BROWN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN BROWN CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

NO. 25-4793

v.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY

COMPANY

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

Baylson, J. October 17, 2025

In a case seeking underinsured motorist coverage, Plaintiff moves the Court to remand this

case to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s

Motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff John Brown alleges that on May 17, 2022, while driving a car owned by Kent

Stewart (“Stewart”), he was struck by a tortfeasor. ECF 1, Notice of Removal, Ex. A, “Compl.”

¶¶ 8–9. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of this collision, he suffered temporary and permanent

injuries. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that the full and final settlement reached with the tortfeasor is

insufficient to fully compensate for his injuries. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Plaintiff alleges that Stewart’s car

was covered by an insurance policy issued by Progressive Commercial Advantage Agency

(“PCAA”), which included coverage for underinsured motorists. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that he

demanded underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to Stewart’s policy but failed to receive

benefits. Id. ¶¶ 12, 26.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County, asserting claims for breach of contract and statutory bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371.

Compl. The body of the Complaint names Progressive Commercial Advantage Agency (“PCAA”)

as the defendant in the Court of Common Pleas and pleads all allegations against PCAA. Id.

However, the Civil Cover Sheet filed alongside the Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas

named United Financial Casualty Company (“UFCC”) as the defendant. Id. Thus, the case was

docketed as “Brown v. United Financial Casualty Company” in the Court of Common Pleas. ECF

1, Notice of Removal, Ex. B, “Mot. to Amend Caption.” Both PCAA and UFCC are subsidiaries

of the Progressive Corporation. Id. ¶ 15.

Plaintiff alleges service of process was effectuated upon PCAA on July 23, 2025. ECF 6,

Motion to Remand, Ex. B “Aff. of Service.” On August 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Leave to Amend Caption in the Court of Common Pleas to name PCAA as the defendant in the

caption and remove UFCC from the caption. ECF 1, Mot. to Amend Caption. Before the Court

of Common Pleas ruled on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Caption, UFCC filed Notice of Removal

in this Court on August 20, 2025. ECF 1, Notice of Removal. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand

in this Court to return the case to the Court of Common Pleas on August 21, 2025. ECF 6, “Mot.

to Remand.” Defendant filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand on August

29, 2025. ECF 9, “Def.’s Opp.”

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if the

federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. District courts “have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

$75,000, exclusive interests and costs, and is between [ ] citizens of different states. Id. §

1332(a)(1). The removing party bears the burden of establishing removal is proper. Frederico v.

Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007). After a case has been removed, it may be

remanded back to state court “if the removal was procedurally defective or subject matter

jurisdiction is lacking.” A.F. v. Dep't of Corr., 2021 WL 3604784, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2021)

(quoting Farrell v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 478 F. Supp. 3d 536, 540 (D.N.J. 2020)).

The removal statute is strictly construed and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of remand.

Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2013).

IV. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

In the Notice of Removal, UFCC alleges that this Court has original diversity jurisdiction

over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Notice of Removal ¶ 17. UFCC asserts that

complete diversity exists because Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania and UFCC is a citizen of

Ohio. Id. ¶ 5, 9. Further, UFCC contends that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional

requirement of $75,000 because Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to underinsured motorist

coverage pursuant to a commercial automobile policy providing $500,000 in underinsured

motorist benefits, as well as punitive damages and attorney’s fees under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371. Id. ¶

16.

In Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, he argues that removal was improper because this Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Mot. to Remand ¶ 11. Plaintiff asserts that, due to a clerical

error, UFCC was inadvertently entered as a defendant in the state court electronic filing system

when the Complaint was uploaded. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff contends that because UFCC was never

named in the Complaint, pleaded against, or served, it is not a party to this case and its removal

was therefore unauthorized and invalid. ECF 6, Mem. in Support of Mot. to Remand at 1–3.

Plaintiff then argues that because PCAA is the only intended defendant in this case, complete

diversity does not exist because PCAA is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania

and is therefore a Pennsylvania citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 2–3.

In its Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, UFCC counters that UFCC, not PCAA,

issued the insurance policy at issue in this matter and is the only insurer that could properly be

named as a defendant in this case. Def.’s Opp. at 1. Further, UFCC contends it was the only party

who could properly remove the case because when removing a case, the federal court caption and

the state court caption must be identical. Id. at 2. Thus, the case against PCAA was not removable

because PCAA was not named in the caption. Id. UFCC also responds that diversity exists

between Plaintiff and PCAA because PCAA was both incorporated in Ohio and maintains its

principal place of business there. Id. at 3.

V. DISCUSSION

A. UFCC Was Not a Party to the State Court Action

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that a complaint contain a caption that

names all parties. However, the caption is not determinative of the identity of the parties to the

action and “[a] person or entity can be named in the caption of a complaint without necessarily

becoming a party to the action.” U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, New York, 556 U.S.

928, 935 (2009). To determine whether an entity has properly been made a party to a lawsuit, the

district court will consult “the caption, pleadings, service of process and other indications of the

intent of the pleader.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 896 F. Supp. 104, 109 (E.D.N.Y.

1995). “Beyond an individual's mere inclusion in the caption, the more important indication of

whether she is a party to the case are the allegations in the body of the complaint.” Habelt v.

iRhythm Techs., Inc., 83 F.4th 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2023).

Here, although UFCC was named as the defendant on the Civil Cover Sheet filed in the

Court of Common Pleas, UFCC is not named anywhere in the body of Complaint itself. Compl.

The Complaint’s caption names PCAA as the defendant and pleads all allegations against PCAA.

Id. Further, PCAA, not UFCC, was served with process in the state court action. Aff. of Service.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Caption provides additional evidence of Plaintiff’s intent that PCAA,

rather than UFCC, is the defendant in this case. Mot. to Amend. After consulting the case caption,

pleadings, service of process, and intent of the pleader, it is clear that PCAA was the intended

defendant in the state court action. Because UFCC was not named as a defendant in the Complaint

in Court of Common Pleas or served with process, UFCC was not a party to the state court action

despite its presence on the Civil Cover Sheet.

B. As a Non-Party, UFCC’s Removal is Improper

The right of removal is limited exclusively to defendants. See Gross v. Deberardinis, 722

F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (D. Del. 2010) (“by its plain language [28 U.S.C. 1441(a)] limits the right of

removal to the ‘defendant’ or ‘defendants.’”). A non-party entity lacks the authority to institute

removal proceedings. See Juliano v. Citigroup, 626 F. Supp. 2d 317, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)

(holding that a non-party lacks standing to invoke removal jurisdiction and purported removal by

a non-party is “improvident and without jurisdiction.”). This is true regardless of whether the non-

party removing entity claims to be a real party in interest. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. RJR

Nabisco Holdings Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 296, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“a non-party—even one that .

. . claims to be a real party in interest—has no authority to notice removal . . . .”); Adams v.

Adminastar Def. Servs., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding that whether the non-

party remover has an interest in the litigation must first be decided by the court in which the

plaintiffs brought suit).

In Kovalev, a plaintiff sued a subsidiary of Lidl grocery stores, “Lidl US, LLC” in state

court. Kovalev v. Lidl US, LLC, 2024 WL 5184290, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2024) (Slomsky, J.).

A different subsidiary of Lidl, “Lidl US Operations, LLC” filed Notice of Removal in federal

court, arguing that plaintiff incorrectly identified Lidl US, LLC as the defendant when Lidl US

Operations, LLC owns and operates the grocery store at issue. Id. at 1–2. Diversity of citizenship

existed between the plaintiff and both subsidiaries. Id. at 2. The plaintiff moved to remand,

arguing that removal was improper because the case was removed by a non-party to the state court

action. Id. The court ultimately held that the case was improperly removed because Lidl US

Operations, LLC was not a defendant in the state case at the time it filed notice of removal. Id. at

4. In Kovalev, the case remained in federal court because the court held that plaintiff had waived

his right to challenge the improper removal when he filed an amended complaint in federal court

adding the non-party remover as a defendant. Id. at 5. However, the court noted that, had the case

been remanded to state court, Lidl US, LLC could have immediately remedied its error by filing

another notice of removal, this time naming itself as the removing party, thus landing the case back

in federal court. Id. at 6.

Here, regardless of whether UFCC issued the automobile insurance policy at issue in this

case, it was not a defendant within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) at the time of removal.

Because UFCC was not properly made a party to the lawsuit in state court before it filed Notice of

Removal, it lacked authority to remove the case to this Court. Thus, the action was improperly

removed by a non-party and must be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas.1

1 Plaintiff argues that even if PCAA had filed the Notice of Removal in this case, remand would still be necessary

because complete diversity is lacking. Mot. to Remand ¶ 10. In Plaintiff’s view, because PCAA is subject to

personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, PCAA is also a citizen of Pennsylvania for purposes of diversity subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. This is a confusion of the doctrines of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.

Regardless of whether PCAA may be subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania based on its business activities

and registration, for purposes of evaluating diversity of citizenship, PCAA is a citizen only of its state of

incorporation and principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED. An appropriate

ORDER follows.

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motion to remand.docx

citizen of Pennsylvania and PCAA was incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in Ohio. The

parties also do not dispute that the amount of controversy is satisfied. The Court therefore recognizes that once this

case returns to state court, Progressive may remedy UFCC’s improper non-party removal by filing another Notice of

Removal naming PCAA as the removing party. See Kovalev, 2024 WL 5184290 at *6.