Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

JOE LEWIS VALENTINE, No. CV 25-02436-VBF (DFM)

Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF

THE BOARD OF PAROLE

HEARINGS et al.,

Defendants.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Joe Lewis Valentine, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”).

Plaintiff asserts claims against the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole

Hearings, the Executive Officer of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation, and the District Attorney of Los Angeles (collectively,

“Defendants”) arising from the denial of his parole in May 2020. See id. at 3-4.

Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Court must screen the

Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim on which relief might be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. As discussed below, the Complaint

must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim. Because the deficiencies in

the Complaint cannot be cured, dismissal is without leave to amend.

Il. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is a California state prisoner currently serving a sentence of 25-

years-to-life for his conviction of conspiracy to commit murder. See Compl. at

13. Plaintiff challenges his parole denial related to this conviction, asserting

that Defendants violated his due process rights during his May 21, 2020, parole

hearing. See id. at 7. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

mischaracterized his conviction by concluding that he was convicted of both

conspiracy to commit murder and the actual murder of the victim, Johnny Ray

Bright, when in fact, he had not been convicted on the murder charge. See id.

In reaching this conclusion, according to Plaintiff, the Parole Board improperly

relied upon a 1982 probation report and 1983 state appellate court decision,

even though the probation report contains inaccurate and unreliable

information, and the appellate decision clarifies that he was not convicted of

murder. See id. at 10-11. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages,

as well as an order that the Parole Board provide him a new parole hearing.

See id. at 6.

Plaintiff previously filed a federal habeas action challenging the same

denial of parole. See Joe Lewis Valentine v. F. Guzman, Case No. CV 24-

02127-VBF-DFM (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2024). Plaintiff's habeas petition was

denied on November 20, 2024, on the ground that it failed to state a cognizable

federal habeas claim. See id., Dkts. 10, 11.

IW. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a

claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient

facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether the complaint states

a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of material fact must be

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Love v.

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Because Plaintiff is

appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations of the complaint

liberally and afford him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A.

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). But “the liberal pleading

standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil

rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption

that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and alteration

omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citation

omitted)).

If the Court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state

a claim, it has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend

should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could

be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. See id. at 1130-31; see also Cato

v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be

given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies,

unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be

cured by amendment.”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.

1987)). But if after careful consideration it is clear that a complaint cannot be

cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss it without leave to amend. See id.

at 1105-06; Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002)

(holding that “there is no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further

amendment” when plaintiffs could not cure the “basic flaw” in the pleading);

Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because

any amendment would be futile, there was no need to prolong the litigation by

permitting further amendment.”).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claims are Heck-Barred

Civil tort actions, including § 1983 suits, are not an appropriate means to

challenge the validity of outstanding criminal judgments where success in the

civil action would necessarily require a plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of

his conviction or confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486

(1994). To recover damages, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove “that the conviction

or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Id. at 487.

The Ninth Circuit has held that Heck applies with equal force in the

context of parole and probation. See Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024

(9th Cir. 1997) (“We have no difficulty in concluding that a challenge to the

procedures used in the denial of parole necessarily implicates the validity of the

denial of parole and, therefore, the prisoner’s continuing confinement.”)

(citation omitted); Baskett v. Papini, 245 Fed. App’x 677, 678 (9th Cir. Aug.

21, 2007) (affirming Heck denial because the complaint “necessarily call[ed]

into question the validity of the probation revocation” and plaintiff “failed to

allege that his sentence ha[d] been invalidated.”). District courts, in turn, have

repeatedly found that the Heck bar applies to claims that challenge the fact or

duration of parole. See, e.g., Breitbard v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab.,

No. 22-0653, 2022 WL 3048173, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2022) (“Because

success on Plaintiff’s claims would necessarily undermine the validity of

Plaintiff’s parole term, the instant claims for damages are barred by the Heck

doctrine.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3047131 (C.D.

Cal. Aug. 2, 2022); Bailey v. Nevada Parole Bd., 2022 WL 980551, at *2 (D.

Nev. Mar. 31, 2022) (“The Heck test also applies to proceedings that affect the

fact or duration of parole.”).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when

they denied him parole based on his refusal “to accept the Board Panel’s

improper legal position and prejudicial conclusion—i.e., that his commitment

offense is a conspiracy to kill and killing Bright.” Compl. at 8. Plaintiff’s claim

falls squarely within the proscription of the Heck doctrine. Indeed, “[f]ew

things implicate the validity of continued confinement more directly than the

allegedly improper denial of parole. This is true whether that denial is alleged

to be improper based upon procedural defects in the parole hearing or upon

allegations that parole was improperly denied on the merits.” Butterfield, 120

F.3d at 1024 (concluding that plaintiff’s allegation that defendants violated his

due process rights when they relied on false information in his prison file to

find him ineligible for parole was barred by Heck).

In Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit

recognized a narrow exception to Heck’s general applicability for claims

brought by “former prisoners challenging loss of good-time credits, revocation

of parole or similar matters” where a habeas remedy is unavailable due to

mootness because the prisoner had “fully served the period of incarceration

that he is attacking” before he was able to obtain habeas relief. Id. at 876. As

the Ninth Circuit has explained: “Nonnette was founded on the unfairness of

barring a plaintiff’s potentially legitimate constitutional claim when the

individual immediately pursued relief after the incident giving rise to those

claims and could not seek habeas relief only because of the shortness of his

prison sentence.” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, the Nonnette exception does not apply to Plaintiff. As an initial

matter, Plaintiff is not challenging the loss of good-time credits or the

revocation of parole; instead, he is challenging the denial of parole and thus

does not fall within the narrow parameters of the Nonnette exception.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s claims fell within the scope of the Nonnette

exception, Plaintiff’s ability to obtain habeas relief was not cut short by his

release from custody. Instead, Plaintiff remains in custody where he sought

habeas relief, which was denied.1 As such, the concern underlying Heck—the

need to avoid “the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort action

after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in

contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting

resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction”—requires

application of the Heck doctrine in this case to avoid conflicting judgments.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims related to the denial of his parole are

Heck barred and must be dismissed.

1 According to publicly available records, Plaintiff remains incarcerated

at California State Prison, Centinela, following his stipulation to unsuitability

for parole on May 13, 2025. See California Incarcerated Records and

Information Search, https://ciris.mt.cdcr.ca.gov/search (search by name “Joe

Lewis Valentine”). He is next eligible for parole in May 2028. See id.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff sues the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings, the

Executive Officer of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, and the District Attorney of Los Angeles in their official

capacity. See Compl. at 3.2 The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

bars suits against states, state agencies, and state officials in their official

capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). An

“official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Such a suit

“is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the

entity.” Id.

Here, Defendants are officers or agents of the California Department of

Corrections or the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff’s official-

capacity claims against these Defendants are tantamount to claims against the

State of California. See Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 988-89 (9th

Cir. 2014) (affirming that claims against state department of corrections is

barred by Eleventh Amendment); Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070,

1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (“California DAs . . . act as state officials, and so possess

Eleventh Amendment immunity, when acting in their prosecutorial capacity.”)

(citation omitted). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s

2 It is not clear whether Plaintiff is attempting to pursue claims against

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Board of Parole

Hearings, or the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office. Although he

references these entities throughout the Complaint, they are not named in the

list of Defendants. See Compl. at 3-4. If he is pursuing claims against these

entities, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984) (the Eleventh

Amendment prohibits suits against a State or its agencies in federal court

unless the State waives its immunity).

claims for damages against these Defendants in their official capacity.

C. Prosecutorial Immunity

In addition, the District Attorney of Los Angeles is entitled to immunity

for any role in Plaintiff’s parole hearing. “A prosecutor is protected by absolute

immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 ‘when performing the

traditional functions of an advocate.’” Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630,

636 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “[P]rosecutors should be afforded

absolute immunity for parole recommendations, because parole decisions are a

continuation of the sentencing process.” Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554

F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 2009).

D. Parole Board Immunity

Likewise, the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings is

immune from Plaintiff’s suit because his claims against him are based entirely

on the denial of Plaintiff’s parole. See Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064,

1066 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Although a section 1983 action may be maintained

against officials acting in their individual capacities, parole board officials are

entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages for their actions taken

when processing parole applications.” (citations omitted)).

D. Supervisory Liability

Finally, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are based solely on their

supervisory status. Supervisory personnel generally are not liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, in the

absence of a state law imposing such liability. See Redman v. Cnty. of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). A plaintiff must allege either (1)

the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).

Here, Plaintiff has done neither, instead asserting only that Defendants

“sanctioned” the “incorrect legal conclusion that [he] committed murder.”

Compl. at 3.

Accordingly, because allowing further amendment of Plaintiff's claims

would be futile for the reasons discussed above, they will be dismissed without

leave to amend.

V. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

and 1915A, that this action is dismissed without leave to amend. Judgment

shall be entered accordingly.

Dated: October 3, 2025 /s/ Valerie Baker Fairbank

VALERIE BAKER FAIRBANK

United States District Judge

Presented by:

DOUGLAS F. a—\

United States Magistrate Judge