Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

IRIS BROWN PLAINTIFF

ADC #709964

V. Case No. 3:25-CV-00125-JM-BBM

ADC, Medical DEFENDANT

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 30, 2025, Iris Brown (“Brown”), an inmate currently incarcerated in the

McPherson Unit of the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”), filed a pro se Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that “ADC, Medical” violated her constitutional

rights. (Doc. 2). Before Brown may proceed with this action, the Court must screen her

claims in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).1 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a).

II. ALLEGATIONS

Brown alleges that, on an unspecified date, she told Nurse Hadley Owens

(“Owens”) that her kidney was infected.2 (Doc. 2 at 4). However, the “only thing they did”

1 The PLRA requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a

governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or a

portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). When making this determination, the Court must accept the truth of the

factual allegations contained in the complaint, and it may consider the documents attached to the complaint.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011).

2 Brown writes Nurse Owens’s name as “Nurse Handy.” (Doc. 2 at 4). The Court gathers from her

attached medical records, e.g., id. at 7, 49–50, that Brown is referring to Nurse Owens when she mentions

Nurse Handy.

was tell Brown that her back is hurting “because of the bed.”3 Id. Unnamed staff members

told Brown to “keep putting in sick call[s].” Id. Brown asked “her” for a second opinion,

and “she” told Brown no, but “they” still placed Brown on medication for an infection and

would not do anything else. Id. Brown alleges that now her back is messed up, she cannot

stand very long, and she does not know why “they won’t let me see a doctor.” Id.

Brown attaches several medical records to her Complaint, which appear to be from

a social security administrative record. (Doc. 2 at 4–39, 41–96). Brown does not explain

the purpose of these medical records, but at least some of the records appear related to her

claims of a kidney infection and back pain. See, e.g., id. at 57–59, 62, 69–70.

Brown also attaches grievance documents, variously referencing Nurse Owens,

kidney issues, and the refusal to let Brown see a doctor. (Doc. 2 at 97–112). Brown sues

the Defendant in its official and individual capacity. Id. at 2. She asks the Court to “let

[her] take an MRI or catscan” and requests damages. Id. at 4–5.

III. INITIAL SCREENING

To survive pre-service screening under the PLRA, a “complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[L]abels and conclusions,” a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and “naked assertions devoid

of further factual enhancement” are insufficient to plead a plausible claim. Id. Further,

3 Throughout this Order, any capitalization, spelling, or grammatical errors are corrected internally

without brackets.

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).

However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed,” and courts “should

construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework.” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849

(8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up; citations omitted); Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th

Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Liberally construing Brown’s Complaint, she fails to allege

any plausible claims against the Defendant, “ADC, Medical.”

A. Official-Capacity Claims

State agencies, such as the ADC, are not “persons” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); McDowell v. Dawson, 221 Fed.

Appx. 497, 498 (8th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (Missouri Department of Corrections was

not “person” under § 1983); Brown v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 353 F.3d 1038,

1041 (8th Cir. 2004). Additionally, any monetary claim against the ADC is barred by

sovereign immunity. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 432 (8th Cir. 1989).

Brown can bring an official-capacity claim against a proper individual defendant,

and such claim would be considered a claim against the State of Arkansas itself. However,

in order to bring an official-capacity claim, Brown must allege facts showing that any

underlying constitutional violation was the result of an ADC policy, custom, or failure to

train. See Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). As

currently pleaded, Brown makes no such allegations.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The crux of Brown’s Complaint is that she was denied adequate medical care for

her kidney and back issues. To plead a plausible inadequate-medical-care claim under the

Eighth Amendment, there must be facts suggesting: (1) Brown had an objectively serious

need for medical care; and (2) Defendants subjectively knew of, but deliberately

disregarded, that serious medical need. See Shipp v. Murphy, 9 F.4th 694, 703 (8th Cir.

2021); Barr v. Pearson, 909 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2018). As to the second element,

deliberate indifference is a high threshold that goes well beyond negligence or gross

negligence. Hall v. Higgins, 77 F.4th 1171, 1179 (8th Cir. 2023); Langford v. Norris, 614

F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010). To establish deliberate indifference, there must be facts

suggesting Defendants “recognized that a substantial risk of harm existed and knew that

their conduct was inappropriate in light of that risk.” Shipp, 9 F.4th at 703 (emphasis in the

original); Smith v. Lisenbe, 73 F.4th 596, 600 (8th Cir. 2023). A mere disagreement with

the course of medical care does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Langford,

614 F.3d at 460; Barr, 909 F.3d at 921–22.

Brown asserts that, on an unspecified date, she told Nurse Owens that her kidney

was infected. (Doc. 2 at 4). Her pain was dismissed as relating to her sleeping

arrangements. Id. When Brown asked for a second opinion, she was denied. Id. Yet, Brown

was still provided medication for an infection. Id. Brown’s back continues to hurt, and she

has not been allowed to see a doctor. Id.

There are several deficiencies with these allegations. First, the only person identified

in Brown’s allegations, Nurse Owens, is not a Defendant in this action. But Brown purports

to bring individual-capacity claims. As the Court referenced above, Brown cannot allege

an individual-capacity claim against the ADC; therefore, to state an individual-capacity

claim against any person, Brown must name a person as a Defendant. And, in § 1983

actions, government officials are only liable for their “own individual actions.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 676 (emphasis added).

Brown also complains of a kidney infection but admits that she was provided

medication for an infection. (Doc. 2 at 4). As pleaded, an allegation that Brown received

prescription treatment for her alleged illness does not state a deliberate-indifference claim.

Additionally, while Brown asked for a second opinion, and Nurse Owens allegedly

declined, (Doc. 2 at 4), as pleaded, Brown’s mere disagreement with Nurse Owens’s care

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Langford, 614 F.3d at 460; Barr, 909

F.3d at 921–22.

Brown further alleges that her “back is messed up,” (Doc. 2 at 4), but without further

factual enhancement—including dates and times of treatment—it is not entirely clear

whether her back issues are related to the care she received on an unspecified date from

Nurse Owens. Indeed, in the medical records attached to the Complaint, Brown reported

having back problems for years. Id. at 70.

Finally, Brown alleges that she does not know why “they” refuse to let her see a

doctor. (Doc. 2 at 4). It is unclear who “they” are, and it is further unclear when or how

“they” refused to let Brown see a doctor. Additionally, while Brown attached grievance

documents to her Complaint, and the grievance documents reference similar problems to

the allegations in Brown’s Complaint—including kidney issues and refusing to let Brown

see a doctor—the grievances do not shed any light on what exact provider visits Brown

takes issue with. In short, Brown may not simply attach medical records and grievances to

her Complaint and claim that her medical care is constitutionally deficient. She must state

who she takes issue with, what those people did, when the events took place, and why those

actions rise to the level of a constitutional violation. For all of these reasons, Brown fails

to state any plausible deliberate-indifference claim.

IV. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND

The Court will allow Brown thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to file an

amended complaint to correct the deficiencies in her current pleading. Any amended

complaint must specify the constitutional rights that Brown alleges were violated, list the

Defendants that she believes were personally involved in violating her constitutional rights,

and explain how those Defendants were personally involved. If Brown seeks to state an

official-capacity claim, she must state the basis for doing so.

Brown is placed on notice that, if she files an amended complaint, that pleading will

supersede her previous Complaint. See In re Atlas Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th

Cir. 2000). Accordingly, her Amended Complaint should contain all Defendants she seeks

to name in this matter, all claims she seeks to pursue in this action, and the factual predicate

for all claims against all Defendants. If Brown elects not to file an amended complaint, the

Court will proceed to screen her June 30, 2025 Complaint, (Doc. 2).

V. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The Clerk is directed to mail Brown a § 1983 complaint form that is labeled

“Amended Complaint.”

2. Brown will be allowed to file, within thirty (30) days of the date of this

Order, an Amended Complaint containing the facts described in this Order, which are

necessary to support her claims. If she elects not to file a timely Amended Complaint, the

Court will screen her original Complaint.

SO ORDERED this 20th day of October, 2025.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE