Todd

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASON TODD, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-1336

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

COMMONWEALTH OF :

PENNSYLVANIA, et al., : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Statement of Facts and Procedural History

This case, which was initially referred to us on September 4, 2025, comes

before us for a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff’s amended

complaint. (Doc. 25). The pro se plaintiff, Jason Todd, recently filed a spate of

lawsuits in this Court, including the instant case.1 Todd’s initial complaint in this

lawsuit was a cryptic document drafted in a stream of consciousness style which

presumed some vast pre-existing knowledge on the reader’s behalf of other unrelated

events.

1 Todd v. Derry Township, 1:25-cv-435; Todd v. Commonwealth, 1:25-cv-1336;

Todd v. Disability Rights of Pennsylvania, 1:25-cv-1337.

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Pennsylvania, (DRP), Derry Township, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the

Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS), and the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Commission (PHRC), agencies of state government. The fairly meager

factual recital which followed in support of Todd’s original complaint alleged that

Todd was assaulted by a man named Shoemaker in September of 2024. (Doc. 1, ⁋ 9).

In October of 2024, Shoemaker pleaded guilty to a state harassment charge but,

according to Todd, “no ADA or victim support followed.” (Id., ⁋ 11). Todd then

asserted that he submitted “sealed suicide risk documentation (Doc. 283) to federal

court” in December 2024. (Id., ⁋ 12). What this documentation may be, what the

nature of this altercation was, and how this documentation supports any federal claim

remained a mystery since nothing was included in the complaint which provided

further content, context, or coherence to this pleading. Todd then stated that he lodged

otherwise unidentified formal complaints with the DRP, DHS and the PHRC but they

closed his complaints. (Id., ⁋ 13).

On the basis of this barebones factual recital, Todd then averred in a cursory

manner that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§12203; the general civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983; the Protection and

Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, (PAIMI) 42 U.S.C. §§10801-

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Clauses of the United States Constitution. (Id., ⁋⁋ 16-28). Relying upon these

enigmatic averments, Todd demanded $20,000,000 in damages; sweeping

declaratory and injunctive relief; the removal of officials from their jobs; and the

appointment of a “federal monitor” over PHRC and DRP. (Id., at 9).

Todd was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis subject to a screening

review of this complaint and also filed a pleading consenting to proceed before a

magistrate judge. (Doc. 8). Therefore, since no other party has been served, for

screening purposes we have sufficient party consent to proceed. See Neals v.

Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995). Following a legally mandated screening

review of this pleading, we dismissed Todd’s complaint without prejudice to

affording the plaintiff one final opportunity to file an amended complaint stating a

claim upon which relief may be granted. (Docs. 15, 16).

Todd has now filed a pleading styled as an amended complaint, (Doc. 25), but

this characterization of his pleading is something of a misnomer. In fact, this amended

complaint names entirely new defendants, a Pennsylvania Capitol police office, a

magisterial district judge, and unnamed officials of the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Commission (PHRC). (Id., ⁋⁋ 4-6). The amended complaint then alleges in

a summary manner that, in December of 2024, following his submission of ADA

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arrested him for terroristic threats. (Id., ⁋⁋ 7-9). Further, according to Todd, the

magisterial district judge wrongfully ordered him fingerprinted and processed, and

the PHRC failed to investigate his complaints regarding the treatment he had

received. (Id., ⁋⁋ 10-11). While Todd provides no further context concerning these

events in his amended complaint, state court records disclose that Todd was charged

on July 31, 2025, with harassment and terroristic threats and is scheduled for a

preliminary hearing on November 17, 2025. Commonwealth v. Todd, MJ-12104-CR-

0000506-2025. Thus, the criminal case that Todd cast as retaliatory is still ongoing,

entails alleged conduct which occurred seven to nine months after the underlying

September 2024 state case which forms the basis for his claims, and involved persons

and law enforcement agencies who were wholly unrelated to that initial state case.

Upon consideration, for the reasons set forth below, the amended complaint

will be dismissed.

II. Discussion

A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review

This court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review

of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the

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claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a

complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a

complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted

the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the

possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

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Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions

will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which

relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,

a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the

Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a

review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts

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[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the

factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District

Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but

may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,

a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.

A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the Court of Appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-

step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters

of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court

may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as

an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached]

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1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the

complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically

attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins,

281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not

consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly

relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to

dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other

parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or when

determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the

requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what

a complaint should say and provides that:

(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the

court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional

support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which

may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and

conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that

are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.

Judged against these legal guideposts, as discussed below, this amended

complaint still fails as a matter of law for several reasons.

B. This Complaint Will Be Dismissed

1. The Complaint Violates Rule 8.

At the outset, dismissal of this complaint is warranted because this pleading

still fails to comply with Rule 8’s basic injunction that, “[a] pleading that states a

claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that each

averment be ‘concise, and direct.’” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F. App=x 221,

222 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1)). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible

or incomprehensible”, id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length,

but it is also largely unintelligible”, Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App=x 785, 787

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See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F.App=x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State

Superior Court, 260 F.App=x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos, 236 F.App=x at 787;

Scibelli, 219 F.App=x at 222; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448,

450 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2005).

Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint “left the defendants

having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],”

Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App=x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when

the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441

F.App=x 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “those cases in

which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible

that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. at 110 (quoting Simmons v.

Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1995) (quotations omitted); see also Tillio v.

Northland Grp. Inc., 456 F. App'x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). Further, a complaint may be

dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is simply illegible and cannot be

understood. See, e.g., Radin v. Jersey City Medical Center, 375 F. App=x 205 (3d

Cir. 2010); Moss v. United States, 329 F. App'x 335 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing

illegible complaint); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App=x 431 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing

complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks

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Mar. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of approximately 50 pages of

mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Philadelphia Police, CIV.A.06-

0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (dismissing illegible complaint).

In its current form, this amended complaint remains a barebones pleading

bereft of well-pleaded facts. Simply put, this amended complaint still leaves

“defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause

of action].” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App=x 158 (3d Cir. 2011).

Therefore Rule 8 calls for dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.

2. The Eleventh Amendment Shields the PHRC from Liability

under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Further, to the extent that Todd is trying to lodge a §1983 civil rights claim for

damages against the PHRC, an agency of state government, this claim fails for at

least two reasons. As we have previously explained in a similar case:

First, as a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States

shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced

or prosecuted against one of the ... States....”, U. S. Const. Amend XI.

By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of

federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and

state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in

his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and

therefore also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan

Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

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officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune

from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Under the Eleventh

Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law

unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by

Congress. Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional

immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Commonwealth clearly has

not waived its immunity. Quite the contrary, the Commonwealth has

specifically by statute invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). Thus, while Pennsylvania has, by law, waived

sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the

Commonwealth in state court, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522, Section

8521(b) flatly states that: “Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be

construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in

federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).

The constitutional protections afforded to the states under the Eleventh

Amendment also expressly apply to claims involving the PHRC. As the

Third Circuit has observed:

The Eleventh Amendment provides a state with immunity “from

liability for damages in a suit brought in federal court by one of

its own citizens.” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 229 n. 2, 109

S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989). This immunity extends to

state agencies. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271

F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). While states can waive their

Eleventh Amendment immunity, see id., Pennsylvania has not

done so, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 8521(b). The PHRC is an

administrative commission within the executive department of

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, as such, it shares in the

Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 43 Pa.

Stat. Ann. §§ 956–7.

Opoku v. Educ. Comm'n for Foreign Med. Graduates, 574 F. App'x 197,

201 (3d Cir. 2014).

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*********************************************************

Moreover, beyond these constitutional considerations, as a matter of

statutory interpretation, the plaintiff cannot bring a damages action

against the PHRC . . . , as a state agency or arm of state government

since it is also well-settled that a state, a state agency, or a state official

acting in an official capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the principal federal civil rights statute. Will v. Michigan

Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In sum, [the plaintiff’s]

federal civil rights claims for . . . damages against the PHRC, . . . [is]

barred both by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution and by cases construing the federal civil rights statute, 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, since the PHRC . . . cannot be sued in this

fashion in federal court, this complaint should be dismissed.

Ally v. PHRC, No. 1:19-CV-1268, 2019 WL 3933661, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa. July 23,

2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-1268, 2019 WL 3928790

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2019). Therefore, both constitutional and statutory considerations

bar § 1983 claims against this state agency. Accordingly, these claims must be

dismissed.

3. Todd Has Not Secured a Favorable Resolution of His State

Criminal Case.

This amended complaint, which seeks to sue officials for conduct relating to

an ongoing criminal case, also fails as a matter of law because it rests on a fatally

flawed legal premise. At bottom, the plaintiff appears to seek to bring a civil rights

action premised, in part, on claims of false arrest and malicious, retaliatory

prosecution without showing that his state criminal case has been resolved in a

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This he cannot do.

Quite the contrary, it is well settled that an essential element of a civil rights

malicious prosecution claim is that the underlying criminal case must have been

terminated in favor of the civil rights claimant. Therefore, where, as here, the civil

rights plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim in a setting where

he has not achieved a favorable outcome in the underlying state case, the plaintiff's

claim fails as a matter of law. The Third Circuit has aptly observed in this regard:

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates

a species of tort liability.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114

S. Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (quoting Memphis Cmty. School

Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 106 S. Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given this close relation

between § 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme Court has said that the

common law of torts, “defining the elements of damages and the

prerequisites for their recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting point

for inquiry under § 1983 as well.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Carey

v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–58, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252

(1978)). The Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate's §

1983 suit, which alleged that county prosecutors and a state police

officer destroyed evidence, used an unlawful voice identification

procedure, and engaged in other misconduct. In deciding whether the

inmate could state a claim for those alleged violations, the Supreme

Court asked what common-law cause of action was the closest to the

inmate's claim and concluded that “malicious prosecution provides the

closest analogy ... because unlike the related cause of action for false

arrest or imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed

pursuant to legal process.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Looking to the

elements of malicious prosecution, the court held that the inmate's claim

could not proceed because one requirement of malicious prosecution is

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favor, and the inmate in Heck had not successfully challenged his

criminal conviction. Id.

Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 155–156 (3d Cir. 2000).

Thus, “our precedents are clear that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging arrest and

prosecution absent probable cause may bring malicious prosecution claims under the

Fourth Amendment but are entitled to relief only if they are innocent of the crime for

which they were prosecuted.” Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d

Cir. 2014) (citing Hector, 235 F.3d at 156). Therefore, “a plaintiff claiming malicious

prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie case.”

Steele v. City of Erie, 113 F. App'x 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2004).

In this case, it is evident that this state criminal prosecution did not terminate

favorably for the plaintiff since Todd’s charges are still pending at this time.

Commonwealth v. Todd, MJ-12104-CR-0000506-2025. In the absence of a favorable

termination of the state criminal case, this federal civil rights malicious retaliatory

prosecution lawsuit cannot proceed. In short, this complaint is based upon the

fundamentally flawed legal premise that the plaintiff can sue the state for malicious

prosecution even though he has not prevailed in the underlying state case. Since this

premise is simply incorrect, this complaint fails as a matter of law. See Galloway v.

Kane, No. 1:15-CV-1007, 2015 WL 3953112, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2015).

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Additionally, the magisterial district judge who presided over the preliminary

hearing in Todd’s state case is also immune from civil liability. To the extent that the

plaintiff seeks in this complaint to hold this judge personally liable for civil rights

violations, based upon an alleged failure to act favorably in ruling upon prior criminal

case, it is well-settled that the judge is individually cloaked with immunity from

liability. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that those officials

performing judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions in our adversarial

system must be entitled to some measure of protection from personal liability for acts

taken in their official capacities. In order to provide this degree of protection from

liability for judicial officials, the courts have held that judges, Mireless v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 13 (1991); prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); and

those who perform adjudicative functions, id. at 423 n.20 (grand jurors); Harper v.

Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d. Cir.1986) (parole board adjudicators); are entitled to

immunity from personal liability for actions they take in our adversarial system of

justice.

These longstanding common law immunities apply here and prevent Todd

from maintaining this civil action against the judge named in this complaint since the

judge is entitled to judicial immunity for their actions in these prior proceedings and

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Means, 365 F. App’x 327 (3d Cir.2010); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3d

Cir. 2000). As we have explained when rejecting similar efforts to impose personal

civil rights liability on a judge, this immunity is both broad and absolute:

“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally ‘immune

from a suit for money damages.’ ” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435,

440 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.Ct.

286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam), and citing Randall v.

Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868)). “The

doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a judge,

in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or

her convictions without threat of suit for damages.” Id. (citations

omitted). Therefore, “[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for

his [or her] judicial acts even if his [or her] exercise of authority is

flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors,” Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978),

and “[j]udicial immunity cannot be overcome by allegations of bad faith

or malice” Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F.Supp.2d 694, 703

(W.D.Pa.2007). Such immunity can be overcome only where a judge's

acts are nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while judicial in

nature, are “taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.

Catanzaro v. Collins, CIV. A. 09–922, 2010 WL 1754765 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27,

2010), aff'd, 447 F. App’x 397 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F.

App’x 238, 243 (3d Cir.2007) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his or her

duties has absolute immunity from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12, 112 S.Ct.

286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the

action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority;

18

all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55

L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)).

This judicial immunity applies to Section 1983 actions like the lawsuit brought

here, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980),

and embraces both requests for damages, as well as costs and attorney's

fees. See Corliss v. O'Brien, No. 3:05–CV–0347, 2005 WL 2334792 (M.D. Pa.

2005), aff'd, 200 F.App'x. 80 (3d Cir. 2006). This judicial immunity also expressly

extends to Pennsylvania magisterial district court judges. Indeed, as the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly observed, there is no distinction

“between judges of courts of limited and general jurisdiction” when applying the

judicial immunity doctrine, Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2000),

and “[t]he doctrine of judicial immunity applies equally to courts of limited

jurisdiction, such as district justices, as to courts of general jurisdiction.” Martin v.

Bicking, 30 F.Supp.2d 511, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see also Schuler v. City of

Chambersburg, 641 F.Supp. 657, 659 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Horne v. Farrell, 560 F.Supp.

219, 222–23 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Moreover, this judicial immunity specifically applies

to judicial actions ruling on bail requests, making probable cause determinations, and

presiding over preliminary hearings in state criminal cases. See, e.g., Williams v.

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and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-0085, 2019 WL 462128 (M.D. Pa. Feb.

6, 2019); Pokrandt v. Shields, 773 F.Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Fox v. Castle, 771

F.Supp. 411 (M.D. Pa. 1977). Therefore, the magisterial district judge should be

dismissed as a defendant.

5. The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Plausible Retaliation

Claim.

Todd’s amended complaint also fails to state a plausible retaliation claim. On

this score, Todd’s barebones pleadings allege that he was the victim of an assault in

September 2024 which was investigated by Derry Township Police. His assailant was

prosecuted and convicted, but Todd was displeased with the victim services he

received and alleges that he lodged ADA complaints in December 2024. Seven

months later, in July of 2025, Todd was arrested by a separate police agency, the

Pennsylvania Capitol Police, and was charged with harassment and terroristic threats.

This separate state case remains pending. On the basis of these disparate events

involving different and distinct actors Todd alleges a claim of retaliation against him

for exercising his ADA rights.

In our view, these allegations are legally insufficient to state a plausible

retaliation claim. As a general rule, to make out a prima facie case of retaliation a

plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that he suffered an

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activity and the adverse action. Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., 851 F.3d

249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017).

The third and final element of a retaliation claim—causation—is frequently

the most hotly contested issue in these cases. This element typically can be pleaded

and proven in one of two ways. In this setting:

To establish the requisite causal connection a plaintiff usually must

prove either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the

protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of

antagonism couple with timing to establish a causal link. See Krouse v.

American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503-04 (3d Cir. 1997); Woodson

v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1997). In the absence

of that proof the plaintiff must show that from the “evidence gleaned

from the record as a whole” the trier of fact should infer causation.

Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000).

Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).

On this score “[t]he mere fact that adverse . . . action occurs after [a protected

activity] will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of

demonstrating a causal link between the two events.” Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh,

120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006).

However, the Third Circuit has stated that if the timing of the allegedly retaliatory

action is “ ‘unusually suggestive’ of retaliatory motive” a causal link may be inferred.

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appeals court has found a temporal proximity of two days demonstrated a causal link,

Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989), but has found that a period of

two months did not. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 760.

Here, the events which Todd seeks to stitch together into a retaliation claim are

separated by some seven months and involve different and distinct actors. Without

further well-pleaded facts, the unusually suggestive temporal proximity which is

essential to a retaliation claim is simply lacking here. Therefore, these retaliation

claims also fail as a matter of law and will be dismissed.

6. The Amended Complaint Will Be Dismissed with Prejudice.

We previously recognized that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often

should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is

dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482

F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile

or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).

Therefore, acting out of a surfeit of caution, we afforded Todd leave to amend his

initial complaint, but to no avail. This amended complaint still fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted and it appears that no further form of artful pleading

may save this this complaint. Accordingly, the amended complaint will be dismissed

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III. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed

with prejudice and the plaintiff’s motion to transmit information to various federal

agencies, (Doc. 27), is DENIED.

An appropriate order follows.

S/Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: October 17, 2025

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