Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Louis Brown, Case No. 1:25-cv-00834

Plaintiff,

-vs-

JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

American Economy Insurance Company,

dba Safeco Insurance.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Defendant.

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant American Economy Insurance Company,

dba Safeco Insurance’s (“Defendant” or “American Economy”) Motion to Dismiss, filed on May 2,

2025 (“Defendant’s Motion”). (Doc. No. 6.) On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff Louis Brown (“Plaintiff”

or “Brown”) filed a Combined Motion in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion and Notice of Plaintiff’s

Counter-Settlement Position (“Plaintiff’s Response”). (Doc. No. 10.) On June 3, 2025, American

Economy filed a Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion (“Defendant’s Reply”). (Doc. No. 11.)

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth the following allegations. Plaintiff entered into a valid

insurance contract with American Economy under policy number OK7319825, which included

coverage for water damage, wind damage, and related perils. (Doc. No. 1-1, PageID # 5.) On three

separate occasions, Plaintiff suffered losses covered under the policy: a. Claim #058695529 (January

23, 2025) – Water damage due to sewer backup. b. Claim #057400285 (July 17, 2024) – Water

damage due to HVAC/plumbing issue. c. Claim #054247731 (July 20, 2023) – Wind damage. (Id.)

Plaintiff timely filed claims and provided all necessary documentation, including damage

assessments, photographs, and repair estimates. (Id.) Defendant failed to pay any of the claims,

despite clear policy coverage and proof of loss. (Id.) Defendant initially authorized water cleanup

for Claim #058695529 but later canceled the service without justification. (Id.) Defendant has failed

to communicate with Plaintiff regarding claim determinations, ignoring numerous inquiries and

failing to provide reasonable justification for denying or delaying payments. (Id.)

Plaintiff has suffered substantial property loss, structural damage, and health complications

due to Defendant’s refusal to provide coverage. (Doc. No. 1-1, PageID # 6.) Plaintiff has a chronic

lung condition and a history of heart transplants and the black mold and toxic smells from the water

damage have exacerbated his medical issues, requiring him to vacate his home and incur additional

living expenses. (Id.) Defendant refused to provide temporary housing despite policy provisions

requiring reasonable accommodations for displacement due to covered losses. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth three claims for relief: Count I - Breach of Contract; Count II

– Bad Faith Insurance Practices; and Count III – Violation of Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.

II. Procedural History

On April 25, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal from the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas and attached thereto the state court pleadings to include Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc.

Nos. 1, 1-1.)1 On April 29, 2025, the Court referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Armstrong for

pretrial supervision, not to include resolution of dispositive motions. (Doc. No. 4.) On May 2, 2025,

American Economy filed its Answer to the Complaint and Defendant’s Motion. (Doc. Nos. 5, 6.) In

1 The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Docket, case number CV114198, demonstrates that Plaintiff’s

Complaint was filed there on March 21, 2025.

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Defendant’s Motion, American Economy seeks dismissal of two of the claims asserted by Plaintiff:

1.) the breach of contract claim for Claim No. 054247731 arising from the wind damage loss that

occurred on July 20, 2023; and 2.) Count III – Violation of Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. 2

(Doc. No. 6, PageID #s 54-55.) On May 27, 2025, Brown filed Plaintiff’s Response, and on June 3,

2025 American Economy filed a Reply in support of Defendant’s Motion. (Doc. Nos. 10, 11.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is ripe for a decision.

III. Standard of Review

In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must

contain (1) ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more than ‘formulaic recitation

of a cause of action's elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative

level.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting in part

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–556 (2007)). For purposes of both Rule 12(b)(6)

and Rule 12(c), “all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be

taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled

to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted).

The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge — whether the Complaint raises a right to relief

above the speculative level — “does not ‘require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

2 In Defendant’s Motion and Reply, American Economy refers to Ohio R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6), instead of Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) and cites Ohio case law interpreting and applying that Ohio rule. (Doc. No. 6, PageID #s 54, 56; Doc. No. 11,

PageID # 209-10.) American Economy is reminded that it removed the case to this Court and Ohio Rules of Civil

Procedure have no application to this matter. The Court will evaluate Plaintiff’s Complaint under the Standard of Review

applicable to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

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Ass’n., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting in part Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at

679. Consequently, examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in

conjunction with the “well-established principle that ‘Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Specific

facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting in part Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)). Nonetheless, while “Rule 8 marks a notable

and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era ... it does not

unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679.

The Court notes that Plaintiff, acting pro se, drafted the Complaint, and that “[p]ro se

complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and

should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). As this case involves a pro se

complaint, the Court will therefore apply a liberal construction.

IV. Analysis

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As a preliminary matter, the Court determines the materials that it may consider in resolving

Defendant’s Motion. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “may consider the Complaint and

any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits

attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are

central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett, 528 F.3d at 426, 430; see also Brent v. Wayne Cty.

Dep’t of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 694 (6th Cir. 2018); Write Start Early Christian Educ. Center,

LLC v, Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins., 836 Fed. Appx. 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2020) (where the Sixth Circuit

found that the district court had properly dismissed the complaint upon reviewing the insurance policy

that included a two-year limitations period that the defendant had “legitimately” incorporated into its

motion to dismiss). In Plaintiff’s Complaint, Brown refers to the insurance policy issued to him by

American Economy and attaches to Plaintiff’s Complaint copies of email and letter correspondence

by and between him and American Economy and Declarations pages associated with policy number

OK7319825.3 (Doc. No. 1-1, PageID #s 15-34.) Indeed, the policy is central to Brown’s claims, was

specifically referred to in Plaintiff’s Complaint and is the premise of Brown’s lawsuit.

3 “The law is clear that courts may consider a document which was attached to the complaint in determining whether

dismissal is proper.” DG Gas, LLC v. TA Franchise Systems LLC, 2025 WL 814928 at *5 n.6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2025)

(citing Cates v. Crystal Clear Technologies, LLC, 874 F.3d 530, 536 (6th Cir. 2017)); Detrick v. KCS International Inc.,

781 F. Supp. 3d 588, 642 (N.D. Ohio 2025) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)) (“[A] copy of any written instrument that is an

exhibit to a pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes.”). Since Brown filed the Complaint and attachments thereto

pro se, the Court has reviewed the same with particular interest in evaluating whether any of the attachments demonstrate

any waiver or estoppel by American Economy of the one-year limitations period applicable to the wind damage

loss/claim. Brown’s attachments include declarations pages of the Policy issued to him by American Economy for the

years June 1, 2023 to June 1, 2024 and June 1, 2024 to June 1, 2025, and notices of certain changes or amendments made

thereto at the request of Brown associated with the mortgage serving company and identity of the first mortgagee. The

reservation of rights letters sent by American Economy to Brown cite the one-year limitations period, but these

reservations of rights letters are associated only with the January 23, 2025 water damage loss referred to in Plaintiff’s

Complaint as Claim #058695529. (Doc. No. 1-1, PageID #s 15-23.) Therefore, they have no bearing on the issue of

whether the one-year limitation for filing suit requires dismissal of Brown’s wind damage loss that is the subject of

Defendant’s Motion. Indeed, the correspondence attached to the Complaint does not include any representations

regarding the July 20, 2023 wind loss, much less any that could be construed as indicating any waiver or estoppel of the

one-year suit limitation by American Economy.

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Attached to Defendant’s Motion as Exhibit 1 are an Affidavit of Jodi Christian, Archivist of

American Economy certifying that the copy of the policy of insurance, number OK7319825 issued

to Named Insured, Louis Brown, and endorsements, in effect from June 1, 2023 to June 1, 2024 is a

true and accurate recital of all of the provisions in the original policy and endorsements attached

thereto (“the Policy”); and the certified copy of the Policy. (Doc. No. 6-1, PageID #s 62-183.)

Accordingly, the Court can and will consider the certified copy of the Policy attached to

Defendant’s Motion as Exhibit 1 in evaluating Defendant’s Motion.

A. Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for Claim No.

054247713 is barred by the one-year suit provision is well-taken and GRANTED.

American Economy argues that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for Claim No. 054247713

should be dismissed because: according to Plaintiff’s Complaint, the loss to the insured property

from the wind damage alleged by Plaintiff occurred on July 20, 2023; there is a policy provision

requiring Brown to have filed suit against it within one year of the loss or by July 20, 2024; Plaintiff’s

Complaint was filed on March 21, 2025 or more than one year after the July 20, 2023 loss; and

therefore, the claim is barred by the one-year time limitation and Brown is not entitled to coverage

for that claim.

In Plaintiff’s Response, Brown contends that he provided timely notice and cooperated fully

with American Economy’s inspections and that the “suit limitation clause” is “questionable.” (Doc.

No. 10, PageID # 204.) Brown asserts that Defendant’s Motion “relies on contested factual issues

and policy interpretations not appropriate for adjudication at the pleading stage.” (Id., PageID # 205.)

Brown submits that “[d]ismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is only proper where there is no

plausible claim for relief on the face of the complaint.” (Id.) According to Brown, he has alleged

property loss events and timely and reasonable notice of the property losses, and Defendant’s failure

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to pay under the policy. Brown asserts that his claims “are supported by documentation, photo

evidence, and communications from the insurer.” (Id.)

In Defendant’s Reply, American Economy argues that in Plaintiff’s Response, Brown

“attempts to frame the timeliness issue as a factual dispute, but it is not” and reiterates its request to

this Court that it apply the “unambiguous policy language” of the one-year limitation for bringing

suit to dismiss Brown’s July 20, 2023 wind loss claim. For the following reasons, the Court finds

that the wind loss claim is barred by the one-year suit provision and must be dismissed.

As an initial matter, in making the argument that the July 20, 2023 wind loss claim should be

dismissed based upon a specific policy provision, i.e., the one-year suit limitation, in its briefing

American Economy cites “Exhibit 1” which consists of 123 pages. It does not cite to the specific

portion of the Policy where the one-year suit limitation applicable to the July 20, 2023 alleged loss is

set forth. This Court should not have to peruse 123 pages of an Exhibit to determine where the

applicable provision is located. See, e.g., Eller Media Co. v. City of Cleveland, 161 F. Supp. 2d 796,

811 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“[T]his Court does not have the burden to conduct a blanket review of nearly

one hundred pages merely generally referred to by Defendant as supporting its position in order to

ascertain whether those exhibits do, in fact, support Defendant's position.”). But after expending time

to do so, the Court located the applicable policy provision within Defendant’s Exhibit 1.

The Policy in effect from June 1, 2023 to June 1, 2024 is the policy that was in force at the

time of the July 20, 2023 wind loss claimed by Brown. SECTION I-PROPERTY CONDITIONS

includes the following condition: “8. Suit Against Us. No action shall be brought against us unless

there has been compliance with the policy provisions and the action is started within one year after

the inception of the loss or damage.” (Doc. No. 6-1, PageID #s 101-04.)

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Ohio enforces a one-year contractual limitation period for bringing suit under a homeowners’

policy when the language of the limitation period is clear and unambiguous. Hounshell v. Am. States

Ins. Co., 424 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ohio 1981); Dominish v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 953 N.E.2d 820, 822

(Ohio 2011). However, in Hounshell, syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court stated, “‘An insurance

company may be held to have waived a limitation of action clause in a fire insurance policy by acts

or declarations which evidence a recognition of liability, or acts or declarations which hold out a

reasonable hope of adjustment and which acts or declarations occasion the delay by the insured in

filing an action on the insurance contract until after the period of limitation has expired.’” Dominish,

953 N.E.2d at 822 (quoting Hounshell, 424 N.E.2d at 311, syllabus).

The language of the one-time contractual limitation in the American Policy is almost identical

to the one-year contractual limitation that the Court in Dominish found to be clear and unambiguous.

Accordingly, the American Economy policy provision is clear and unambiguous. The only remaining

issue as to enforcement of this condition to bar Brown’s wind loss claim is whether there are any

allegations in the Complaint or indications or language in the attachments that can be construed as

indicating that American Economy waived the condition. There are none. Indeed, Plaintiff’s

Complaint and attachments thereto do not contain any allegations, theories or facts indicating the

one-year limitation condition does not or should not apply. Accordingly, the Court finds that Brown’s

wind loss claim is barred by the one-year limitation condition, and it is dismissed with prejudice.

B. Defendant’s argument that Count Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint must be

dismissed because the OCSPA is inapplicable to insurance contracts is well-taken

and GRANTED.

In Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Brown claims that Defendant’s conduct constitutes an

unfair or deceptive act under Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1345.02 and

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1345.03; that Defendant engaged in unfair practices by accepting insurance premiums while

systematically denying valid claims without justification; and Defendant’s actions constitute

consumer fraud, entitling Plaintiff to treble damages and attorney fees. (Doc. No. 1-1, PageID # 6.)

However, the OCSPA does not include within its definition of “consumer transactions”

transactions with insurance companies. Id. § 1345.01(A). Specifically, pursuant to § 1345.01(A),

one of the “persons” excluded from the OCSPA is an “insurance company” as defined in relevant

part in Ohio Rev. Code § 5725.01(C) as “every corporation, association, and society engaged in the

business of any character, or engaged in the business of entering into contracts substantially amount

to insurance of any character….” Id. § 5725.01; Bernard v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,

2009 WL 2413922 at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2009). American Economy is correct when it asserts

that “Ohio courts interpreting the OCSPA ‘have routinely ruled that insurance coverage disputes are

not consumer transactions recognized under the OCSPA.’” Id. (collecting cases). (Doc. No. 6,

PageID # 59.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s OCSPA claim set forth in Count III against American

Economy, the insurance company that issued a policy of homeowners’ insurance to Brown, which

policy forms the basis for his lawsuit, must be dismissed.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claim for the

wind damage loss that occurred on July 20, 2023 and identified as Claim No. 054247731 in Plaintiff’s

Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Also, Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Pamela A. Barker

PAMELA A. BARKER

Date: October 20, 2025 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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