Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 WESTERN DIVISION

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12 Case No. 2:24-cv-09340-BFM

CHRISTINE P.,1

13 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, AND ORDER

14 v.

15 FRANK BISIGNANO,

Commissioner of Social Security,2

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Defendant.

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19 This case is before the Court for review of Social Security Administration’s

20 decision denying Plaintiff’s applications for Social Security benefits. For the

21 reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s request for remand (ECF 13) is granted and

22 the decision of the Commissioner is reversed.

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25 1 In the interest of privacy, this Report and Recommendation uses only the

first name and middle and last initials of the non-governmental party in this

26 case.

27 2 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security in May 2025

and is substituted as Defendant here pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure.

1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2 On January 7, 2022, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits

3 under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging that she became disabled on

4 October 6, 2020. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 994-1002, 1011.)3 Plaintiff’s

5 application was denied at the initial level of review and upon reconsideration,

6 after which Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.

7 (AR 895-99, 911-19.)

8 On September 20, 2023, the ALJ held a hearing and heard from Plaintiff

9 and a vocational expert. (AR 36-60.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on

10 November 24, 2023, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 15-35.) The ALJ

11 found at Step Two of the disability analysis4 that Plaintiff had the severe

12 impairments of: bilateral temporomandibular joints (TMJ) disorder; hearing

13 loss on the left side; bruxism; vertigo; turbinate hypertrophy, status post

14 turbinate reduction; tinnitus; bipolar disorder; anxiety disorder; and

15 depression/affective psychosis. (AR 21.) At Step Three, the ALJ concluded that

16 Plaintiff’s conditions do not meet or medically equal the severity of any

17 impairment contained in the regulation’s Listing of Impairments—impairments

18 that the Social Security Administration has deemed so severe as to preclude all

19 substantial gainful activity and require a grant of disability benefits. (AR 21-

20 23); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.

21 Because Plaintiff’s impairments were not severe enough to require an

22 outright grant of benefits at Step Three, the ALJ proceeded to consider at Step

23 Four whether Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)—defined as what

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25 3 Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date from September 1, 2020, to

October 6, 2020. (AR 1011.)

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4 A five-step evaluation process governs whether a plaintiff is disabled. 20

27 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g)(1), 416.920(a)-(g)(1). The ALJ, properly, conducted the

full five-step analysis, but only the steps relevant to the issue raised in the

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Complaint are discussed here.

1 Plaintiff can do despite her limitations—is such that she would be able to work.

2 (AR 24.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform medium work with certain

3 limitations: she could lift, carry, push, and pull 50 pounds occasionally and 25

4 pounds frequently; could stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday;

5 could sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; could handle no more than

6 moderate noise level; could frequently climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds and

7 have frequent exposure to hazards such as dangerous moving machinery and

8 unprotected heights; would be limited to performing simple, routine work with

9 occasional public contact; and would be absent from work once a month. (AR

10 24.)

11 The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant

12 work. (AR 28-29.) She was an individual “closely approaching advanced age” as

13 of the amended alleged onset date and date last insured and had at least a high

14 school education. (AR 29.) The ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age,

15 education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs

16 that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could

17 perform, including: Cleaner, Window (DOT No. 389.687-014, medium work,

18 unskilled, SVP 2, with 111,400 jobs nationally); Waxer, Floor (DOT No. 381.687-

19 034, medium work, unskilled, SVP 2, with 110,800 jobs nationally); and Cleaner,

20 Wall (DOT No. 381.687-026, medium work, unskilled, SVP 2, with 110,400 jobs

21 nationally). (AR 29-30.) The ALJ therefore found Plaintiff was not disabled and

22 denied her claim. (AR 30-31.) The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s

23 decision, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Social Security

24 Administration. (AR 1-7.)

25 Dissatisfied with the Social Security Administration’s resolution of her

26 claim, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review in this Court. (ECF 1.) The

27 parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge and the case was

28 assigned to the undersigned for all purposes. (ECF 9.) The case has been fully

1 briefed. (ECF 13, 20.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court reverses the

2 Commissioner’s decision and remands this action.

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4 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

5 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision

6 to deny benefits to determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported

7 by substantial evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards.

8 See Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008);

9 Brewes v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

10 “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ It means—and only

11 means—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

12 to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citations

13 omitted); Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th Cir. 2014)

14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine whether

15 substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court “must review the

16 administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and

17 the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Reddick v.

18 Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 710 (9th Cir. 1998).

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20 III. DISCUSSION

21 Plaintiff raises two issues: (1) whether the ALJ appropriately articulated

22 clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting

23 Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations testimony regarding her vertigo; and (2)

24 whether the ALJ’s RFC finding related to Plaintiff’s vertigo was supported by

25 substantial evidence. (ECF 13 (“Pl. Brief”) at 4-16.) The Court concludes that

26 remand is warranted on the first issue and thus declines to reach the second

27 issue.

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1 A. Subjective Symptoms and Limitation Testimony

2 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide a clear and convincing

3 reason, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting her testimony

4 regarding her vertigo. (Pl. Brief at 4-13.) After review, the Court agrees and thus

5 reverses.

6 1. Legal Framework

7 Where a claimant testifies about subjective medical symptoms, an ALJ

8 must evaluate such testimony in two steps. First, the ALJ must determine

9 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying

10 impairment that could “reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

11 symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)

12 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

13 If the claimant meets that first standard and there is no evidence of

14 malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony only by offering

15 “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation and internal

16 quotation marks omitted). An ALJ “is not required to believe every allegation of

17 disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a

18 result plainly contrary to the Social Security Act.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th

19 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At the

20 same time, when an ALJ rejects a claimant’s testimony, she must “specify which

21 testimony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and convincing reasons,

22 supported by evidence in the record,” to support that determination. Brown-

23 Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). General or implicit

24 findings of credibility will not suffice; the ALJ must show the work. Smartt, 53

25 F.4th at 499; see also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090,

26 1102 (9th Cir. 2014).

27 The sufficiency of the ALJ’s explanation should be judged in light of its

28 purpose—ensuring that this Court’s review is “meaningful.” Brown-Hunter, 806

1 F.3d at 489. That is, the explanation must be “‘sufficiently specific to allow a

2 reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on

3 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony

4 regarding pain.’” Id. at 493 (citation omitted). A “reviewing court should not be

5 forced to speculate as to the grounds for an adjudicator’s rejection of a claimant’s

6 allegations of disabling pain.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th

7 Cir. 1991).

8 2. Plaintiff’s Testimony

9 Regarding her vertigo, Plaintiff testified that she gets vertigo “as many as

10 a few times a month.” (AR 48.) She said that her dizziness episodes sometimes

11 lasted for a couple hours, but usually longer, sometimes lasted between one and

12 four days. (AR 47-48.) Plaintiff testified that that when she felt dizzy, she would

13 not be able to carry or lift anything. (AR 48.) Her vertigo impacts her ability to

14 stand and causes her to fall a lot. (AR 50.)

15 3. The ALJ’s Decision

16 The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be

17 expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” meeting the standard at the first step

18 of the analysis. (AR 24.) At the second step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s

19 “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

20 symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

21 evidence in the record.” (AR 24.)

22 The ALJ’s reasons for these conclusions were unclear. The ALJ did not

23 describe Plaintiff’s testimony, except to say that she was “fully cognizant of the

24 fact that [Plaintiff] alleges greater limitations than allowed for” in the RFC,

25 including “problems standing, balancing, and hearing.” (AR 24.) After setting

26 out a summary of various medical and mental health records and medical

27 opinions, the ALJ concluded that “overall,” Plaintiff’s allegations were “less than

28 fully consistent with the record as a whole,” such that Plaintiff could perform

1 medium exertional work. (AR 27.) That conclusion is followed by two

2 paragraphs: one that relates to the treatment Plaintiff received for all her

3 various impairments; the second relates to Plaintiff’s activities of daily life. (AR

4 27-28.)

5 The ALJ’s explanation is inadequate. An ALJ is required to “identify the

6 testimony she or he finds not to be credible, and must explain what evidence

7 undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th

8 Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). Here, however, the ALJ merely summarized the

9 medical records, and concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations were not fully

10 consistent with them. In doing so, the ALJ nearly replicated the explanation

11 found to be inadequate in Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (criticizing ALJ for

12 doing nothing more than stating her conclusion concerning the claimant’s

13 credibility and then summarizing the medical evidence that supported her RFC

14 determination). The same can be said for the paragraphs concerning activities

15 of daily life and treatment regime: the ALJ lumped all of Plaintiff’s physical and

16 mental-health conditions together, concluded that Plaintiff’s testimony was

17 undermined, but did not explain how any particular evidence undercuts

18 Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her vertigo. The Court is not supposed to

19 speculate about why a claimant’s testimony has been rejected, and the ALJ’s

20 explanation leaves it in precisely that position. The failure to explain, alone,

21 warrants remand.

22 Brown-Hunter also makes clear that courts err when they undertake the

23 ALJ’s duty to try to link particular testimony to specific evidence that the ALJ

24 might have found to undermine it. Id. at 494 (ALJ’s “error could not be corrected

25 by the district court’s statement of links between claimant testimony and

26 certain medical evidence.”). But even if the Court could do so, the ALJ’s

27 apparent reasoning here is not persuasive. Giving the ALJ every benefit of the

28 doubt, the decision mentions three possible reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s

1 testimony concerning her vertigo: (1) her testimony was inconsistent with the

2 objective medical evidence; (2) Plaintiff’s testimony was undermined by her

3 conservative treatment; and (3) Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with her

4 daily activities. (AR 24, 27, 28.) None of these, on the facts of this case, is a

5 specific, clear and convincing reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony.

6 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s testimony was not fully consistent

7 with the medical evidence in the record. (AR 24.) The lack of supporting medical

8 evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting testimony, but it is a factor

9 that the ALJ can consider. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir.

10 2005) (“In evaluating the credibility of pain testimony after a claimant produces

11 objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject

12 a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to

13 fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.”).

14 In discussing the objective medical evidence related to Plaintiff’s vertigo,

15 the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had issues with dizziness and balancing

16 beginning in February 2021, corresponding to the onset of hearing loss in her

17 left ear. (AR 24 (citing AR 1187).) The ALJ noted, however, that in May 2021,

18 Plaintiff “displayed intact motor and sensory functioning.” (AR 24 (citing AR

19 1202).) In November 2021, Plaintiff was observed to have a “normal gait, except

20 when going from sitting to standing with a slight loss of balance, with the

21 claimant considered independent for ADLs/Self Care and Transfers.” (AR 24

22 (citing AR 1187).) Moreover, in May 2022, Plaintiff was noted to “not use a cane

23 or walker for ambulation.” (AR 24 (citing AR 1385).)

24 None of these records undercut Plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff testified

25 that her condition was episodic. At most, these records reflect that Plaintiff did

26 not have vertigo symptoms on the three dates reported in those medical records.

27 That Plaintiff was not suffering from an episode of vertigo during her visit to

28 the doctor’s office does not mean that she did not suffer such episodes. Certainly,

1 that is not what her doctors took from observing her condition; they prescribed

2 medication and exercises to address that condition, even though it was not on

3 display at the time of the appointment. (See, e.g., AR 1188 (discussing treatment

4 plan for Plaintiff’s vertigo).) In any event, the absence of medical records

5 positively reflecting a particular symptom cannot be the sole basis for

6 discounting a claimant’s testimony with respect to that symptom. Burch, 400

7 F.3d at 681. As such, the ALJ was required to articulate additional reasons for

8 discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.

9 Second, the ALJ appeared to have discounted Plaintiff’s symptoms

10 testimony based upon conservative treatment. (See AR 27.) An ALJ may

11 consider a claimant’s course of treatment in evaluating a claimant’s subjective

12 complaints. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding

13 evidence of conservative treatment sufficient to discount claimant’s testimony

14 regarding severity of impairment); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), (v)

15 (medication effectiveness and treatment history are relevant factors for

16 evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony). The fact that a claimant fails to

17 pursue aggressive treatment options sometimes signals that either the doctor

18 or the patient does not see the problem as one that is worthy of more aggressive

19 treatments; other times, it reflects the fact that there is no non-conservative

20 treatment for a particular impairment, or that even aggressive treatment

21 options would not meaningfully improve the condition or its symptoms. A social

22 security claimant “cannot be discredited for failing to pursue non-conservative

23 treatment options where none exist.” Lapeirre-Gutt v. Astrue, 382 F. App’x 662,

24 664 (9th Cir. 2010). Because “conservative” treatment is prone to such

25 ambiguity, courts have declined to accept an ALJ’s reliance on routine or

26 conservative treatment as a basis for rejecting a claimant’s testimony “absent

27 discussion of the additional, more aggressive treatment options the ALJ believes

28 are available.” Tiffany M. P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

1 EDCV1800933MWFRAO, 2019 WL 3215856, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2019)

2 (quoting Moon v. Colvin, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1220 (D. Or. 2015)).

3 Here, the ALJ discussed the treatment Plaintiff received for all her

4 physical and mental-health conditions in a single paragraph. (AR 27.) With

5 respect to her physical conditions, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff’s doctors

6 had “no overarching treatment plan,” nor did they find that Plaintiff needed

7 “any specific treatment, aside from managed medication, for her impairments.”

8 (AR 27.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had not received “pain relief injections,”

9 apart from steroid injections in connection with hearing, nor had she received

10 surgical intervention, aside from the turbinate reduction procedure in February

11 2022.” The ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff’s “limited treatment record

12 suggests that she is not as limited as alleged.” (AR 27.)

13 As discussed above, the failure to discuss Plaintiff’s individual conditions

14 and its impact on specific testimony leaves this Court guessing as to whether

15 the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s vertigo was conservatively treatable.

16 Plaintiff’s vertigo is not related to pain management, nor did any doctor suggest

17 there was a surgical fix to it. As far as the Court can tell, there is no indication

18 in the record that any medical professional believed there was a course of

19 treatment for her vertigo itself available apart from medication, which Plaintiff

20 used with (apparently) limited success.

21 Beyond that, it appears Plaintiff’s vertigo was connected to her sudden

22 hearing loss in one ear. With respect to that condition, Plaintiff was diagnosed

23 with “idiopathic” hearing loss—idiopathic meaning a condition for which the

24 cause is unknown. (AR 1164.) She was treated by a specialist, received the

25 steroid injections that the ALJ mentioned, and her hearing did not improve.

26 None of Plaintiff’s doctors discuss any other treatment that would have restored

27 her hearing (and by doing so, possibly resolved her vertigo). In the absence of

28 some specific treatment option that was available and that Plaintiff declined to

1 follow, the Court does not believe that the ALJ’s reference to conservative

2 treatment is a specific, clear and convincing reason to discount her testimony

3 concerning her vertigo. See Tiffany M.P., 2019 WL 3215856, at *2.

4 In resisting that conclusion, Defendant argues Plaintiff does not cite

5 evidence suggesting that her vertigo treatment was anything beyond

6 conservative. (ECF 20 (“Opp’n”) at 5-6.) As just set out, this is beside the point:

7 there is no basis in the record to know whether Plaintiff’s course of treatment

8 reflected the seriousness of her impairment or whether it reflected the lack of

9 available non-conservative treatment options for her condition. If it is the latter,

10 it has no bearing on whether Plaintiff’s testimony about her symptoms should

11 be credited. Without more, “conservative” treatment is not a basis to reject

12 Plaintiff’s testimony.

13 Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were “not

14 consistent with the alleged degree of impairment,” as Plaintiff “reported being

15 able to dress and bathe herself, and that she could drive, and has a hobby

16 involving painting with water color.” (AR 28 (citing AR 1361).)

17 An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective complaints when the daily

18 activities demonstrate an inconsistency between what the claimant can do and

19 the degree of disability alleged. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th

20 Cir. 2012) (an ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily

21 activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms”), superseded by regulation on

22 other grounds. Even where a plaintiff’s activities suggest some difficulty

23 functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to

24 the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment. Id.

25 at 1113.

26 But the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that a claimant’s ability to complete

27 minimal daily activities does not detract from the claimant’s credibility. See

28 Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (“evidence that [claimant]

1 could assist with some household chores was not determinative of disability.

2 ‘Disability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded

3 from all forms of human and social activity.’”) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637

4 F.2d 968, 971 (3d Cir. 1981)); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.

5 2001) (“This court has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has

6 carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or

7 limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as

8 to her overall disability.”). That would seem to be particularly true where the

9 Plaintiff alleges her condition is episodic, not constant.

10 Here, some of Plaintiff’s daily activities cited by the ALJ—independently

11 bathing, dressing, and driving—are ones the Ninth Circuit has cautioned

12 against using to discredit symptoms testimony. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff required

13 help with some of those daily activities, undermining the ALJ’s assertion that

14 they reflected a higher degree of capacity than Plaintiff testified to. (AR 1361

15 (noting that Plaintiff’s son reminded her to shower every day and that Plaintiff

16 did not go places by herself).) As Plaintiff’s reported daily activities appear to be

17 minimal, they are not a proper basis for discounting Plaintiff's symptoms

18 testimony. Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050.

19 Defendant resists this conclusion, arguing that Plaintiff’s daily activities

20 did not need to be commensurate with full-time work to show exaggeration of

21 symptoms or limitations. (Opp’n at 6-7.) The Court does not doubt that to be

22 true, in principle. At the same time, for a daily activity to undercut a claimant’s

23 testimony, the activity must give rise to an inference that the claimant has

24 somehow exaggerated her symptoms. It is unclear how Plaintiff’s ability to

25 bathe, dress, or drive undermines Plaintiff’s testimony that her dizziness affects

26 her lifting and carrying capacity—particularly given her testimony that her

27 condition consists of episodes that last between a few hours and a few days. (AR

28 27, 47-48.) Defendant suggests that each of the activities required the ability to

1 balance. Setting aside that this was not the ALJ’s reasoning, the fact that

2 Plaintiff can regularly bathe, dress, and drive during the course of a day or week

3 simply does not undermine Plaintiff’s testimony that she is prone to falls and

4 unable to lift items when she is suffering an episode of vertigo.

5 Defendant also argues that any error in consideration of Plaintiff’s daily

6 activities would be harmless, as the ALJ provided additional valid reasons

7 supported by the record. (Opp’n at 7.) But this Court has not found that any of

8 the ALJ’s reasons are valid and thus declines to find harmless error. The ALJ’s

9 decision is therefore reversed.

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11 IV. REMEDY

12 Remand (as opposed to an outright grant of benefits) is appropriate as the

13 circumstances of this case suggest that further administrative proceedings

14 could remedy the ALJ’s errors. See Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th

15 Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative

16 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction

17 to provide benefits.”); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101, n.5 (remand for further

18 administrative proceedings is the proper remedy “in all but the rarest cases”);

19 Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2000) (remand for further

20 proceedings rather than for the immediate payment of benefits is appropriate

21 where there are “sufficient unanswered questions in the record”).

22 Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address

23 Plaintiff’s remaining argument regarding the ALJ’s RFC finding, which also

24 related to Plaintiff’s claim concerning her vertigo. That question can be

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26 5 Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“Long-standing principles of administrative law require us to review the

27 ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the

ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator

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may have been thinking.”)

1 || addressed, as necessary, on remand. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212

2 || (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated,

3 || we decline to reach [plaintiffs] alternative ground for remand.”); see also

4 || Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal.

5 || 2008) (“[The] Court need not address the other claims plaintiff raises, none of

6 || which would provide plaintiff with any further relief than granted, and all of

7 || which can be addressed on remand.”); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6

8 || (9th Cir. 1990) (“Because we remand for reconsideration of step three, we do not

9 || reach the other arguments raised.”).

10

11 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

12 For the reasons above, it is therefore ordered that: (1) Plaintiff's request

13 || for reverse and remand (ECF 18) is granted; (2) the decision of the

14 || Commissioner is reversed and this matter is remanded for further

15 |} administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order; and (8)

16 || Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff.

TeMinnyf

18 || DATED: October 15, 2025

19 HON. BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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