Opinion

Leverton

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Sep 23, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.8%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

MICHAEL J. LEVERTON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 3:25-cv-03054-CDC

SHERIFF JOHN MONTGOMERY, Baxter

County, Arkansas; JAIL ADMINISTRATOR

TABITHA MAZE, Baxter County Detention

Center (BCDC); CORPORAL MASON

CRUISE (BCDC); and SERGEANT ALMA

BROWN (BCDC) DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Michael J. Leverton (“Leverton”) filed this action alleging civil rights violations

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Leverton proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The case is before the

Court for preservice screening of the Complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1

Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. However, because

not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and some of

Plaintiff’s claims require dismissal, the Court enters its findings as a Report and Recommendation

and the case will automatically be reassigned to United States District Judge Timothy L. Brooks.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; General Order 2024-02.

1 Enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

I. BACKGROUND

Leverton’s Complaint asserts four claims. Two of his counts allege unconstitutional

conditions of confinement in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. The other two counts allege First Amendment violations: one regarding

restriction of his ability to communicate with the outside world, and the other regarding

impediments to his ability to access the courts.

Leverton brings his claims against all defendants in both their official and individual

capacities. As relief, he is seeking compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and

injunctive relief.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being

issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or

it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to

vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re

Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is

discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe

the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). However, the complaint must still allege

specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

III. ANALYSIS

Section 1983 was enacted to provide a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected

civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). To assert a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that the action occurred under color of law; and

(2) that the action is a deprivation of a federal statutory or constitutional right.

There are two deficiencies in Leverton’s Complaint. The most straightforward one is that

although the caption names Corporal Mason Cruise as a defendant, the pleading does not actually

contain any factual allegations about him. Lacking any facts about Defendant Cruise, the

Complaint does not provide any basis for inferring that he deprived Leverton of any federal right.

Since the Complaint does not state any claims against Defendant Cruise, he must be dismissed

from this case.

The other deficiency concerns Leverton’s First Amendment claim for deprivation of his

right of access to the courts. Leverton alleges that the facility’s law library is inadequately stocked,

and that Defendant Maze refused to fill out his in forma pauperis application. See ECF No. 1, p.

9. Leverton asserts that this violates his right of access to the courts under the First Amendment.

“To prove a violation of the right of meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner must

establish the state has not provided an opportunity to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner’s . . .

conditions of confinement in a court of law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the hindrance

of a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.” White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d

677, 680 (8th Cir. 2007). To prove “actual injury,” the plaintiff must “demonstrate that a

nonfrivolous legal claim ha[s] been frustrated or [is] being impeded.” Id. Here, Leverton has not

alleged any facts showing that his ability to litigate his other claims in this case have actually been

frustrated or impeded. Indeed, he has successfully filed his Complaint (ECF No. 1); and although

his in forma pauperis application was initially deficient, see ECF No. 3, the Court entered an Order

directing Defendant Maze to assist Leverton with completing it, see ECF No. 4, and the defect was

ultimately remedied, see ECF No. 8. Thus, Leverton’s Complaint does not allege any facts

showing that he has suffered an “actual injury” to his right of access to the courts. Accordingly,

that claim must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), it is recommended that:

(1) All claims against Defendant Corporal Mason Cruise be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and

(2) Plaintiff’s claim for a violation of his First Amendment right of access to the courts

be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

This leaves for later resolution Plaintiff’s claims regarding unconstitutional conditions of

confinement and restrictions on communication with the outside world. By separate order the

Complaint will be served on Defendants Montgomery, Maze, and Brown.

Status of Referral: This case should remain referred for all matters not recommended

for dismissal in this report and recommendation.

The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in

which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 23rd day of September 2025.

/s/ Christy Comstock

HON. CHRISTY COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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