The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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Sandra Heras,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
19-CV-02694 (DG) (PK)
-against-
Metropolitan Learning Institute, Inc. and Boris
Davidoff,
Defendants.
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DIANE GUJARATI, United States District Judge:
On May 7, 2019, Plaintiff Sandra Heras commenced this action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (the “FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (the “NYLL”) against Defendants
Metropolitan Learning Institute, Inc. and Boris Davidoff (together, “Defendants”). See ECF No.
1. On November 25, 2024, a one-day bench trial was held before the undersigned. The Court
concluded that Plaintiff had met her burden of proof as to her claims for unpaid overtime
violations under the FLSA, unpaid overtime violations under the NYLL, failure to provide wage
statements under the NYLL, and failure to provide spread-of-hours pay under the NYLL and
Plaintiff was awarded a total of $25,233.06. See Judgment, ECF No. 171; see also Findings of
Fact & Conclusions of Law, ECF No. 170.1
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s March 14, 2025 letter motion for attorney fees and
expenses (the “Motion”). See Motion, ECF No. 173. Plaintiff initially requested $105,474.80 in
attorney fees and $5,714.72 in expenses, see generally Motion; see also March 28, 2025 Letter,
ECF No. 175; Plaintiff thereafter requested an additional $1,605.00 in attorney fees for time
1 Familiarity with the lengthy procedural history and background of this action is assumed
herein.
spent by Plaintiff’s counsel (at an hourly rate of $500) “reviewing Defendants’ application [at
ECF No. 176], reviewing applicable case law, opposing their application (dkt 179) and reviewing
the Court’s April 16, 2025 decision denying Defendants’ request,” see Declaration of Jacob
Aronauer (“Aronauer Decl.”), ECF No. 180; and Plaintiff thereafter requested that the Court
“take [an additional $2,734.01 in] fees and expenses into consideration with respect to Plaintiff’s
outstanding application for attorney fees (dkt 173),” see July 17, 2025 Letter, ECF No. 188.
Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that “Defendants engaged in vexatious litigation;” that “[t]here
were procedural tools available to Defendants to reduce their financial exposure to potential
attorneys’ fees in what was not a high value FLSA case;” and that “the parties settled in principle
after a mediation . . . [but] Defendants elected not to honor the settlement and proceed to trial . . .
[which] led to Plaintiff’s counsel incurring further fees including preparing for trial, the actual
trial and the post-trial brief” and Plaintiff asserts that her request is reasonable. See generally
Motion.
Defendants oppose the Motion. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition
(“Def. Br.”), ECF No. 177. More specifically, Defendants request that “the Court deny
Plaintiff’s Motion entirely or decrease the amount to a reasonable amount at the discretion of the
Court.” See Def. Br. at 6.
Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s fees are in excess of the prevailing rate;” that “counsel
has not demonstrated this matter is anything more than a straightforward FLSA case;” that
“Plaintiff’s exhibits are irrelevant to the subject case;” that “Plaintiff’s claims are excessive;” and
that “Plaintiff’s time entries are vague and unintellig[i]ble.” See generally Def. Br.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
DISCUSSION
As set forth below, the Court has determined that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees in
the amount of $65,299.28 and costs in the amount of $5,714.62.
I. Applicable Law
A. Attorney’s Fees
Under the FLSA and the NYLL, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s
fees. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); N.Y. Lab. Law § 198; see also Fisher v. SD Prot. Inc., 948 F.3d
593, 600 (2d Cir. 2020). A district court has discretion to determine what constitutes a
reasonable fee. See Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011); see also
Bay Park Ctr. for Nursing & Rehab. LLC v. Philipson, 659 F. Supp. 3d 312, 317-18 (E.D.N.Y.
2023) (noting that courts “have broad discretion, using their experience with the case, as well as
their experience with the practice of law, to assess the reasonableness of each component of a fee
award” (quotation omitted)). The fee applicant must submit adequate documentation supporting
the requested fee, see Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600, and the fee applicant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the requested fee is reasonable, see Rosario v. Marper Terminal Servs. Corp.,
No. 24-CV-04511, 2025 WL 2687741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2025).
“Both [the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit] and the Supreme Court
have held that the lodestar – the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number
of hours required by the case – creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’” See Millea, 658 F.3d
at 166 (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. Cnty. of Albany, 522
F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) and additionally noting that “[w]hile the lodestar is not always
conclusive, its presumptive reasonability means that, absent extraordinary circumstances, failing
to calculate it as a starting point is legal error”).
With respect to determination of a reasonable hourly rate, the Second Circuit has stated
that “courts should generally use the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing
court sits in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee.” See Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,
575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also Teoh v. Manhasset Rest., LLC,
No. 22-CV-04110, 2025 WL 1088045, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2025) (noting that “[t]o
determine the reasonable hourly rate, courts generally use the prevailing rates used in their
District” and that “[a]dditionally, courts also use factors such as the labor and skill required, the
difficulty of the legal questions, the attorney’s customary rate, the amount at stake, and awards in
similar cases” (quotations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-CV-04110,
2025 WL 1736835 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2025).
With respect to determination of the reasonable number of hours required by the case, the
Second Circuit has stated that “a district court should ‘examine the particular hours expended by
counsel with a view to the value of the work product of the specific expenditures to the client’s
case,’ and if it ‘concludes that any expenditure of time was unreasonable, it should exclude these
hours’ from the fee calculation.” See Hines v. City of Albany, 613 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir.
2015) (alteration accepted) (quoting Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1997));
see also Chen v. Glow Asian Foods, Inc., No. 19-CV-00630, 2023 WL 6292576, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2023) (noting that “[a]n application for attorney’s fees must be supported by accurate,
detailed, and contemporaneous time records” but that “[e]ven when supported by such
documentation hours that were excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary to the litigation
are not recoverable” (quotations omitted)); Zang v. Daxi Sichuan, Inc., No. 18-CV-06910, 2023
WL 2305934, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2023) (noting that “generally the denial of a class or
collective action certification motion justifies a reduction in fees, given the impact that such
certification may have on the quantity and quality of the available relief” and that “courts reduce
attorney’s fees for work done on motions that were never filed, on claims that were abandoned,
on motions that were unreasonable or had little chance of success, and on submissions that failed
to comply with court orders” (quotations omitted)). “In determining the reasonable number of
hours of work for a fee award, courts are expected to take into account their own familiarity and
experience both generally and with the particular case at hand.” Shen v. ZenTao Inc., No. 19-
CV-07269, 2025 WL 746478, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (ellipses omitted) (quotation
omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-07269, 2025 WL 746063 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2025). The Second Circuit has stated that “[a] district court may exercise its discretion
and use a percentage deduction as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application,” see
McDonald ex rel. Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450 F.3d 91,
96 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted), and has noted that “the Supreme Court has been careful to
note that only those hours ‘reasonably expended’ are to be awarded,” see id. (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983)).
B. Costs
Under the FLSA and the NYLL, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover costs. See 29
U.S.C. § 216(b); N.Y. Lab. Law § 663(1); see also Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600. “An award of costs
normally includes those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney and which
are normally charged fee-paying clients.” Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600 (alteration accepted)
(quotation omitted); see also Ladino v. Cordova, No. 21-CV-02449, 2024 WL 968898, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2024) (noting that “[o]rdinarily, plaintiffs may recover ‘[c]osts relating to
filing fees, process servers, postage, and photocopying’” (quoting Teamsters Loc. 814 Welfare
Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., 545 F. Supp. 2d 260, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)); that
“[p]laintiffs may also recover the costs of depositions where they appear to have been reasonably
necessary to the litigation at the time they were taken” (quotation omitted); and that “[o]nly those
costs that are tied to identifiable, out-of-pocket disbursements are recoverable” (quotation
omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-CV-02449, 2024 WL 967635 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 6, 2024). “The fee applicant must submit adequate documentation supporting the requested
. . . costs.” Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600.
II. Plaintiff Is Entitled to an Award of Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff prevailed at trial as to the majority of her claims and Plaintiff is entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees, to be paid by Defendants jointly and severally.2
Hourly Rates
Here, the “hourly requested rates” are:
• 2019: $400 for attorneys and $100 for paralegals
• 2020: $415 for attorneys and $110 for paralegals
• 2021: $450 for attorneys and $125 for paralegals
• 2022: $475 for attorneys and $150 for paralegals
• 2023: $475 for attorneys and $150 for paralegals
• 2024: $500 for attorneys and $150 for paralegals
• 2025: $500 for attorneys and $150 for paralegals
See Motion at 3; see also Aronauer Decl. ¶ 5; ECF No. 188-1.3
2 Although the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish standing with respect to her
claim for failure to provide a wage notice under the NYLL, see Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law at 3, 25, 32; Judgment at 1, Plaintiff is properly deemed a prevailing
plaintiff here and, indeed, Defendants do not appear to contest that Plaintiff is a prevailing
plaintiff, see generally Def. Br.
3 The Court notes that although Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $150 for paralegals for work
done in 2025, the billing records submitted with the July 17, 2025 Letter reflect an hourly rate
of $175 for paralegals for work done in 2025, see ECF No. 188-1, and although Plaintiff
requests an hourly rate of $100 for paralegals for work done in 2019, the billing records
submitted with the Motion reflect an hourly rate of $400 for paralegals for June 26, 2019, June
28, 2019, and November 4, 2019. See ECF No. 173-6.
Plaintiff provides the following information about her counsel, Jacob Aronauer: in 2005,
Mr. Aronauer received a J.D. from Suffolk University Law School; in 2013, he formed his own
law firm after working at the New York City Mayor’s Office of Labor Relations for four and a
half years, where he represented New York agencies in labor disputes; and from 2018 through
2020 and from 2022 through 2024, he received certain accolades. See Motion at 3. Plaintiff sets
forth that Mr. Aronauer’s firm specializes in employment law with a primary focus in wage and
hour actions. See Motion at 3.
Plaintiff does not provide individualized information about Mr. Aronauer’s paralegals but
asserts that Mr. Aronauer “disbursed a fair amount of work to paralegals that in most small firms
like [his] are undertaken by the attorneys.” See Motion at 4.
Plaintiff asserts that counsel “obtained an excellent result for [Plaintiff]” and that the
“result was not obtained after filing a complaint and then reaching a quick resolution . . . [r]ather,
it was obtained after six years of litigation and winning at trial.” See Motion at 4.
Plaintiff argues that “the rates sought are consistent with prior fee awards issued in the
EDNY” and asserts that “there is a plethora of cases in the EDNY ordering relatively low hourly
rates compared to the rates across the river in the Southern District of New York.” See Motion at
4. Plaintiff criticizes “the Eastern District courts” for purportedly “making reasonability
determinations for decades out of whole cloth.” See Motion at 4.
The Court declines to award the requested hourly rates for Mr. Aronauer and his
paralegals.
As courts have noted, judges in the Eastern District of New York in recent years in wage
and hour cases have awarded hourly rates ranging from $300 to $450 for partners, $200 to $325
for senior associates, $100 to $200 for junior associates, and $70 to $100 for legal support staff.
See Shen, 2025 WL 746478, at *3; Diaz v. Rene French Cleaners, Inc., No. 20-CV-03848, 2022
WL 4646866, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2022); see also Teoh, 2025 WL 1088045, at *4 (noting
that “[t]he prevailing hourly rates for wage and hour cases within this District typically span
from $300 to $450 for partners, $200 to $300 for senior associates, $100 to $200 for junior
associates, and $70 to $100 for support staff” and collecting cases (quotation omitted)); Gao v.
Jian Song Shi, No. 18-CV-02708, 2021 WL 1949275, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2021) (similar),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Bin Gao v. ABC Corp., No. 18-CV-02708, 2021
WL 1946322 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2021); Payamps v. M & M Convenience Deli & Grocery Corp.,
No. 16-CV-04895, 2019 WL 8381264, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019) (noting that “[i]n recent
years, courts have approved the following hourly rates for attorneys practicing in the Eastern
District of New York: $200 to $450 for partners in law firms, $200 to $325 for senior associates,
$100 to $200 for junior associates, and $70 to $100 for paralegals” (quotation omitted)), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-04895, March 31, 2020 docket entry; but see Rubin v.
HSBC Bank USA, NA, 763 F. Supp. 3d 233, 243-44 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (in Fair Credit Reporting
Act matter, increasing hourly rates for attorney’s fees to account for inflation and market
conditions).
Here, the requested hourly rates for Mr. Aronauer are at the high end of – or above – the
range of rates generally found to be reasonable and therefore awarded in this District. The
requested rates are not reasonable under the circumstances of this case – which, inter alia, did
not involve any particular novelty or complexity – legal or factual. See, e.g., Ladino, 2024 WL
968898, at *6 (reducing Mr. Aronauer’s requested hourly rate of “$415 for 2021 and 2022, and
$425 for 2023” to “$315 for all hours expended on this case” because, inter alia, “[t]here is
nothing about this FLSA case that was particularly complex,” “[the case] did not involve novel
issues of law, complicated facts, or a multitude of parties,” “[t]he motion for conditional class
certification was denied,” and “[m]ultiple discovery motions and motions for sanctions were also
denied”).
Mr. Aronauer’s hourly rates are reduced as follows:
Jacob Aronauer
Year Requested Hourly Rate Reduced Hourly Rate
2019 $400 $300
2020 $415 $315
2021 $450 $350
2022-2023 $475 $375
2024-2025 $500 $400
The requested hourly rates for Mr. Aronauer’s paralegals also are not reasonable. As an
initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not submitted documentation that would permit
the Court to conclude that the requested rates are reasonable. Indeed, Plaintiff provides no
information about any paralegal’s background, experience, or work history. See generally
Motion; Aronauer Decl.; July 17, 2025 Letter; see, e.g., Bay Park Ctr. for Nursing & Rehab.
LLC, 659 F. Supp. 3d at 319 (noting that “[n]o resume or background information for the
paralegal was submitted” and stating that “[a]lthough such deficiency would enable the Court to
deny fees for the unnamed paralegal altogether, or at least postpone the determination of a
reasonable hourly rate, the Court finds that an award at the lower end of the spectrum for
paralegals – $70 per hour – is appropriate”). This omission is particularly notable in light of the
fact that in connection with a fee application, another judge in this District recently reduced the
hourly rate for Mr. Aronauer’s paralegals from $165 to $70, highlighting that “no information
about these paralegals’ individual experiences or work history to allow the Court to justify
awarding [the] higher rate” was provided. See Ladino, 2024 WL 968898, at *6. In addition, as
noted above, there was nothing particularly novel or complex about the legal or factual issues in
this case.
The hourly rates for the paralegals are reduced as follows:
Paralegals
Year Requested Hourly Rate Reduced Hourly Rate
2019 $100 $70
2020 $110 $70
2021 $125 $70
2022-2025 $150 $70
Hours Worked
Plaintiff submitted billing records reflecting dates, numbers of hours worked, and nature
of work performed (with varying degrees of specificity). See ECF No. 173-6; ECF No. 180-1;
ECF No. 188-1. According to the records submitted, Mr. Aronauer and his paralegals spent a
total of 289.34 hours on this case since its inception in 2019. Specifically, Mr. Aronauer spent
203.81 hours and the paralegals spent a combined 85.53 hours.
Upon review of the billing records and consideration of the record as a whole – and
having presided over the bench trial in this action in November 2024 and having presided over
this action as a whole for more than four years – the Court has determined that a percentage
reduction in the number of hours is warranted.
Here, as reflected on the docket, Plaintiff’s counsel engaged not only in unsuccessful
motion practice but also in conduct that was found to constitute “sharp practices,” was found to
demonstrate a failure to act in good faith, was found to constitute a “flagrant violation” of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a)(1), and ran afoul of Court orders and the Individual
Practice Rules of more than one judge in this District. See generally docket; see, e.g., March 19,
2021 Order (then-Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann stating that “[c]ounsel have ignored the
Court’s order of February 11, 2021”); ECF No. 41 (Judge Mann noting in July 30, 2021
Memorandum and Order that “plaintiff oversimplifies the state of the law and overlooks recent
caselaw in this District”); ECF No. 87 (Judge Mann observing in January 3, 2022 Memorandum
and Order: “Despite this Court’s repeated rebukes of both counsel for unnecessarily multiplying
the proceedings in this case and engaging in sharp practices, counsel for plaintiff Sandra Heras
has filed yet another discovery application devoid of merit” (quotations and citations omitted)
(citing ECF Nos. 71 and 84)); ECF No. 127 (then-Magistrate Judge Sanket J. Bulsara observing
in August 18, 2023 Report & Recommendation that “[t]he parties’ Rule 56.1 statements are,
quite frankly, a complete and total mess, and run afoul of the basic rules governing such
submissions”); November 22, 2023 Order (Judge Bulsara stating, inter alia, that “[t]he parties’
Joint Pretrial Order [ECF No. 136] fails to comply with Judge Gujarati’s Individual Practices in
several substantial respects” and that “[t]hese failures to comply and attendant omissions risk the
Court’s sanction including entry of a judgment via default, striking of claims or defenses and
risks substantial delay in setting a trial date”); September 23, 2024 Order (Judge Bulsara stating,
inter alia: “Plaintiff’s counsel has repeatedly filed letters with the Court. This violates several of
the Court’s Individual Practices and the Court’s prior admonitions in this case. The conduct
must cease.”); November 18, 2024 Order (the undersigned – on the eve of trial – stating that
“[t]he parties have failed to comply with the undersigned’s Individual Practice Rules with
respect to provision of exhibits to the Court”). In addition, examples of time inefficiently spent
by Plaintiff’s counsel abound. See, e.g., June 25, 2021 Order (reflecting that Plaintiff filed an
application that both failed to identify the legal basis supporting Plaintiff’s request of the Court
and that was premature); August 4, 2021 Order (Judge Mann – in response to Plaintiff’s counsel
purporting to remind Judge Mann that a motion was still pending – noting that she had acted on
the motion the day it was filed); ECF No. 153 (November 6, 2024 letter from Mr. Aronauer to
Court stating: “I apologize very much but I misplaced my notes from the conference. I recognize
that this is not acceptable. Accordingly, I request that the Court provide (admittedly once again)
the content of the joint legal memorandum it ordered.”); ECF No. 154 (November 11, 2024 letter
from Mr. Aronauer to Court stating: “I withdraw my request for clarification from the Court with
respect to the legal memorandum of law (dkt 153). I ordered the transcript from the October 30,
2024 conference. I thank the Court for its patience.”); ECF No. 155 (November 12, 2024 letter
from Mr. Aronauer to Court stating: “I will shortly be providing Plaintiff’s proposed exhibit list
and Plaintiff’s proposed joint legal memorandum of law. Defendants’ counsel is not responding
to me.”); ECF No. 166 (December 10, 2024 letter from Mr. Aronauer to Court requesting to
“amend post-trial brief” because “I did not provide the lines of the transcript pages that I cited in
my post-trial brief”); see also ECF No. 173-6 (reflecting that on November 6, 2024, Mr.
Aronauer spent 0.10 hour and charged $50.00 for “Letter in re joint legal memo of law;” that on
November 12, 2024, Mr. Aronauer spent 0.10 hour and charged $50.00 for “Letter in re not
responsive Defendants;” and that on December 10, 2024, Mr. Aronauer spent 0.10 hour and
charged $50.00 for “Motion to amend/correct/supplement post-trial brief”).4
The Court reduces the number of hours by 20%. See McDonald ex rel. Prendergast, 450
F.3d at 96; see also Ladino, 2024 WL 968898, at *7-8 (in case where Mr. Aronauer represented
plaintiff, reducing total number of hours by 25% across the board in light of the unmeritorious
motion practice and non-legal work included in counsel’s time logs); Teoh, 2025 WL 1088045,
at *10 (finding 30% across-the-board reduction to requested hours appropriate considering
4 It is also notable that although Plaintiff’s request for conditional certification of the FLSA
collective action was granted in part, see ECF No. 57, Defendants thereafter successfully
moved to decertify, see ECF No. 88; January 11, 2022 Sua Sponte Report and
Recommendations (noting that “[t]he deadline for members of the collective to opt in has now
passed, but not a single employee has sought to opt in”); February 8, 2022 Order Adopting Sua
Sponte Report and Recommendations.
“excessive hours, inappropriate delegation of rudimentary work to more senior attorneys, and
wrongdoings that further prop up [the law firm’s] bill”).
Total Fee Award
The Court awards Plaintiff $65,299.28 in attorney’s fees as indicated below, which
accounts for the reduced rates and hours:
Jacob Aronauer
Year Original Reduced Requested Reduced Fees
Hours5 Hours Hourly Rate Hourly Rate Awarded
2019 10.69 8.55 $400 $300 $2,565.60
2020 0.20 0.16 $415 $315 $50.40
2021 54.37 43.50 $450 $350 $15,223.60
2022-2023 83.30 66.64 $475 $375 $24,990.00
2024-2025 55.25 44.20 $500 $400 $17,680.00
Total $60,509.60
Paralegals
Year Original Reduced Reduced Fees
Hours6 Hours Hourly Rate Awarded
2019-2025 85.53 68.42 $70 $4,789.68
Total $4,789.68
III. Plaintiff Is Entitled to an Award of Costs
As a prevailing plaintiff, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs, to be paid by
Defendants jointly and severally.
Plaintiff seeks to recover the following:
• $400 for the filing fee
• $140 for service of the Complaint
• $4,234.30 for deposition costs
5 The Court calculated the original hours based on the billing records submitted by Plaintiff. See
ECF No. 173-6; ECF No. 180-1; ECF No. 188-1. In future cases before the undersigned,
counsel for Plaintiff must set forth the total number of hours.
6 The Court calculated the original hours based on the billing records submitted by Plaintiff. See
ECF No. 173-6; ECF No. 188-1. In future cases before the undersigned, counsel for
Plaintiff must set forth the total number of hours.
• $300 for mediation with Joseph DiBenedetto
• $640.42 for the November 25, 2024 trial transcript
See Motion at 2. Plaintiff has submitted certain documentation in support of these expenses and
the Court finds these expenses to be reasonable.7
Plaintiff also appears to seek to recover the following:
• $24 for Stamp Abstract of Judgment
• $10 for filing Judgment with County Clerk (Nassau County)
• $25 for filing Judgment with County Clerk (Queens County)
• $69.24 for Bank Notices
• $33.78 for Subpoenas for Davidoff
• $10.99 for Subpoenas for MLI CPA
See July 17, 2025 Letter; see also ECF No. 188-1. Plaintiff has not submitted any invoices or
other documentation in support of these expenses and, accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has not met her burden of demonstrating that these expenses are reasonable.
The Court awards Plaintiff $5,714.62 in costs.
7 The Court notes a ten-cent discrepancy between the amount sought for the November 25, 2024
trial transcript and the amount actually paid. As reflected below, the amount awarded for this
expense is the amount actually paid – $640.32 (rather than $640.42). The Court further notes
that Plaintiff submitted an invoice for the $300 mediation fee but did not submit a receipt for
payment of the same. In light of the submission of the invoice and absent any indication that
the amount was not paid, Plaintiff will be awarded the $300 sought. In future cases before
the undersigned, counsel for Plaintiff must provide sufficient supporting documentation
for amounts sought.
CONCLUSION
As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. 173, is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $65,299.28 and costs in the amount
of $5,714.62, for a total award of $71,013.90, to be paid by Defendants jointly and severally.8
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Diane Gujarati __
DIANE GUJARATI
United States District Judge
Dated: October 22, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
8 Plaintiff’s motion to stay, ECF No. 178, is denied as moot and that portion of Plaintiff’s
motion for a pre-motion conference, ECF No. 189, that is premised on the instant Motion also
is denied as moot. The Court declines to address Plaintiff’s motion for discovery, ECF No.
187, pending decision on the appeal in this action, see ECF No. 181, and, relatedly, declines to
hold a pre-motion conference on the motion for discovery.