parole 25 officials are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the imposition of parole conditions 26 because such acts are integrally related to an officer’s decision to grant or revoke parole, 27 which is a quasi-judicial function
How later courts described this case
- parole 25 officials are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the imposition of parole conditions 26 because such acts are integrally related to an officer’s decision to grant or revoke parole, 27 which is a quasi-judicial function
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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7 MONROE JONES, Case No. 25-cv-04420-WHO (PR)
Plaintiff,
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL
v.
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10 BOARD OF PAROLE, ADULT
PAROLE OPERATIONS, et al.,
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Defendants.
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13 INTRODUCTION
14 Plaintiff Monroe Jones brings suit against California’s Division of Parole
15 Operations and Parole Agent Supervisor Virgil Jorge for requiring him to wear an ankle
16 monitor as part of his punishment for a recent criminal offense. He alleges that imposition
17 of this condition violated his constitutional rights in various ways. His 42 U.S.C. § 1983
18 complaint containing these allegations is now before me for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
19 § 1915A(a).
20 This federal civil rights action is DISMISSED because parole officials are
21 absolutely immune for imposing parole conditions, even if those conditions are
22 unconstitutional.
23 DISCUSSION
24 A. Standard of Review
25 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a
26 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
27 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any
1 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
2 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed.
3 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
4 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
5 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
6 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
7 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
8 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal
10 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably
11 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55
12 (9th Cir. 1994).
13 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
14 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
15 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the
16 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
17 B. Legal Claims
18 Jones alleges that the Division of Parole Operations and Virgil Jorge, a supervisor
19 within the Division, violated his constitutional rights by imposing an ankle-monitor
20 condition as part of his parole. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) Such a condition was not
21 warranted by his offense, he contends, but was related to a prior offense. (Id.)
22 This civil rights action must be dismissed because parole officials are absolutely
23 immune from suit for imposing parole conditions, even if those conditions are
24 unconstitutional. Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 839-840 (9th Cir. 2013) (parole
25 officials are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the imposition of parole conditions
26 because such acts are integrally related to an officer’s decision to grant or revoke parole,
27 which is a quasi-judicial function). Even if the imposition of such a condition was
1 || covered officials when they perform the functions which give rise to the need for absolute
2 || protection, even when the officials make egregious mistakes in carrying out these duties.”
3 || Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1983).
4 The claims against the Board itself must be dismissed because agencies of the state
5 || are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Brown v.
6 || California Department of Corrections, 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009).
7 Jones’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 10.)
8 CONCLUSION
9 The complaint is DISMISSED. The application to proceed in forma pauperis is
10 || GRANTED. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of
11 defendants, and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 22, 2025 WUQe
5 H. ORRIC
15 United States District Judge
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