Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MADDEN GULF COAST LLC CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 24-2233

HILARK INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL. SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is plaintiff Madden Gulf Coast, LLC’s (“Madden”) motion1 for

review of and objections to the U.S. Magistrate Judge’s (“magistrate judge”) order2

granting the motion3 to compel plaintiff to respond to supplemental discovery

requests filed by defendants Hilbilt-Lufkin Distribution, LLC (“Hilbilt-Lufkin”) and

Hilark-Lufkin Heavy Haul Trucks & Trailers, LLC (“Hilark-Lufkin”) (collectively, the

“Lufkin defendants”). The Lufkin defendants filed a response4 in opposition. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the magistrate judge’s order.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties’ dispute arises out of the alleged wrongful conduct of defendants

Hilark Industries, Inc.; Hilbilt Sales Corp.; Hill G3 Industries, Inc.; and Grayling V.

Hill (collectively, the “Hilbilt defendants”) and the Lufkin defendants “in connection

with the engineering, design, research, testing, manufacture, production, inspection,

installation, sale, distribution and/or warranty of six 19-foot steel dump bodies that

1 R. Doc. No. 159.

2 R. Doc. No. 153.

3 R. Doc. No. 146.

4 R. Doc. No. 171.

[d]efendants manufactured and installed on six new 2023 Western Star 47X

vocational quad axle dump trucks” (“quad trucks”).5 As a result of the allegedly

defective design of the dump bodies at issue, the amended complaint details how two

of the quad trucks rolled over during use, causing damage to the trucks and dump

bodies and causing alleged injuries to one of Madden’s employees.6

Madden filed this action against the Hilbilt defendants, the Lufkin defendants,

and Grayling V. Hill on September 11, 2024.7 The complaint alleged five counts:

Violation of Louisiana Products Liability Act (Count I); Negligence (Count II); Breach

of Warranty for Fitness of Use (Count III); Breach of Express Warranty (Count IV);

and Redhibition (Count V). A scheduling order was issued and, as is relevant to the

current dispute, the discovery deadline was set for March 17, 2025.8

On March 3, 2025, the Lufkin defendants filed a motion9 for summary

judgment. A week later, Madden filed a motion10 for leave to file a supplemental and

amended complaint. Before Madden’s motion was decided, the Hilbilt defendants

filed a motion11 for partial summary judgment, which the Lufkin defendants joined.12

5 R. Doc. No. 106 ¶ 1.

6 See id. ¶¶ 40, 43, 50, 53.

7 R. Doc. No. 1.

8 See R. Doc. No. 13, at 2.

9 R. Doc. No. 41.

10 R. Doc. No. 43.

11 R. Doc. No. 67.

12 See R. Doc. No. 100.

The magistrate judge granted Madden’s motion for leave to file an amended

complaint,13 and Madden filed the same on April 14, 2025.14 The amended complaint

contains new allegations and claims against the Lufkin defendants, including a new

count of apparent manufacturer claims (Count VIII) and a new count of negligence

and vicarious liability claims (Count X).15 It also adds personal liability claims

against defendant Grayling Hill as well as claims against an additional defendant,

Travelers Property Casualty Company of America.16

Shortly thereafter, the Hilbilt defendants filed an unopposed motion to

continue the trial in this matter.17 The Court granted the motion, noting that all

defendants “need[ed] additional time to investigate the new claims” in the amended

complaint.18 The order continuing trial noted that the trial, the pretrial conference,

and “all other deadlines” would be reset at a scheduling conference with the Court.19

On May 23, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motions for

summary judgment.20 As it pertains to the present motion, the Lufkin defendants’

motion for summary judgment was denied with respect to Madden’s claims based in

warranty that the Lufkin defendants assumed by the terms of the Asset Purchase

Agreement (“APA”) as well as Madden’s negligence claims to the extent that they rest

13 See R. Doc. No. 105.

14 See R. Doc. No. 106.

15 See id. at ¶¶ 209–220, 232–241.

16 See id. ¶¶ 183–208.

17 See generally R. Doc. No. 112.

18 See R. Doc. No. 113, at 1 (citing R. Doc. No. 112, at 3–4).

19 See id.

20 See generally R. Doc. No. 126.

on a negligent breach-of-contract theory.21 The Court also noted in its order and

reasons that it had “recently extended the discovery deadlines in this case to allow

time for the parties to address Madden’s new claims.”22

A new scheduling order was issued that set the discovery deadline for October

24, 2025.23 The Court then held a status conference, with counsel for all parties

participating, on July 14, 2025.24 As reflected in the minute entry following the

conference, the Court permitted the parties to “issue supplemental discovery relating

to the new allegations in the amended complaint.”25 The minute entry also stated

that “any issues with respect to this discovery will be resolved by the U.S. Magistrate

Judge.”26

On August 22, 2025, the Lufkin defendants filed their motion27 to compel

Madden to respond to their supplemental discovery requests, which underlies the

Court’s present review. The motion sought to compel production of only four of the

supplemental requests for production:28 David Madden’s entire unredacted journal,

with all consecutive pages beginning on October 1, 2020 through September 11,

2024;29 the entire personnel files for a number of Madden employees;30 the

21 See id. at 13, 33.

22 See id. at 25.

23 See R. Doc. No. 129, at 2.

24 See R. Doc. No. 139, at 1.

25 See id.

26 Id.

27 R. Doc. No. 146.

28 The Lufkin defendants originally sought fifteen supplemental requests for

production. See R. Doc. No. 146-3.

29 See R. Doc. No. 146-2, at 5–6.

30 See id. at 16–17.

maintenance, service and repair records for the six quad trucks beginning from the

date of the inception of the leases;31 and the personnel file for each certified welder

employed at Madden’s Minden facility from January 1, 2023 onward.32 Madden filed

a response33 in opposition, and the magistrate judge ordered the parties to appear for

oral argument on the motion.34

At the hearing held on September 24, 2025, the magistrate judge granted the

Lufkin defendants’ motion to compel with respect to all four requests, albeit, with

some modifications.35 She also ordered the parties to “review their responses to

31 See id. at 19.

32 See id. at 21.

33 R. Doc. No. 148.

34 See R. Doc. No. 147.

35 See generally R. Doc. No. 153. Specifically, the magistrate judge ordered Madden

to:

• Have its counsel review all of David Madden’s journal entries from

March 1, 2023, through July 31, 2024, and produce any entries that

reference discussion with Grayling Hill, the Quad Trucks at issue in this

lawsuit (including maintenance, repair, lease, use, etc.), or otherwise

relevant to the claims and defenses in this lawsuit. Plaintiff may redact

any irrelevant journal entries that may appear on the same page as

relevant entries, as long as doing so does not obfuscate the relevant

entries.

• Determine and identify all individuals who performed repair or

modification work on the dump bodies of the four Quad Trucks from

February through July 2024.

• Have counsel review the personnel files of the individuals that worked

on the dump bodies of the four Quad Trucks from February through July

2024 and produce any materials relevant to their qualifications or

training.

• Produce repair, maintenance, and service records for all six Quad

Trucks from March 1, 2023, through July 31, 2024.

• Have counsel review the personnel files of any certified welder employed

at Madden’s Minden facility that performed modifications, maintenance

and/or repair on the dump bodies of the four Quad Trucks from February

discovery and make any appropriate supplementation or amendment” by October 8,

2025.36

Madden timely filed the present motion for review of the magistrate judge’s

order compelling discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).37

Madden objects to the magistrate judge’s ruling because it believes (1) it is in violation

of this Court’s order permitting supplemental discovery relating only to new

allegations in the amended complaint and, therefore, violates the law-of-the-case

doctrine; (2) the magistrate judge failed to determine whether there was “good cause”

to reopen discovery, constituting an abuse of discretion; and (3) the magistrate judge

failed to evaluate the relevancy and proportionality of the Lufkin defendants’

supplemental discovery related to the new claims asserted in the amended

complaint.38

With respect to its first argument, Madden contends that the Lufkin

defendants’ supplemental discovery request pertains to facts and claims pled in its

original complaint or otherwise understood by the Lufkin defendants to be asserted

in the original complaint, and therefore exceeds the scope of discovery as reopened by

this Court.39 According to Madden, the “only nominally new claim that plaintiff

asserted against the Lufkin Defendants was for vicarious liability for the negligent

through July 2024 and produce any materials relevant to the welders’

qualifications or training.

See id. at 1–2.

36 See id. at 2.

37 See generally R. Doc. No. 159.

38 See id. at 1–2.

39 See R. Doc. No. 159-1, at 2–3.

actions of their president and/or employee, Defendant Hill.”40 As a result, to the

extent that the magistrate judge granted the Lufkin defendants’ supplemental

discovery request “based upon the warranty claims and negligent breach of contract

claims,” Madden maintains that that grant is contrary to the law of the case as

reflected in this Court’s minute entry.41

As to Madden’s second argument, it explains that, in “allow[ing] the Lufkin

Defendants to receive information and documents in response to four supplemental

requests for production that clearly relate to claims and/or subjects that were at issue

before Plaintiff filed its amending complaint,” the magistrate judge effectively issued

an order to reopen discovery.42 Because the magistrate judge failed to conduct the

“‘good cause’ analysis” that courts are required to consider when determining whether

to reopen discovery, the magistrate judge abused her discretion.43

Lastly, Madden argues that the magistrate judge improperly evaluated the

relevance and proportionality of the Lufkin defendants’ supplemental requests with

respect to all of Madden’s remaining claims against the Lufkin defendants, rather

than with respect to the only remaining new, vicarious liability claim against the

Lufkin defendants.44 Madden asks this Court to set aside the magistrate judge’s

ruling as “clearly erroneous, contrary to law” and “an abuse of discretion.”45

40 See id. at 4.

41 See id. at 9.

42 See id. at 12.

43 See id.

44 See id. at 14–16.

45 See R. Doc. No. 159, at 2.

In response, the Lufkin defendants argue that the magistrate judge’s ruling

was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law because: the magistrate judge

properly considered the pleading and discovery dispute history of the case in

rendering her rulings on the motion to compel; the four discovery requests were all

aimed at new facts and claims asserted by Madden in its amended complaint; and

there exists good cause for the discovery requests in light of the timing of Madden’s

amended complaint and the initial discovery deadline.46 The Lufkin defendants also

assert that Madden has waived its right to object to the discovery because its objection

is untimely.47

Having reviewed the parties’ filings, the applicable law, the relevant

documents in this case, and the transcript from the hearing before the magistrate

judge, the Court AFFIRMS the magistrate judge’s ruling.

II. STANDARDS OF LAW

a. Review of a Magistrate Judge’s Order

Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs a district court’s review

of a magistrate judge’s decision on a pretrial matter. Rule 72(a) requires a party who

objects to a magistrate judge’s ruling to “serve and file objections to the order within

14 days after being served with a copy.”

Rule 72(a) provides that a district judge reviewing an order on a non-

dispositive matter may “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly

46 See R. Doc. No. 171, at 2.

47 See id.

erroneous or is contrary to law.” “The district court may only find the magistrate

judge’s ruling clearly erroneous or contrary to law when the reviewing court is ‘left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” McCallon

v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 05-0597 c/w 05-0700, 2006 WL 3246886, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov.

8, 2006) (Fallon, J.) (quoting Palacios Seafood, Inc. v. Piling, Inc., 888 F.2d 1509, 1513

(5th Cir. 1989)). Rule 72(a) further provides that “[a] party may not assign as error a

defect in [a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive order] not timely objected to.”

b. Motion to Compel Discovery

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) explains that, in general, “[a]ny

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional

to the needs of the case” is discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Great Lakes

Ins., S.E. v. Gray Grp. Invs., LLC, 550 F. Supp. 3d 364, 375 (E.D. La. 2021) (Vance,

J.). “Relevance at the discovery stage is a low bar.” Great Lakes, 550 F. Supp. 3d at

375. “A request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is ‘any possibility’

that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”

Id. (citations omitted). “The party opposing relevance bears the burden to establish

that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of

the party seeking discovery.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Information within

th[e] scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

III. ANALYSIS

a. The Scope of Reopened Discovery and the Lufkin Defendants’

Supplemental Discovery Requests

Madden’s first two arguments turn on whether the magistrate judge’s ruling

was aligned with this Court’s order reopening discovery limited to the new allegations

and claims in the amended complaint. If so, then the magistrate judge did not reopen

discovery and Madden’s abuse of discretion arguments with respect to the same are

inapplicable. However, if the magistrate judge’s ruling allowed the Lufkin defendants

to discover documents and information outside the scope of this Court’s order, then

the ruling must be properly understood as an order reopening discovery and

Madden’s abuse-of-discretion48 arguments become relevant.

The sole sentence in the Court’s minute entry following the July 14th status

conference on which Madden’s argument relies states that “the parties may issue

supplemental discovery relating to the new allegations in the amended complaint, and

that any issues with respect to this discovery will be resolved by the U.S. Magistrate

Judge.”49 Aside from that, the only guidance as to the scope of reopened discovery

that is offered by this Court is the sentence in the Court’s order and reasons granting

48 Discretionary decisions, such as decisions on whether to reopen discovery, are reviewed for

abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Crawford v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 19-00412, 2020 WL 2468771, at

*1 (E.D. Tex. May 13, 2020) (reviewing the magistrate judge’s decision to reopen discovery for

abuse of discretion); see also Green v. Archer Daniels Midland, No. 10-4481, 2012 WL 85409, at

*3 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2012) (Africk, J.) (noting that the “U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has

applied a four-factor balancing test in certain contexts to determine whether good cause exists to

modify a scheduling order by weighing (1) the explanation for the failure to adhere to the deadline

at issue; (2) the importance of the proposed modification to the scheduling order; (3) potential

prejudice; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice,” and evaluating the

magistrate judge’s ruling based on their application of these factors).

49 R. Doc. No. 139, at 1 (emphasis added).

in part and denying in part the motions for summary judgment that, “[b]ecause the

Court has recently extended the discovery deadlines in this case to allow time for the

parties to address Madden’s new claims, including its claims of fraud against Mr. Hill,

the Court concludes that it is premature to dismiss Madden’s claims against Mr.

Hill.”50

There is no dispute between the parties, and the Court agrees, that the

vicarious liability claim against the Lufkin defendants, Count X of the amended

complaint,51 constitutes a “new claim” that falls within the scope of this Court’s order

reopening discovery.52 However, the parties disagree whether the warranty claims

and negligent breach of contract claims that survived the motions for summary

judgment are similarly “new allegations in the amended complaint.”53

Madden contends that the warranty claims and negligent breach of contract

claims are based upon its allegations that the “Lufkin Defendants refused to honor

the warranty obligations . . . they assumed under the Asset Purchase Agreement,”

which “[u]ndeniably, [were] all . . . facts . . . pled in plaintiff’s original Complaint

and/or further developed in discovery before Madden filed its Motion for Leave to File

its Supplemental and Amended Complaint on March 10, 2025.”54 As proof that the

Lufkin defendants understood Madden’s claims against them, Madden points to a

letter from the Lufkin defendants, dated February 23, 2025, acknowledging that

50 R. Doc. No. 126, at 25 (emphasis added).

51 See supra text accompanying note 15.

52 See R. Doc. No. 159-1, at 4, 9; R. Doc. No. 171, at 6.

53 See generally R. Doc. No. 159-1; R. Doc. No. 171.

54 R. Doc. No. 159-1, at 2–3.

Madden intends to bring claims against them in negligence and breach of warranty,

based in part on a theory that they assumed liabilities pursuant to the APA.55

In contrast, the Lufkin defendants argue that their supplemental discovery

requests are, in fact, directed toward the new allegations in the amended complaint.56

For example, with respect to the personnel files of the individuals involved in

modifying or repairing the four quad dump bodies in 2024, the Lufkin defendants are

“alleged to be vicariously liable for Grayling Hill’s decision (and now the Lufkin’s

decision) to not modify or repair the four non-rollover Quad bodies.”57 Therefore, the

Lufkin defendants argue, “[i]t is important that [they] be allowed to examine the

employment background and welding qualifications of those individuals who

allegedly made the modifications and repairs to discern whether they were

qualified.”58

They also argue that the original complaint alleged that the Lufkin defendants

were “derivative defendants” that were “responsible merely as a successor,” however,

in the amended complaint “Madden has claimed that all of that alleged HilBilt

conduct is now direct Lufkin Defendant conduct.”59 For this reason, the Lufkin

55 See id. at 3, n. 5; see also R. Doc. No. 148-1.

56 See R. Doc. No. 171, at 2–12. Indeed, the Lufkin defendants point out that they

“narrowed and limited the discovery propounded to Madden to restrict them to the

allegations in the amended complaint.” See id. at 11.

57 R. Doc. No. 171, at 5.

58 Id. at 5–6.

59 See id. at 3.

defendants argue that the supplemental discovery also pertains to the “new direct

warranty claims” against them.60

In support of that conclusion, the Lufkin defendants invite the Court to

compare the allegations in the original complaint with the amended complaint,

arguing that “what can be seen is that Madden has now asserted that it has direct,

rather than successor, warranty claims against the Lufkin Defendants, because now

as it alleges, all of its post dump truck roll over event interactions were interactions

with the Lufkin Defendants, rather than the HilBilt Defendants.”61 For example, as

the Lufkin defendants point out, the original complaint alleged:

54. Thereafter, Madden sent the four remaining Quad trucks to

Madden Contracting Company’s facility in Minden, Louisiana, and

Madden Contracting Company arranged to have the trucks driven to

Defendant Hilark Industries facility in Benton, Arkansas before

Christmas 2023, so Defendants could reengineer or modify and fix the

dump beds.

55. In late January 2024, Mr. Hill notified Madden that

Defendants would not be reengineering or modifying and fixing the

dump beds because Defendants’ insurance company told Defendants to

do nothing and to pick up the Quad trucks.62

The amended complaint now alleges:

83. After allegedly inspecting the six Quad trucks, Mr. Hill asked

Madden to send the four remaining Quad trucks to the Lufkin

Defendants’ facility in Benton, Arkansas, where Mr. Hill would be able

to perform a better inspection of the Dump bodies and to do something

60 See, e.g., id.

61 See id. at 7.

62 See id. at 7–8 (quoting R. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 54–55).

to fix and modify the problems with the Hilbilt dump beds on the Quad

trucks.

84. Thereafter, Madden arranged to have the four Quad trucks

driven to the Lufkin Defendants’ facility in Benton, Arkansas, so Mr.

Hill could fix and modify the dump beds.

90. Madden’s tender of the Dump bodies on the four Quad trucks

to the Lufkin Defendants’ President on December 1, 2023 constituted a

warranty claim under the APA, which legally was the responsibility of

the Lufkin Defendants.

91. As President of the Lufkin Defendants and the President and

owner of Defendants Hilbilt Sales and Hilark Industries, and as

signatory to the APA on behalf of Defendants Hilbilt Sales and Hilark

Industries, as well as himself individually, Mr. Hill certainly knew that

Madden’s December 1, 2023 tender of the Dump bodies on the four Quad

trucks was a warranty claim under the APA, for which the Lufkin

Defendants were responsible.63

Importantly, the negligent breach-of-contract theory that the Court ruled survived

the motions for summary judgment appears for the first time in the amended

complaint.64 And new allegations related to the negligent breach of contract theory

63 See id. at 9 (emphasis in original) (quoting R. Doc. No. 106 ¶¶ 83–84, 90–91).

64 See R. Doc. No. 106, at 33; see also R. Doc. No. 126, at 13 (“However, part of

Madden’s amended complaint alleging negligence states that defendants’ acts in

taking possession of the four quad trucks under representations that they would be

repaired, replaced, or modified and holding the trucks for two months without taking

any action was negligent. This portion of Madden’s complaint appears to allege a

negligence theory sounding in contract.” (citing R. Doc. No. 106, at 33 ¶ 162)).

now also make clear that “the Lufkin Defendants are liable for their own negligence

related to Madden’s warranty claims.”65

Even if the law of the case doctrine applies to this Court’s minute entry, which

the Court finds questionable,66 the Court cannot find that the magistrate judge’s

order compelling discovery was clearly contrary to the order limiting supplemental

discovery to new allegations and claims in the amended complaint. Regardless of

whether the Lufkin defendants were otherwise on notice of the direct warranty

claims, the fact is that the allegations pertaining to the direct warranty allegations

against the Lufkin defendants are, literally, new to the amended complaint. And to

the extent that the magistrate judge based her decision on the fact that the Lufkin

defendants’ supplemental requests also relate to the new vicarious liability claims

against them, the Court finds such discovery is within the scope of the reopened

65 See id. at 10 (quoting R. Doc. No. 106 ¶ 237).

66 See, e.g., Tonti Mgmt. Co. v. Soggy Doggie, LLC, No. 19-13134, 2020 WL 9172035,

at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2020) (Currault, M.J.) (“Plaintiffs are mistaken in citing ‘the

law of the case’ doctrine to support their position that this Court should not revisit

its earlier June 25, 2020, ruling[.] The law of the case doctrine is inapplicable here.

That doctrine generally ‘precludes reexamination of issues of law or fact decided on

appeal, either by the district court on remand or by the appellate court itself on a

subsequent appeal.’ There is no appellate decision at issue in this matter, and thus,

the law of the case doctrine has no application.” (emphasis in original)); see also

United States v. Palmer, 122 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The law-of-the-case

doctrine does not, however, set a trial court’s prior rulings in stone, especially if

revisiting those rulings will prevent error.”).

discovery as ordered by this Court and, therefore, that the magistrate judge’s ruling

was not clearly erroneous.

Furthermore, the Court’s order explicitly contemplates that the magistrate

judge, given her familiarity with the status of discovery in this case, is better

positioned to determine discovery-related disputes.67 Absent a ruling compelling

discovery that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law, the Court will not disturb the

magistrate judge’s judgment with respect to discovery.

As such, the Court need not address whether the magistrate judge

independently “reopen[ed] discovery” and, therefore, Madden’s argument that the

magistrate judge should have conducted a “good cause analysis” prior to granting the

motion to compel is inapplicable.

b. Relevance and Proportionality

Madden also asks this Court to review the magistrate judge’s determination of

relevance and proportionality with respect to the supplemental discovery requests.68

Madden argues that the magistrate judge erred by considering “relevancy and

proportionality of the supplemental discovery requests with respect to the case as a

whole” rather than with respect to the vicarious liability claim alone.69 Madden’s

argument is based on the same rationale it proffered with respect to its argument

67 See R. Doc. No. 139, at 1 (“[A]ny issues with respect to this discovery will be resolved

by the U.S. Magistrate Judge.”).

68 See R. Doc. No. 159-1, at 14.

69 See id.

above:70 because the “only new claim asserted against the Lufkin Defendants in the

amended complaint” is the vicarious liability claim, relevance and proportionality of

the sought discovery must be measured with respect to this new claim only.71

The Court has already rejected Madden’s argument that the magistrate judge

was clearly erroneous when she determined that the scope of supplemental discovery

authorized by this Court includes the new allegations with respect to the direct

warranty claims and negligent breach of contract claims.72 Consistent with that

reasoning and having reviewed the magistrate judge’s reasoning from the hearing,

the Court finds that the magistrate’s determination of relevance was not clearly

erroneous. See Childers v. Rent-A-Ctr. E., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 3d 693, 696 (E.D. La.

2024) (Currault, M.J.) (“If relevance is in doubt, the court should be permissive in

allowing discovery.”).

As for proportionality, the Court notes that the magistrate judge narrowed the

Lufkin defendants’ requested supplemental discovery considerably. With respect to

David Madden’s journal, for example, she stated at the hearing:

I definitely don’t want Mr. Madden to have to turn over his whole

journal. I think there is probably a lot of stuff in there that has nothing

70 See, e.g., id. at 15–16 (“[T]he factual basis for these assertions . . . are all facts that

were well known to and in the possession of the Lufkin Defendants before plaintiff

filed its amended complaint. For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge’s decision to

reopen discovery with respect to matters that have no relation to either new

allegations in the amended complaint or the claim against the Lufkin Defendants for

the vicarious liability for Defendant Hill’s actions was an abuse of her discretion.”).

71 See id. at 14–16.

72 See supra Section III(a).

to do with this case. I do want you to be the one or somebody from your

office to be the one to search the journal.

Let’s go ahead and go with March 1, 2023, through July 31, 2024, as

requested, looking only for references to discussions with Grayling Hill

and any reference to anything to do with these Quad body trucks in that

window.73

The Lufkin defendants’ request for production sought the “entire unredacted journal,

with all consecutive pages beginning on October 1, 2020 through September 11,

2024.”74

Similarly, with respect to the Lufkin defendants’ requests for personnel files,

the magistrate judge ordered Madden to “strip out anything that isn’t relevant to

the[] qualifications” or training of the employees who worked on the dump bodies of

the quad trucks from February to July 2024.75 The Lufkin defendants’ request

originally sought the entire personnel files.76 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds

that the magistrate judge’s determination that the evidence was discoverable was not

clearly erroneous or contrary to law requiring modification.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the magistrate judge’s order compelling supplemental

discovery is AFFIRMED.

73 R. Doc. No. 159-2, at 8.

74 See R. Doc. No. 146-2, at 5–6.

75 See R. Doc. No. 159-2, at 17; see also R. Doc. No. 153, at 2.

76 R. Doc. No. 146-2, at 16–17.

New Orleans, Louisiana, October 21, 2025.

LANCE M. AFRICK

UNITED STAZES DISTRICT JUDGE

19