Woods

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT October 21, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

ERNEST WOODS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-1098

§

CHANDLER HOLLOWAY, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Ernest Woods, representing himself and proceeding without paying the filing fee, sued the

City of Conroe, the City of Conroe Police Department, and City of Conroe Police Officers

Chandler Holloway and Parker Tullis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket Entry Nos. 1, 12). The

lawsuit arises from a January 2025 traffic stop and detention. (Id.). The court previously dismissed

the claims against the City and the Police Department. (Docket Entry No. 35). The court also

dismissed Woods’s excessive force claims against Officers Holloway and Tullis. (Docket Entry

No. 37). The remaining claims against Officers Holloway and Tullis are for an illegal stop, an

illegal search, and racial profiling. Holloway and Tullis have moved for summary judgment as to

those claims. (Docket Entry No. 38). Woods filed a response, and the officers replied. (Docket

Entry Nos. 40, 43). Based on the court’s review of the motion, the response and reply, the record

evidence, and the law, the court grants the motion for summary judgment and enters final judgment

by separate order. The reasons are explained below.

I. Background.

In his amended complaint, Woods alleges that on January 24, 2025, he left his home in

Conroe, Texas, and drove his mother’s van1 to a park next to a Montgomery County library.

(Docket Entry No. 12, p. 2). While he was walking in the park, he answered a telephone call from

his daughter. (Id.). A few minutes later, still on the telephone call, he went back to the van, drove

out of the parking lot, and proceeded down the freeway, heading for a grocery store. (Id.).

As Woods drove out of the parking lot, a City of Conroe Police Department patrol car

pulled in behind him and followed him down the freeway. (Id.). When Woods arrived in the

grocery store parking lot, three or four patrol cars surrounded the van. (Id.). Woods stopped, and

Officer Holloway approached the driver’s side door. (Id.). Holloway ordered Woods to put his

hands on the steering wheel and end his call with his daughter. (Id.). When Woods asked why he

was being stopped, Holloway said it was because of an “insurance lapse.” (Id.). Holloway ran a

check of Woods’s driver’s license, which confirmed the insurance lapse on the van but reported

no other issues. (Id. at 3).

Holloway ordered Woods out of the van. (Id.). Woods refused, telling Holloway that there

was no probable cause for the stop. (Id.). In response, Holloway reached through the open driver’s

window, unlocked the door, opened it, and ordered Woods to get out of the van. (Id.). When

Woods again refused, Officer Tullis threatened to use physical force if Woods did not comply.

(Id.). Woods then got out of the van. (Id.). Holloway ordered him to walk to the back of the van,

where he frisked Woods. (Id.). Holloway then searched the van, telling Woods it was an inventory

search necessary before the van was towed. (Id.). Nothing illegal was found. (Id.). The van was

1The vehicle in question was a Chrysler Pacifica, which is sometimes described as a van and other

times as a car.

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towed due to the lack of insurance, and Woods was cited for driving without insurance. (Id.). On

February 25, 2025, the citation was dismissed because of a technical error. (Id.).

Woods alleges that these actions violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he was

stopped without reasonable suspicion, patted down without consent, had his van searched without

either consent or probable cause, and was subjected to excessive force. (Id.). He also alleges that

the stop was racially motivated, violating equal protection. (Id.). Woods seeks compensatory

damages for the emotional distress and economic losses that he allegedly suffered because of the

constitutional violations, along with the costs resulting from the van being towed. (Id.). He also

seeks an award of legal fees so that he can retain counsel. (Id.).

The court previously dismissed the excessive force claims against Holloway and Tullis.

(Docket Entry No. 37). Holloway and Tullis have now filed a motion for summary judgment as

to the remaining claims. (Docket Entry No. 38). In support of their motion, Holloway and Tullis

filed the video from Holloway’s body camera during the stop, along with their affidavits. (Docket

Entry Nos. 38-1, 38-2, 39). They contend that this evidence shows that the stop, pat down, and

inventory search were lawful and that there is no evidence to support Woods’s claim of racial

profiling. (Docket Entry No. 38, pp. 6-9). In the alternative, Holloway and Tullis contend that

they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 9-11).

In his affidavit in support of the motion, Holloway states that he was on patrol at 9:20 p.m.

on January 24, 2025, when he saw a single vehicle–a grey or silver Chrysler Pacifica–parked in

the Conroe library parking lot. (Docket Entry No. 38-1, p. 2). As he pulled into the parking lot,

the driver started the Chrysler and began driving away. (Id.). Holloway knew that there had been

“a series of car burglaries involving someone driving a Chrysler Pacifica,” and he found it

suspicious that the Chrysler left the parking lot just as he entered in his marked patrol car. (Id.).

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He decided to follow the Chrysler and run a computer check on the license plate. (Id.). The check

showed that the insurance on the vehicle was “unconfirmed.” (Id.). Based on this, Holloway

believed that he had a sufficient basis for a traffic stop. (Id.).

The remainder of Holloway’s affidavit generally tracks the events recorded on his body

camera footage. This footage begins as Holloway is pulling into the grocery store parking lot

behind the Chrysler. (Docket Entry No. 39, at 21:23). Holloway stops his patrol car and

approaches the driver’s side of the Chrysler. (Id.). Holloway sees that Woods is on his cell phone

and asks him to put his hands on the steering wheel. (Id.). Woods refuses, demanding that

Holloway explain the reason for the stop. (Id.). Holloway introduces himself and tells Woods that

a check of his license plate showed no insurance on the Chrysler. (Id. at 21:24:01). Woods insists

that the Chrysler is insured and again states that he will not comply with any orders until Holloway

tells him why he was pulled over. (Id.). Holloway again tells Woods that he was pulled over

because a computer check showed that there was no insurance on the Chrysler. (Id.).

Woods begins looking through the glove box, presumably for the insurance card, while

arguing with Holloway about whether Holloway lawfully followed him when he left the library

parking lot. (Id. at 21:27:09). When Woods is unable to find an insurance card, he calls his mother,

who admits that there is no insurance on the Chrysler because it became “too expensive.” (Id. at

21:29:32). The call is on speakerphone, and Woods’s mother’s statement that there is no insurance

on the Chrysler is clearly audible in the body camera footage.

With confirmation that the Chrysler was not insured, Holloway orders Woods to step out

of the car. (Id. at 21:31:21). Woods refuses, again saying he will not comply until Holloway tells

him the reason. (Id.). Holloway opens the driver’s door, but Woods again says, “I’m not stepping

out without you telling me why I’m stepping out.” (Id. at 21:31:30). Tullis tells Woods that he

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has been given a lawful order that is supported by law from the Supreme Court and that he should

comply to avoid the use of force. (Id. at 21:31:41). Woods then gets out and moves to the back

of the Chrysler. (Id.).

Holloway pats down Woods for weapons and tells him that during the past week and a

half, the Conroe Police had 20 to 25 reports of car burglaries committed by a “skinny black male

driving a silver Chrysler Pacifica.” (Id. at 21:33:15). Holloway explains that based on the

description in these reports, he had a reasonable suspicion to stop Woods—a black man driving a

grey Chrysler Pacifica—to investigate. (Id. at 21:34:09). Woods responds that he is not skinny

and that he believes he is being profiled. (Id.). Holloway then tells Woods that they are satisfied

that he had nothing to do with the burglaries and that, if the Chrysler had insurance, he would be

free to go. (Id. at 21:34:49). Holloway explains that because the vehicle had no insurance,

department policy required the Chrysler to be towed after an inventory search. (Id. at 21:35:11;

21:35:35). During that inventory search, Holloway gives Woods multiple items from inside the

Chrysler to take with him, including Woods’s mother’s wallet, Woods’s “medicine box,” and a

backpack. (Id. at 21:36:45-21:46:10).

After the inventory search, Holloway cites Woods for driving without insurance. (Id. at

21:56:14). Woods then walks toward the grocery store to wait for a ride. (Id. at 21:58:01). The

towing company arrives a minute later. (Id. at 21:57:28).

Tullis’s affidavit states that he acted as a back-up officer. (Docket Entry No. 38-2, p. 2).

Tullis’s statement is consistent with Holloway’s account in all important respects. (Id. at 2-3).

In his response to the motion, Woods contends that summary judgment is premature

because the Conroe Police Department has not fully responded to Freedom of Information Act

requests he made before filing this action. (Docket Entry No. 40, p. 2). Woods also contends that

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summary judgment is improper because there are factual questions as to whether the officers had

a reasonable suspicion for stopping him. (Id. at 3). He contends that the arrival of multiple police

vehicles at the scene contradicts Holloway’s testimony that this was a “routine insurance check.”

(Id.). Woods also contends that there is a factual dispute as to whether the stop was pretextual

because the citation for lack of insurance was dismissed. (Id.). Woods contends that he did not

consent to the vehicle search or the pat down, and that, because the officers stopped him without

reasonable suspicion, they are not entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 4). Woods attaches

several unauthenticated transcripts of telephone calls he has had with Conroe Police Department

officials and employees of the City of Conroe as summary judgment evidence, along with his

affidavit. (Docket Entry Nos. 41, 41-1, 42).

In their reply, Holloway and Tullis contend that the unauthenticated transcripts Woods

filed are not proper summary judgment evidence. (Docket Entry No. 43, p. 1, n.1). They assert

that the subsequent dismissal of the traffic citation does not affect whether Holloway had a

reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop and that neither a pat-down search nor an inventory

search requires consent. (Id. at 3-4). They also contend that Woods has not carried his burden to

identify clearly established law showing that either Holloway or Tullis violated his constitutional

rights. (Id. at 2). They ask the court to grant their motion and dismiss the action against them.

II. The Legal Standards.

A. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Woods brings his claims against Holloway and Tullis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section

1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for

violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v. Texas Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758,

759 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To

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state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Gomez v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). When no competent evidence

exists to sustain a finding that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, summary

judgment is properly entered in favor of the defendants. See, e.g., Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d

242, 249 (5th Cir. 2019).

B. Motions for Summary Judgment

“Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine

[dispute] as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). “The

movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253,

261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)). “A fact is

material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374,

379 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134,

134 (5th Cir. 2010)). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018)

(per curiam) (cleaned up).

The court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the evidence and draw

inferences “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (quoting

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)); see also Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380. When

both parties have submitted evidence that tends to show conflicting facts, “the evidence of the

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nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Willis v.

Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). But unverified pleadings and

unauthenticated documents are not proper summary judgment evidence. See King v. Dogan, 31

F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In addition, the court will not consider the nonmoving

party’s conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions as evidence. See Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). “Speculative theories cannot defeat a motion

for summary judgment.” Guillot on Behalf of T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 750 (5th Cir. 2023).

If record evidence clearly contradicts a party’s version of events, the court “should not

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 253-54 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). When video evidence exists, the court will “view[] the facts

in the light depicted by the videotape.” Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 280 (5th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381); see also Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th 577, 582 (5th Cir. 2022)

(“[W]e assign greater weight, even at the summary judgment stage, to the video recording taken

at the scene.”) (cleaned up); Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011) (“A

court . . . need not rely on the plaintiff’s description of the facts where the record discredits that

description but should instead consider the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”) (cleaned

up).

After viewing the offered evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

summary judgment may be granted if the nonmoving party has failed to show that genuine disputes

of fact exist that are material to every element on which he bears the burden of proof and that no

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-

23; see also Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2000).

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C. Pleadings from Self-Represented Litigants

Woods is representing himself. Courts construe pleadings filed by self-represented

litigants under a less stringent standard of review. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)

(per curiam). Under this standard, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this liberal standard, self-represented

litigants must still “abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd.,

767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014). They must also “properly plead sufficient facts that, when

liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders,

present summary judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” Id.

(cleaned up). While self-represented litigants are held to less stringent standards than attorneys,

they are not excused from the requirement of alleging sufficient facts to state a plausible claim.

See Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Toole v. Peak, 361

F. App’x 621, 621 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (a self-represented litigant “still must argue

something that is susceptible to liberal construction”).

III. Discussion.

A. The Summary Judgment Motion is Not Premature

Woods first contends that consideration of the motion for summary judgment is premature

because he has not received information he requested from the City of Conroe and the Conroe

Police Department before he filed this action. He specifically identifies two items: (1) the record

of the CAD keystroke data from Holloway’s in-car computer before the traffic stop; and (2) the

“missing” audio from Holloway’s body camera footage. (Docket Entry No. 40, p. 2). Woods

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contends that the CAD keystroke data is relevant to show whether Holloway checked the

Chrysler’s license plate before initiating the traffic stop. (Id.). Woods contends that the “missing”

audio is relevant because it might contain his “initial refusals or other exculpatory statements.”

(Id.).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the court to defer ruling on a motion for

summary judgment when the nonmoving party shows, either by affidavit or declaration, that he

“cannot present facts essential to justify [his] opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). The nonmoving

party must show that these facts exist, are capable of being obtained through specific discovery

within a reasonable time, and will likely show genuine factual disputes material to summary

judgment. See McKay v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 700 (5th Cir. 2014); see also

Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1999). “If the additional

discovery will not likely generate evidence germane to the summary judgment motion, the district

court may, in its discretion, proceed to rule on the motion without further ado.” Int’l Shortstop,

Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Netto v. Amtrak, 863 F.2d 1210,

1216 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[A] plaintiff’s entitlement to discovery before a ruling on a motion for

summary judgment is not unlimited and may be cut off when the record shows that the requested

discovery will not be likely to produce facts he needs to withstand a summary judgment motion.”

(citing Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1029–30 (5th Cir. 1983))).

As to the CAD keystroke data, Woods fails to show that the data exists or is capable of

being obtained within a reasonable time. Sergeant Robinson of the Conroe Police Department told

Woods during a recorded conversation on February 26, 2025, that “a CAD call is not created until

after a stop is created. So if he . . . since he ran your car before he stopped your vehicle, it’s not

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going to be within the CAD call.” (Docket Entry No. 20, p. 47). Later in the same call, Sergeant

Robinson explained that

[t]he keystrokes in the car that are tied to directly tied to end during that traffic stop

are what you have. You’re not going to have, as of right now, you’re not going to

have what the officer was running or researching. You’re doing any of that when

he was not assigned to a specific call. So majority of these guys come out here on

the street, they’re just out available for dispatch to send them somewhere. And

while they’re doing that, that’s when they conduct all their driver’s license checks,

their license plate checks, their suspect checks, their suspicion checks, like business

checks, checks. All that stuff is . . . is not . . . It’s all . . . every keystroke we utilize

is documented, but it’s not going to be documented under a specific CAD number

like they provided you.

* * *

If you want further information, I would come get with the records clerk in person

and see if there was a way that you could pull up Holloway and Tullis’s keystrokes,

maybe an hour before that stop. I don’t . . . like I said, it’s just a suggestion. I don’t

know how it works back there. I don’t know how it’s logged or any of that.

(Id. at 48-49, emphasis added).

This conversation, assuming it could be properly authenticated,2 indicates that the CAD

keystroke data Woods seeks is not recorded in a way that connects it to a particular insurance

check, stop, or investigation and so is not readily available. This information does not provide the

court with a plausible basis to believe that the keystroke data from Holloway’s patrol car still exists

or that it is capable of being obtained within a reasonable time. Woods is not entitled to have the

decision of the summary judgment motion deferred on this basis.

As to the body camera footage, Woods fails to show that the allegedly missing audio would

include evidence germane to the issues raised in the summary judgment motion. Woods alleges

that the missing audio may contain his “initial refusals or other exculpatory statements.” (Docket

2Holloway and Tullis object to the court’s consideration of the transcripts of Woods’s telephone

calls with various City officials as unauthenticated. (Docket Entry No. 43, p. 1, n.1). The court has

reviewed these unauthenticated transcripts and gives them the weight they are due.

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Entry No. 40, p. 2). But the only missing audio in the copy of the footage filed in support of the

motion for summary judgment is from the first 32 seconds after Holloway activated his body

camera. (Docket Entry No. 39, at 21:22:44-21:23:16). During that time, Holloway is still in his

patrol car, pulling into the parking lot behind Woods. (Id.). The audio begins when Holloway

stops his patrol car and records the entire interaction between Holloway and Woods. Because the

audio begins before Holloway approaches Woods, there is no plausible basis to conclude that the

“missing” portion contains Woods’s “initial refusals” or other allegedly “exculpatory statements.”

Woods has failed to show that the allegedly missing audio would, if produced, create genuine

factual disputes material to the outcome of the pending motion.

Because Woods has not shown that the “missing” evidence he seeks is either readily

obtainable or material to the summary judgment issues, he has not shown a basis to defer

consideration of the motion.

B. The Traffic Stop Was Lawful

On the merits of the motion, Woods first contends that Holloway and Tullis are not entitled

to summary judgment because there are factual disputes material to determining whether the stop

was lawful or the result of racial profiling.

Woods argues that there was no probable cause for the traffic stop, but probable cause is

not required. See Emesowum v. Cruz, 756 F. App’x 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2018). An individual may

be stopped and detained based on an officer’s “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts

that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). A “reasonable suspicion” exists when the officer can

point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those

facts, reasonably warrant” the detention. United States v. Alkheqani, 78 F.4th 707, 716 (5th Cir.

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2023) (quoting United States v. Broca-Martinez, 855 F.3d 675, 678 (5th Cir. 2017)). This standard

requires “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and

obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” United States v. Thomas, 997 F.3d 603, 610

(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020)). Instead, it “permit[s]

officers to make common-sense judgments” based on the totality of the facts, even when individual

actions might have innocent explanations. Id. (cleaned up).

“The Fourth Amendment requires a traffic stop to be justified when it begins,” and any

later actions must remain “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.”

United States v. Walker, 49 F.4th 903, 906-07 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Brigham,

382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). “A traffic stop is justified at its inception when an

officer has ‘an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic

violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.’” Id. at 907 (quoting United

States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005)). The reasonableness of police conduct

is measured by an objective standard, considering the totality of the circumstances. See United

States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fourth Amendment is satisfied “[a]s

long as all the facts and circumstances, viewed objectively, support the officer’s decisions.” Id.

The summary judgment evidence shows that Woods was sitting in a grey Chrysler Pacifica

in a public parking lot shared by a closed library and a park after 9:00 p.m. on a Friday night. The

Chrysler was the only car in the lot. In the preceding week and a half, Conroe Police had received

20 to 25 reports of car burglaries by a “skinny black man in a silver Chrysler Pacifica.” When

Holloway passed the library on patrol, he saw Woods—a black man—sitting in a grey Chrysler

Pacifica. When Holloway drove his marked patrol car into the parking lot, the Chrysler pulled out

and left. Holloway followed and did a computer check of the license plate. The insurance status

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came back as “unconfirmed.” Based on all these facts, Holloway had a reasonable suspicion that

the vehicle Woods was driving lacked insurance, which is a traffic offense under Texas law. See

TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 601.051. Holloway decided to conduct a traffic stop based on this

reasonable suspicion. These facts, when considered objectively, establish that the traffic stop was

lawful.

Woods points to no evidence in support of his assertion that Holloway stopped him solely

because he was black. A party’s conclusory assertions and unsupported opinions are not

competent summary judgment evidence. Woods’s subjective belief as to Holloway’s reasons for

the traffic stop are insufficient to defeat this motion for summary judgment, which is supported by

competent evidence. See Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2019) (per

curiam); Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Forsyth v. Barr, 19

F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994).

Further, even if the court credited Woods’s opinions about Holloway’s motivations, those

opinions would not preclude summary judgment on this record. An officer’s subjective motivation

for conducting a traffic stop does not affect the validity of the stop if the officer has reasonable

suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806, 813 (1996) (the law “foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of

traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved”); see also

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“Our cases make clear that an arresting officer’s

state of mind (except for the facts he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. [T]he

Fourth Amendment’s concern with reasonableness allows certain actions to be taken in certain

circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”) (cleaned up); Wood v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 147 F.4th

534, 550 (5th Cir. 2025) (“an officer’s subjective intentions have no impact on analyzing

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reasonable suspicion or probable cause because they are both considered to be based on an

objective test” (quoting Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 432)).

Woods also contends that the fact that the citation was later dismissed shows that the

insurance lapse was a pretext for stopping the vehicle. The undisputed summary judgment

evidence shows that the Chrysler was not insured when Holloway pulled Woods over. The fact

that a traffic citation or ticket is later dismissed does not show that the officer lacked reasonable

suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 819 (because it is only the initial stop

of his vehicle that must be valid, if the “officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had

violated the traffic code[, t]hat rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”); see

also Wood, 147 F.4th at 550 (the fact that driver did not receive a traffic citation during the stop

did not demonstrate that there was not reasonable suspicion for the stop at its inception); Deville

v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (evidence that an arrestee is innocent

of the crime charged does not determine whether there was probable cause to stop or arrest); United

States v. Ulibarri, 723 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1108 (D.N.M. 2024) (the issue is whether a stop is initially

justified).

The summary judgment evidence shows that Holloway had a reasonable suspicion that

Woods committed a traffic violation by driving the Chrysler without insurance. Because Woods

has not shown genuine factual disputes material to determining that Holloway lawfully stopped

the vehicle, Holloway and Tullis are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

C. The Order to Exit and the Pat-Down Were Lawful

In the alternative, Woods argues that even if the stop was lawful, the order for him to get

out of the Chrysler and the ensuing pat down were not.

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Because of the “inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in

a vehicle,” officers have the right to order the driver out of the vehicle during a traffic stop.

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1977) (per curiam) (a police officer conducting

lawful traffic stop may order the driver out of vehicle as a matter of course without violating the

Fourth Amendment, even if the officer has no reason to suspect foul play from driver); accord

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (applying the Mimms rule to passengers as well as

drivers). If an officer has lawfully conducted a traffic stop and reasonably believes the person may

be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a limited protective pat-down search for

concealed weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.

323, 326-27 (2009). The officer has the right to conduct a pat-down search for officer safety even

if the detained individual does not consent. See United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407 (5th

Cir. 2006).

The video of the traffic stop shows that Woods was hostile from the inception of the stop.

He was verbally adversarial, he demanded the officers’ names and badge numbers, and he insisted

on filming the encounter. Even after Woods’s mother admitted that there was no insurance on the

Chrysler, Woods questioned Holloway’s reason for stopping him, accused Holloway of racial

profiling, and refused to get out of the car. Under these circumstances, the officers had the right

to insist that Woods get out of the Chrysler. In addition, under these circumstances, Holloway had

the discretion to conduct a pat-down search for weapons to ensure officer safety—a pat-down

search that did not require Woods’s consent.

Woods has not shown that genuine disputes of fact exist material to the question of whether

the order to get out of the Chrysler and the pat-down search were lawful. Holloway and Tullis are

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entitled to summary judgment in their favor, and Woods’s claims on this basis will be dismissed

with prejudice.

D. The Inventory Search Was Lawful

Woods also contends that the inventory search of the Chrysler was unlawful because he

did not consent to it. Holloway and Tullis contend that Holloway performed a lawful inventory

search of the Chrysler before impounding and towing it as an uninsured vehicle.

“An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and detained, in order to

ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as might be kept in a towed car), and to

protect against false claims of loss or damage.” Whren, 571 U.S. at 812 n.1. Inventory searches

are “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Colorado v.

Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). They may be lawfully conducted when a vehicle is waiting to

be towed. United States v. Sanders, No. 4:20-cr-32, 2022 WL 411165, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9,

2022); United States v. Duarte, 52 F.3d 1067, 1995 WL 241789, at *2 (5th Cir. 1995). Inventory

searches may include a search of closed compartments and personal effects. See Bertine, 479 U.S.

at 372-74.

At the same time, “an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order

to discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). To prevent “general

rummaging,” the law requires that an inventory search be both reasonable and “conducted pursuant

to standardized regulations and procedures that are consistent with (1) protecting the property of

the vehicle’s owner, (2) protecting the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property,

and (3) protecting the police from danger.” United States v. Lage, 183 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir.

1999); see also S. Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). The standardized regulations

and procedures must “sufficiently limit the discretion of law enforcement officers to prevent

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inventory searches from becoming evidentiary searches.” United States v. Andrews, 22 F.3d 1328,

1336 (5th Cir. 1994). An “ulterior motive to search” will not invalidate an otherwise lawful

inventory search that complies with the established regulations and procedures. United States v.

McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 210 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

The City of Conroe Police Department policy on impounding and towing uninsured or

unlicensed vehicles provides, in pertinent part:

C. Vehicles on Private Property

1. At the conclusion of the traffic stop or accident

investigation of a motor vehicle stopped on private property

or publicly accessed property, the motor vehicle shall be

removed for safekeeping purposes if no financially

responsible licensed operator is present to assume

responsible for operation of the vehicle.

* * *

D. Towing and Storage

1. A vehicle removed under this policy will be towed

by a rotation wrecker and placed in their respective vehicle

storage facility.

2. The officer will complete a vehicle tow slip and

conduct an inventory of the vehicle to ensure that no

preventable loss will occur concerning perishable and/or

valuable items.

City of Conroe Police Dep’t Gen. Order No. 7-08 (issued Feb. 15, 2012), available at

https://cms3.revise.com (visited Oct. 6, 2025).3

3The court may take judicial notice of publicly available official documents and policies “whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See FED. R. EVID. 201(b).

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Woods does not dispute that Holloway followed the Conroe Police Department’s policy

concerning inventory searches. Woods contends that Holloway did not obtain his consent before

conducting the search and that he exceeded the scope of an inventory search.

Police officers do not need to obtain consent for an inventory search as long as that search

is conducted in compliance with department policies. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 384 (Powell, J.,

concurring) (noting that consent for an inventory search is not necessary because the owner of a

vehicle that is subject to an inventory search is often not present at the time of the search). Woods

does not contend, much less point to any evidence, that the Chrysler was unlawfully impounded

or that Holloway failed to comply with the Conroe Police Department’s policies in conducting the

search. The inventory search was not unlawful because Woods did not consent.

Woods also points to no evidence tending to show that Holloway acted in bad faith in

conducting the search or conducted it for the sole purpose of searching for contraband. See Bertine,

479 U.S. at 372-73; see also United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The

investigating officer’s suspicion that he might find contraband or other evidence does not

invalidate an inventory search where it is clear that the procedure used is a valid inventory

procedure and is not merely a pretext for a search.”). Woods’s conclusory allegation that the

search was conducted for a nefarious purpose is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment when

the video and other record evidence shows otherwise.

Woods has not carried his burden to show that there are genuine factual disputes material

to determining that the inventory search of the Chrysler was lawful. Holloway and Tullis are

entitled to summary judgment on this issue. Woods’s claims based on an unlawful search of the

Chrysler are dismissed, with prejudice.

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E. There is no Evidence of Racial Profiling

Woods alleges that Holloway and Tullis violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection rights by stopping him based on racial profiling rather than on a reasonable suspicion

of a traffic violation. In support of this claim, Woods alleges only that he was stopped without a

legitimate basis. (Docket Entry No. 12, p. 3).

A claim of racial profiling is based on “selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws.”

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608

(1985). To prove racial profiling, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was treated differently than

other similarly situated individuals and that the unequal treatment arose from a discriminatory

intent. See Stout v. Vincent, 717 F. App’x 468, 471 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Bowlby

v. City of Aberdeen, Miss., 681 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2012)). The plaintiff’s “subjective belief

that he was discriminated against, standing alone, is not adequate evidence to survive a motion for

summary judgment.” Id. at 472 (quoting Raina v. Veneman, 152 F. App’x 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2005)

(per curiam)).

Holloway and Tullis have moved for summary judgment on this claim, noting that there is

no evidence that they treated Woods differently from any non-African American driver who was

similarly situated. In the absence of evidence of disparate treatment between Woods and similarly

situated non-African Americans who were driving vehicles without insurance, Woods has not

stated a viable claim of racial profiling. The motion for summary judgment on this claim is

granted.

F. The Officers Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Finally, Holloway and Tullis contend that they are protected from liability under the

doctrine of qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their

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conduct violates a clearly established right.” Austin v. City of Pasadena, Tex., 74 F.4th 312, 322

(5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). To determining whether qualified immunity

applies, “first we ask whether the officer’s alleged conduct has violated a federal right; . . . second

we ask whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation,

such that the officer was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.” Solis v. Serrett, 31

F.4th 975, 981 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (en

banc)). When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to immunity by showing a

violation of a clearly established constitutional right. See Escobar v. Montee, 895 F.3d 387, 393

(5th Cir. 2018).

Woods has not carried his burden to show genuine factual disputes material to determining

whether Holloway and Tullis violated his constitutional rights. The summary judgment evidence

does not show that either Holloway or Tullis violated Woods’s constitutional rights either before

or during the stop and search. And while Woods contends there are genuine factual disputes as to

whether Holloway’s subjective reason for the initial stop was racial profiling, they are not material

because, as explained above, an officer’s subjective intentions are not material to the

constitutionality of the stop. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Wood, 147 F.4th at 550 (“an officer’s

subjective intentions have no impact on analyzing reasonable suspicion or probable cause because

they are both considered to be based on an objective test”). In the absence of evidence that either

Holloway or Tullis violated Woods’s constitutional rights by stopping him without a reasonable

suspicion of a traffic violation, they are protected from his action by qualified immunity. Their

motion for summary judgment on this basis is granted.

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IV. Conclusion

Holloway’s and Tullis’s motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 38), is granted.

This action is dismissed with prejudice. Any remaining pending motions are denied as moot. Final

judgment will be separately entered.

SIGNED on October 21, 2025, at Houston, Texas.

LW Crente

Lee H. Rosenthal

Senior United States District Judge

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