be granted. The Majewskis are not state actors subject to a § 1983 civil rights

claim and it is in any event not apparent at all how their conduct caused a harm for which

the law provides a remedy. The claim against the Majewskis is DISMISSED.

C. Objection to Denial of Request for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

On August 22, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a combined Motion to Proceed Without

Prepayment of Fees and Costs (ECF No. 3). The Magistrate Judge denied the request,

observing that Plaintiffs, as a household, “collectively receive $4,964 in monthly income

and have only $3,927 in monthly expenses, leaving them with $1,037 each month for

discretionary spending.” Docket Order (ECF No. 7). The Magistrate Judge also noted that

James Maffei has $2,000 in cash. Id.

The record reflects that the primary income earner in the household is Lynn Torre,

whose gross annual income is somewhere in the range of $30,000. At present, due to life

circumstances, she is not financially responsible for her husband or her children, and her

housing is subsidized by the Maffeis. On September 8, 2025, Lynn Torre paid the filing

fee for this case under protest. Although Lynn Torre has significant costs of living and

liabilities, including student loan debt, credit card debt, and vehicle maintenance costs,

based on my review of the record, including supplemental filings, I cannot conclude that

the funds remaining to her are so limited that she cannot afford to pay the filing fee for the

claims she advanced on her own behalf in this action. Because the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling on this question was not clearly erroneous, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), Lynn Torre’s

Objection is DENIED (ECF No. 20).

Because the filing fee has been paid, Plaintiff Vincent Torre’s Objection and the

Maffei’s Objection are DENIED AS MOOT. Notwithstanding the denial of leave to

proceed without prepayment of fees and costs, the Court concludes that it is most

appropriate in this case for the Clerk’s Office to see to the service of the Complaint (and

this Order) on Maine State Police Detective Victoria Knight-Lane, Windham Police

Officers Joseph Cushman, Martin J. Royle, Time Denman, and Alexander Brokos, and the

Cumberland County Sheriff’s Department.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ claims against the State of Maine, Maine DHHS, and official capacity

claims that seek relief designed to overturn or nullify state court criminal and parental

rights proceedings and rulings or to expunge related records while those proceedings

remain pending are DISMISSED. Plaintiffs’ Objection (ECF No. 22) to the denial of

emergency injunctive relief is DENIED for the same reason.

All claims against the following Defendants are hereby DISMISSED: Leanne

Keenan-Nelson, Michelle Freeman, Roxanne Zwaga, Natalie Anderson, Anthony Pizzo,

Lauren VanDine, Elizabeth McCullum, Erin Clough, Carlos Diaz, Cole Gagnon, Child

Advocacy Center, Town of Windham, Cumberland County, Jessica Leighton, Karen

Majewski, and John Majewski.

Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 20) to the denial of leave to proceed without

prepayment of fees and costs is DENIED.

The matter will proceed exclusively on claims advanced against Detective Victoria

Knight-Lane, Windham Police Officers Joseph Cushman, Martin J. Royle, Time Denman,

and Alexander Brokos, and the Cumberland County Sheriff’s Department (based on the

arrest of April 2, 2025, executed by three to four unknown deputies). Notwithstanding the

denial of leave to proceed without prepayment, the Court will attend to the service of the

Complaint and this Order on these Defendants.

Finally, the Torre Plaintiffs are hereby subject to a filing restriction pertaining to all

future filings in this Court against the State of Maine, Maine DHHS, and official capacity

claims that seek relief designed to overturn or nullify state court criminal and parental

rights proceedings and rulings or to expunge related records while those proceedings

remain pending.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 23rd day of October, 2025.

/s/ Lance E. Walker

Chief U.S. District Judge