Torres

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 JULIAN TORRES, Case No. 25-cv-08964-TLT

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER SCREENING AND

9 v. DISMISSING COMPLAINT

10 EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 2

DEPARTMENT (EDD), et al.,

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Defendants.

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13 Before the Court is Plaintiff Julian Torres (“Plaintiff”)’s motion for leave to proceed in

14 forma pauperis and Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order. ECF 1; ECF 2.

15 After review and consideration of the complaint, motion, attachments and exhibits thereto,

16 the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, DISMISSES

17 WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and DENIES Plaintiff’s

18 motion for temporary restraining order.

19 I. BACKGROUND

20 On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a combined complaint and motion for temporary

21 restraining order against Defendant Employment Development Department (“EDD”). ECF 1.

22 Plaintiff’s complaint brings claims under: (1) violation of Title II of the Americans with

23 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; (2) 29 U.S.C. § 794; (3) Cal. Gov. Code. § 11135,

24 (4) 42 U.S.C. § 12203; and (5) Due Process, U.S. Const. amend XIV. ECF 1 at 2. Plaintiff seeks

25 declaratory and injunctive relief “compelling ADA-compliant procedures, acceptance of

26 certification under protest, non-retaliation, record preservation and product, and any further just

27 relief, including fees and costs. Id.

1 On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF

2 2.

3 II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

4 On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF 2.

5 Having considered the application, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma

6 pauperis subject to Plaintiffs complaint being screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has

7 submitted the required documentation and the listed assets and income are insufficient to enable

8 payment. See ECF 2.

9 III. LEGAL STANDARD

10 A. Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

11 The in forma pauperis statute provides that the Court shall dismiss the case if at any time

12 the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or that the action (1) is frivolous or

13 malicious, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

14 against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

15 A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because Section 1915(e)(2)

16 parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

17 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000). The complaint, therefore, must allege facts that plausibly establish the

18 defendant’s liability. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007). When the

19 complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, courts must “construe the pleadings liberally . . . to

20 afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)

21 (citations omitted). Upon dismissal, pro se plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis must be given

22 leave to “amend their complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint

23 could not be cured by amendment.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1235 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984)

24 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

25 B. Temporary Restraining Order

26 Requests for TROs are governed by the same general standards that govern the issuance of

27 a preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347

1 (9th Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy,” that is never

2 awarded as of right. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008) (internal citations omitted).

3 Whether seeking a TRO or a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish four factors: (1) that

4 he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence

5 of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is

6 in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Plaintiff

7 carries the burden of establishing the Winter factors. Id.

8 IV. DISCUSSION

9 A. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Insufficient to Satisfy Section 1915 Screening

Because Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim

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11 To satisfy the pleading standard required to survive Section 1915(e)(2) a Plaintiffs’

12 “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must . . . suggest that the claim has at least a plausible

13 chance of success.’” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v.

14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Courts

15 may dismiss claims that lack “sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v.

16 Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted)

17 Plaintiff’s complaint brings claims under: (1) violation of Title II of the Americans with

18 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; (2) 29 U.S.C. § 794; (3) Cal. Gov. Code. § 11135,

19 (4) 42 U.S.C. § 12203; and (5) Due Process, U.S. Const. amend XIV. ECF 1 at 2. Plaintiff seeks

20 declaratory and injunctive relief “compelling ADA-compliant procedures, acceptance of

21 certification under protest, non-retaliation, record preservation and product, and any further just

22 relief, including fees and costs. Id. Plaintiff broadly alleges that his claims are related to a

23 whistleblower disclosure and requested accommodations under the ADA, but Plaintiff’s complaint

24 includes no argument or facts related to his five causes of actions. See ECF 1 at 2; Iqbal, 556 U.S.

25 at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

26 statements, do not suffice.”).

27 With respect to Count I, Plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations related to his

1 Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017) (To allege a claim under Title II of the ADA,

2 Plaintiff must allege “(1) he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability;’ (2) he was either excluded

3 from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, or

4 was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of

5 benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” ).

6 With respect to Count II, Plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations related to

7 Defendant’s “inten[tion] to discriminate,” nor does he provide factual support for the contention

8 that any actions taken by Defendant were “on the basis of [Plaintiff’s] disability.” See T.B. ex rel.

9 Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 466 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To establish a

10 claim for damages under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA, a plaintiff must prove that the

11 defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of his or her disability, or was deliberately

12 indifferent to the disability.”).

13 With respect to Count III, Plaintiff fails to allege that state agencies themselves are liable

14 under Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135 (which is aimed at recipients of state funding), and moreover,

15 Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts about his alleged disability and how he experienced

16 discrimination. See Martinez v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 20-cv-06570, 2025 WL 240767, at *19

17 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2025) (Section 11135 “incorporates the protections and prohibitions of the

18 ADA and its implementing regulations.”) (internal quotations omitted); Merritt-Rojas v. Life

19 Moves, No. 23-cv-04383, 2023 WL 8190175, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2023) (dismissing § 11135

20 claim for the same reasons as plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title II of the ADA).

21 With respect to Count IV, Plaintiff fails to allege retaliation under the ADA because he

22 fails to plausibly allege that he engaged in any protected activity related to a qualifying disability.

23 See Dominguez v. Bachofer, No. 24-cv-02904, 2024 WL 5163946, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16,

24 2024); Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that to state a

25 claim under Title V of the ADA, Plaintiff must allege as a threshold matter, that “he or she

26 engaged in a protected activity”). Plaintiff does not adequately allege a qualifying disability under

27 the ADA in Count I, nor does he allege any particular policies discriminating against him on the

1 Finally, with respect to Count V, Plaintiff does not allege any substantive due process right

2 or deprivation of a protected interest giving rise to a procedural due process claim. See Witt v.

3 Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding substantive due process claim

4 requires allegations of a “fundamental right”); Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904

5 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding procedural due process claim requires allegations of a “(1) a liberty or

6 property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government;

7 [and] (3) lack of process”).

8 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Counts I–V and his complaint is deficient

9 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

10 The decision of whether to grant leave to amend is “within the discretion of the district

11 court.” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Foman

12 v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). A district court may deny leave for many reasons, including

13 “futility of amendment.” Id. Here, Plaintiff’s complaint consists of only a few short statements

14 and no argument. ECF 1. Accordingly, the Court finds that granting leave to amend would be

15 futile. See Sohn v. California Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 20-cv-03780, 2021 WL 3173301, at *6

16 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2021) (dismissing complaint without leave to amend where plaintiff “failed to

17 allege facts sufficient to state a claim under any of the federal statutes enumerated” and finding

18 that “nothing in the [complaint] suggests that [plaintiff] would be able to state a claim” if given

19 opportunity to amend); Sermeno v. Tang, No. 25-cv-06488, 2025 WL 2722659, at *6 (N.D. Cal.

20 Sept. 5, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 25-cv-06488, 2025 WL 2721682 (N.D.

21 Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (recommending dismissal with prejudice where complaint “lacks any legally

22 viable theory of liability); Feng v. Alta Bates Summit Med. Ctr., No. 25-cv-06598, 2025 WL

23 2899510, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (dismissing claim with prejudice where “claims are too

24 insubstantial” to warrant amendment).

25 Accordingly, although Plaintiff financially qualifies for IFP, Plaintiff’s complaint is

26 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, for

27 the reasons stated above. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

1 B. Temporary Restraining Order

2 Because the Court dismisses this claim as deficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court

3 || DENIES Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF 1. See Lawson v. Pacholke,

4 || 830F. App’x 976, 977 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming dismissal of denial of preliminary injunction

5 motion where underlying claims dismissed); Jurado v. Ramirez, No. 20-cv-08602, 2021 WL

6 || 3771783, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2021) (similar).

7 V. CONCLUSION

8 For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES the case WITH PREJUDICE and

9 finds that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted for the reasons stated

10 || above. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining

11 order. The Clerk of Court is ordered to terminate the case.

12 The Order resolves ECF 1, ECF 2.

14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

15 |) Dated: October 17, 2025 ( » fe

TRINA L PSON

3 17 United States District Judge

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