Poullard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

SANCTIONED/BARRED JOHN POULLARD CASE NO. 6:25-CV-00744

VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

ANYA GUILLORY MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID J. AYO

ORDER and REASONS

Before the Court for consideration are a Motion to Amend Complaint [ECF No. 22] and a

Motion to Vacate the Court’s Order dismissing this civil action with prejudice [ECF No. 23]. For

the reasons that follow, the motions are DENIED.

Plaintiff John Poullard’s original Complaint asserted claims against Anya Guillory,

Manager of American Cash Advance (“ACA”), for deprivation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and for violation of Poullard’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101, et seg.! The Court dismissed all claims with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2).” Poullard asserts the Court’s Order should be vacated, because he “clearly stated a

claim” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., in that

Guillory was attempting to “enforce[e] an illegal contract.’?

According to the Complaint, on an unspecified date in 2024, Poullard went to ACA to

obtain a loan, which Guillory approved.* Thereafter, Poullard states he discovered the loan

“violated the law and was absolutely null” because “it included that my SSI Benefits could be □

ECF No. | at 4, 13.

2 ECF No. 18 at 4.

3 ECF No. 23 at 2. Poullard asserts additional reasons why the Order should be vacated, none of which have

any merit and will not be addressed.

“ECF No. 1 at 2-3.

garnishment from my bank account or garnishment in General.”* Poullard alleges Guillory sent

him a letter, dated December 21, 2024, stating that his loan was past due and reminding him that

“Per signed agreement terms and conditions you authorize American Cash Advance to initiate . . .

....., (Garnishment Fees). .....”° Poullard alleges that the letter constitutes a threat to garnish

his Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).’

Contrary to his assertions, Poullard did not “clearly state[] a claim” under the FDCPA in

his original Complaint. Nevertheless, due to his pro se status, the Court will consider whether it

should vacate its Order dismissing this suit and permit Poullard to amend the Complaint to add a

new claim arising under the FDCPA.® Where a case or claim is disposed of without a trial, a motion

to alter or amend the judgment is considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).’ District courts have

“considerable discretion” in deciding whether to grant a Rule 59(e) motion.!? Nevertheless, the

rule “serve[s] the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to

present newly discovered evidence” and is an “extraordinary remedy” that should be granted

5 Id. at 4-5 (errors in original).

6 Id. at 6-7. Poullard asserts Guillory subsequently sent two more letters in an attempt to collect on the loan,

and that she made “multiple harassment” telephone calls to him between December of 2024 and March of

2025. Id. at 7-8, 10.

7 Td. at 5-6. 42 U.S.C. §407(a) provides that “none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under

this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the

operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.” The Court notes the letter from Guillory, as quoted by

Poullard, does not explicitly state that ACA was attempting to garnish Poullard’s SSI benefit payments.

Regardless, financial institutions are subject to federal regulations which prohibit the garnishment of

protected federal benefits. See 31 C.F.R. § 212.1, et seq.

8 See e.g. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,

and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal quotation marks, citations omitted).

° See e.g. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (Sth Cir. 1997); Smither v.

Ditech Fin., L.L.C., 681 Fed.Appx. 347, 350 (Sth Cir. 2017).

0 Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993).

Page 2 of 5

“sparingly.”!! Rule 59(e) motions “cannot be used to argue a case under a new legal theory.”!”

Nevertheless,

Where judgment has been entered on the pleadings, a holding that the trial court

should have permitted amendment necessarily implies that judgment on the

pleadings was inappropriate and that therefore the motion to vacate should have

been granted. Thus the disposition of the plaintiffs motion to vacate under rule

59(e) should be governed by the same considerations controlling the exercise of

discretion under rule 15(a).'°

Leave to amend under Rule 15(a) should be “freely given when justice so requires.”!* Although

leave to amend is a favored remedy under the express language of Rule 15(a), it is not automatic

and may be properly denied where, for example, a court finds amendment would be futile.!> In

determining futility, courts “apply the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies to Rule

12(b)(6).”'° In other words, if an amendment would be subject to dismissal under a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, amendment would be futile, and the court should deny leave to amend.

Here, Poullard moves to amend the Complaint to assert a claim under the FDCPA. The

FDCPA seeks “to protect consumers from a host of unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt collection

practices without imposing unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors.”!’ To state a claim

under the FDCPA, Poullard must allege facts sufficient to show the following: (1) he has been the

object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector, as

"| Matthews vy. Tidewater, Inc., 108 F.4th 361, 370-71 (Sth Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting

Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (Sth Cir. 2004)).

Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763 (Sth Cir. 2005).

Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981).

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Filgueira v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 734 F.3d 420, 422 (Sth Cir. 2013)

(quoting S&W Enters., LLC v. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003)).

1S Stripling v. Jordan Production Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A.,

Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

16 Stripling, supra.

Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 351-52 (Sth Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Jerman vy.

Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 577 (2010) (‘Congress enacted the FDCPA

in 1977, 91 Stat. 874, to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, to ensure that debt collectors who

abstain from such practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent state action to

protect consumers.”)

Page 3 of 5

that term is defined by the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission

prohibited by the FDCPA.'* With regard to the second element, the FDCPA defines a “debt

collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or

attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due

another.”!? “The term does not include .. . any officer or employee of a creditor . . . collecting

debts for such creditor.””° Nor does the term include “any person collecting or attempting to collect

any debt owed . . . to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was originated by such

person.””!

Poullard fails to plausibly allege Guillory is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA.

Poullard’s pleadings state that the alleged debt sought to be collected by Guillory was originated

by ACA.” A “debt collector” under the statute does not include a consumer’s creditors.”? Rather,

18 See e.g. Hunsinger v. SKO Brenner Am., Inc., 3:13-CV-0988-D, 2013 WL 3949023, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug.

1, 2013); Sequel Grp., Inc. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y FSB, 3:16-CV-02056-N (BF), 2017 WL 3704833,

at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 3:16-CV-02056-N (BF), 2017 WL

3674866 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2017); Browne v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, Inc., CIV.A. H-11-02869,

2013 WL 871966, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2013).

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); see also Hester v. Graham, Bright & Smith, P.C., 289 Fed.Appx. 35 (5th Cir. 2008)

(“The statute contains two categories of debt collector, those who collect debts as their ‘principal purpose,’

and those who do so ‘regularly.’”)

2015 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A).

21 Td. at § 1692a(6)(F)(ii).

2 Likewise, Poullard sets forth no factual allegations indicating Defendant was either engaged “in [a]

business the principal purpose of which [was] the collection of . . . debts” or that Defendant “regularly

collect[ed] or attempt[ed] to collect . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692a(6).

3 Perry y. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (Sth Cir. 1985) (“a debt collector does not include the

consumer’s creditors”); see also Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3rd Cir. 2000)

(“Creditors—as opposed to ‘debt collectors’—generally are not subject to the FDCPA.”), abrogated on

other grounds by Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., LLC, 582 U.S. 79, 81-82 (2017); see also Staub

v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 277 (3rd Cir. 1980) (“The statute does not apply to persons or businesses collecting

debts on their own behalf.”); Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Services, Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1998)

(“As a general matter, creditors are not subject to the FDCPA.”); Schmitt v. FMA Alliance, 398 F.3d 995,

998 (8th Cir. 2005) (The FDCPA “does not regulate creditors’ activities at all’) (quoting Randolph v.

IMB.S., Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 2004)).

Page 4 of 5

the term “debt collector” specifically refers to those who are collecting a debt on behalf of

another.’ It does not apply to creditors—like American Cash Advance, or its employees—who

are collecting their own debts. Because Poullard has failed to plausibly allege that Guillory is a

debt collector under the FDCPA, he has failed to state a claim. As such, the Court finds granting

leave to amend would be futile and would only result in needless delay, and therefore leave to

amend will be denied.”

For these reasons, the Motion to Amend Complaint [ECF No. 22] and the Motion to Vacate

[ECF No. 23] are DENIED.

THUS DONE in Chambers on this ro Nd day of October, 2025.

ROBERT R. SUMMERHAY,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4 Perry, 756 F.2d at 1208 (“The FDCPA makes it unlawful for debt collector to use abusive tactics while

collecting debts for others.”) (emphasis added).

5 In addition to his original Complaint, Poullard has filed two proposed Amended Complaints. See ECF

No. 22-1, ECF No. 24. Accordingly, the Court finds he has pleaded his best case. See e.g. Brewster v. Dretke,

587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (Sth Cir. 2009).

Page 5 of 5