Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ST. JOHN’S UNITED CHURCH OF

CHRIST and DEVIN CLARY,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 3:25-CV-1022-NJR

STATE AUTO PROPERTY &

CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

On March 27, 2024, St. John’s United Church of Christ (“St. John’s UCC”) and

Devin Clary (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Washington

County, Illinois, alleging claims against their insurer, State Auto, for breach of contract,

statutory vexatious refusal to pay, and common law bad faith related to State Auto’s

refusal to pay for damages that St. John’s UCC sustained from high winds on July 1, 2023.

(Doc. 1-1). Plaintiffs also asserted a claim for fraud against a John Doe defendant. (Id.)

Prior to filing suit, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed State Auto’s adjuster that he would

be filing a lawsuit and requested that the adjuster accept service of process. (Doc. 1 at

p. 3). The adjuster responded on March 26, 2024, and informed counsel in writing that he

was not authorized to accept service of process. (Id.). The adjuster informed Plaintiffs’

counsel that he would need to serve State Auto through its registered agent, Corporation

Service Company. (Id.).

Over the next year, several events delayed service of the Complaint. The same day

that Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the Complaint, he underwent triple bypass surgery. (Doc. 9

at p. 2). He then spent the next three months recovering and rehabilitating. (Id.). Counsel

filed a motion for summons to issue on July 29, 2024, but it was never properly served

due to the Illinois Secretary of State’s requirements for serving the Director of the Illinois

Department of Insurance. (Id. at pp. 2-3). Counsel also dealt with a recusal issue in state

court, since the presiding circuit judge was a member of St. John’s UCC. (Id. at pp. 4-5).

Once the state court judge finally recused, Plaintiffs’ counsel sought an alias summons in

late February 2025. (Id. at p. 5). The summons was issued but never forwarded to

Plaintiffs’ counsel by the Circuit Clerk. (Id.).

Plaintiffs finally obtained an alias summons on April 1, 2025, and served the

Complaint on the Illinois Department of Insurance on April 15, 2025. (Doc. 1-1). The

Department of Insurance provided a copy of the alias summons and Complaint to State

Auto by mail, which it received on April 22, 2025. (Id.). State Auto then removed the case

to this district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction on May 21, 2025. (Doc. 1).

On June 11, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand, arguing that State Auto’s

Notice of Removal was untimely filed. (Doc. 9). State Auto filed a response in opposition.

(Doc. 12).

LEGAL STANDARD

Removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any

civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have

original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district

court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such

action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removing party bears the burden of

demonstrating removal is proper. Boyd v. Phoenix Funding Corp., 366 F.3d 524, 529 (7th

Cir. 2004). Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 “should be construed narrowly and against

removal.” People of State of Ill. v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1982).

A plaintiff may challenge removal by filing a motion to remand the case to state

court. Remand to state court is appropriate for (1) lack of district court subject matter

jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal process. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1447(c); GE Betz, Inc.

v. Zee Co., 718 F.3d 615, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2013). “A motion to remand must be granted if

the case removed from state court could not have been brought in federal court originally

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Sarauer v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Dist. No. 10, 966

F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1447(c)).

DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiffs St. John’s UCC and Devin Clary are citizens of Illinois,

Defendant State Auto is a citizen of both Iowa and Massachusetts, and the amount in

controversy is at least $350,099.25, well in excess of the statutory threshold of $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs. (Doc. 1). Although Plaintiffs also named a John Doe

defendant, the citizenship of such defendant can be disregarded for purposes of

determining diversity jurisdiction. See Pain Ctr. of SE Indiana LLC v. Origin Healthcare Sols.

LLC, 893 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2018).

Instead, Plaintiffs assert the case should be remanded due to a defect in the

removal process. Specifically, they argue that State Auto’s Notice of Removal was

untimely. Without citing any statute or case law, Plaintiffs assert that the Notice of

Removal was not filed within 30 days of service or within one year of the Complaint being

filed. The Court suspects that Plaintiffs filed the motion due to State Auto’s preemptive

arguments in its Notice of Removal that the removal was timely under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(b)(1) and that the one-year deadline provided by § 1446(c)(1) did not apply

because Plaintiffs acted in bad faith to prevent State Auto from removing the action.

(See Doc. 1).

The procedure for removal of civil actions is outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1446. The

statute provides that a “notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed

within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy

of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or

proceeding is based . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). See also Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc., 727

F.3d 819, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2013) (“It’s clear that the 30–day removal clock is triggered only

by the defendant’s receipt of a pleading or other litigation paper facially revealing that

the grounds for removal are present.”). Under Illinois law, when a plaintiff effects service

on an insurer defendant by serving the Illinois Department of Insurance, “[s]ervice of

such process shall not be complete until the copy thereof has been so mailed and received

by the company.” 215 ILCS 5/112(2). Thus, service upon State Auto was not complete

until it received a copy of the summons and Complaint on April 22, 2025. (Doc. 1-1). State

Auto then had 30 days—until May 22, 2025—to remove the case to federal court, making

its removal on May 21, 2025, timely.

The parties also discuss, at length, the one-year rule provided in § 1446(c)(1) and

whether Plaintiffs acted in bad faith to prevent State Auto from removing the case within

one year of its filing. As discussed below, however, the Court need not decide whether

Plaintiffs acted in bad faith.

Section 1446(c)(1) states:

A case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of

jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than 1 year after

commencement1 of the action, unless the district court finds that the

plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from

removing the action.

§ 1446(c)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (b)(3) permits a defendant to remove a case

that was not initially removable within 30 days after receiving an amended pleading, motion,

order, or other paper that indicates the case has become removable. § 1446(b)(3).

Courts reading these provisions together have found that the one-year limitation

only applies to cases removed under § 1446(b)(3)—i.e., where the case stated by the initial

pleading was not removable. See Stigleman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 16-1060, 2016 WL

1611577, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2016) (collecting cases); Ward v. Progressive Preferred Ins.

Co., No. CV 23-3666, 2024 WL 219237, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2024) (one-year time limit

does not apply where the initial complaint is removable on its face); Chandler v. WFM-

WO, Inc., No. 13-2450, 2014 WL 1653504, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 24, 2014) (“The one-year

limitation stated in 28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1) applies only to cases removed under subsection

(b)(3), which allows removal of cases that were ‘not removable’ under their ‘initial

1 Under Illinois law, an action is “commenced” when the complaint is filed. 735 ILCS 5/2-201.

pleading.’”).

While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue head-on,

it has commented, based on an earlier version of the statute, that every circuit to have

considered the question “has held that of the one-year bar applies only to cases that are

not initially removable.” Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624, 631 n.6 (7th Cir. 2007);

see also Brown v. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 284 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that

the one year-limitation period “only applies to cases that were not removable to federal

court when originally filed”).

In this case, the action was removable on the basis of diversity when it was filed

in Washington County, Illinois. Thus, under a plain reading of the statute, the one-year

time limit in § 1446(c)(1) does not apply to this case. The only time limit that applied to

State Auto was the 30-day deadline in § 1446(b)(1), which State Auto met.

Because State Auto timely removed this case to federal court on the basis of

diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 9) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 21, 2025

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |

Chief U.S. District Judge

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