Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

GRIMALDI DEEP SEA S.p.A.,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:24-cv-562-MMH-SJH

SSA ATLANTIC, LLC,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant SSA Atlantic, LLC’s

Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 24; Motion), filed April 24, 2025.

On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff, Grimaldi Deep Sea S.p.A. (Grimaldi), filed its

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31;

Response). Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for consideration.

I. Background1

On June 3, 2020, the M/V Hoegh Xiamen (the Vessel), a cargo ship, was

berthed at the Blount Island Marine Terminal in Jacksonville, Florida. See

1 In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the

Amended Complaint (Doc. 22), filed on April 10, 2025, as true, consider the allegations in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, Grimaldi Deep Sea S.p.A., and accept all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. See Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335

(11th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). As such, the

facts recited here are drawn from the Amended Complaint and may well differ from those that

can ultimately be proved.

Amended Complaint ¶ 8. The Vessel was time chartered to Grimaldi.2 Id. ¶ 3.

Prior to the Vessel’s arrival in Jacksonville, Grimaldi contracted with

Defendant, SSA Atlantic, LLC (SSA), for stevedoring services. Id. ¶ 18. As the

stevedore, SSA was responsible for loading approximately 1,500 used vehicles

onto the Vessel for international transport. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17, 18. When the parties

entered into the contract, Grimaldi provided SSA with instructions on how to

complete the loading operations, including procedures for disconnecting

batteries in used vehicles. Id. ¶ 19. Specifically, SSA was to remove the negative

cable from its battery post and cover the exposed part with a battery cap or

wrap the disconnected battery cable with tape. Id. ¶¶ 20–22. The purpose of

these procedures was to reduce the risk of fires caused by used vehicles. Id. ¶ 23.

On June 4, 2025, shortly after the loading operations were completed, a

fire broke out on the Vessel. Id. ¶¶ 38, 49–50. The Vessel’s crew attempted to

extinguish the fire until a team of firefighters from the Jacksonville Fire and

Rescue Department (JFRD) arrived. Id. ¶¶ 58–62, 64. While JFRD crew were

on board the Vessel, an explosion occurred, causing extensive injuries to many

of the firefighters. Id. ¶ 71. After eight days of firefighting efforts, the U.S. Coast

Guard declared that the fire had been extinguished. Id. ¶ 72. Ultimately, many

2 A time charter does not involve transfer of possession or control of a vessel; the owner

of the vessel fully equips and maintains the vessel and retains responsibility for it. See Walker

v. Braus, 995 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1993).

of the vehicles on the Vessel were damaged in the fire, and the Vessel itself was

declared a total loss. Id. ¶¶ 73–74.

Eleven firefighters who were injured in the explosion on the Vessel sued

multiple defendants, including both Grimaldi and SSA. Id. ¶ 83. Shortly before

trial, the firefighter plaintiffs settled their claims against SSA and Grimaldi.

Id. Grimaldi also faced claims for loss or damage to the vehicles that were on

board the Vessel and claims from the Vessel’s owner. Id. ¶¶ 100, 101–103.

Grimaldi ultimately settled these claims as well. Id.

Grimaldi now brings a breach of contract action against SSA, seeking to

recover “contribution and/or indemnity” for the expenses Grimaldi incurred in

defending against and settling the claims asserted against it. See id. ¶¶ 104,

105. According to Grimaldi, SSA failed to properly disconnect numerous

batteries, secure disconnected cables, and cap the battery posts in vehicles

loaded aboard the Vessel. Id. ¶¶ 29, 32. Grimaldi contends that the fire was

caused, in whole or in part, by SSA’s failure to properly load, stow, and secure

the cargo in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with the stevedoring

contract. Id. ¶ 108.

II. Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint

should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide

the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also

Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations,

unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will

not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled

to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on

a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

III. Discussion

In the Amended Complaint, Grimaldi brings one claim for breach of

contract and/or breach of implied warranty of workmanlike performance

(Warranty) against SSA. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 105–109. In the Motion,

SSA seeks dismissal of the Amended Complaint, arguing, amongst other things,

that Grimaldi, as a time charterer, cannot avail itself of the Warranty.3 See

Motion at 20–22. As discussed below, while the Warranty is implied in the

contract between Grimaldi and SSA, Grimaldi does not have a contractual right

to indemnification under the Warranty. Because Grimaldi cannot recover the

3 Among its other arguments, SSA contends that the Amended Complaint is due to be

dismissed because Grimaldi failed to perfect service of process within 90 days of initiating this

action. See Motion at 12–16. It is undisputed that Grimaldi failed to properly serve SSA within

90 days as required by Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). See Motion

at 12; Response at 4. However, on February 21, 2025, the Court extended the deadline for

Grimaldi to effect and file proof of proper service on SSA. See Order (Doc. 11) (extending the

deadline to March 21, 2025). Grimaldi complied with this court-ordered deadline. See Return

of Service (Doc. 12), filed on March 3, 2025. As such, the Amended Complaint is not due to be

dismissed for failure to serve process in accordance with Rule 4(m). See Rule 4(m); Horenkamp

v. Van Winkle and Co., 402 F. 3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that “Rule 4(m) grants

discretion to the district court to extend time for service of process even in the absence of a

showing of good cause.”); Henderson v. U.S., 517 U.S. 654, 663 (1996) (noting that complaints

are not due to be dismissed if served “within such additional time as the court may allow.”).

only damages it seeks, Grimaldi’s claim for breach of contract fails to state a

cause of action and must be dismissed.

To adequately allege a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege

the existence of 1) a valid contract, 2) a material breach, and 3) damages. See

Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir.

2005). In the Amended Complaint, Grimaldi pleads both (1) the existence of a

valid contract between itself and SSA and (2) SSA’s breach of that contract. See

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 18, 29. But in alleging its damages resulting from SSA’s

breach, Grimaldi seeks only “contribution and/or indemnity from SSA” for

settlement payments and litigation expenses it incurred in defending itself

against claims brought by the firefighters, the vehicle owners, and the Vessel’s

owner. See id. ¶¶ 99–104. Grimaldi alleges no other damages apart from

indemnification for claims asserted by other parties. See id. Yet, the contract

between Grimaldi and SSA does not expressly provide for a right to

indemnification. See Exhibit A (Doc. 22-1) at 2–3, filed on April 10, 2025. As

such, whether Grimaldi states a claim for relief depends on whether it has an

implied right to indemnity under the contract.

Under Ryan Stevedor. Co. v. Pan-Atl. Steam. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956),

maritime service contracts include “the implied promise to perform those

services with reasonable care, skill, and safety.” See Vierling v. Celebrity

Cruises, Inc., 339 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2003). A breach of this Warranty

can give rise to a contractual right to indemnity. See, e.g., id. at 1320 (holding

that a shipowner was entitled to indemnity if the trier of fact found that the

port authority breached its warranty of workmanlike performance and that the

breach caused the shipowner’s injury). But it does not always. See, e.g., Smith

& Kelly Co. v. S/S Concordia TADJ, 718 F.2d 1022, 1028 (11th Cir. 1983)

(declining to extend Ryan indemnity to controversies involving seamen injured

at sea); Agrico Chem. Co. v. M/V Ben W. Martin, 664 F.2d 85, 92 (5th Cir. 1981)

(“The duty of workmanlike performance arises out of the stevedoring contract,

but it does not automatically imply that the stevedore owes the owner

indemnity against all liability under all circumstances.”). “The Ryan doctrine

thus includes two facets: an implied undertaking by a stevedore to render

workmanlike performance and the stevedore’s duty to indemnify the owner for

liability arising out if its breach of the duty.” See Agrico Chem. Co., 664 F.2d at

93.

Ryan’s indemnity doctrine is a judicial creation that was “intended to ease

the shipowner’s burden of absolute liability stemming from the doctrine of

unseaworthiness.” See Campbell Indus., Inc. v. Offshore Logistics Int'l, Inc., 816

F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, a

shipowner was held strictly liable to longshoremen who were injured due to the

vessel’s unseaworthy condition. See Smith & Kelly Co., 718 F.2d at 1025. To

mitigate the potential for unfairness created by this doctrine, under Ryan,

shipowners were permitted to procure indemnity from an independent

contractor whose activities caused the vessel’s unseaworthiness. See id. The

Court reasoned that liability in such cases “should fall on the party best situated

to adopt preventative measures and thereby reduce the likelihood of injury.”

See id. (citing Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring

Co., 376 U.S. 315, 324 (1964)).

Following Ryan, courts began to extend its indemnity principle to new

factual scenarios, applying it beyond just contracts involving stevedores and

longshoremen. See id. at 1026 (collecting cases). However, this expansion

“began to ebb when, in 1972,” Congress amended the Longshoremen’s Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (LHWCA). See Smith &

Kelly Co., 718 F.2d at 1026. In doing so, Congress abrogated Ryan, prohibiting

longshoremen from bringing seaworthiness suits against vessel owners and

prohibiting vessel owners from collecting indemnity from stevedores based on

the Warranty. See id. Since then, courts have been reluctant to extend Ryan

indemnity to new factual situations. See, e.g., id. at 1028 (declining to extend

Ryan indemnity to controversies involving seamen injured at sea); Gator

Marine Serv. Towing, Inc. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th

Cir. 1981) (describing the Ryan doctrine as “withered” and declining to extend

it to disputes between vessels and stevedores over damaged cargo).4

Here, SSA contracted with Grimaldi to provide stevedoring services on

the Vessel. See Amended Complaint ¶ 18. As such, SSA had a duty to perform

these services with “reasonable care, skill, and safety.” See Vierling, 339 F.3d

at 1315. To the extent it failed to do so, SSA breached the warranty of

workmanlike performance implied in every maritime service contract. As such,

Grimaldi can pursue a breach of contract claim based on a breach of this implied

warranty, but a breach of the Warranty does not automatically entitle Grimaldi

to indemnification under Ryan. Rather, Grimaldi is not entitled to Ryan

indemnity because this case falls far “beyond those controversies involving the

special rules governing the obligations and liability of shipowners which

necessitated [Ryan indemnity] and justify its application.” See In re Dearborn

Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 287 (5th Cir. 1974) (internal quotation marks

omitted). First, Grimaldi was the time charterer of the Vessel, not the owner.

See Amended Complaint ¶ 3. A time charter does not involve transfer of

possession or control of a vessel; instead, the owner of the vessel fully equips

and maintains the vessel and retains responsibility for it. See Walker v. Braus,

995 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1993). No obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel is

4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

imposed upon a time charterer who assumes no operational control of a vessel.

See Stranahan v. A/S Atlantica & Tinfos Papirfabrik, 521 F.2d 700, 703 (9th

Cir. 1975). Consequently, “the policy reasons behind judicial creation of the

implied warranty on behalf of the shipowner are absent where a time-charterer

is involved.” Id. As such, a time charterer, like Grimaldi, does not have an

implied right to indemnity against a stevedore under the Warranty.5 See id.

Second, unlike Ryan and its progeny, many of the claims for which

Grimaldi seeks indemnity for relate to property damage, not personal injuries.

See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 100, 102. Even if Grimaldi could recover indemnity

under the Warranty as a time charterer, Grimaldi is not entitled to Ryan

indemnity for these types of claims. See Gator Marine Serv. Towing, Inc., 651

F.2d at 1100 (“Disputes between vessels and stevedores over damaged cargo are

best accommodated by a straightforward application of the usual maritime

comparative fault system”); Cont'l Grain Co. v. Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping

Auth., 972 F.2d 426, 439 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[W]e deem it improvident to apply the

warranty liability created by Ryan to property damage claims against

5 The Court notes that the Fifth Circuit has held that a time charterer who was sued

directly by a libellant could receive the benefit of Ryan indemnity. See D/S Ove Skou v. Hebert,

365 F.2d 341, 352 (1966). However, this decision was rendered before Congress amended the

LHWCA in 1972 and before the courts, including the Fifth Circuit, receded from extending

Ryan indemnity “beyond those controversies involving the special rules governing the

obligations and liability of shipowners which necessitated its formulation and justify its

application.” In re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d at 287 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

stevedoring contractors”). As a result, Grimaldi is not entitled to Ryan

indemnity for claims stemming from damage to the vehicles loaded on board

the Vessel or from damage to the Vessel itself.

For similar reasons, even if Grimaldi could recover Ryan indemnity as a

time charterer, Grimaldi is not entitled to indemnification for the firefighters’

personal injury claims. Unlike Ryan and its progeny, this case does not stem

from a typical pier-side accident. And the doctrine of unseaworthiness does not

apply where, as here, maritime rescuers board a vessel with knowledge of and

the specific intent to address the vessel’s unseaworthy condition. Compare

McDaniel v. the M/B Lisholt, 180 F. Supp. 24, 26–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding

that a fireman was not entitled to a warranty of seaworthiness because he was

not engaged in work traditionally done by seamen and entered the vessel only

after it was obviously unseaworthy), aff'd sub nom. McDaniel v. The Lisholt,

282 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1960); with Complaint of Garda Marine, Inc., No. 88-2282-

CIVHIGHSMITH, 1992 WL 321213, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 1992) (holding that

the warranty of seaworthiness applied to first responders because they were

unaware of the ship’s unseaworthy condition and did not enter the vessel

because of its unseaworthy condition), aff'd sub nom. In re Garda Marine, 9

F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993). Notably, the firefighters directly sued the Vessel’s

owner, as well as Grimaldi and the contractors involved in loading the vehicles

onto the Vessel, including SSA. See Jolly et al. v. Hoegh Autoliners Shipping

AS et al., No. 3:20-cv-1150-MMH-MCR (M.D. Fla.). Indeed, the firefighters sued

each party for its respective negligence in causing the explosion. See id. No

party faced strict liability for the firefighters’ injuries. As such, the original

justification for Ryan indemnity does not apply here, and Ryan indemnity is

therefore inappropriate.6

Moreover, application of comparative fault in these circumstances best

advances the goals underpinning the Ryan doctrine. “Ryan was in large part

aimed at enhancing safety by placing liability on the party best able to avoid

accidents and encouraging that party to take precautionary measures.” See

Smith & Kelly Co., 718 F.2d at 1028. Where a fire accelerates out of control on

a vessel and necessitates aid from first responders, all parties involved are in a

position to mitigate or prevent potential injuries to the first responders. For

example, the vessel’s owner can ensure that the ship is properly equipped with

safety supplies and reasonable systems and protections for fires, the time

charterer can implement proper loading procedures and policies designed to

reduce the risk of fires, and the stevedore can exercise reasonable care in

6 The Court notes that Ryan indemnity may be appropriate in some circumstances

where the doctrine of unseaworthiness does not apply. See Vierling, 339 F.3d at 1319

(extending the Ryan indemnity doctrine to injuries sustained by passengers while boarding a

ship because a shipowner owes a high duty of care to passengers as a common carrier and it

would make no sense to apply Ryan indemnity to seamen but not to passengers who are hurt

as a result of the same accident). However, here, unlike in Vierling, there is no risk of having

“different rules for different people who are injured under the same circumstances.” See id.

The circumstances under which a first responder enters a vessel to address an unseaworthy

condition are vastly different from those of a seaman or passenger who enter a ship without

even the slightest knowledge of the dangers on board.

loading cargo on the vessel. As such “[a]voidance of future accidents can be best

achieved by interesting [all] parties in greater care.” See id. at 1029, 1030 (also

noting that “[t]he clear trend in maritime cases is to reject all-or-nothing or

other arbitrary allotments of liability in favor of a system that divides damages

on the basis of the relative degree of fault of the parties.”).

For all of the foregoing reasons, Grimaldi is not entitled to Ryan

indemnity under the implied warranty of workmanlike performance. Because

Grimaldi pleads no other damages, Grimaldi’s breach of contract claim fails to

state a cause of action and must be dismissed.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant SSA Atlantic, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

(Doc. 24) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Doc. 22) is DISMISSED.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all pending motions and

deadlines as moot and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 17th day of October

2025.

United States District Judge

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