T. Ballard v. B. Spencer

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Todd Ballard, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Brian Spencer; James Glass, et al., : No. 240 M.D. 2024

Respondents : Submitted: August 8, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 17, 2025

Before this Court are Clearfield County (County) Common Pleas Court

(Common Pleas Court) Prothonotary Brian Spencer’s (Prothonotary Spencer) and

the County Magisterial District Judge (MDJ) James Glass’s (MDJ Glass)

(collectively, Respondents) Preliminary Objections (Preliminary Objections) to

Todd Ballard’s (Ballard) pro se Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Petition). After

review, this Court sustains Prothonotary Spencer’s Preliminary Objection and

dismisses the Petition as to Prothonotary Spencer, and sustains MDJ Glass’s

Preliminary Objection to this Court’s jurisdiction, and transfers this matter to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Background

Ballard is currently an inmate at the State Correctional Institution (SCI)

at Mercer.1 On March 5, 2024, Ballard mailed to the Common Pleas Court’s

1

https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/Result (last visited Oct. 16, 2025).

Prothonotary’s office a civil complaint, a private criminal complaint, and a petition

for a temporary restraining order with supporting grievance documents (TRO

petition) against Department of Corrections (DOC) SCI-Houtzdale Corrections

Officer Daniel Smith (C.O. Smith), and asked that they be filed and presented to a

Common Pleas Court judge. See Petition ¶ 4; see also Petition Exs. 1-3. By March

26, 2024 letter, Common Pleas Court Administrator F. Cortez Bell, III, Esquire

(Bell), informed Ballard that the Common Pleas Court lacked jurisdiction to litigate

or issue an injunction against DOC, and that this Court has such jurisdiction. See

Petition ¶ 5; see also Petition Ex. 4. Bell further notified Ballard that his private

criminal complaint must be filed with the MDJ who has jurisdiction over the

intentional acts he alleged C.O. Smith committed against him. See id. Bell

explained that the MDJ may forward the private criminal complaint to the County

district attorney (DA) for further action, and that the Common Pleas Court was not

required to process it for him. See Petition Ex. 4.

On April 4, 2024, Ballard filed his civil complaint in MDJ Glass’s

office, filed his private criminal complaint in the DA’s office, and filed his TRO

petition in Prothonotary Spencer’s office. See Petition ¶ 6; see also Petition Ex. 5.

By letter dated April 11, 2024, MDJ Glass denied Ballard’s civil complaint on the

basis that Ballard therein alleged crimes that should be addressed by private criminal

complaint rather than a civil complaint. See Petition ¶ 7; see also Petition Ex. 6.

MDJ Glass instructed Ballard to submit a private criminal complaint to the DA’s

office. See id. Ballard did not receive responses from Prothonotary Spencer or the

DA. See Petition ¶ 8.

On April 26, 2024, Ballard filed the Petition in this Court’s original

jurisdiction seeking a writ of mandamus compelling Prothonotary Spencer and MDJ

Glass to carry out their affirmative duties - Prothonotary Spencer to accept the TRO

2

petition for filing in the Common Pleas Court and MDJ Glass to accept the civil

complaint - and for both to schedule hearings and adjudicate his claims.2

By order entered on July 9, 2024, the Common Pleas Court

acknowledged that it had received Ballard’s April 4, 2024 TRO petition, and ruled:3

2

That same day, Ballard filed in this Court a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and an

Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP Application). By May 23, 2024 Order,

this Court denied Ballard’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel and his IFP Application.

By May 23, 2024 letter from Common Pleas Court President Judge Fredric J. Ammerman

(P.J. Ammerman) to this Court’s Prothonotary, P.J. Ammerman confirmed the background Ballard

presented in the Petition and further explained that Prothonotary Spencer had provided Ballard’s

TRO petition and supporting documents to the Common Pleas Court and they were “being

reviewed by the [Common Pleas] Court pursuant to the provisions of [Pennsylvania] Rule of Civil

Procedure [(Rule)] 240(j)[,]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1) (a court may dismiss an action filed with an

IFP petition if satisfied that the action is frivolous, i.e., lacks arguable basis in law or fact). P.J.

Ammerman Letter at 2. P.J. Ammerman declared that the Common Pleas Court, not MDJ Glass,

had jurisdiction over Ballard’s civil complaint, and the Common Pleas Court lacked jurisdiction

to grant the TRO petition against DOC or its employees. See id. He asserted that because, in his

opinion, both Prothonotary Spencer and MDJ Glass acted appropriately, this Court should dismiss

the Petition. See id. at 2-3.

On June 6, 2024, Ballard responded to P.J. Ammerman’s letter, claiming that the Common

Pleas Court had jurisdiction over his TRO petition, and MDJ Glass had jurisdiction over his civil

complaint. On June 26, 2024, Ballard filed what he titled an Addendum to Petition for Writ of

Mandamus, wherein he declared that the DA finally, after two months, disapproved his private

criminal complaint against C.O. Smith.

By letter sent on July 22, 2024, Ballard submitted additional documents to this Court and

inquired regarding the status of a TRO petition he purportedly filed in this Court, but which was

not docketed. One of the documents attached to Ballard’s letter was a copy of an order P.J.

Ammerman entered in the Common Pleas Court on July 9, 2024, dismissing Ballard’s complaint

against C.O. Smith as frivolous pursuant to Rule 240(j)(1). See Ballard 7/22/2024 Letter, Ex. D

at 3.

By July 31, 2024 letter, Ballard informed this Court’s Prothonotary that he had been

returned to SCI-Houtzdale, where C.O. Smith and his colleagues work, and stated that he was

seeking injunctive relief to avoid more unlawful acts against him and was awaiting this Court’s

adjudication of his filings. By letter mailed August 14, 2025, Ballard informed this Court that he

had been temporarily transferred to SCI-Mercer.

3

Rule 1019(g) provides, in relevant part: “A party may incorporate by reference any matter

of record in any [s]tate or [f]ederal court of record whose records are within the county in which

the action is pending[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(g); see also Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2),

Pa.R.E. 201(b)(2). Where, as here, Ballard expressly referenced underlying civil and criminal

actions in the Petition, this Court may take judicial notice of the dockets related thereto. See Page

3

[Ballard] has failed to establish a cause of action as the . . .

Common Pleas [Court] does not have subject matter

jurisdiction to litigate or issue an injunction against []

DOC or its employees. Therefore, [Ballard’s] civil

complaint is frivolous and will be DISMISSED, pursuant

to Pennsylvania Rule[] of Civil Procedure 240(j)(1)[,

Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1)].

Ballard’s Response to Order, Ex. D at 3. The Common Pleas Court’s order

dismissed Ballard’s complaint against C.O. Smith “with prejudice.” Id.

On September 13, 2024, MDJ Glass filed Preliminary Objections to the

Petition, alleging therein that this Court lacks jurisdiction to issue mandamus relief

against an MDJ, and MDJ Glass is entitled to judicial immunity. On September 22,

2024, Prothonotary Spencer filed a Preliminary Objection to the Petition, claiming

that Ballard failed to state a cognizable cause of action against him. On October 10,

2024, Ballard filed answers opposing Respondents’ Preliminary Objections. This

Court ordered the parties to brief their respective positions, which they did.

Respondents’ Preliminary Objections are now ripe for disposition.

Discussion

Initially,

[i]n ruling on preliminary objections, [this Court] must

“accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the

petition for review,” as well as inferences reasonably

deduced therefrom. Garrison v. Dep’t of Corr., 16 A.3d

560, 563 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Th[is] Court need not

accept as true conclusions of law, “unwarranted inferences

from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of

opinion.” Id. To sustain preliminary objections, “it must

appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery,

v. Rogers, 324 A.3d 661 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024); see also Krenzel v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 840 A.2d

450, 454 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“Judicial notice can be taken of pleadings and judgments in

other proceedings where appropriate.” (citation omitted)); Solomon v. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa.,

Inc., 797 A.2d 346, 352 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of public documents

in ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer.”).

4

and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain

them.” Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010).

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits

well-pleaded facts and inferences reasonably deduced

therefrom in order to test the legal sufficiency of a petition

for review. Id. A demurrer can “be sustained only in cases

where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for

which relief can be granted.” Id.

Robinson v. Pa. Parole Bd., 306 A.3d 969, 972 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), aff’d, 328

A.3d 467 (Pa. 2024). “Thus, th[is C]ourt may determine only whether, on the basis

of the [petitioner’s] allegations, he or she possesses a cause of action recognized at

law.” Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 5, by McNesby v. City of Phila., 267 A.3d

531, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). “[D]ocuments attached as exhibits [and] documents

referenced in the [petition], as well as facts already of record[,] may also be

considered.” Id. at 542.

Moreover,

[t]he common law writ of mandamus lies to compel the

performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty.

Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Golden, 35 A.3d 1277

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). “The burden of proof falls upon the

party seeking this extraordinary remedy to establish his

legal right to such relief.” Werner v. Zazyczny, . . . 681

A.2d 1331, 1335 ([Pa.] 1996). To state a claim for

mandamus, a petitioner must establish the following three

elements: (1) a clear legal right to relief in the petitioner;

(2) a corresponding duty in the respondent; and[] (3) the

lack of any other adequate and appropriate remedy.

Wilson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 942 A.2d 270, 272

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “Mandamus is not available to

establish legal rights but only to enforce rights that have

been established.” Smires v. O’Shell, 126 A.3d 383, 387

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citations omitted). Further, “[a]s a

high prerogative writ, mandamus is rarely issued and

never to interfere with a public official’s exercise of

discretion.” Id.

5

Baron v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 169 A.3d 1268, 1272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), aff’d, 194

A.3d 563 (Pa. 2018).

Prothonotary Spencer’s Preliminary Objection

Prothonotary Spencer objects to the Petition on the basis that Ballard

failed to state a cognizable cause of action against him. Ballard responds that he has

a fundamental right to seek monetary damages and injunctive relief by a civil

complaint against C.O. Smith filed in the Common Pleas Court.

In one of our early cases, cited many times by the courts

of this Commonwealth, [this Court] observed as follows:

A [p]rothonotary may have the power, and even

the duty, to inspect documents tendered for filing

and to reject them if they are not on their face in

the proper form . . . but this power is limited. He

is not in the position of an administrative officer

who has discretion to interpret or implement rules

and statutes. . . . Any question of construction

must be resolved by the courts, not by the

[p]rothonotary nor the parties. The [p]rothonotary

must accept papers and file them. He must also

collect fees fixed by the legislature. He has no

discretion in this matter nor does he act in a

judicial capacity.

Warner v. Cortese, 288 A.2d 550, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1972)

....

. . . . [W]hether [a plaintiff’s] suit may proceed as filed

is a matter properly to be decided by the trial court.

Lawson v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Montgomery Cnty. Prothonotary Off. (Pa.

Cmwlth. No. 277 M.D. 2022, filed Dec. 21, 2023), slip op. at 5-6 (original italic

emphasis omitted; bold emphasis added).4

4

While not binding, unreported opinions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may

be cited for their persuasive authority pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure

6

Therefore, Prothonotary Spencer had a responsibility to accept

Ballard’s complaint/TRO petition and present it to the Common Pleas Court for

disposition. The Common Pleas Court’s July 9, 2024 order dismissing Ballard’s

TRO petition makes clear that Prothonotary Spencer accepted the documentation

and presented it to the Common Pleas Court for consideration as required. Under

the circumstances, Ballard’s request for this Court to order Prothonotary Spencer to

accept his TRO petition and related documentation and present it to the Common

Pleas Court is moot.

“A case is ‘moot’ when a determination is sought on a

matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical

effect on the existing controversy.” Commonwealth v.

Nava, 966 A.2d 630, 632-33 (Pa. Super. 2009). Stated

differently, “[a]n issue before a court is moot if in ruling

upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any

legal force or effect.” Id. at 633. Cases presenting

mootness problems are those that involve litigants who

clearly had standing to sue at the outset of the litigation.

“The problems arise from events occurring after the

lawsuit has gotten underway - changes in the facts or in

the law - which allegedly deprive the litigant of the

necessary stake in the outcome. The mootness doctrine

requires that ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all

stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is

filed.’” In re Gross, . . . 382 A.2d 116 ([Pa.] 1978)

(quoting G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 1578 (9th Ed.

1975)).

This Court will not decide moot questions.[5] Pa.R.A.P.

1972(4). . . .

Chruby v. Dep’t of Corr., 4 A.3d 764, 770-71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

124(b), Pa.R.A.P 126(b), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210

Pa. Code § 69.414(a). Lawson is cited herein for its persuasive value.

5

“Exceptions to this [mootness] principle are made where (1) the conduct complained of

is capable of repetition yet likely to evade review, (2) the case involves issues important to the

public interest, or (3) a party will suffer some detriment without the court’s decision.” Chruby v.

Dep’t of Corr., 4 A.3d 764, 771 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). None of those exceptions apply in this

instance.

7

Accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in the Petition and drawing all

inferences reasonably deducible therefrom in Ballard’s favor, as this Court must, see

Robinson, because Ballard’s mandamus action against Prothonotary Spencer is moot

and “the law will not permit recovery,” id. at 972 n.7 (quoting Torres, 997 A.2d at

1245), this Court sustains Prothonotary Spencer’s Preliminary Objection and

dismisses the Petition as to him.

MDJ Glass’s Preliminary Objections

MDJ Glass objects to the Petition on the bases that this Court lacks

jurisdiction to issue mandamus relief against an MDJ, and MDJ Glass is entitled to

judicial immunity.6 Ballard responds that because MDJ Glass “suggested legal

advise [sic] contrary to his oath of office” (i.e., that Ballard’s civil action was

criminal in nature, despite that he was seeking damages for C.O. Smith’s conduct),

this Court has jurisdiction to entertain his action and/or transfer his Petition to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, 42

Pa.C.S. § 5103(a).

This Court has explained:

This Court has original jurisdiction under [Section

761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code,] 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)[,]

over actions against [MDJ Glass], as []he is a

Commonwealth officer. Leiber v. C[nty.] of Allegheny,

654 A.2d 11, 14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); [Sections 102 and

6

Generally, . . . when not objected to in preliminary objections, . . . it

is now currently accepted that immunity is a defense that may be

raised by preliminary objection “when to delay a ruling thereon

would serve no purpose.” Faust v. Dep’t of Revenue, . . . 592 A.2d

835, 838 n.3 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1991).

Chasan v. Platt, 244 A.3d 73, 81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). Here, Ballard did not object by way of a

preliminary objection to MDJ Glass’s immunity defense being included in his Preliminary

Objections.

8

301(9) of the Judicial Code,] 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 102

[(Commonwealth government is defined to include

officers of the unified judicial system)], 301(9) [(“The

judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a

unified judicial system consisting of . . . [MDJs].”).

This Court, however, does not have jurisdiction to

issue mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction,

including [MDJs], except where the mandamus is

ancillary to a pending appeal. Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d

394, 407 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Leiber, 654 A.2d at 14; see

also Mun[.] Publ[’ns] v. C[t.] of Common Pleas of Phila[.]

C[nty.], . . . 489 A.2d 1286, 1287-88 ([Pa.] 1985) (Superior

Court lacks jurisdiction to issue mandamus or prohibition

to lower court unless ancillary to a pending appeal).

Exclusive jurisdiction over non-ancillary mandamus to

courts of inferior jurisdiction lies in the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court. Leiber, 654 A.2d at 14; see also

Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 407.

Kneller v. Stewart, 112 A.3d 1269, 1271 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (emphasis added),

mandamus denied, 118 A.3d 1106 (Pa. 2015); see also Section 721(2) of the Judicial

Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 721(2) (The Pennsylvania Supreme Court shall have original but

not exclusive jurisdiction of all cases of “mandamus . . . .”). Because, in the instant

matter, Ballard has not alleged in the Petition that his mandamus action is ancillary

to a pending appeal, nor is there evidence to suggest that it is, this Court lacks

jurisdiction to issue mandamus relief.

“The remedy for this lack of jurisdiction, however, is transfer to the

[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court, not dismissal.” Id. Section 5103(a) of the Judicial

Code provides:

If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court

or magisterial district of this Commonwealth which does

not have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the

court or [MDJ] shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the

matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper

tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other

matter shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee

tribunal on the date when the appeal or other matter was

9

first filed in a court or magisterial district of this

Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive

jurisdiction of a court or [MDJ] of this Commonwealth but

which is commenced in any other tribunal of this

Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal

to the proper court or magisterial district of this

Commonwealth where it shall be treated as if originally

filed in the transferee court or magisterial district of this

Commonwealth on the date when first filed in the other

tribunal.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a). Accordingly, this Court sustains MDJ Glass’s Preliminary

Objection as to jurisdiction and orders that Ballard’s mandamus action be transferred

to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.7 See Kneller.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, this Court sustains Prothonotary Spencer’s

Preliminary Objection and dismisses the Petition as to Prothonotary Spencer. This

Court also sustains MDJ Glass’s Preliminary Objection to this Court’s jurisdiction

and transfers the portions of the Petition related to MDJ Glass to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code.

_______________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

7

Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Ballard’s

mandamus claim against MDJ Glass, this Court does not address MDJ Glass’s Preliminary

Objection based on judicial immunity.

10

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Todd Ballard, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Brian Spencer; James Glass, et al., : No. 240 M.D. 2024

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2025, Clearfield County

Common Pleas Court Prothonotary Brian Spencer’s (Prothonotary Spencer)

Preliminary Objection to Todd Ballard’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Petition)

is SUSTAINED, and the Petition is DISMISSED as to Prothonotary Spencer.

Clearfield County Magisterial District Judge James Glass’s (MDJ

Glass) Preliminary Objection to this Court’s jurisdiction is SUSTAINED, and the

portions of the Petition relative to MDJ Glass shall be TRANSFERRED to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, 42

Pa.C.S. § 5103(a). This Court’s Prothonotary shall certify a photocopy of the docket

entries of the above matter and the record to the Prothonotary of the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court.

________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge