Brock

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

FELICIA BROCK, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-685

Plaintiffs,

Cole, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

HAMILTON COUNTY JFS CHILDREN

SERVICES, et. al.

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On September 17, 2025, Plaintiff proceeding pro se, filed an application seeking

to initiate the above-captioned case in forma pauperis, or without payment of a filing fee.

On September 26, 2025, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. On the same date, the undersigned filed a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) that this matter be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state

a claim for relief. (Doc. 5). Plaintiff filed objections to that R&R, which remain pending

before the presiding district judge. (Doc. 7). Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss on September 30, 2025.

Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on October 3, 2025. (Doc. 14). Under

Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may amend a

complaint “once as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of a responsive

pleading or motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

was filed as of right. But because the Amended Complaint is now the operative pleading,

this Supplemental R&R must be issued in order to properly screen the newly Amended

Complaint.

Defendants also filed another motion to dismiss, presumably directed at the

amended complaint. (Doc. 15).

I. Screening Standard

In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a

“litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying

litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive

lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized

federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action

is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be

dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable

basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v.

Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis

when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal

interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable

factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or

“wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need

not accept as true factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional in reviewing a

complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A

complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same

token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also

Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs

dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept

all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual

allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading

that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

II. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants removed her children from her custody in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff’s complaint claims, inter alia, that

Defendants “stated false allegations in court” and allowed interference with child custody.

(Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff’s amended complaint consists of over 1200 pages of documents

including, medical records and records related to her custody cases. (Doc. 14). Despite

these references Plaintiff did not cite to any such court action. Notably, however, this

Court has authority to “take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record” on

screening of plaintiff's complaint. See Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d

736, 738 (6th Cir.1980) (quoting Granader v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 82–83 (6th

Cir.1969)); Saint Torrance v. Firstar, 529 F.Supp.2d 836, 838 n. 1 (S.D.Ohio 2007); see

also Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n. 5 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d

327, 332 n. 3 (6th Cir.1999)) (involving judicial notice of on-line court records).

A search of on-line court records from Hamilton County, Ohio reveal a prior action

filed by Plaintiff against the same defendants in the instant action, seeking to reverse a

ruling of the Juvenile Division of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas and return

her children to her. See Brock v. Patton, Case No. A 2303760. Defendants moved to

dismiss the action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim

for relief upon which relief may be granted. Id. Defendants also asserted they are entitled

to qualified immunity. The Court granted Defendants motion and dismissed the action on

December 8, 2023. Id. Upon careful consideration, the undersigned concludes that this

Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's amended complaint.1

Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which arose from the Supreme Court's

decisions in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983),

1 At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff's amended complaint does not comply with Rule 8. Namely, it fails to

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” against the remaining

individual Defendants. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Here, the amended complaint is so devoid of factual detail that it fails

to state a claim as a matter of law against any Defendant.

and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), the lower federal courts are

precluded “from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers'

challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059

(2006) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudia Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)). The doctrine is premised on the “the

notion that appellate review of state court decisions and the validity of state judicial

proceedings is limited to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal

district courts lack jurisdiction to review such matters.” See In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548

(6th Cir.2009) (and cases cited therein).

In this case, it is clear from the face of the complaint that Rooker–Feldman applies

to bar this Court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims challenging the rulings

of the state court. See Lee v. Johnson-Wharton, No. 1:14cv868, 2014 WL 7015178, at *4

(S.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 2014) (Dlott, J.; Litkovitz, M.J.) (relying on Stephens and Sefa v.

Kentucky, 510 Fed.Appx. 435, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2013), in holding that the district court

lacked jurisdiction to consider claims couched in terms of a civil rights action, which

essentially amounted to a collateral attack of a state-court judgment terminating the

plaintiff’s parental rights). As such, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff's claims because they fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state courts and

the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's claims. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

Additionally, to the extent the juvenile court proceedings are ongoing, this Court is

precluded from adjudicating plaintiff’s claims under the abstention doctrine formulated in

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention not only applies to criminal

prosecutions but has been judicially expanded to include certain civil enforcement

proceedings and “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in

furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions,” such as divorce

and custody orders. Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588,

187; FCA US, LLC v. Spitzer Autoworld Akron, LLC, 887 F.3d 278, 290 (6th Cir.2018).

Under Younger, the federal court must abstain where “[1] state proceedings are

pending; [2] the state proceedings involve an important state interest; and [3] the state

proceeding will afford the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional

claims.” Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Nilsson v. Ruppert,

Bronson & Chicarelli Co., 888 F.2d 452, 454 (6th Cir. 1989)). See also Pennzoil Co. v.

Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-05

(1975).

All three factors supporting Younger abstention are present in this case. First, it

appears the dependency case is currently pending in the Hamilton County juvenile court.

See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608; Loch v. Watkins, 337 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2003); Foster

v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144, 1146 (6th Cir. 1990). Second, the dependency case

implicates the important state interests in child custody and parental rights. See Meyers

v. Franklin Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2001) (Younger

abstention case stating that “cases out of the Supreme Court and this Court make it clear

that abstention is generally appropriate in matters of family relations such as child

custody”). See also Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45. Third, there is no allegation that the state

juvenile court proceedings cannot provide an opportunity for plaintiff to raise any

constitutional claims in connection with the dependency proceedings. See Furr-Barry v.

Underwood, 59 F. App’x 796, 797 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming the application of Younger

where a case was pending in a Tennessee juvenile court, because “there was no

evidence that the state court proceedings did not provide an opportunity for [the plaintiff]

to raise her constitutional claims[ ]”). Therefore, abstention under Younger is appropriate.

Extraordinary circumstances barring abstention include “great and immediate”

irreparable injury, state law that is “flagrantly and patently violative of express

constitutional prohibitions,” or “bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance

that would call for equitable relief.” Younger, See Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 750

(6th Cir. 1996). This case does not present extraordinary circumstances that would bar

abstention. Instead, there is “overwhelming precedent that [abstention] includes custody

matters” as being barred by Younger. Smith v. Dewine, S.D.Ohio No. 2:14-cv-198, 2014

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99422, at *6-7 (July 22, 2014). See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,

435, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979); Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir.

1995); Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 23 F. App'x 201, 203 (6th Cir.

2001). For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that adherence to the Younger

abstention doctrine is required in this case.

Plaintiff has also failed to identify any HCJFS policy that would even serve as a

basis for her claims. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,

694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).

Accordingly, for these reasons, it is therefore RECOMMENDED this action be

DISMISSED with PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for relief.2 It is further

RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 9, 15) be DENIED as

MOOT. It is also RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and

Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to

appeal in forma pauperis.

s/ Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge

2 In light of the foregoing, Defendants motions to dismiss should be denied as moot, subject to

refiling if the Report and Recommendation is not adopted and the complaint has been served.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

FELICIA BROCK, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-685

Plaintiffs,

Cole, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

HAMILTON COUNTY JFS CHILDREN

SERVICES, et. al.

Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after

being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on

timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the

portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in

support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within

FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make

objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).