Britt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KATHLEEN BRITT, individually and

As the Surviving Parent of Jason Britt, and

As Personal Representative on behalf of

JASON BRITT, deceased

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No.: 6:23-cv-03316-MDH

AGAPE BAPTIST CHURCH INC., d/b/a

AGAPE BOARDING SCHOOL,

JULIO SANDOVAL, individually and in his

role As Dean of Students for Agape Boarding

School,

SAFE, SOUND AND SECURE YOUTH

MINISTRIES, INC.,

BRENT JACKSON, Individually and in his role

as Vocational Director and Staff Member for

Agape Boarding School,

SCOTT DUMAR, Individually and in his role

as Medical Director, Member of the Board of

Directors and Staff Member for Agape Boarding

School,

JON WILKE, Individually and in his role as

Staff Member for Agape Boarding School,

DAVID WILSON, Individually and in his role

as Staff Member for Agape Boarding School,

ROBERT GRAVES, Individually and in his

role as Staff Member at Agape Boarding School,

and Individually and as Deputy Sheriff for

Cedar County, State of Missouri,

CEDAR COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT,

JAMES “JIMBOB” McCRARY, SHERIFF, in

his Individual and Official Capacity,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Robert Graves’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 121). Defendant

Graves filed Suggestions in Support (Doc. 122), Plaintiff filed Suggestions in Opposition (Doc.

129) and Defendant Graves has filed a reply (Doc. 146). The motions are now ripe for adjudication

on the merits. For reasons herein, Defendant Graves’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART

AND DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

This is a wrongful death action brought by Plaintiff Kathleen Britt who is the mother of

Jason Britt (“Decedent”). She brings this suit, individually and as personal representative of the

estate of Decedent, against Agape Boarding School (“Agape”), those with leadership positions at

Agape, members of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department, and Cedar County itself. Plaintiff is

a resident of Idaho and Decedent’s estate was opened in Idaho. All Defendants are citizens of

Missouri.

Defendant Agape was a non-profit organization with its principal place of business in

Stockton, Missouri. Decedent attended Agape at the age of 16. Plaintiff alleges that Decedent was

brutalized by Defendants Jackson, Sandoval, and Wilke. Plaintiff claims Decedent was held down

and a broom/mop handle was inserted into Decedent’s rectum. After Decedent left Agape, he

allegedly developed an interest in weightlifting to protect himself from sexual assault. It is claimed

Decedent used steroids, developed a drug addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression,

anxiety and suicidal tendencies. Decedent died from multi-organ failure due to steroids,

testosterone, high blood pressure and anxiety coupled with the drug addiction. Plaintiff asserts

Decedent’s death was a direct result of the abuses he suffered at Agape.

Plaintiff alleges that those associated with the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department were

aware of reports of abuse happening at Agape during this period and that Cedar County itself,

through the Sheriff’s Department, had on occasion taken actual custody and supervision of the

students after learning of abuses. Plaintiff further alleges no one at the Sheriff’s Department

reported those abuses and continued to return students to Agape without remedial action.

Defendants Sandoval and Graves allegedly worked both at Agape and as members of the Sheriff’s

Department.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) alleges six counts against Defendant

Graves in his individual and official capacity.1 Count One is a wrongful death actions premised on

childhood sexual abuse; Count Three is a wrongful death claim based on 18 U.S.C. § 1581; Counts

Four through Six are wrongful death actions premised on negligence; and Count Eight is a

wrongful death claim based upon a violation of § 1983 claim.2

Defendant Graves seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint arguing that Plaintiff has failed to

allege sufficient facts upon which relief can be granted; Defendant Graves is entitled to qualified

immunity and official immunity; Count VIII – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails to allege sufficient facts

against Defendant Graves; and Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant Graves in

his individual or official capacity. The Court will take each in turn.

STANDARD

1 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint is a corrected version of her Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel

had misnumbered her headings. As the corrections were not substantive in nature the Court will construe Defendant

Graves’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint as applying to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended

Complaint.

2 Plaintiff also alleges Count Nine: Claims for Relief by Kathleen Britt. Count Nine is styled as a cause of action

against all Defendants but does not plead any additional cause of action. The Court in its January 2, 2025, has already

ruled to the extent it is attempting to include an additional cause of action it is insufficiently plead.

A complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, are sufficient to

state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face. Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010)

(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court “must accept the allegations

contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The

complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level,” and the motion to dismiss must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545

(2007). Further, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Complaint asserts multiple counts of negligence and intentional acts against

multiple defendants resulting in the wrongful death of Jason Britt. Although there can be multiple

theories upon which a wrongful death action may be pursued, and it may be pursued against

multiple defendants, Missouri statutes allow only one claim and one recovery for the death of any

person. The damages recoverable are statutorily defined as specified damages suffered by the

Plaintiff because of the death. The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action is three years

from the date of death.

Missouri law also authorizes that in certain circumstances there can be a recovery of

damages for which the Defendants would have been liable if the claim had been pursued by the

deceased if death had not ensued. The statute of limitations which would have applied to any claim

by the deceased against the Defendants had his death not ensued would have been five years.

Plaintiff's Complaint was filed within three years of the death of Jason Britt. To the extent Plaintiff

can demonstrate a causal relationship between Defendants' actions and the death she may pursue

a wrongful death action. However, prior to the Decedent's death the statute of limitations expired

on claims which the deceased could have pursued against the Defendants. Any claim for the

damages the Decedent suffered is barred. Plaintiff may pursue a claim only for the damages

Plaintiff incurred as a read result of the death of Jason Britt. Plaintiff may not pursue a claim for

damages which Jason Britt suffered during his lifetime because of the expiration of its statute of

limitations on their claims. Regardless of the theory of negligence Plaintiff pursues she may only

recover if she is able to prove the causal link between the Defendants conduct and the death of

Jason Britt and then may only recover for the statutorily authorized damages which she can

demonstrate she suffered resulting from the death.

I. Failure to Allege Sufficient Facts Upon Which Relief Can be Granted

A. Qualified and Official Immunity

Defendant Graves argues that he was not associated with the Cedar County Sheriff’s

Department at the time Decedent attended Agape Boarding School and therefore could not have

engaged in any of the conduct alleged in his role as a deputy for the Cedar County Sheriff’s

Department. Alternatively, Defendant Graves states that even if he had been a deputy with the

Cedar County Sheriff’s Department at any time that Decedent was at Agape, he would be entitled

to immunity, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. Plaintiff argues that it appears

that Defendant Graves was not yet a deputy when Decedent allegedly experienced the sexual

assault at Agape. Plaintiff argues that if Defendant Graves was not a public official, he would have

no immunity for his actions as an individual employee of Agape.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability and the burdens of

litigation unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right

of which a reasonable person would have known. Truong v. Hassan, 829 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir.

2016) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).

Official immunity under Missouri state law “protects public officials sued in their individual

capacities from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the course of their official

duties for the performance of discretionary acts.” Hall v. Woodruff, 121 F.4th 1155, 1157 (8th Cir.

2024) (quoting State ex rel. Morales v. Alessi, 679 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Mo. banc 2023)).

Here, it appears that Defendant Graves was not employed by the Cedar County Sheriff’s

Department while Decedent attended Agape Boarding School. Plaintiff concedes in her briefing

that “[f]rom the facts gleaned thus far, it appears that Graves was not yet a deputy when Britt was

gang raped.” (Doc. 129, page 4). Because Defendant Graves was not a government official nor a

public official during the alleged sexual abuse, the doctrines of qualified immunity and official

immunity would not apply as to his actions as an individual employee of Agape. As such, the Court

finds that Defendant Graves is not entitled to qualified immunity or official immunity in this case.

For the reasons stated, Defendant Graves’s Motion to Dismiss all counts in his official capacity as

Deputy Sheriff of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department is GRANTED and Count One –

Childhood Sexual Abuse in his individual capacity is DENIED. The Court will now analyze

Plaintiff’s negligence claims against Defendant Graves.

B. Count Four - Negligence

In Missouri, in an action for negligence, the plaintiff must establish that “(1) the defendant

had a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant failed to perform that duty; and (3) the defendant’s

breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” Webb v. Medicalodges, Inc., 728

F.Supp.3d 1019, 1024 (W.D. Mo. 2024) (quoting Martin v. City of Wash., 848 S.W.2d 487, 493

(Mo. banc 1993).

Here, Plaintiff alleges:

Defendants had a duty to protect Plaintiff. This duty arose from:

a. Defendants’ acceptance of custody and supervision of the child.

b. The Plaintiff’s presence on property controlled by the Defendants.

c. The Defendants’ affirmative acts that placed Plaintiff in danger and in the

zone of danger.

d. Agape’s employment of Sandoval, Wilke, Wilson, Dumar, Graves and the

transport company as their agents.

e. All Defendants’ fiduciary and/or confidential relationship with the Plaintiff

and his family. Upon information and belief, Agape, by and through their

agents, servants and employees, knew or reasonably should have known of the

individual defendants’ dangerous and exploitative propensities and/ or that they

were unfit agents.

Despite such knowledge, the Defendants breached their duty to protect Plaintiff

when they failed to protect Plaintiff from the sexual abuse, physical abuse, neglect

and misfeasance described herein. As a direct result of the conduct of Agape and

the staff defendants including Sandoval, Dumar, Graves, Wilson, Wilke and

Jackson, Plaintiff lost her son.

(Complaint ¶¶ 130-133). Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss,

Plaintiff has raised a right to relief above a speculative level. Plaintiff has alleged a duty on the

part of Defendant Graves, a breach of that duty, a proximate cause between the breach and the

resulting injury and actual damage to Plaintiff. Thus, at this stage of the litigation Plaintiff’s cause

of action is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated, Defendant Graves’s

Motion to Dismiss Count Four – Negligence in his individual capacity is DENIED.

C. Count Five - Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention, and Failure to Warn

This Count contains four theories–which arise from hiring, supervision, retention and

failure to warm–premised on negligence. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997)

(en banc) (discussing negligent hiring and retention and referencing the employer’s negligence);

Davis v. Lutheran S. High Sch. Ass’n of St. Louis, 200 S.W.3d 163, 165–166 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)

(referencing the standard elements of negligence when discussing negligent supervision”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants failed to provide reasonable supervision of staff

members, failed to use reasonable care in investigating, hiring and retaining and supervision of its

staff members and failed to provide adequate warning to Plaintiff, and his family, of their

dangerous propensities.” (Complaint ¶ 139). As discussed prior, Defendant Graves was not an

employee of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department when Plaintiff was at Agape Boarding School.

During this time Defendant Graves was solely acting as security personnel for Agape Boarding

School. Plaintiff fails to allege how Defendant Graves, in his capacity as security personnel for

Agape had any sort of responsibility when it came to hiring, supervision, or retention of employees

at Agape Boarding School. Further, Plaintiff additionally alleges a negligent failure to warn claim

but has failed to allege any duty Defendant Graves had that would warrant liability under that

claim. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted as to

Defendant Graves on this count. For the reasons stated, Defendant Graves’s Motion to Dismiss

Count Five – Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention, and Failure to Warn in his individual

capacity is GRANTED.

D. Count Six - Negligent Failure to Supervise Children3

To state a prima facie case of negligent supervision, a plaintiff must plead “(1) a legal duty

on the part of the defendant to use ordinary care to protect the plaintiff against unreasonable risks

3 Under Missouri law there is no cause of action titled negligent failure to supervise children. Missouri does recognize

a cause of action titled negligent supervision. The Court will therefore construe this cause of action as a wrongful

death action premised on a theory of negligent supervision.

of harm; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate cause between the breach and the resulting

injury; and (4) actual damages to the plaintiff’s person or property.” Lipp v. Ginger C, L.L.C., No.

2:15-CV-04257-NKL, 2016 WL 1583663, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016) (quoting Cook v. Smith,

33 S.W.3d 548, 553–54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).

Plaintiff alleges:

The staff defendants – Graves, Wilke, Wilson, Sandoval, Dumar, Jackson -- each

had a duty to supervise decedent but breached those duties to protect and supervise

decedent by engaging in grooming activities, boundary violations, physical,

emotional and sexual abuse of the minor decedent as described herein. As a direct

result of the conduct of Defendants, Plaintiff[] lost [her] son. … As a direct result

of the conduct of Defendants, Decedent suffered lost future wages, lost earning

capacity, mental anguish, pain of body and mind.

(Complaint ¶¶ 155, 161 and 162). Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of a motion to

dismiss, Plaintiff has raised a right to relief above a speculative level. Plaintiff has alleged a duty

on the part of Defendant Graves, a breach of that duty, a proximate cause between the breach and

the resulting injury and actual damages to Plaintiffs. Thus, at this stage of the litigation, Plaintiff’s

cause of action is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated, Defendant

Graves’s Motion to Dismiss Count Six – Negligent Failure to Supervise Children in his individual

capacity is DENIED.

II. Count VIII – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendant Graves argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint is void of any official custom or policy

that allegedly led to a constitutional deprivation. Defendant Graves further argues that the

Complaint is void of any details of when he allegedly became aware of reports of abuse, his

investigations into the abuse, and what role he had while Plaintiff was at Agape. Additionally,

Defendant Graves states the Complaint is void of any alleged responsibilities he had while Plaintiff

was at Agape and thus Plaintiff’s claims warrant dismissal. Plaintiff does not make an argument

regarding Defendant Graves 42 U.S.C. § 1983 argument.

“The essential elements of a § 1983 claim are (1) that the defendant(s) acted under color of

state law, and (2) that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally

protected federal right.” Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing

DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 1999)). Only persons acting under color of state law

can be held liable under § 1983. Magee v. Trs. Of the Hamline Univ., Minn., 957 F.Supp.2d 1047,

1057 (D. Minn. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Magee v. Trs. Of Hamline Univ., Minn., 747 F.3d 532 (8th

Cir. 2014) (citing Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress, 552 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 2008)). Section 1983

therefore “secures most constitutional rights from infringement by governments, not private

parties.” Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2004). “A

private party may be held liable under § 1983 only if it is a ‘willful participant in joint activity with

the State or its agents.’” Gibson v. Regions Fin. Corp., 557 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). “[A]

plaintiff seeking to hold a private party liable under § 1983 must allege, at the very least, that there

was a mutual understanding, or a meeting of the minds, between the private party and the state

actor” regarding the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d

1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere allusion to such a conspiracy

is insufficient; the conspiracy, or meeting of the minds, must be pleaded with specificity and factual

support. See Holbird v. Armstrong-Wright, 949 F.2d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 1991); Deck v. Leftridge,

771 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1985).

As discussed above, the Court finds that Defendant Graves was not employed by the Cedar

County Sheriff’s Department during Decedent’s time at Agape Boarding School. Because

Defendant Graves was not a state actor, and Plaintiff has not pleaded with specificity that there

was a meeting of the minds necessary for liability to attach to a private party for purposes of §

1983, Defendant Graves cannot be held liable for this count. For the reasons stated, Defendant

Graves’s Motion to Dismiss Count Eight – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Failure to State a Claim in his

individual is GRANTED.

III. 18 U.S.C. § 1581

Defendant Graves seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Count Three arguing that Plaintiff does not

cite any prior criminal violation under the statute by Defendant Graves nor has Plaintiff stated any

allegation when, taken as true, would warrant relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 against Defendant

Graves.

Plaintiff’s Count Three is a wrongful death claim premised under 18 U.S.C. § 1581. The

Court in its January 2, 2025, Order dismissed this claim as it was barred by the statute of limitations

as noted in 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c). (Doc. 84, pages 8-9). 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c) states:

No action may be maintained under subsection (a) unless it is commenced not later

than the later of (1) 10 years after the cause of action arose; or (2) 10 years after the

victim reaches 18 years of age, if the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged

offense.

Decedent would have had to bring this claim prior to his 29th birthday on November 2, 2021. As

Decedent failed to do so this claim is barred by the statute of limitations. As such, the Court

continues to find that Plaintiff’s Count Three fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

and is once again dismissed it its entirety. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Count Three – Action

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 is DISMISSED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Graves’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant Graves’s

Motion to Dismiss all counts in his official capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of the Cedar County

Sheriff’s Department is GRANTED. Count One – Childhood Sexual Abuse in his individual

capacity is DENIED; Count Three – 18 U.S.C. § 1581 is GRANTED; Count Four – Negligence

in his individual capacity is DENIED; Count Five – Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention, and

Failure to Warn in his individual capacity is GRANTED; Count Six - Negligent Failure to

Supervise Children in his individual capacity is DENIED; and Count Eight – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in

his individual capacity is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2025

/s/ Douglas Harpool

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

United States District Judge