Klat

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 SUSAN V. KLAT, Case No.: 25-cv-241-WQH-BJW

Plaintiff,

11 ORDER

v.

12

13 JOHN MORRILL, in his official

capacity as Executive Clerk for

14 San Diego District Court,

15 Southern District of California;

STEPHANIE MICHELE, in her

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official capacity as Courtroom

17 Deputy for the Hon. Judge

Cynthia Bashant (San Diego

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District Court, Southern District

19 of California); SCOTT WAHL, in

his official capacity as Chief of

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Police for the City of San Diego;

21 KELLY MCGEEHAN, Esq., in

her official capacity as Senior

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Deputy City Attorney for the City

23 of San Diego; and DOES 1–100,

24 inclusive,

Defendants.

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26 HAYES, Judge:

27 The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants John

28 Morrill and Stephanie Michele. (ECF No. 12.)

1 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2 On February 3, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint against

3 Defendants John Morrill, Stephanie Michele, Scott Wahl, Kelly McGeehan, and Does 1–

4 100. (ECF No. 1.)

5 On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed proof of service as to Defendants Morrill,

6 Michele, Wahl, and McGeehan. (ECF No. 8–11.)

7 On May 16, 2025, Defendants Morrill and Michele (“Federal Defendants”) filed a

8 Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 12.) On June 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the

9 Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 13.) On June 16, 2025, Federal Defendants filed a Reply in

10 support of the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 14.)

11 The docket reflects that Defendants Wahl and McGeehan (“State Defendants”) have

12 not filed a responsive pleading.

13 II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

14 On July 17, 2024, Plaintiff “forwarded a detailed written police records request to

15 [the San Diego Police Department’s] Record Division” related to the “the death of her 25-

16 year-old grandson, Dejon Marques Heard, who was shot and killed by San Diego Police

17 on July 6, 2024.” (ECF No. 1 at 4–5.)

18 Defendant Wahl, the Chief of Police for the San Diego Police Department, was

19 “aware of this public records demand” but “refus[ed] to surrender prior officer-civilian

20 interaction records specific to the deceased despite repeated requests.” (Id.)

21 On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in United States

22 District Court for the Southern District of California seeking “declaratory judgment and

23 injunctive relief specific to public records access under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and

24 identifying Defendant Wahl as the sole named defendant. (Id. at 4); see Case No. 3:24-cv-

25 01474-BAS-AHG.

26 On October 15, 2024, Defendant McGeehan, the “Senior Deputy City Attorney

27 assigned to represent the defendant,” filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on behalf of

28 Defendant Wahl. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) On November 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to

1 the motion to dismiss. (Id. at 6.) The “motion’s date scheduled for hearing [was] on

2 December 9, 2024.” (Id.)

3 On December 9, 2024, Plaintiff “became aware of Judge Cynthia Bashant’s daily

4 calendar . . . created by the [Federal Defendants.]” (Id.) The calendar did not list a hearing

5 for argument on the motion to dismiss. (Id.) Plaintiff sought a correction and received no

6 response. (Id.)

7 On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff “filed a motion for order and judgment on the

8 pleadings to get the motion material addressed.” (Id. at 7.)

9 On January 29, 2025, the United States District Court for the Southern District of

10 California “posted a 5-page disposition order and final judgement entry ‘alleging’ the judge

11 had denied the motions . . . without a hearing applying ‘blanket theory’ lack of jurisdiction

12 with the case immediately closed . . . .” (Id.) “This entry order and judgment recites the

13 opinion as final, ineligible for reconsideration or appeal, and with the case closed,

14 effectively blocking the Plaintiff from accessing a motion to recover costs . . . .” (Id.)1

15 Plaintiff alleges that Federal Defendants, in their capacities as “Executive Clerk”

16 and “Courtroom Deputy”

17 conspired to deceive the Plaintiff [by] generating a judicial order to a believed

to be non-existent judicial case review [sic] . . . ending with [Federal

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Defendants] generating what appears to be a mock judgment and opinion

19 detailing a specific ruling incongruent with the thought process of a 10-year

practicing federal judge with demonstrated integrity and knowledge of

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constitutional law.

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(Id. at 2, 8.)

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Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), 1986 and Cal. Civil Code

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§§ 1709, 1710. (Id. at 7–12.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages of $10,000 for “the time

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associated with pursuing public records and recovery of lost personal belongings seized by

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27 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 201(b)(2), the Court takes judicial notice of the relevant

filings in the case: ECF No. 8 (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and ECF No. 9

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1 San Diego law enforcement,” $750 “for costs and fees associated with pursuing this case,”

2 and “any such further relief this Court deems proper and just.” (Id. at 8, 13).

3 III. CONTENTIONS

4 Federal Defendants, in their Motion to Dismiss, contend that the Court lacks subject

5 matter jurisdiction and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

6 pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 12.)

7 Federal Defendants contend that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because

8 sovereign immunity shields them from Plaintiff’s claims. (Id. at 5–8.) Federal Defendants

9 also contend that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its related causes of action cannot form the basis

10 of a suit against federal employees. (Id. at 6.) Moreover, Defendants contend that “[t]o the

11 extent Plaintiff’s claims can be interpreted as constitutional claims brought against [Federal

12 Defendants] under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

13 403 U.S. 388 (1971), such claims would also fail because Plaintiff brings suit against these

14 Defendants in their official capacities and not in their individual capacities.” (Id. at 7.)

15 “Even granting Plaintiff the additional benefit of the doubt by assuming she brought her

16 claims against the [F]ederal Defendants in their individual capacities, her allegations do

17 not fit within the three types of recognized constitutional violations giving rise to a Bivens

18 claim.” (Id.)

19 Federal Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

20 failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because “Plaintiff’s

21 allegations . . . are simply not plausible.” (Id. at 8.) “Even if th[e] Court were to find that

22 Plaintiff’s claims against [Federal Defendants] rise above mere threadbare recitals, quasi-

23 judicial immunity requires dismissal.” (Id. at 8–9 (quotation omitted).)

24 IV. LEGAL STANDARD

25 Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move

26 for dismissal on grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Fed. R.

27 Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the court has subject matter

28 jurisdiction over an action. Assoc. of Med. Colls. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778–79

1 (9th Cir. 2000). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that

2 power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial

3 decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden

4 of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.

5 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).

6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a

7 claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim for

8 relief, a pleading “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

9 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Federal Rule of

10 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory[,] or an

11 absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New

12 Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarro v.

13 Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). “[W]here the petitioner is pro se, particularly in

14 civil rights cases, [courts] construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the

15 benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v.

16 Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).

17 V. DISCUSSION

18 a. Federal Defendants

19 i. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

20 Federal Defendants contend the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all

21 claims in this case because “[s]overign immunity shields both the federal government and

22 its agencies from suit” unless the United States expressly waives its immunity. (ECF No.

23 12 at 5–6.) Federal Defendants also contend that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 cannot

24 support justiciable claims unless the defendants were “‘acting under color of State law’ and

25 not federal law.” (Id. at 7.) Federal Defendants contend that, “[t]o the extent that Plaintiff’s

26 claims can be interpreted as constitutional claims brought against [Federal Defendants]

27 under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

28 (1971), such claims would also fail because Plaintiff brings suit against these Defendants

1 in their official capacities and not in their individual capacities. . . . Even granting Plaintiff

2 the additional benefit of the doubt by assuming she brought her claims against the [F]ederal

3 Defendants in their individual capacities, her allegations do not fit within the three types

4 of recognized constitutional violations giving rise to a Bivens claims. . . .” (ECF No. 12 at

5 7.)

6 Plaintiff, in response, contends that the Federal Defendants “mistakenly assert that

7 all federal employees possess the same sovereign immunity as the United States . . . and

8 therefore require express consent before being sued for actions that exceed the boundaries

9 of the Constitution. . . . Plaintiff argues that both [F]ederal [D]efendants are employees of

10 the federal government and not independent agencies or entities, as the motion contends.”

11 (ECF No. 13 at 2–3 (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiff contends that “the immunity conferred

12 by [the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988] does not

13 extend or apply to suits against federal employees for violation of the Constitution or

14 federal statutes. Thus, government officials sued for constitutional torts continue to be

15 protected only by qualified immunity.” (Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiff also contends

16 that the “sovereign immunity claimed by the [Federal Defendants] does not apply to core

17 civil right deprivations . . . .” (Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).)

18 “Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, the United States, as sovereign, is

19 immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596,

20 608 (1990) (quotations omitted); Chang v. United States, 139 F.4th 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.

21 2025). Unless Congress “expressly waives” sovereign immunity, federal courts lack

22 subject matter jurisdiction over claims against the United States. Morales v. United States,

23 895 F.3d 703, 713 (9th Cir. 2018). Sovereign immunity “cannot be avoided by naming

24 officers and employees of the United States” as defendants but nonetheless alleging

25 unlawful conduct undertaken in the defendants’ official capacities as federal employees.

26 Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). In this case, Plaintiff brings

27 claims under federal and state law against Federal Defendants “acting in their Official

28 Roles and Capacities as public employees representing . . . the United States Government”

1 without identifying a waiver of sovereign immunity that would permit the Court to

2 establish jurisdiction over her claims. (ECF No. 1 at 7–8.) To the extent that Plaintiff might

3 seek waiver under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for her state law claims, the

4 Court finds that the exceptions for claims related to “misrepresentation [or] deceit” render

5 the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity inapplicable to this case. 28 U.S.C. §

6 2680(h); see ECF No. 1 at 11–12 (stating a claim for “misrepresentation with intent to

7 deceive”). Sovereign immunity precludes jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state and federal

8 claims.

9 The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 limits its scope to persons acting “under color of any

10 statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

11 Columbia . . . .” A plaintiff must contend that “the alleged deprivation was committed by

12 a person acting under color of state law” to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. West v.

13 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The statute generally does not support a claim against

14 employees or officers of the federal government. Chatman v. United States Dep't of the

15 Navy, 846 F. App'x 543 (9th Cir. 2021); see Morse v. N. Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118

16 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1997) (“§ 1983 precludes liability in federal government actors”).

17 Plaintiff alleges that Federal Defendants violated her rights in the course of “performing

18 their official duties” as employees of the federal government. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The Court

19 finds that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its related provisions do not provide a jurisdictional basis

20 for Plaintiff’s federal claims.

21 Plaintiffs, however, may state a claim against federal officers for constitutional

22 violations under the implied cause of action recognized by the Supreme Court of the United

23 States in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S.

24 at 389 (holding that a search and seizure in alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment

25 gave rise to a cause of action for damages). This implied cause of action has been

26 recognized by the Supreme Court in only two other circumstances. In Davis v. Passman,

27 the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens cause of action in a case involving an alleged

28 violation of the Fifth Amendment for discrimination of the basis of sex. 442 U.S. 228

1 (1979). In Carlson v. Green, the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens cause of action for an

2 alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment in a case involving the medical mistreatment

3 of a prisoner. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a “two-step framework to

4 determine whether a plaintiff should be afforded a cause of action under Bivens.” Sheikh v.

5 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 106 F.4th 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2024). Courts consider whether

6 the case “presents a new Bivens context” and, if so, “there are special factors indicating

7 that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to weigh the costs and

8 benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Court finds,

9 if Plaintiff’s claims are interpreted as Bivens claims against the Federal Defendants, the

10 allegations are “different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases” because the

11 allegations concern constitutional rights that have not formed the basis of a recognized

12 Bivens claim. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139–40 (2017); see ECF No. 1 at 8 (alleging

13 violations of “the First and Fourteenth Amendments”). The Court also finds that there is

14 “a rational reason” to think that Congress is better situated than the Judiciary to provide a

15 damages remedy for alleged violations arising from the conduct of federal court employees

16 because of the Judiciary’s close relationship with its own officers. Egbert v. Boule, 596

17 U.S. 482, 492 (2022). Plaintiff’s claims against the Federal Defendants, if construed as a

18 Bivens cause of action, would also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

19 ii. Failure to State a Claim

20 Federal Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations that they “conspired to

21 prevent Plaintiff from receiving a hearing on a motion and then drafted a false order in the

22 name of a United States District Judge . . . dwell within the realm of speculation and are

23 simply not plausible.” (ECF No. 12 at 8.) Plaintiff, in response, reiterates her claims and

24 “also request[s] an open court hearing to authenticate the judicial findings.” (ECF No. 13

25 at 9.)

26 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

27 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

28 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

1 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

2 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

3 alleged.” Id. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

4 ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

5 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

6 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). While a pleading “does not require

7 ‘detailed factual allegations,’” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 nevertheless “demands

8 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556

9 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court is not “required to accept as true

10 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

11 inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

12 The Court finds that Plaintiff does not allege sufficient factual matter to support

13 Plaintiff’s claim of a conspiracy by employees of the United States District Court for the

14 Southern District of California. Plaintiff contends that the order issued on January 1, 2025

15 in her earlier case was a forgery authored by the Federal Defendants. (ECF No. 1 at 2); see

16 No. 3:24-cv-01474-BAS-AHG, ECF No. 8. In support of her claim, Plaintiff alleges that:

17 an in-person argument before Chief Judge Bashant was not calendared for her motion (id.

18 at 5); the Federal Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff’s requests for “correction” (id.);

19 and the order issued by the district court was “incongruent with the thought processing of

20 a 10-year practicing federal judge with . . . knowledge of constitutional law” (id. at 2). The

21 Court finds that—despite drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff—the facts

22 alleged create no greater likelihood than the “sheer possibility,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 768, that

23 the Federal Defendants “forged a false narrative . . . to close a civil rights complaint” by

24 impersonating a federal judge and surreptitiously filing an order denying Plaintiff relief.

25 (ECF No. 1 at 8.)

26 The Court accordingly finds that the entirety of Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a

27 claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

28 / / /

1 iii. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

2 Federal Defendants separately contend that “quasi-judicial immunity requires

3 dismissal” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff brings claims

4 against courtroom employees—the Executive Clerk of the United States District Court for

5 the Southern District of California and the Courtroom Deputy for Chief Judge Cynthia A.

6 Bashant—for alleged conduct in the course of duties related to the judicial process. (ECF

7 No. 12 at 8–9.)

8 Plaintiff contends in response that

9 the actions of the [F]ederal [D]efendants are unrelated to quasi-judicial duties,

and . . . the unaddressed prosecutable criminal behavior undermines the

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fundamental purpose of the federal court system, especially when such

11 conduct obstructs a party’s core ability to seek protection and redress for civil

rights violations that have been perpetrated by rogue public servants who stray

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from their roles in safeguarding the Constitution and upholding law and order.

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(ECF No. 13 at 8.)

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Quasi-judicial immunity protects those who “perform functions closely associated

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with the judicial process” from claims that allege wrongful conduct during the performance

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of their responsibilities. Gay v. Parsons, 61 F.4th 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

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Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[c]ourt

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clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when

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they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr.

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Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) “[C]lerks qualify for quasi-

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judicial immunity unless [their] acts were done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.

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The Ninth Circuit has “extended absolute quasi-judicial immunity to non-judicial officers

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for purely administrative acts—acts which taken out of context would appear ministerial,

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but when viewed in context are actually a part of the judicial function.” Fort v. Washington,

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41 F.4th 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002)

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(emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted)). Moreover, a “mistake or an act in excess of

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jurisdiction does not abrogate judicial immunity, even if it results in grave procedural

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1 The Court finds that the Federal Defendants are protected by quasi-judicial

2 immunity in this case. The alleged conduct pertains to the filing of a court order, which is

3 an integral part of the judicial process. Plaintiff’s particular allegations that the Defendants

4 “work[ed] together” and “forged a false narrative” to “generat[e] what appears to be a mock

5 judgment” while filing the court order is insufficient to circumvent immunity. (See ECF

6 No. 1 at 2, 8.) In Moore v. Brewster, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal

7 of claims against a judicial clerk notwithstanding allegations that he “deceived [the

8 plaintiff] regarding the status of [a] bond and improperly conducted hearings to assess

9 costs, all in coordination with Judge Brewster” because the alleged conduct nonetheless

10 “would fall within [his] quasi-judicial duties and [is] thus protected by absolute immunity.”

11 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996), superseded on other grounds by statute; see also

12 Coulter v. Murrell, No. 10CV102-IEG(NLS), 2011 WL 13208995, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar.

13 1, 2011), aff'd sub nom., Coulter v. Roddy, 463 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting the

14 defendant’s motion for summary judgment in response to claims that he directed state court

15 clerks to “improperly and illegally” deny the filing of judicial documents). Allegations of

16 conspiratorial acts in the course of judicial conduct do not, by themselves, overcome

17 immunity. Cf. Moore, 96 F.3d at 1244 (“Nor is judicial immunity lost by allegations that a

18 judge conspired with one party to rule against another party. . . .”).

19 The Court finds that quasi-judicial immunity establishes a complete and independent

20 bar to Plaintiff’s claims.

21 b. State Defendants

22 The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (“Eleventh Amendment”)

23 protects states and their officials from claims brought in federal court, unless the state

24 consents to the lawsuit. Jensen v. Brown, 131 F.4th 677, 696 (9th Cir. 2025); Alden v.

25 Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (“We have . . . sometimes referred to the States’ immunity

26 from suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity.’ The phrase is convenient shorthand but

27 something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from,

28 nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”). A claim for damages brought

1 |}under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state official “in his or her official capacity ... is no

2 || different from a suit against the State itself’ and remains barred by sovereign immunity.

3 || Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep’t of

4 || State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).

5 Plaintiff brings claims against State Defendants based on alleged conduct undertaken

6 || “in their Official Roles and Capacities as public employees representing the City of San

7 Diego .. . in conjunction with the San Diego Police and the San Diego City Attorney’s

8 || Office.” (ECF No. 1 at 10.) The Court finds, based on Plaintiff's allegations, that colorable

9 || questions arise regarding whether sovereign immunity protects State Defendants from her

10 ||clatms. The Court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter

11 |/jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H

12 || Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff ought to show

13 cause as to whether subject matter jurisdiction over her claims against State Defendants is

14 || appropriate.

15 VI. CONCLUSION

16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) filed by

17 || Federal Defendants is granted. The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed as to Federal

18 || Defendants without prejudice.

19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff show cause as to whether the Court may

20 || properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over her claims against State Defendants.

21 || Plaintiff shall file a response within thirty (30) days of the filing of this Order. If Plaintiff

22 || files to timely file a response or fails to show that the Court may properly exercise subject

23 matter jurisdiction over her claims against State Defendants, the Court will dismiss the

24 || Complaint without prejudice.

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26 || Dated: October 20, 2025 BME: ie Z. A a

27 Hon. William Q. Hayes

28 United States District Court