McMillan

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DONDRE MCMILLAN, No. 4:23-CV-00561

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

TYSON HAVENS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

OCTOBER 21, 2025

Now pending before the Court in this civil rights matter are two motions for

summary judgment filed by the remaining Defendants, Tyson Havens, Michael A.

Caschera, III, and Clinton Gardner. Pro se Plaintiff Dondre McMillan has not

opposed the motions, nor has he submitted any evidence to support his remaining

claims. For the following reasons, the motions are granted and judgment is entered

in favor of Defendants on Counts II-XI. The Court declines supplemental

jurisdiction over the unresolved state law claims, and Counts XII-XIV are dismissed

without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts and evidentiary submissions. Because he did not submit any

opposition, Mr. McMillan has “failed to properly address [these] assertion[s] of fact

as required by Rule 56(c),” and I will therefore “consider [them] undisputed for

purposes of the motion.”1

In 2019, Mr. McMillan was charged by Lycoming County Pennsylvania law

enforcement with felonies for possession of a firearm and carrying a firearm without

a license.2 That case went to trial in April 2021, and Mr. McMillan was acquitted on

both counts.3

On June 11, 2021, Lycoming County Detectives Tyson Havens and Michael

Caschera set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine in Williamsport, Pennsylvania.4

Caschera was undercover and attempted to purchase the controlled substance from

Shalamar Brown,5 while Havens observed the transaction from a distance.6 Caschera

documented the cash that he was using to make the purchase and passed five

recorded $20 notes to Brown, who advised that he needed to call in a supplier.7

Caschera left the immediate area to wait for the delivery,8 and Havens continued

observing Brown’s residence.9 Eventually, Mr. McMillan arrived at Brown’s

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

2 Doc. 29 (Am. Compl.) ¶ 30.

3 Id. ¶ 48.

4 Doc. 74-2 (Havens Decl.) ¶¶ 1, 4; Doc. 74-3 (Caschera Decl.) ¶¶ 1, 3-4.

5 Doc. 74-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 74-3 ¶¶ 3-5.

6 Doc. 74-2 ¶¶ 6-7.

7 Doc. 74-3 ¶¶ 5-7.

8 Id. ¶ 7.

9 Doc. 74-2 ¶¶ 6-8.

apartment.10 Havens watched as Brown got in the car with Mr. McMillan for about

thirty seconds before returning to his apartment, at which point Mr. McMillan drove

away.11 According to Mr. McMillan, he was stopping by Brown’s house to “check[]

his AC on his vehicle.”12 Mr. McMillan recalls that he got out of his car to meet

Brown and stayed there for “at least ten minutes, 20 minutes at least.”13

Havens followed Mr. McMillan.14 Several other police officers in the area

were also tracking Mr. McMillan, and, when one officer witnessed him fail to stop

at a stop sign, Officer Clinton Gardner executed a traffic stop.15 While the stop was

in progress, Brown called Caschera to let him know that the drugs had arrived.16

Caschera returned to Brown’s apartment, where Brown gave him suspected crack

cocaine.17 Brown explained that he had paid his supplier $80 of Caschera’s $100 and

was keeping the last $20 for himself.18 After the transaction was complete, Caschera

10 Id. ¶ 8; Doc. 74-5 (McMillan Dep.) at 125:15-126:14.

11 Doc. 74-2 ¶¶ 9-10.

12 Doc. 74-5 at 47:13-17, 48:2-18.

13 Id. at 126:18-128:7, 150:16-151:18.

14 Doc. 74-2 ¶ 10.

15 Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Gardner also justified the stop based on illegal window tint. Id. Mr. McMillan

contends that the tinting justification was contrived because, although his windows were in

fact tinted, they were down at the time of the stop. Doc. 74-5 at 50:2-52:11. He also disagrees

that he ran a stop sign. Id. at 129:8-22. Defendants included a bystander’s video of the stop,

Doc. 74-7, but the essentially none of the disputed interactions is captured in the footage.

16 Doc. 74-3 ¶ 12.

17 Id. ¶ 13.

18 Id. ¶ 14.

radioed Havens to confirm that he had received a suspected controlled substance

from Brown, and that Brown’s supplier likely had the four outstanding twenties.19

Havens arrived at the traffic stop shortly thereafter.20 Based on his own

observations and the information conveyed by Caschera, Havens believed that there

was probable cause to arrest Mr. McMillan for felony delivery of a controlled

substance.21 Havens ordered Mr. McMillan out of his car and patted him down.22

Mr. McMillan says that Havens took his phone before ordering him out of the car.23

The pat-down revealed what felt like a wad of money in Mr. McMillan’s front

pocket, and, according to Havens, Mr. McMillan agreed to produce the money and

consented to Havens’s request to review it.24 Mr. McMillan does not recall Havens

asking to review the money nor his consenting thereto.25 Mr. McMillan also

contends that Havens took money—$400—out of the center console of his car over

his objection to a vehicle search.26 When Havens checked the bills, he confirmed

that four twenties with serial numbers matching the prerecorded notes were in Mr.

19 Id. ¶ 15; Doc. 74-2 ¶ 14.

20 Doc. 74-2 ¶ 17.

21 Id. ¶ 20.

22 Id. ¶ 21.

23 Doc. 74-5 at 52:16-19, 57:22-59:20, 61:5-62:20 (when this search occurred during the stop is

not clear from Mr. McMillan’s testimony).

24 Doc. 74-2 ¶¶ 21-22; see Doc. 74-5 at 53:10-11.

25 Doc. 74-5 at 142:14-143:10.

26 Id. at 53:2-10.

McMillan’s possession.27 Mr. McMillan claims that throughout the stop Gardner

repeatedly asked him if he was a gang member.28

After reviewing the money, Havens asked Mr. McMillan to “lower his outer

pants and waistband for a quick visual check” for contraband hidden in the groin

area, which he did.29 The check “lasted fewer than ten seconds” and occurred

“behind an open patrol-car door on the curb side of the road.”30 Mr. McMillan’s

recollection is different: he describes this check as an extensive strip search which

occurred after the officers had placed him in handcuffs.31 Mr. McMillan refused a

search of his vehicle, so Havens impounded it pending a search warrant

application.32 The stop “was conducted in approximately 15 minutes or less.”33 At

the end of the stop, Mr. McMillan was released.34 In his deposition, Mr. McMillan

conceded that he had not located any witnesses who would testify to corroborate his

recollection of the stop.35

27 Doc. 74-2 ¶¶ 23-24. Mr. McMillan generally believes that the authorities entirely fabricated

the prerecorded bills. Doc. 74-5 at 134:16-139:3, 144:8-23.

28 E.g., Doc. 74-5 at 62:21-64:11.

29 Doc. 74-2 ¶ 25.

30 Id.

31 Doc. 74-5 at 54:11-55:11, 81:15-83:3.

32 Doc. 74-2 ¶ 26.

33 Id. ¶ 29.

34 Id. ¶ 30.

35 Doc. 74-5 at 176:4-10.

As part of the impoundment, authorities also held the items in the car, all of

which were returned with the vehicle approximately a week after the stop.36 Mr.

McMillan avers that his phone and the $400 were never returned.37

Several months later, on October 27, 2021, authorities filed a state criminal

complaint against Mr. McMillan based on the events of June 11.38 Caschera was the

affiant on the probable cause affidavit.39 The affidavit stated that “Dondre McMillan

dealt approx. 0.55grams [sic] of suspected crack, cocaine to Shalamar Brown in the

area of Memorial St. and Locust St. BROWN [sic] then delivered the suspected

crack, cocaine to this Det.”40 The affidavit describes the controlled buy as set forth

above, and notes that the interaction between Mr. McMillan and Brown involved “a

hand to hand exchange.”41 The affidavit also describes the traffic stop and location

of the documented transaction money.42 Caschera explains in his declaration that he

“believed the hand-to-hand exchange occurred based on circumstantial evidence

reported to me from other” officers.43 On October 28, 2021, Pennsylvania

Magisterial District Judge Christian David Frey issued an arrest warrant for Mr.

McMillan based on the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause.44 And at

36 Id. at 97:10-100:15.

37 Id. at 100:16-21, 101:16-102:5.

38 Doc. 74-3 ¶ 23.

39 Id. ¶ 23.

40 Id. ¶ 24.

41 Id.

42 Id.

43 Id. ¶ 28.

44 Id. ¶ 26.

a preliminary hearing on the charges, Magisterial District Judge Frey determined

that the Commonwealth had established a prima facie case based on “substantially

the same evidence.”45 Mr. McMillan was held on those charges until June 28, 2022,

when they were nolle prossed following a habeas corpus proceeding in which Mr.

McMillan claims that Brown testified that he had purchased the June 11 crack

cocaine from someone other than Mr. McMillan.46

B. Procedural Background

Mr. McMillan commenced this case on April 3, 2023.47 After he submitted an

amended complaint,48 Defendants moved to dismiss his claims in full.49 I granted in

part and denied in part those motions on January 26, 2024.50 The remaining

Defendants took discovery. Mr. McMillan did not participate in discovery at all

except to sit for a deposition.51 At the end of discovery, Defendants submitted the

instant motions for summary judgment.52 Mr. McMillan did not file any opposition.

II. LAW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate

where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

45 Id. ¶ 36.

46 See Doc. 29 ¶ 101; Doc. 74-5 at 166:4-167:13.

47 Doc. 1 (Compl.).

48 Doc. 29.

49 Docs. 31, 32 (Mots. to Dismiss).

50 Docs. 40 (Mem. Op.), 41 (Order).

51 See Doc. 74 (Defs. Statement of Undisputed Facts) ¶¶ 57-63.

52 Docs. 71, 72 (Mots. for Summ. J.).

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”53 Material facts are those “that

could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence

exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person

with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”54 A defendant “meets this

standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s

case.”55 Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “point to

admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie

case under applicable substantive law.”56

In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly

proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”57 the Court “must view the

facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.”58 Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of

fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule

56(c),” the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”59

53 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

54 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).

55 Clark v. Mod. Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).

56 Id.

57 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp.

Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).

58 Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020).

59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d

Cir. 2018).

Finally, although “the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may

consider other materials in the record.”60

When a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the Court may grant

summary judgment when review of the record establishes “that judgment for the

moving party is ‘appropriate.’”61 Because the movant here does not bear the burden

of proof at trial, to grant the motion I “must determine that the deficiencies in the

opponent’s evidence designated in or in connection with the motion entitle the

moving party to judgment as a matter of law.”62

III. ANALYSIS

Twelve of Mr. McMillan’s fourteen counts survived dismissal in some form.

Those counts are: Count II – Unlawful Search and Seizure (Fourth Amendment);

Count III – False Imprisonment (Fourth Amendment); Count IV – Equal Protection

(Fourteenth Amendment); Count V – Retaliation (First Amendment); Count VI –

Malicious Prosecution (Fourth Amendment); Count VII – False Arrest (Fourth

Amendment); Count VIII – False Imprisonment (Fourth Amendment); Count IX –

Fabrication of Evidence (Fourteenth Amendment); Count XI – False Imprisonment

(Pennsylvania Common Law); Count XII – Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress (Pennsylvania Common Law); Count XIII – Trespass to Chattel

60 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

61 Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990).

62 Id. at 175 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).

(Pennsylvania Common Law); and Count XIV – Conversion (Pennsylvania

Common Law). All of these counts center on the June 11 stop and the charges that

arose therefrom. I will review them in chronological order, moving through the

controlled buy, stop, search, arrest, charges, and global issues. Before analyzing the

counts, the Court preliminarily resolves the matter of the remaining Doe Defendants.

A. Doe Defendants

In his amended complaint, Mr. McMillan levied several claims against an

“unknown . . . number” of unidentified “John and/or Jane Doe(s).”63 Although the

rules permit claims against “Doe Defendants,” “the plaintiff must eventually

identify” them.64 The time to do so arrives following an opportunity for “reasonable

discovery.”65 “[I]f the plaintiff does not identify the Doe defendants after adequate

time for discovery, the court may dismiss [them] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.”66

Mr. McMillan had an opportunity for discovery and failed to use it. The still-

unnamed Doe Defendants are therefore dropped as parties under Rule 21.

B. Count IX – Fabrication of Evidence

Mr. McMillan maintains a section 1983 claim for fabrication of evidence

against only Caschera.67 This claim centers on the allegation that “Caschera

63 Doc. 29 ¶ 11.

64 Evans v. Columbia County, 711 F. Supp. 3d 256, 316 (M.D. Pa. 2024).

65 Blakeslee v. Clinton County, 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).

66 Evans, 711 F. Supp. 3d at 316 (collecting cases); see Blakeslee, 336 F. App’x at 250 (stating

Doe defendants not identified following discovery “must be dismissed” (emphasis added)).

67 The Count was also alleged against dismissed defendants Lycoming County and Ryan

Gardner. Neither of those defendants was present for the controlled buy or the stop.

fabricated the evidence that Plaintiff was in possession of prerecorded police funds

in order to charge the Plaintiff with a serious crime.”68 A fair reading of the

complaint suggests that Mr. McMillan also contends that Caschera fabricated a

description of the controlled buy in the affidavit of probable cause which led to Mr.

McMillan’s arrest.69

The evidentiary bar for establishing a due process claim based on fabricated

evidence is high.70 To withstand a motion for summary judgment, Mr. McMillan

“must bring ‘persuasive evidence supporting a conclusion that [defendant] was

aware that evidence is incorrect or that it was offered in bad faith.’”71 Testimony

that turns out to be wrong or is “simply disputed” does not meet reach the threshold.72

Furthermore, a section 1983 fabrication plaintiff’s “claim requires him to show that

the criminal proceedings against him—and the consequent deprivations of his

liberty—were caused by [defendant’s] malfeasance in fabricating evidence.”73 This

causation standard is similarly high: Mr. McMillan must show that “absent that

fabricated evidence, [he] would not have been criminally charged,” and “that the

fabricated evidence ‘was so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the

68 Doc. 29 ¶ 188.

69 See id. ¶¶ 87-91

70 Black v. Montgomery County, 835 F.3d 358, 372 (3d Cir. 2016).

71 Mervilus v. Union County, 73 F.4th 185, 194 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Black, 835 F.3d at 372).

72 Id. (quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 295 (3d Cir. 2014)).

73 McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 117 (2019).

criminal case.’”74 Because the standard is difficult to meet, the Third Circuit has

repeatedly warned that “it will be an unusual case in which a police officer cannot

obtain a summary judgment in a civil action charging him with fabricated

evidence.”75

Mr. McMillan has not produced sufficient evidence to establish fabrication.

His contention that Caschera fabricated the prerecorded police funds is rooted solely

in the circumstantial evidence of his conflicting account of the events of June 11. He

argues that he never transacted anything with Brown, so he couldn’t have had the

prerecorded funds. But it is undisputed that Caschera gave prerecorded bills to

Brown.76 Caschera did not witness the interaction between Mr. McMillan and

Brown.77 Nor was Caschera present at the stop.78 It was Havens who observed the

transaction and supposedly recovered the prerecorded funds.79

These facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. McMillan,

fail to establish a fabrication claim against Caschera for two reasons. First, assuming

it is true that Mr. McMillan never received money from Brown and so did not have

74 Black, 835 F.3d at 371-72; see Burke v. Bachert, 702 F. Supp. 3d 347, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2023)

(listing these considerations as a three-factor test).

75 Mervilus, 73 F.4th at 194 (quoting Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295).

76 See Doc. 74-5 at 123:8-125:14 (“Q. [A]ssume that the transaction was complete means that the

undercover officers provided the money to Mr. Brown. A. Okay. Q. Do you have any reason

to believe that that’s not true? A. No.”); Doc. 74-3 ¶¶ 5-7.

77 Doc. 74-3 ¶ 7.

78 Doc. 74-5 at 156:22-157:1 (agreeing that Caschera could not have planted money at the stop

because he was not present).

79 Doc. 74-2 ¶¶ 6-9, 21-24.

it at the stop, nothing in the record demonstrates that Caschera was or had any reason

to be aware of that fact. Even if Havens was lying about the interaction between Mr.

McMillan and Brown and finding the money on Mr. McMillan, nothing other than

speculation suggests that Caschera knew the information was not true.

Circumstantial speculation falls far short of the “persuasive evidence” requirement

for surviving summary judgment by showing that Caschera knew that the evidence

was incorrect or offered in bad faith.80 Second, because Mr. McMillan has not

provided any opposition or evidence, the record in his favor is so thin that the Court

cannot reasonably determine what impact the evidence had on the filing of criminal

charges or the outcome of his case. So he fails the causation requirement as well.

These conclusions similarly negate a claim based on the affidavit of probable cause,

because Caschera’s statements about the controlled buy and stop were clearly based

on the observations of other officers, which there is no evidence Caschera knew were

untrue.81

Accordingly, Caschera’s motion for summary judgment on Count IX is

granted.

80 Mervilus, 73 F.4th at 194; see Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 279-80 (2d

Cir. 2016) (“In order to succeed on a claim for a denial of the right to a fair trial against a police

officer based on an allegation that the officer falsified information, an arrestee must prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that the officer created false information, the officer

forwarded the false information to prosecutors, and the false information was likely to

influence a jury’s decision.”) (emphasis added).

81 Doc. 74-9 at 6 (describing “[s]urveillance” of McMillan/Brown exchange “after [Caschera]

departed the area” and noting that “Ofc Gardner stopped McMillan”).

C. Count II – Unlawful Search and Seizure

Mr. McMillan’s section 1983 claim for an unlawful search and seizure in

violation of the Fourth Amendment arising from the June 11 traffic stop remains as

to only Caschera.82 To be liable under section 1983, a defendant must have been

“personally involved in the constitutional violation.”83 On a Fourth Amendment

claim for unlawful search and seizure, personal involvement is established by

showing that the defendant was either involved in the search itself,84 or played a

direct role in establishing an illegitimate ground for the search, thereby rendering it

illegal.85 Caschera was not present at the stop and did not participate in the search

conducted there.86 And, to the extent the searching officers’ probable cause

determination was based on his statements, there is no dispute that he was truthful

in stating that (1) he gave the marked bills to Brown and (2) Brown later gave him

crack cocaine. Havens, who is no longer a defendant on this count, was responsible

82 See Doc. 40 at 15-16 (dismissing Count II as to “Havens, Clinton Gardner, and Defendant

Doe(s)”); Doc. 41 (same).

83 Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2021).

84 Swope v. City of Pittsburgh, 90 F. Supp. 3d 400, 411 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (defendant “cannot be

held liable for conducting an unreasonable search and seizure that he did not participate in”);

see Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Inasmuch as [defendant] did not

participate in the search itself, it was not error to grant summary judgment as to him.”).

85 Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 831 (Defendant “may be held liable for his role in the illegal search if the

jury found that he participated by procuring an invalid warrant or authorizing the search based

on that warrant.”); see Witters v. Smith, 736 F. Supp. 3d 238, 247 (M.D. Pa. 2024) (explaining

that personal involvement means “direct participation, personal direction, or actual knowledge

and acquiescence” (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).

86 Doc. 74-5 at 67:8-14 (“Q. Can you tell me when Officer Caschera arrived? A. Which one? Q.

You said Caschera was present. A. There’s two of them. Q. Were both of them there? A. I seen

Gino. I didn’t see Michael.”); see id. at 141:9-11 (“Q. And Gino Caschera, just so it’s clear, is

not Michael Caschera; right? A. Right.”).

for connecting the marked bills to Mr. McMillan.87 Because he did not participate in

the search and any illegal aspect of it was not based on evidence fabricated by him,88

Caschera cannot be liable for an illegal search and seizure.

Accordingly, Caschera’s motion for summary judgment on Count II is

granted.

D. Count III - False Imprisonment

Mr. McMillan’s first false imprisonment count appears to challenge his

temporary detention at the stop.89 This count remains as to Caschera only.90 Fourth

Amendment false imprisonment claims are based on detention pursuant to an arrest

made without probable cause.91 On this count, Mr. McMillan plainly states that he

was detained only temporarily and was not arrested on June 11,92 so the claim must

87 Doc. 74-2 ¶¶ 20, 22-24. Havens was dismissed as to this count because Mr. McMillan’s theory

at the motion to dismiss stage centered on his contention that Caschera fabricated evidence.

On that issue, I reasoned that reasonable reliance on Caschera’s false statements (without

knowledge that they were false) would insulate the searching officers from liability. Doc. 40

at 15-16 (citing Vanderklok v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 3d 373, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2015)).

Discovery has produced evidence that the circumstances differed from Mr. McMillan’s

original theory, but he has not sought to amend his complaint, and I cannot do so for him. ETC

Int’l, Inc. v. Curriculum Advantage, Inc., 272 F. App’x 139, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he court

has no power, let alone obligation, to amend sua sponte a plaintiff’s inartful pleading.”). I can

only take the case as it comes, and Mr. McMillan has never alleged that Havens fabricated

evidence.

88 See Section III.B, supra (holding that there is no evidence that Caschera fabricated evidence).

89 See Doc. 29 ¶¶ 130-140 (discussing “events of June [11] 2021”).

90 Doc. 40 at 15-16.

91 Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 202 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,

47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)); see Covington v. Plymouth Twp. Police Dep’t, 779 F. Supp.

3d 509, 526-27 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (distinguishing wrongful seizure and false imprisonment

claims based on whether there was an arrest and length of detention); Williams v. Ponik, 822

F. App’x 108, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)).

92 Doc. 74-5 at 16:23-17:8, 105:6-8 (“Q. So you get pulled over on June 10th and then you get

arrested on November 1st? A. Yes.”).

fail.93 Moreover, as stated in the prior section, Caschera was not present at the stop

and he is not responsible for any false statements giving rise to an incorrect

determination of probable cause. Thus, even if the detention at the stop were

actionable on this count, Caschera had no personal involvement and therefore cannot

be liable.

Accordingly, Caschera’s motion for summary judgment on Count III is

granted.

E. Count IV – Equal Protection

Mr. McMillan asserts an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment, contending that he was subjected to the June 11 stop, and more

specifically the alleged strip search, because he is black.94 This claim is brought

against Caschera, Havens, and Gardner.95 To survive summary judgment on his

equal protection claim, Mr. McMillan must provide evidence of Defendants’

“racially discriminatory intent or purpose”96 and that he was “treated differently

from others similarly situated.”97 Mr. McMillan contends in his deposition that

93 Covington, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 527 (“Without a finding of an arrest, the Court grants summary

judgment for Officer Wells with respect to Plaintiff's false arrest/imprisonment claim.”);

Kintzel v. Kleeman, 965 F. Supp. 2d 601, 608-09 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing false

imprisonment claim because the plaintiff was not arrested).

94 Doc. 29 ¶¶ 141-49.

95 Id.

96 City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 194 (2003)

(quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)).

97 Abdul-Latif v. County of Lancaster, 990 F. Supp. 2d 517, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting

Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990)).

during the stop Gardner repeatedly suggested that he was a gang member, which he

believes evinces discriminatory intent.98 Even if it does, Mr. McMillan’s claim fails

because he has not provided any evidence to show that he was treated differently

than anyone else. Failure to identify a comparator is fatal to an equal protection

claim.99 And in any event, Mr. McMillan identified only Gardner’s comments as

racially tinged. So the claim fails as to Caschera and Havens for failure to show

discriminatory intent (and, for Caschera, for lack of personal involvement).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count IV is

granted.

F. Counts VI, VII, VIII, & XI – Malicious Prosecution, False Arrest,

& False Imprisonment (Fourth Amendment and Common Law)

Mr. McMillan’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution

claims are brought against Caschera only, and stem from the arrest warrant for which

Caschera was the affiant. “The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false

arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether

the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had

committed the offense.”100 “[A] plaintiff may succeed in a § 1983 action for false

98 See Doc. 74-5 at 53:12-54:10, 62:21-63:1, 63:24-64:11, 91:19-92:22.

99 Brooks v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 707 F. Supp. 3d 448, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (quoting

Stradford v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022)); Saucon Valley Manor,

Inc. v. Miller, 392 F. Supp. 3d 554, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2019).

100 Groman, 47 F.3d at 634-35 (quoting Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir.

1988)).

arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the

evidence: (1) that the police officer knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless

disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in

applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are material, or

necessary, to the finding of probable cause.”101

“False arrest and false imprisonment are both injuries arising from the same

Fourth Amendment injury, i.e. an unreasonable seizure. False arrest is a ‘species’ of

false imprisonment and they can both be considered one tort.’”102 A false

imprisonment claim arises once the plaintiff is detained pursuant to the false

arrest.103 A finding “in plaintiff’s favor on the false arrest claim” supports a

“find[ing] that [Plaintiff] suffered a violation of his constitutional rights by virtue of

his detention pursuant to that arrest.”104

“Malicious prosecution differs from false arrest inasmuch as ‘a claim for false

arrest, unlike a claim for malicious prosecution, covers damages only for the time of

detention until the issuance of process or arraignment, and not more.’”105 Once a

101 Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752 F. Supp. 2d 643, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Wilson v.

Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000))

102 Clifton v. Borough of Eddystone, 824 F. Supp. 2d 617, 624 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Wallace

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388-89 (2007)); see Moffitt v. Britton, No. 21-CV-0109, 2023 WL

1863314, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2023) (“[F]alse arrest and false imprisonment are essentially

the same claim.” (quoting Olender v. Twp. of Bensalem, 32 F. Supp. 2d 775, 791 (E.D. Pa.

1999)).

103 Groman, 47 F.3d at 636.

104 Id. (citing Pritchard v. Perry, 508 F.2d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1975)).

105 Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery v. De Simone, 159

F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998)).

person is detained pursuant to legal process, false imprisonment and false arrest

claims cease to provide relief, and malicious prosecution takes over.106 To prove a

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the

defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in [the

plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause;

(4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff

to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the

concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”107

Mr. McMillan has not produced evidence to satisfy the elements of knowing

or reckless falsity on the false arrest and imprisonment claims and malicious purpose

on the malicious prosecution claim. He contends that the false statements in the

affidavit of probable cause related information about the supposedly fabricated

account of the exchange between Mr. McMillan and Brown, and the presence of the

prerecorded police funds on Mr. McMillan’s person. There is no evidence in the

record from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Caschera lied in preparing

the affidavit. He truthfully related the information that he gathered firsthand, and

nothing suggests that he knew that information gathered from other officers—the

account of the exchange with Brown and recovery of the prerecorded bills108—was

106 Kato, 549 U.S. at 388-90.

107 Black, 835 F.3d at 364 (quoting Knorr, 477 F.3d at 82) (emphasis omitted).

108 See Doc. 74-3 ¶¶ 22, 27.

false, if in fact in was.109 Moreover, the record is absolutely devoid of evidence

suggesting anything about Caschera’s purpose in submitting the affidavit.110

Because there is no evidence that he deliberately or recklessly provided false

information in the affidavit of probable cause, nor that he acted with malice or a

purpose other than justice, Caschera cannot be liable for Mr. McMillan’s arrest,

related detention, and subsequent prosecution.111

Accordingly, Caschera’s motion for summary judgment on Counts VI, VII,

VIII, and XI is granted.

G. Count V - Retaliation

Mr. McMillan argues that the June 11 search and October arrest were

retaliation for his April 2021 victory on the weapon possession charges, and

specifically his exercise of his First Amendment rights.112 To succeed on a section

1983 retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show “(1) constitutionally protected

109 See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Wilson, 212 F.3d at 783, 786-

87); see Doc. 74-3 ¶¶ 27-29.

110 See Doc. 74-3 ¶¶ 31-32 (averring that Caschera’s “only purpose in this case was to enforce

narcotics laws”).

111 See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-89. This finding covers Mr. McMillan’s state law claim for false

imprisonment because such a claim requires a showing that the plaintiff “(1) . . . was detained;

and (2) the detention was unlawful.” Martin-McFarlane v. City of Phila., 299 F. Supp. 3d 658,

671 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citing Gwynn v. City of Phila., 719 F.3d 295, 304 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013)), and

the failure of evidence showing that Caschera lied in the affidavit precludes a finding that the

detention was unlawful because of him. See also Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581,

593-94 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (analyzing Pennsylvania state false arrest and false imprisonment

claims together, reasoning that Pennsylvania state false arrest claim is “co-extensive” with

federal constitutional false arrest claim, and dismissing Pennsylvania state false arrest and false

imprisonment claims based on analysis resulting in denial of federal false arrest claim).

112 Doc. 29 ¶¶ 150-57.

conduct, (2) an adverse action by . . . officials ‘sufficient to deter a person of ordinary

firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,’ and (3) ‘a causal link between

the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.’”113

A plaintiff fails the causal link element if he cannot show that the defendant knew

of the protected conduct at the time of the adverse action.114

Mr. McMillan’s retaliation claim must fail because the only evidence in the

record establishes that Defendants did not know about Mr. McMillan’s testimony at

the suppression hearing before his earlier trial when they searched him and sought

an arrest warrant. Havens and Caschera both swear that they had “no knowledge of

any prior criminal litigation or testimony involving [Mr. McMillan] in other cases”

at the time of the events of this case.115 And there is nothing in the record to suggest

that Gardner knew anything about the prior charges either.116 Without any evidence

suggesting that Defendants knew about his protected activity, their actions cannot

be retaliatory.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Count V are

granted.

113 Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330,

333 (3d Cir. 2001)); see Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir.

2007).

114 Zucal v. County of Lehigh, 760 F. Supp. 3d 290, 299-300 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (quoting Eskridge v.

Phila. Hous. Auth., 772 F. App’x 296, 299 (3d Cir. 2018)).

115 Docs. 74-2 ¶ 33; 74-3 ¶ 30.

116 See Doc. 74-5 at 45:16-46:7, 75:15-76:23, 95:14-96:2 (repeatedly admitting that Gardner was

not involved in the gun case).

H. Counts XII, XIII, & XIV – Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress, Trespass to Chattel, & Conversion

Because Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted as to all of

the preceding issues, only Mr. McMillan’s state law claims remain. The Court has

only supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.117 A district court “may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it] has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction.”118 “As a general rule, the Court should

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where all of the

federal claims have been dismissed.”119 I will take that path here. The remaining

claims arise under state law and likely do not give rise to sufficient damages to justify

the expenditure of resources for further federal litigation.120 Additionally, Mr.

McMillan’s failure to oppose Defendants’ motions for summary judgment indicates

a lack of concern with pursuing his claims in this venue. So I conclude that declining

supplemental jurisdiction is not unfair.121

117 See Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1995).

118 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

119 Anserphone, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 418, 433 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Heller v.

CACL Fed. Credit Union, 775 F. Supp. 839, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1991)).

120 See Booth v. Drissel, No. 20-CV-1751, 2023 WL 7183508, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2023)

(declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment to

defendants on all federal claims).

121 See Anserphone, 955 F. Supp. at 433 (quoting Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983

F.2d 1277, 1285 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Accordingly, Mr. McMillan’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional

distress (Count XII), trespass to chattel (Count XIII), and conversion (Count XIV)

are dismissed without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are

granted as to Counts II-XI. Counts XII-XIV are dismissed without prejudice.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge