Bradney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA BRADNEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 6:24-cv-03263-MDH

CEDAR COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, JAMES “JIMBOB”

McCRARY et. al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Cedar County, Missouri, Cedar County Sheriff’s

Department, Robert Graves and Sheriff James “JimBob” McCrary’s (collectively “Cedar County

Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Docs. 47). Cedar County

Defendants have submitted their Suggestions in Support (Doc. 48) and Plaintiff has failed to

respond. The motion is now ripe for adjudication on the merits. For reasons herein, Cedar County

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out Plaintiff’s disclosure of alleged physical and sexual abuses he suffered

by staff members or other boys at Agape Boarding School (“Agape”) to members of the Cedar

County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Indiana and Defendants are all

residents of Missouri.

Plaintiff was a student at Agape from 2014 to 2016. Plaintiff alleges that the Cedar County

Sheriff’s Department was often at the school conducting conceal carry classes for the community

and would watch the students on Valentine’s Day. Plaintiff alleges during these events he would

tell various members of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department of the abuses that were occurring

on the premises of Agape. Plaintiff alleges he told them that he had been physically and sexually

abused by the other boys at the school and by the staff. Plaintiff alleges he would show them the

scars from being shanked; however, no action was taken.

Plaintiff alleges he reached out to multiple members of the Cedar County Sheriff’s

Department who would tell Plaintiff to go talk to the staff. Plaintiff alleges that the sheriff’s

deputies were on the premises when one of the boys allegedly raped Plaintiff in the bathroom.

Plaintiff alleges he reported the incident immediately thereafter, but no action was taken. Plaintiff

states he was aware of five boys who ran away from Agape Boarding School and who were

returned to the school by the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department with punishments following any

reports made to law enforcement by the Agape staff.

Plaintiff brings nine counts in this action: Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train;

Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Protect; Count Three – Aiding and Abetting

Constitutional Violations; Count Four – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory Liability; Count Five –

Action under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq.; Count Six – Negligence; Count Seven – Negligent Failure

to Supervise Children; Count Eight – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and Count Nine

– Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint should be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against Cedar County

Sheriff’s Department; Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support a claim under 18 U.S.C. §

1581; Plaintiff’s tort claims are barred by sovereign immunity; Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants in their

official capacity. The Court will take each in turn.

STANDARD

A complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, are sufficient to

state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face. Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010)

(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court “must accept the allegations

contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The

complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level,” and the motion to dismiss must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545

(2007). Further, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISCUSSION

I. Cedar County Sheriff’s Department

Cedar County Defendants first argue that the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department is not a

suable entity. The Court agrees. A sheriff’s department is not a suable entity. See De la Garza v.

Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of

county jail and sheriff’s department as parties because they are not suable entities); see also Owens

v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ounty jails are not legal entities

amenable to suit.”); Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that

“departments or subdivisions” of local government are not “juridical entities suable as such”). The

Court finds no statutory authorization for the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department to sue or be sued.

For these reasons, Cedar County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Cedar County Sheriff’s

Department is GRANTED. Cedar County Sheriff’s Department is hereby dismissed from this

case.

II. 18 U.S.C. § 1581

Plaintiff brings Count Five – Action Under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq. against all Defendants.

Cedar County Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not cure the deficiencies outlined in the Court’s

April 28, 2025, Order as there is no particularity as to when Cedar County Defendants received

any alleged benefit for any alleged participation in any alleged joint venture. Cedar County

Defendants further assert that there are no facts describing what benefits Cedar County Defendants

received from the participation short of an allegation that some bulletin from an unknown Sunday

service contained a comment that some unidentified Cedar County Defendants received a donation

from the church. Cedar County Defendants lastly argue that 18 U.S.C. § 1581 is a criminal statute

and thus a private party does not have standing to enforce it.

18 U.S.C. § 1595, often referred to as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization

Act, provides a private right of action for human trafficking victims to sue their traffickers. On

December 23, 2008, this right of action was expanded, allowing suits against not only traffickers

themselves, but also those who knowingly benefit from a trafficking venture. Following the 2008

amendments, the law, in pertinent part, provides as follows:

An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action

against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to

benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a

venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in

violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and

may recover damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)

Drew v. Householder, No. 6:22-CV-03211-MDH, 2023 WL 8789744, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19,

2023).

Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss,

Plaintiff has failed to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint

alleges:

Defendant Cedar County and the Cedar County Sheriff’s office received cash

donations from Agape Baptist Church d/b/a/ Agape Boarding School as shown in

their Sunday bulletins. Upon information and belief, these donations were made on

a regular basis. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff understands that Cedar

County Sheriff’s office received remuneration for the conceal carry classes that

were conducted on Agape grounds and they received permission for the firearms

classes to be held at that location. The receiving of monetary donations and an event

space for their classes constituted benefits conferred by the joint adventure between

Agape and Cedar County Sheriff’s office.

(Complaint ¶¶ 69, 70, and 72). Plaintiff’s Compliant demonstrates that Defendant Agape Baptist

Church made donations to Cedar County and the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department. However,

this does not show nor constitute a benefit from an alleged tracking venture. Plaintiff fails to state

the amount of the donations, the timing of the donations as it relates to the current action, or how

those donations were considered anything more than charity to the local county sheriff’s

department. Likewise, the renumeration for concealed carry classes are just that, payment for the

use of space. While Plaintiff may attempt to plead a cause of action that Cedar County Defendants

received a benefit for a venture in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization

Act, the allegations are tenuous and lack specificity for the Court to find this cause of action raises

a right to relief above a speculative level. For the reasons stated, Cedar County Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss Count Five – Action Under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq. is GRANTED.

III. State Tort Claims

A. Cedar County, Missouri

Plaintiff brings Counts Six – Negligence, against Defendant McCrary and Graves in their

individual and official capacities. Plaintiff brings Count Seven – Negligent Failure to Supervise

Children;1 Count Eight – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and Count Nine – Negligent

Infliction of Emotional Distress against all Defendants. Cedar County Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s Counts Six through Nine are barred by sovereign immunity. Defendants further argue

that Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that any exception to sovereign immunity applies and

thus these counts should be dismissed.

Sovereign immunity has existed by statute in Missouri since 1977, with certain exceptions

that Missouri courts construe narrowly. Specifically, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600, provides that

municipalities generally retain sovereign immunity for both negligent and intentional tort claims

unless an express exception applies. See White v. Dulany, No. 2:21-CV-04103-MDH, 2021 WL

4303602, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Sept 21, 2021). Review of the statute demonstrates that sovereign

immunity can be waived, for example, in automobile cases and cases involving injury caused by a

dangerous condition of public property. Additionally, Missouri Courts have long held that for a

plaintiff to successfully bring a tort claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must plead specific

facts that the municipality falls under one of the statutory exceptions. White v. Dulany, No. 2:21-

CV-04103-MDH, 2021 WL 4303602, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Sept 21, 2021) (citing Epps v. City of Pine

Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 594 (8th Cir. 2003)). Although sovereign immunity is a tort protection for

government entitles, not their employees, public employees are covered by two different

government immunity doctrines: the official immunity and public duty doctrines. Southers v. City

of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. 2008), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 30, 2008).

1 Under Missouri law there is no cause of action titled negligent failure to supervise children. Missouri does

recognize a cause of action titled negligent supervision. The Court will therefore construe this cause of action as a

negligent supervision claim.

Here, Plaintiff has failed to specifically plead facts demonstrating that his claims are within

an exception to sovereign immunity. Cedar County, Missouri is a political subdivision of the State

of Missouri. Defendant Cedar County, Missouri is entitled to sovereign immunity absent

specifically pleaded facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claim falls within an exception as defined by

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.600.1 or 537.600.2. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s Complaint does he plead any

facts that would indicate that Defendant Cedar County has purchased liability insurance for tort

claims covered under Counts Seven through Nine. As such, Defendant Cedar County is entitled to

sovereign immunity against Plaintiff’s tort claims. For the reasons stated, Defendants Motion to

Dismiss Count Seven – Negligent Failure to Supervise Children, Count Eight – Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress and Count Nine – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is

GRANTED as to Defendant Cedar County, Missouri.

B. Defendants McCrary and Graves

i. Official Capacities with the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department

Defendants McCrary and Graves to the extent they are sued in their official capacities as

part of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department are entitled to sovereign immunity. Sovereign

immunity bars any suits against states and their employees in their official capacities. Montin v.

Moore, 846 F.3d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13, 119

S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity, like it has for

claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or states can waive sovereign immunity, but in the

absence of such abrogation or waiver, sovereign immunity bars all suits. Montin v. Moore, 846

F.3d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55, 116

S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Defendants McCrary and Graves, in their official capacities

within the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department, are employees of Cedar County, Missouri, a

political subdivision of the State of Missouri. Thus, Defendants McCrary and Graves are entitled

to sovereign immunity in their official capacities with the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department. As

sovereign immunity applies to Defendants McCrary and Graves, and Plaintiff has not shown any

abrogation or waiver of sovereign immunity, Plaintiff’s Counts Six through Nine as they apply to

Defendants McCrary and Graves in their official capacities with the Cedar County Sheriff’s

Department must be dismissed. For the reasons stated, Defendants Motion to Dismiss Count Six

– Negligence, Count Seven – Negligent Failure to Supervise Children, Count Eight – Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress and Count Nine – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is

GRANTED as to Defendants McCrary and Graves in their official capacities with the Cedar

County Sheriff’s Department.

ii. Individual Capacities Regarding Negligence Claims

Cedar County Defendants next argue that McCrary and Graves are entitled to official

immunity as to Plaintiff’s negligence claims against them in their individual capacities. Cedar

County Defendants state that Plaintiff’s Complaint is void of any specific allegation as to when

McCrary and Graves became aware of reports of abuse, details regarding the investigation into the

abuse, what was done in response to such knowledge, and what role McCrary or Graves were

acting in during the period of time Plaintiff was at Agape. Defendants additionally argue that

Plaintiff fails to detail when McCrary and Graves had supervision of the students at Agape.

Missouri applies the doctrine of official immunity to “protect[] public employees from

liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the

performance of discretionary acts.” Letterman v. Does, 859 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 207) (quoting

Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. 2008)). “The official immunity

doctrine, however, does not provide public employees immunity for torts committed when acting

in a ministerial capacity.” Id. “A discretionary act requires the exercise of reason in the adaptation

of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or course

pursued,” id., while a ministerial function “is one of a clerical nature which a public officer is

required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate

of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the

act to be performed[.]” Id. Which category an act falls into is determined “on a case-by-case basis”

considering three factors: “(1) the nature of the public employee’s duties; (2) the extent to which

the act involves policymaking or exercise of professional judgment; and (3) the consequences of

not applying official immunity.” Id. However, official immunity does not apply where the

discretionary act “is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges “[d]uring the times that they supervised the boys, they each learned

that boys were being abused at the school.” (Complaint ¶ 79). “Despite such knowledge, the

Defendants breached their duty to protect Joshua when they failed to protect Joshua from the

abuses, neglect and misfeasance described herein.” (Complaint ¶ 82). Plaintiff further argues that

Defendants actions in threatening to taze Plaintiff for reporting, failing to take any action when the

crimes on his body were reported, refused to make the required reports to the Children’s Division

and otherwise preventing those who could act on his behalf from leaning of or taking action created

liability.2 (Complaint ¶ 92).

Defendants McCrary and Graves are entitled to official immunity arising out of

employment as deputies of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff has failed to allege

2 Plaintiff alleges Defendants actions in threatening to taze Joshua for reporting but nowhere in the Complaint does

Plaintiff state who made the threat other than a general allegation that “Plaintiff made so many reports to law

enforcement when they were on premises, that he reports that they threatened to taze him if he kept bothering them.”

(Complaint ¶ 24).

any ministerial capacity that would exclude Defendants McCrary and Graves from official

immunity. Missouri case law holds that the investigation of a crime and the decision to arrest a

suspect constitute discretionary acts for purposes of Missouri’s official-immunity doctrine. Jiang

v. Porter, 156 F.Supp.3d 996, 1006 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (citing Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo.,

447 F.3d 569, 585 (8th Cir. 2006)). Further, Missouri case law states that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.115,

which imposes on the officers a duty to report child abuse to the Missouri Children’s Division is a

discretionary function. See K.B. v. Waddle, 764 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s Complaint

also fails to allege with particularity any event that would show specifically that Defendant

McCrary or Graves actions were willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption. For the reasons

stated, Defendants McCrary and Graves are entitled to official immunity and thus Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Count Six – Negligence; Count Seven – Negligent Failure to Supervise

Children; and Count Nine – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress are GRANTED as to

Defendants McCrary and Graves in their individual capacities.

IV. Individual Capacities Regarding Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court finds

Plaintiff has failed to allege a right to relief above a speculative level. To state a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead extreme and outrageous conduct

by a defendant who intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress that results in

bodily harm.” Kyndryl, Inc. v. Cannady, No. 23-03279-CV-S-BP, 2024 WL 3102043, at *5 (W.D.

Mo. May 28, 2024), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kyndryl Holdings, Inc. v. Cannady, No. 24-2279,

2024 WL 5240820 (8th Cir. Nov. 5, 2024) (citing Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo.

1997)). In addition, “[t]he conduct must be intended only to cause extreme emotional distress to

the victim.” Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo. 1997).

Here, Plaintiff alleges:

Defendants actions in threatening to taze Joshua for reporting, failing to take any

action when the crimes on his body were reported and refusing to make the required

reports to the Children’s Division and otherwise preventing those who could act on

his behalf from learning of or taking action regarding the abuses at Agape

intentionally inflicted emotional and physical pain upon him and placed Plaintiff in

the zone of danger.

(Complaint ¶ 92). Plaintiff fails to identify who threatened to taze Plaintiff or separate out the

claims made between Defendants McCrary, Graves or other individuals acting on behalf of the

Cedar County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff further fails to allege how Defendants McCrary and

Graves actions caused severe emotional distress that resulted in bodily harm. The Court finds this

pleading is not sufficient at this stage of the litigation to raise a right of relief above a speculative

level. For the reasons stated, Cedar County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Eight –

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as to Defendnats McCrary and Graves in their

individual capacities is GRANTED.

V. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A. Cedar County, Missouri

Plaintiff brings Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train; Count Two – 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Failure to Protect; Count Three – Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations; and Count

Four – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory liability against all Defendants. Cedar County Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is void of any official custom or policy that allegedly led to a

constitutional deprivation. Cedar County Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is

void of any details of when McCrary or Graves allegedly because aware of the reports of abuse,

their investigations into the abuses, what role they were in while Plaintiff was at Agape, and alleged

responsibilities while Plaintiff was at Agape.

A § 1983 action against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a claim

against the entity itself, requiring proof that an official custom or policy led to a constitutional

deprivation. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1991). The

Complaint alleges that Defendants acted pursuant to a policy or custom of Defendant Cedar

County in:

refusing to make reports of abuse to the Children’s Division;

refusing to investigate complaints of physical and sexual abuse of children at

religious boarding schools:

allowing conflicts of interest such that individuals who were charged with abuse of

children were allowed to investigate and/or make recommendations regarding the

outcomes of those complaints;

hiding the fact of abuse from parents, the Children’s Division and all authorities

who had the ability to investigate those complaints;

allowing personnel to affirmatively aid and abet the abuse occurring at the facility;

allowing personnel to use their position as law enforcement officers to enforce

peonage, trafficking and abuse in violations of the Wilberforce Trafficking Act. G.

Other similar acts.

(Complaint ¶ 34). Plaintiff alleges that he had a right to bodily integrity and a substantive due

process right to protection during the time that Defendants had custody and control over him.

(Complaint ¶¶ 45 and 47). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Cedar County’s policy or

custom, its failure to adopt clear policies and failure to properly train its deputies were a direct and

proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation suffered by Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 40).

Taking the allegations as true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss Plaintiff has

sufficiently plead facts that would demonstrate a right to relief above a speculative level. Plaintiff

outlines the alleged custom/policies in his Complaint and how it led to a constitutional deprivation

of his rights. At this stage of the litigation Plaintiff is allowed to proceed on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims. For the reasons stated, Cedar County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count One – 42

U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train, Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Protect, Count Three –

Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations, and Count Four – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory

Liability is DENIED as to Defendant Cedar County, Missouri.

B. Defendants McCrary and Graves in their Individual Capacities

Cedar County Defendants argue that McCrary and Graves are entitled to qualified

immunity and that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is void of any specific allegations that

would defeat qualified immunity. Specifically, Cedar County Defendants argue that Plaintiff

neither alleged any wrongful conduct by McCrary while Plaintiff was at Agape nor alleged conduct

by McCrary that violated a constitutional or clearly established right. Cedar County Defendants

argue that Plaintiff failed to allege with any particularity any conduct by Graves other than alleged

knowledge of physical and sexual abuse.

Government officials “are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they

violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was

clearly established at the time.” Johnson v. Schurman, 145 F.4th 897, 903 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting

Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63, 138 S.Ct. 577, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018)). To

determine if an individual is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must conduct a two-part

inquiry: “(1) [whether] the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate

the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) [whether] the right was clearly

established at the time of deprivation.” Ryno v. City of Waynesville, 58 F.4th 995, 1004 (8th Cir.

2023) (quoting Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2012)). A right is “clearly

established” when its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640,

107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The courts have the discretion to decide which of the two

prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first. Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 38 F.4th 684,

690 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d

1149 (2011)).

The Court will proceed first to determine whether the facts, viewed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right.

i. Defendant McCrary

Plaintiff alleges:

During his tenure with the Sheriff’s Department, McCrary became aware of and

“investigated” reports of abuse at Agape Boarding School. Sheriff McCrary took

no actions regarding the inherent conflict of interest that existed as his employees

were some of the same individuals who had reports of abuse made against them.

No effective actions were taken regarding the reports of abuse. Sheriff McCrary

maintained a policy or practice of refusing to investigate and/or report allegations

of abuse at Agape, returning children to the school for further abuse. Sheriff

McCrary failed to train his officers and deputies causing foreseeable harm to these

children.

(Complaint ¶ 5). Plaintiff further alleges that “he knew both men who became Sheriff of Cedar

County and made report to both of them – McCrary and Dwerlkotte.” (Complaint ¶ 25). Plaintiff

additionally alleges that “Defendants Sheriff, Cedar County, Graves and Cedar County Deputies

received numerous reports of physical and sexual abuse of students amounting to violations of

students’ well-established right to bodily integrity.” (Complaint ¶ 37).

Plaintiff’s allegations, taken in the light most favorable to him fail to show a deprivation

of a statutory or constitutional right of Plaintiff from Defendant McCrary. While Plaintiff alleges

the constitutional right that was violated was Plaintiff’s right to bodily integrity, it is generally

unclear how Defendant McCrary violated that right. Plaintiff’s Complaint attempts to tie

unspecified reports of abuse by students to the inaction of Defendant McCrary. However, the

Complaint does not state what were in those alleged reports of abuse, when those reports of abuse

were made, nor how they relate to Plaintiff. While Plaintiff does allege he made a report to

Defendant McCrary, the Complaint does not detail what the substance of the report was, when the

report was made, or any details that would warrant liability to Defendant McCrary for the alleged

constitutional deprivation suffered by Plaintiff.

Additionally, Plaintiff attempts to claim Defendant McCrary had supervisory

responsibilities or was a policy maker for Cedar County in the Complaint. However, the Complaint

specifically alleges that Plaintiff attended Agape from 2014-2016 and Defendant McCrary was not

elected to the position of Cedar County Sheriff until 2017. The Court finds that, even taking the

allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to show a

constitutional deprivation caused by Defendant McCrary.

The Court finds Defendant McCrary is entitled to qualified immunity and will dismiss the

42 U.S.C. § 1983 counts against him in his individual capacity. For the reasons stated, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train; Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Failure to Protect; Count Three – Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations; and Count Four

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory Liability is GRANTED as to Defendant McCrary in his individual

capacity.

ii. Defendant Graves

As to Defendant Graves, Plaintiff alleges “Graves knew of the physical and sexual abuse

of Joshua as well as others and engaged in abuse of the boys.” (Complaint ¶ 7). Plaintiff further

alleges that:

Plaintiff’s father, when he found out what was going on at Agape, also made a report

to the police. Deputy Graves told Plaintiff’s father that no evidence of abuse had

been found. Graves moonlighted at Agape as a security guard and has been alleged

to have abused children there.

(Complaint ¶ 26). Plaintiff additionally alleges that “Defendants Sheriff, Cedar County, Graves

and Cedar County Deputies received numerous reports of physical and sexual abuse of students

amount to violations of students’ well-established right to bodily integrity. (Complaint ¶ 37).

Plaintiff’s allegations, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff fail to show a

deprivation of a statutory or constitutional right of Plaintiff by Defendant Graves. Nowhere in the

Complaint does Plaintiff claim any report was made by Plaintiff to Defendant Graves. Likewise,

Plaintiff makes no mention of how Defendant Graves was responsible for the alleged constitutional

deprivation of Plaintiff other than conclusory allegations of reports with no detail on when they

were made, what the substance of those reports were, or any details that would warrant liability to

Defendant Graves. Additionally, the Complaint fails to indicate how Defendant Graves would have

any influence on the policies or customs of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department within his role

as a Deputy Sheriff nor any alleged responsibilities he had in training officers. Thus, the Court

finds that even taking the allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

Plaintiff has failed to show a constitutional deprivation caused by Defendant Graves. For the

reasons stated, the Court finds Defendant Graves is entitled to qualified immunity in his position

as a Deputy Sheriff for Cedar County Sheriff’s Department and thus Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train; Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to

Protect; Count Three – Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations; and Count Four 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 Supervisory Liability; is GRANTED as to Defendant Graves in his individual capacity.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Cedar County Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant Cedar

County Sheriff’s Department is dismissed from the case. Cedar County Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train, Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to

Protect, Count Three – Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations, and Count Four – 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 Supervisory Liability is DENIED as to Defendant Cedar County and GRANTED as to

Defendants McCrary and Graves in their individual capacities. Cedar County Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss Count Five – Action Under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq is GRANTED. Cedar County

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Six – Negligence, Count Seven – Negligent Failure to

Supervise Children, Count Eight – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Count Nine –

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress are GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2025 /s/ Douglas Harpool

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

United States District Judge