The opinion
FILED
Oct 17 2025, 3:01 pm
CLERK
PETITIONER APPEARING PRO SE: RESPONDENT: Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ERIC GROSSMAN CRAIG GOERGEN
Lafayette, IN West Lafayette, IN
IN THE
INDIANA TAX COURT
TIPPECANOE COUNTY ASSESSOR, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25T-TA-00007
)
CRAIG GOERGEN, )
)
Respondent. )
ON APPEAL FROM
THE INDIANA BOARD OF TAX REVIEW
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
October 17, 2025
MCADAM, J.
The Tippecanoe County Assessor, Eric Grossman, filed an original tax appeal in
this Court without counsel. In his appeal petition, Grossman challenges the denial of a
continuance by the Indiana Board of Tax Review as biased and raises constitutional
claims related to Petitioner’s “constitutional rights to due process and fair assessments.”
(Pet. ¶1.) Grossman is not a licensed attorney and appears to have filed this appeal in
his official capacity. In an order dated August 1, 2025, the Court sua sponte raised the
issue of whether the Tippecanoe County Assessor may appear without counsel in this
appeal and whether Grossman, as the elected official, may represent the county
assessor’s office. The Court ordered Petitioner either to notify the Court of its intent to
obtain legal counsel or file a brief explaining why Grossman, as the elected assessor,
may represent Petitioner in this Court. Grossman filed a brief contending that he, as the
elected assessor, is authorized to represent the Tippecanoe County Assessor’s Office.
The Respondent did not file any response by the September 30, 2025, deadline. After
reviewing the matter, the Court concludes that Petitioner must be represented by
counsel because Grossman is not authorized to represent Petitioner and has not cited
any authority that would permit him, as a non-attorney, to represent Petitioner.
No Statute Authorizes Grossman to Represent His Office in the Indiana Tax Court
The Court solicited authority from Grossman for his claim that a county assessor
may represent his office in this Court, and Grossman identified two statutes in response:
Indiana Code sections 33-26-7-1 and 6-1.1-35.7-2. Both statutes relate to
representation of the county assessor’s office, but neither permit an elected assessor
like Grossman to represent his office in Tax Court.
When reviewing statutory language, an unambiguous statute must be held to
mean what it plainly expresses, and its plain and obvious meaning may not be enlarged
or restricted. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872
(Ind. 1994). Interpretation is only necessary when the statute is ambiguous. Id. When
interpretation is required, this Court relies on the plain and ordinary meaning of each
word unless the statute indicates otherwise. Covance Cent. Lab’y Servs. LP v. Indiana
Dep’t of State Revenue, 204 N.E.3d 348, 355 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2023). When reading
unambiguous statutes or when interpreting statutes, the “rules of statutory construction
caution against expanding or contracting statutory language beyond its plain meaning.”
Gilday & Assocs., P.C. v. Marion Cnty. Assessor, 236 N.E.3d 1160, 1169 (Ind. Tax
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Ct. 2024).
Grossman reads the permissive “may elect” language found in subsection (a) of
Indiana Code section 33-26-7-1 as allowing a county assessor to choose to represent
his own office in Tax Court, but this reading ignores the obvious dichotomy established
by the statute. Indiana Code section 33-26-7-1 contains two subsections which
establish a choice of representation for local officials appearing before this Court.
Subsection (a) provides that a county assessor “may elect” to hire and pay for his own
attorney in a proceeding before this Court. IND. CODE § 33-26-7-1(a) (2025). Subsection
(b) offers an alternative, stating that a county assessor “may elect to be represented by
the office of the attorney general under a written agreement.” I.C. § 33-26-7-1(b). The
parallel use of “may elect” across the subsections indicates a choice between
representation by a private attorney and representation by the Attorney General’s
Office, not a choice between representation and no representation.
Nonetheless, even if Indiana Code section 33-26-7-1 allowed a county assessor
to represent his office in Tax Court, the statute does not apply in this appeal. Indiana
Code section 33-26-7-1 only applies when the county assessor “is a defendant in a
judicial proceeding in the tax court.” I.C. § 33-26-7-1(a)(2). Because Grossman filed an
original tax appeal in this case, he is not the defendant, and Indiana Code section 33-
26-7-1 does not apply. This Court will not expand the application of this statute.
Grossman also points to Indiana Code section 6-1.1-35.7-2 as support for his
ability to represent the county assessor’s office in this Court but again attempts to
expand a statute beyond its unambiguous meaning. Indiana Code section 6-1.1-35.7-2
defines “tax representative” for proceedings before a county property tax assessment
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board of appeals (PTABOA) and the Department of Local Government Finance (DLGF)
and excludes certain individuals from that definition. I.C. § 6-1.1-35.7-2. County
assessors are not included in the definition of tax representative, and the statute
specifically excludes “a representative of a local unit of government appearing on behalf
of the unit.” I.C. § 6-1.1-35.7-2(4). According to Grossman, this demonstrates a
legislative intent to allow non-attorney county assessors to represent their offices in tax
matters. But the plain language of the statute limits its application to proceedings before
PTABOAs and the DLGF. There is no justification for expanding its application to Tax
Court proceedings.
Even a generous reading of Grossman’s argument regarding Indiana Code
section 6-1.1-35.7-2 fails because exclusion from the definition of tax representative
does not entitle a person to represent others before this Court. The definition of tax
representative also excludes “a permanent full-time employee of the owner of the
property . . . who is the subject of the appeal.” I.C. § 6-1.1-35.7-2(3). Nonetheless,
corporations, partnerships, and LLCs are generally required to be represented by
counsel before Indiana courts, absent an exception. I.C. § 34-9-1-1. Just as full-time
employees of other organizations are excluded from the definition of tax representative
but are generally not permitted to represent their organizations before Indiana courts,
county assessors are not authorized to represent their offices before this Court simply
because they are excluded from the definition of tax representative for PTABOA and
DLGF proceedings.
In fact, the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass’n
v. Miller highlights that constitutional arguments like the one Grossman raises in his
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petition are meaningfully distinct from valuation arguments which a tax representative
may make before the PTABOA or IBTR. 770 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind. 2002). In Miller, the
Indiana Supreme Court addressed whether a non-attorney should be enjoined from
representing others before the State Board of Tax Commissioners, as it then existed. Id.
at 329. The Court acknowledged that non-attorneys may be even more qualified than
attorneys to understand the property tax assessment process and, in doing so, that they
may examine “court opinions to answer the questions of what constitutes obsolescence
or depreciation.” Id. at 330. Nonetheless, the Court also noted that a non-attorney’s
expertise in the assessment process does not make them qualified in the practice of
law, specifically referencing constitutional claims as a type of issue that qualifies as
legal practice. Id. Although the Court did not enjoin the non-attorney from representing
others before the Board, it reached this conclusion only because the Board
implemented new rules that prohibited tax representatives from presenting legal
arguments, including constitutional arguments, or addressing legal issues related to the
assessment. Id. at 331. Some of Grossman’s claims appear to be constitutional in
nature and clearly constitute the practice of law. As the Supreme Court noted in Miller,
there is difference between the scope of work performed by non-attorneys, like tax
representatives, and the work performed by attorneys. Indiana Code section
6-1.1-35.7-2 does nothing to alter that allocation of responsibility.
The Indiana Supreme Court Has Not Authorized an Assessor to
Represent His Office in the Indiana Tax Court
Even without statutory support, Grossman believes that an assessor’s tax
expertise and “inherent authority” should allow him to represent his office in Tax Court.
But Grossman fails to recognize that the Indiana Supreme Court has the authority to
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determine who may practice law in this state, including who may represent another in
judicial proceedings. When exercising that authority, the Supreme Court has been clear
and explicit; it has not made any provision allowing a county assessor to represent his
office.
The Indiana Supreme Court has “the inherent jurisdiction to determine who are
qualified as attorneys to practice law in this state. This is a judicial function, separate
from that of either the executive or legislative departments.” State ex rel. Ind. State Bar
Ass’n v. Moritz, 191 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ind. 1963). The Indiana Supreme Court has long
recognized that the “performing of services in a court of justice” constitutes the practice
of law. State ex rel. Disciplinary Comm’n v. Crofts, 500 N.E.2d 753, 754 (Ind. 1986)
(quoting Fink v. Peden, 17 N.E.2d 95, 96 (Ind. 1938)). If a statute conflicts with the rules
adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court governing the qualifications for admissions and
practice of law, then the Court’s “rules must take precedence and the conflicting
phrases within that statute must be deemed without force or effect.” State ex. rel.
Western Parks v. Bartholomew Cnty. Ct., 383 N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ind. 1978).
Generally, only a licensed attorney may represent someone other than himself in
court. “[W]hile any natural person may appear in court on his or her own behalf, only
persons duly admitted to practice law may appear on behalf of other persons. This rule
is well recognized.” Simmons v. Carter, 576 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
Corporations, for instance, generally must be represented by counsel before Indiana
courts because they “cannot be wholly identified with any individual person and thus, by
necessity, must be represented by its agents.” Western Parks, 383 N.E.2d at 292. Like
corporations, the county assessor’s office represents the entire county—its citizens and
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its units of government—and cannot be wholly identified with the elected assessor. A
loss by the assessor affects the interests of the entire county, not just the interests of
the assessor personally.
In instances when the Indiana Supreme Court permits non-attorneys to appear
on behalf of others in Indiana courts, it does so clearly and explicitly. For example,
Indiana Small Claims Rule 8 provides an exception to the general rule that corporations
and other business entities be represented by an attorney. See Ind. Small Claims Rule
8. In a small claims hearing, sole proprietorships and partnerships “may be represented
by the sole proprietor or partner, owner, counsel, or by a designated full-time employee”
and “[a]ll corporate entities, Limited Liability Companies (LLC’s), and Limited Liability
Partnerships (LLP’s), and Trusts may be represented by counsel, owner, or by a
designated full-time employee of the corporate entity, or, in the case of a trust by a
trustee.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(C)(2)–(3). Indiana Small Claims Rule 8 specifies
when the rule applies, what organizations may use it, and who may represent those
organizations. See Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A), 8(C).
Here, however, Grossman has not identified any judicial rule that would permit
him to represent his office in this case. Instead of identifying judicial rules or supporting
case law, Grossman argues that he is entitled to represent the county assessor’s office
because, as an elected official, he retains the inherent authority to represent his office.
However, being an elected official with statutory duties does not inherently allow him to
represent his office in court. In fact, the Indiana Supreme Court has previously enjoined
an elected prosecuting attorney who was never a member of the bar from practicing law
despite the centrality of legal practice to the work of a prosecutor’s office. Moritz, 191
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N.E.2d at 24–25. Despite the statutory duties conferred upon them, prosecuting
attorneys are not authorized to represent the State of Indiana when they have not been
admitted to the Indiana bar. See id. The Court can discern no reason why a non-
attorney, elected assessor should be subject to a different rule. To permit otherwise
would be to permit a person who has not been duly admitted to the practice of law to
appear on behalf of other persons.
The risks of allowing a non-attorney to represent others in court is made plainly
apparent in Grossman’s brief when he cites Hamilton Cnty. Assessor v. Allisonville Rd.
P’ship, 170 N.E.3d 1117 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2021)—a case that does not exist. Courts have
sanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigants for citing fictitious cases in briefs.
Williams v. Kirch, --- N.E.3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 2383623, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 18,
2025); see also In re Baby Boy, --- N.E.3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 2046315, at *23 (Ill. App.
Ct. July 21, 2025) (requiring an attorney who cited fictious cases in his briefs to pay
monetary sanctions and sending a copy of the opinion to the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission). False citations may also have negative
effects on the outcome of a case. See, e.g., Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 52–53
(Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (determining that the appellant’s use of fictitious citations in his brief
mandated a dismissal of the appeal). Citing fictious cases adversely affects all parties in
a case. Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). It “wastes time
and money in exposing the deception” and takes a court’s time “from other important
endeavors.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he client may be deprived of arguments based on
authentic judicial precedents.” Id.1
1
While the Court cannot be certain of the origin of the fictitious case cited in Grossman’s brief, it
appears likely to be the result of a hallucination by generative artificial intelligence. See
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The Tippecanoe County Assessor May Not Appear Without Counsel
After reviewing the issue, this Court has determined that Petitioner may not
appear without counsel in this appeal but may take steps to hire counsel before the
appeal is dismissed. This Court has held that “while an appeal initiated by a non-
attorney on a corporation’s behalf is procedurally defective, the defect is curable.”
Wireless Advocs., LLC v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 973 N.E.2d 111, 113 (Ind.
Tax Ct. 2012) (citing Sherry Designs, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 589 N.E.2d 285,
285 n.1 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1992)). Likewise, when a corporation attempts to prosecute or
defend its case pro se, “Indiana courts generally have given the corporation an
opportunity to retain counsel, which the corporation must refuse before dismissing the
action.” Id. at 112 (citing Western Parks, 383 N.E.2d at 292–93). Petitioner shall
therefore be given an opportunity to retain counsel.
Williams, --- N.E.3d at ----, 2025 WL 2383623, at *2. The Court admonishes Grossman for citing
a fictitious case in his brief and “caution[s] attorneys and pro se litigants alike against using AI to
conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated. Judges must be
able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the parties to make just decisions.” Id.
Litigants have a duty to verify the authenticity of authoritative sources cited to the Court and
ensure they are used accurately.
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Therefore, the Court ORDERS that Petitioner may only proceed with legal
counsel and that Petitioner’s counsel must file a notice of appearance by November 17,
2025. If Petitioner is unable to obtain counsel by this date, Petitioner shall file a notice
with the Court by the same date detailing the efforts to retain counsel and explaining
why those efforts have been unsuccessful. If Petitioner fails or is unwilling to appear by
counsel, the case may be dismissed.
ORDERED: 10/17/2025
Justin L. McAdam
Judge, Indiana Tax Court
Distribution:
Eric Grossman, Craig Goergen.
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