Stacey Bridges v. J.C. Poe, Jr.

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FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12028

____________________

STACEY BRIDGES,

CHARITY TESSENER,

JESSICA RAINER,

WHITLEY GOODSON,

MEGAN DUNN,

ALLISON MANN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

J.C. POE, JR.,

Individually and in his official capacity as

Chief of the City of Jasper Police Department,

DEBORAH JOHNSON,

Individually and in her official capacity as

a Jail Supervisor,

DENNIS BUZBEE,

Individually and in his official capacity as Jailor,

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 7:19-cv-00529-LSC

Consolidated with D.C. Docket Nos. 7:19-cv-01314-LSC, 7:19-cv-01392-LSC,

6:19-cv-01399-LSC, 7:19-cv-01571-LSC, and 7:19-cv-01961-LSC

____________________

Before GRANT, ABUDU, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Some cases have both difficult facts and clear law that bars

recovery. This is one of them. Stacey Bridges and five former

inmates of Jasper City Jail credibly allege that they suffered

widespread sexual abuse at the hands of their jailers. The problem

is that they sued various jail administrators and Jasper City—but

not their primary alleged abuser. And to hold any of those

administrators or the City liable, the plaintiffs needed to show a

link between the administrators’ actions and the alleged violations.

But they did not offer one. Without knowledge, or even suspicion,

about what was going on, jail administrators could not have

offered so much as tacit approval for the monstrous behavior the

plaintiffs allege—much less an unofficial custom or policy of

tolerating sexual abuse. We therefore affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

I.

The facts here are complicated, so we break them into

several parts. We first describe the defendants, then the jail’s

policies and procedures, and then the plaintiffs and their

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22-12028 Opinion of the Court 3

allegations. We close by considering the plaintiffs’ attempts to raise

their concerns and the litigation that followed.

A.

As chief of police for the City of Jasper, J.C. Poe Jr. was

responsible for the management, efficiency, and general conduct of

the police department, including the jail. According to the

department manual, he could create, enforce, and approve changes

to policies and procedures at the jail. Poe could also hire, suspend,

or dismiss jail employees. In short, he was “ultimately responsible

for the operation of the jail.”

Though Poe was the final authority, chief jailer Deborah

Johnson ran the show, overseeing day-to-day operations. She

trained employees, assisted jail officers in carrying out their tasks,

and monitored employee compliance with rules and regulations.

Johnson’s duties also included addressing disturbances and

complaints at the jail, all of which were to be recorded in the jail’s

logbook.

The other defendants played roles in the life of the jail too.

David Mize served as jail administrator and was Johnson’s direct

superior. His duties included recruiting and hiring jailers,

maintaining “control and order of the jail,” and generally ensuring

that “the jail was operating the way it was supposed to.” Dennis

Buzbee and Rusty Boyd were jailers. They booked inmates

entering the jail, searched them for contraband, and made sure

they had their hygienic and personal necessities. Like all jail

employees, Buzbee and Boyd were responsible for the “proper

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safeguard” of inmates in their custody. And though Boyd was the

primary sexual antagonist named in the pleadings, only Buzbee

was named as a defendant.

Some Jasper inmates earned what the jail called “trustee”

status. Trustees washed cars, laundered uniforms, prepared meals,

and so forth. A perk of these extra duties was that trustees had

more time out of their cells; sometimes they even got extra meals

at night. Trustee status was a “privilege, not a right,” and jail policy

entrusted Johnson, the supervisor, with selection of trustees

(though there was some evidence that Mize played a role too).

Still, no formal selection process existed, and the parties dispute

who really appointed the trustees. Bridges, for instance, said that

Boyd began to select inmates to serve as trustees at some point,

and Dunn said that Boyd would also escort non-trustee inmates out

of their cells under the guise of the program. Mize disagreed,

testifying that jailers were not allowed to appoint trustees without

his permission or Johnson’s. He did not recall granting Boyd such

permission.

As for the department’s policies and procedures for

investigating and responding to inmate complaints, the relevant

guides included the police department manual, the jail’s internal

manual, and the City’s employee handbook. The most relevant of

the three for our purposes is the jail’s internal manual, which

expressly prohibited fraternizing or sexually engaging with

inmates. The manual also forbade “subject[ing] inmates to any

form of physical or emotional abuse.” Finally, it required on-duty

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jailers to “maintain a log of all activities,” including “any

disturbances, injuries, attempted assualts [sic] or suicides or any

other event involving safety or security threats.”

As chief jailer, Johnson was required to report employee

violations of both department regulations and law to her

“commanding officer.” And employees had to escalate

information that they received about any “matters that indicate the

need for police action.” Each employee was also responsible for

“assisting in the prevention of harassment” by “[r]efraining from

participation in, or encouragement of, actions that could be

preceived [sic] as harassment” and “[r]eporting acts of harassment

to a supervisor.” And for inmates who had concerns, the jail’s

inmate handbook contained instructions for submitting a

grievance and outlined the process for filing an “Inmate Request

form” that would be investigated and answered within seventy-

two hours. Unsatisfied inmates could escalate a grievance,

including to the chief of police if necessary.

These grievances, as well as more minor complaints and

general administrative questions, were submitted by inmates

through an electronic kiosk system at the jail. The kiosks were in

common areas, and only Mize, Poe, Johnson, and the assistant chief

of police had access to the system—though Mize was not sure that

Poe or the assistant chief “ever knew how to log into it.” Jailers,

however, could not access any inquiry or grievance submitted

through the kiosks—the administrative questions all went to Mize,

and the grievances to either Mize or Johnson. From 2016 through

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2018—the two years surrounding the allegations here—Mize did

not recall receiving grievances “from any female inmate

concerning sexual exploitation” through the kiosk system.

The extent of sexual-harassment-specific training is disputed

terrain. When the City hired jailers, it instructed them on the use

of force and first aid; everything else was generally taught on the

job. But one non-defendant jailer testified that she, two other

jailers, and Johnson received a week of training at the Jefferson

County Academy about “the basics on sexual harassment.”

Johnson also recalled completing sexual-harassment training and

received a 2013 certificate of completion, but could not remember

many details because it had been “so many years ago.” She did

know that sexual harassment was “not allowed” at the jail.

For his part, Boyd said it was “common sense” that jailers

could not have sex with inmates. He recalled reading about

custodial sexual misconduct “in the police academy.” Buzbee too

said it was “common knowledge” that sex with inmates was

prohibited—and sexual harassment too. The City also asserted in

discovery that both jailers received “on the job training” from

employees who had attended the Jefferson County training.

B.

With that background, we now turn to the plaintiffs’

allegations, viewing the evidence in their favor and drawing all

inferences in that same direction at this stage of the case. Nehme v.

Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs., 121 F.4th 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2024). The

women—Whitley Goodson, Jessica Rainer, Megan Dunn, Allison

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Mann, Charity Tessener, and Stacey Bridges—served varying

terms of incarceration in Jasper City Jail. Five plaintiffs accuse only

Boyd of sexual misconduct, while one accuses both Boyd and

Buzbee.

Goodson. Goodson alleged that Boyd shocked her buttocks

with a taser and said, “bet you like that because you are a freak.”

Around the same time, he pulled her aside to watch a pornographic

video on his cell phone and would not let her leave. Boyd later

took her to an outdoor storage shed and had vaginal intercourse

with her. She did not want to, but “was scared to say no or to do

anything to stop him.” Goodson later disclosed to state

investigators that two other inmates—Rainer and Dunn—divulged

to her that Boyd had assaulted them or talked to them about sex-

related topics.

Rainer. Rainer made similar allegations against Boyd,

asserting that he took her into a closet where he made

inappropriate sexual comments, shoved his hand down her pants,

kissed her on her neck, and said he “couldn’t wait to fuck” her.

After that, Rainer avoided being “in a corner or close to a closet”

anytime she saw Boyd. Even so, Boyd followed her into a storage

room after he had told her to drop off food there. Once they were

both inside, he kissed her and again put his hand down her pants.

Impeded by her tight pants, he instructed her to change into looser

ones. Rainer protested, but Boyd insisted, cautioning her to make

sure that no one saw her reenter the storage room after she

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changed. Once she returned, Boyd told her to sit on the freezer

and had sex with her.

Dunn. Dunn alleged that Boyd made sexually suggestive

comments and advances toward her, one night telling her that he

wanted her and a cellmate to “put on a show” for him. Another

time he told her that she was “just a little whore.” And on yet

another evening, when Boyd escorted Dunn past a closet, he told

her that’s where they would go if he “want[ed] a kiss or something

like that” because it was “one of the blind spots where the cameras

can’t see.” He then asked Dunn if she would “tell on” him if he

propositioned her for sex. Fearful that he would harm her, Dunn

said she would keep quiet. On her last night at the jail, Boyd took

Dunn to a secluded area, where he kissed her neck, fondled her

breasts, and put his hand down her pants.

Mann. Mann too accused Boyd of sexually assaulting her.

As her release date approached, Boyd started asking Mann

questions about her sexual preferences and history. One night,

Boyd took her out of her cell and into a storage space supposedly

to “get some books.” There, he first penetrated her vagina with his

fingers and then had vaginal intercourse with her. Mann testified

that she didn’t protest because she “just wanted to be done.”

Another time, Boyd ordered her to help him—but he instead took

her into a closet, pulled his pants down, and told her to “suck it for

him.” Feeling like she “had no choice,” Mann performed oral sex

on Boyd, who ejaculated onto the floor and handed her a towel to

clean it up.

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Tessener. Tessener also alleged that Boyd sexually assaulted

her. Not pleased when she rebuffed him, Boyd removed her from

her trustee position and placed her in lockdown for about six days,

but his harassment continued. He first slid his hand across her

buttocks, and another day masturbated in front of her.

Things got worse. A few days later, Boyd approached

Tessener while she was working in a private area and began

rubbing his penis against her backside. He taunted her: “if you ever

tell anybody no one would believe you,” and held her so that she

couldn’t turn around. Though Tessener resisted, Boyd raped her.

After that, he assaulted her two or three times a week over the next

several months—sometimes he ordered her into the same closet

where he first raped her, and others he would take her into a room

upstairs or an outdoor supply closet. Boyd often ejaculated onto

the floor and told Tessener to clean it up.

Bridges. Bridges was the only plaintiff to sue Buzbee. She

testified that he directed sexual remarks to her, groped her, kissed

her, ran his hand down her pants, penetrated her with his fingers,

tried to penetrate her with his penis, and forced her to perform oral

sex on him—all while she was working as a trustee. Though she

did not name Boyd as a defendant in her individual lawsuit, Bridges

eventually alleged that he groped her, grabbed her, and made

inappropriate comments in her presence.

C.

The plaintiffs claim that their attempts to raise their

concerns with jail staff were stymied. To start, they say the kiosks

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for complaints simply didn’t work. Tessener, for instance, said

they were “always down.” They had privacy concerns too,

worrying that “anybody could have read” complaints submitted on

the kiosks. But Mize called this fear unfounded—only he, Poe,

Johnson, and the assistant chief of police had access to inquiries and

grievances filed through the kiosks. By testifying that he checked

the kiosks “multiple times a day,” Mize implied that they were

typically in working order.

For her part, Tessener said that she asked jailer Raeven Clay

not to be left alone with Boyd, and Clay replied that Tessener was

“not the first one [Boyd] has been that way with.” And when state

investigators interviewed Clay about sexual-assault allegations at

the jail, she confirmed that Tessener asked her “not to leave her

alone with Boyd.” Clay, who is not a defendant, acknowledged

that Tessener requested to be returned to her cell whenever Clay

left to pick up meals and Boyd and Buzbee were the only jailers still

there. She also recalled a day when Tessener appeared upset after

finishing her trustee shift. When Clay asked what was wrong,

Tessener told her that Boyd “made her get in the closet with him

and ejaculated and made her clean it up.” Clay, who did not report

the allegations to anyone until her interview with state

investigators, said that Tessener had told her that she had reported

it herself. But Tessener denied having done so in her deposition,

and nothing else in the record suggests that she did.

To be sure, the inmates did complain to Poe and Johnson—

but it was about other issues, from water temperature and food

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quality to the availability of hygiene products. Some inmates also

started writing Poe letters, which were often delivered to him by

another jailer, Monique Softley (the inmates felt comfortable

approaching her). The City produced several of these letters from

Tessener and Mann, and none made any reference, even implicit,

to sexual assault. As for Softley, she could not testify about the

letters she transmitted because she did not read them before sliding

them under Poe’s door, adding that no inmate “came to [her] about

nobody sexually harassing them.”

Tessener testified that she sent Poe a letter explaining that

she “didn’t like the way that Rusty [Boyd] would do things” at the

jail. She says she gave the letter to Softley to deliver—but there is

no copy of the letter in the record or evidence of its existence

beyond Tessener’s testimony.1 When queried about notes from

Tessener, Poe testified that he remembered receiving one or two

letters from her “requesting to be a trustee” but nothing

referencing sexual harassment. Poe maintained that if he had

received any letter mentioning sexual misconduct, he “would have

initiated an investigation immediately.”

1 The parties dispute whether this letter exists. Though one letter sent around

December 2017 includes a request for Poe to “come speak with” Tessener, it

addresses only Tessener’s complaints about work on a particular trustee

assignment. Because this appeal comes before us on a grant of summary

judgment in the defendants’ favor, however, we assume that Tessener wrote

the letter described in her testimony, and that Poe received and read that

letter. See United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc).

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Finally, there is evidence that Softley told chief jailer

Johnson that another jail employee, Jonathan Long—who was

never a defendant in this suit—was sexually assaulting Tessener.

According to Softley, Johnson replied that she had “told John he

[was] going to get caught doing the things that he [was] doing.”

Johnson acknowledged that Softley escalated a complaint from

Tessener about Long, but added that she had never observed any

inappropriate conduct between inmates and jail staff. During her

deposition, Johnson admitted hearing rumors of Long “talking

dirty” to Tessener, and also signed a statement noting that she had

heard that Long made “inappropriate advances” toward Tessener.

Other evidence undercuts that account, starting with the

fact that Softley did not work on the day that she first said she heard

Johnson’s comment. The jail incident log lacks any mention of an

assault, and Mize confirmed that the log does not contain “any

report of sexual misconduct by Monique Softley.” Finally,

Tessener herself testified that she was not sexually assaulted by

anyone other than Boyd.

As for Boyd, Tessener later took matters into her own

hands. In late 2017, she told two employees of the local animal

shelter where she worked as a trustee that a jailer wanted “sexual

favors.” The employees replied that the jailer’s conduct was

inappropriate and “likely illegal,” so Tessener asked to be referred

to an attorney, which eventually led to this lawsuit. After Boyd’s

next assault, Tessener saved the towel that she used to clean up his

ejaculate. She marked the towel with an “X,” snuck it out of the

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jail on her way to work at the shelter, and gave it to one of the

employees for safekeeping. When Tessener later reported Boyd’s

assaults to state investigators, her lawyer turned over the towel,

and the DNA sample matched Boyd.

The Alabama State Bureau of Investigation began looking

into the allegations in January 2018. Investigators interviewed

several witnesses, including plaintiffs Tessener, Mann, and

Goodson, as well as Buzbee, Boyd, and other jail employees. Not

interviewed was Bridges, the only plaintiff who alleged abuse by

Buzbee. In the meantime, Poe placed Boyd on administrative

leave.

Three months later, the Bureau forwarded its final report to

the district attorney for presentation to a grand jury. Boyd resigned

that month. Buzbee followed seven months later, citing “medical

issues.” The jail soon suspended the trustee program, and Mize

and another police captain interviewed jailers to ferret out “any

current harassment issues at the Jail.” Finally, in January 2020,

Boyd was indicted in state court on two counts of unlawful sexual

conduct with a person in custody of the jail. See Ala. Code § 14-11-

31(a).

D.

Bridges, Rainer, Goodson, Dunn, Mann, and Tessener filed

six separate complaints. They asserted claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Poe, Johnson, and the City for violations of their

Eighth Amendment rights on theories of supervisory and

municipal liability. Each plaintiff also sued Poe, Johnson, and the

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City for violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection

Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), and Bridges asserted additional

state and federal claims against Buzbee. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591,

1595(a). For whatever reason, none of the plaintiffs filed claims

against Boyd.

The district court consolidated the six complaints. After

discovery, Poe, Johnson, and the City filed a joint motion for

summary judgment. Poe and Johnson contended that the plaintiffs

could not establish a causal connection between their actions and

the alleged constitutional harms because the plaintiffs had

“provided no evidence whatsoever” that Poe or Johnson knew

about the alleged abuse. Nor, the defendants said, was there any

evidence that Poe and Johnson “initiated the[] alleged customs or

practices” allowing that abuse, which meant the plaintiffs could not

show that their injuries were caused by a custom or practice

adopted by a municipal policymaker as required by Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

The district court granted the joint motion for summary

judgment, and dismissed all claims against Buzbee, Poe, Johnson,

and the City. 2 See Bridges v. Poe, No. 7:19-cv-00529, 2022 WL

2 Two preliminary points. First, the plaintiffs individually asserted various

claims under state and federal law. They do not challenge the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to Poe, Johnson, and the City on their negligent

hiring, conspiracy, and Fourth Amendment claims, so those claims are

forfeited. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872–74 (11th Cir. 2022) (en

banc).

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1598437, at *2, *31–32 (N.D. Ala. May 19, 2022) (unpublished). For

Buzbee, the court granted his separate motion for summary

judgment because Bridges failed to properly serve him.3 See id. at

*10–11, *31 n.12. For Poe and Johnson, the court concluded that

qualified immunity applied because the plaintiffs had failed to show

that the defendants caused their injuries. See id. at *23–27. For the

City, the court determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish that

it had a custom or policy of disregarding jailer misconduct. Id. at

*27. This appeal followed.

II.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in the light

most favorable to the plaintiffs. Nehme, 121 F.4th at 1383.

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact” such that Poe, Johnson, and the City are

“entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Second, after granting the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment, the

district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over two of

Bridges’s state-law claims against Johnson because no federal-law claims

remained. See Bridges v. Poe, No. 7:19-cv-00529, 2022 WL 1598437, at *31–32

(N.D. Ala. May 19, 2022) (unpublished). Those rulings are unchallenged.

3 Buzbee’s counsel filed a responsive brief and appeared at oral argument, but

because Bridges does not challenge the dismissal of her claim against him, we

consider any argument that he remains in the case forfeited.

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16 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

III.

There are three issues before us. First, all six plaintiffs

challenge the district court’s rejection of their claims that Poe and

Johnson violated the Eighth Amendment because they tolerated

the sexual abuse of inmates and failed to train jail employees about

sexual exploitation. Second, Rainer and Mann contend that their

claims are not time-barred. And third, Bridges, Tessener, and

Goodson challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on their TVPRA claims.

A.

We start with the district court’s qualified-immunity

decision for Poe and Johnson in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity is a “demanding standard” that protects “all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quotation

omitted). An official has the initial burden of raising a qualified-

immunity defense by showing that she acted within her

discretionary authority. Est. of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934,

939 (11th Cir. 2018). Once that threshold is satisfied, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to show that the official violated “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346

(11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).

The plaintiffs concede that Poe and Johnson acted within

their discretionary authority. And there is no question that the

plaintiffs had a clearly established right to be free from sexual abuse

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while incarcerated. See Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1267

(11th Cir. 2020). The question before us, then, is whether Poe and

Johnson’s actions (or inactions) violated that right.

The plaintiffs contend that Poe and Johnson did just that by

tolerating the sexual exploitation of female inmates, failing to train

against sexual misconduct, and neglecting to require reporting and

investigation of the sexual abuse of female inmates. Boiled down,

they claim two supervisory failures: (1) permitting an

unconstitutional custom or policy of sexual abuse to flourish at the

jail, and (2) failing to train subordinates that sexual abuse was

wrong.

Supervisory liability of this sort is demanding. Without

personal participation in a constitutional violation, a supervisor is

liable only if the plaintiff can show that the supervising official’s

actions caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. Cottone v.

Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), overruled in part on other

grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). One way to do

that is to show that a supervisor’s custom or policy reflected

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Piazza

v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019). That requires

“subjective awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm to the

inmate.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir.

2013); see Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1253, 1262 (11th Cir.

2024) (en banc). All that to say, “the standard by which a supervisor

is held liable in his individual capacity for the actions of a

subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Keith v. DeKalb County, 749 F.3d

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1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014) (alteration adopted and quotation

omitted).

1.

We begin with the plaintiffs’ theory that the supervisors had

a custom or policy of tolerating sexual assault. To show a

constitutional violation in this way, a custom or policy must be so

“longstanding and widespread” that we can understand it to be

implicitly authorized by policymakers who were aware of the

problem but failed to act. 4 Craig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1310

(11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). So the plaintiffs need to show

that Poe or Johnson knew about “multiple incidents or multiple

reports of prior misconduct by a particular employee.” Piazza, 923

F.3d at 957 (citation omitted). Put differently, a single report is not

enough—“even when the incident involves several subordinates.”

Id. (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). Instead, to prove

that a custom or policy caused their constitutional injuries, the

plaintiffs must show “a persistent and wide-spread practice.”

Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007)

(quotation omitted).

This threshold is high, as our precedents show. In one case,

reports of understaffing had been made to supervisors so many

times that “it was like whipping a dead horse.” Anderson v. City of

Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 1985). In another, supervisors

4 Cases addressing municipal liability are “analogous” to supervisory liability,

so we may use their holdings to assess Poe and Johnson’s conduct. See Greason

v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 837 (11th Cir. 1990).

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failed to “act in response to the ‘numerous’ prior incidents of

similar conduct of which they were specifically aware.” Danley v.

Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled in part on other

grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir.

2010). And in a third, a warden-supervisor “was put on notice by a

history of widespread abuse” committed by “certain corrections

officers.” Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1235, 1239 (11th Cir.

2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223. 5

Here, we have none of that. The plaintiffs’ strongest

available evidence shows—no matter how serious and violative

Boyd’s alleged abuses in particular were—that Poe had no warning

about what had been going on, and Johnson had, at best, a single

report about a different jailer. See Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty.,

604 F.3d 1248, 1265–67 (11th Cir. 2010) (two complaints to a high

school principal about a teacher sexually harassing students did not

reach the “obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration”

standard for supervisory liability on custom-or-policy theory

(quotation omitted)). Without more, the plaintiffs cannot show

5 The dissent suggests that we wrongly use Danley and Valdes to create a “rule”

that “even ‘numerous’ instances of abuse may not be sufficient to demonstrate

‘a persistent and wide-spread practice.’” Dissent at 13 n.4. Not so. In fact, we

do not understand that contention. In both cases, this Court found that the

plaintiffs had offered enough evidence because they showed two things: that

there were numerous examples of misconduct and that the defendants knew

about it. Danley, 540 F.3d at 1315; Valdes, 450 F.3d at 1235, 1239–41. And in

any event, the rule the dissent imagines would have no role to play here,

where the evidence shows at most a single report of abuse to a single

supervisor.

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

that a custom or policy resulted in deliberate indifference to their

constitutional rights.

We start with Poe. As police chief, Poe was the jail’s highest-

level supervisor, but neither party contends that he was part of its

day-to-day management. The record lacks any evidence of in-

person reports to Poe about assaults, and Poe disclaims any

knowledge about jailer misconduct.

Tessener emphasizes the letter she wrote to Poe explaining

that she “didn’t like the way that Rusty [Boyd] would do things

down there or the way things were going” in the jail. But even

assuming, as we must, that the letter existed as Tessener described

it, that is not nearly enough to show that Poe knew about, much

less broadly tolerated, sexual assault against inmates. Receipt of a

letter complaining in general terms about what one jailer was

doing (without referencing anything sexual) does not come close

to knowledge or approval of a policy of sexual abuse. Nor do the

letters that are in the record contain any reference to Boyd or

connections to sexual misconduct. Instead, they ask Poe for

permission to receive mail from her father, or complain about

being punished for another inmate’s “stupid behavior.” And Poe

says that he did not learn about the plaintiffs’ allegations until state

investigators contacted him in January 2018—after the alleged

abuse took place. Poe could not be deliberately indifferent about a

risk that he did not know existed, and the plaintiffs have offered no

evidence to suggest he did. See Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1334; Wade,

106 F.4th at 1262.

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22-12028 Opinion of the Court 21

The claims against Johnson, the chief jailer, also come up

short, though this time they do have at least one piece of evidence:

testimony that Johnson heard Tessener and Long were having sex.

The “exact words” that jailer Softley recalled hearing from an

intermediary were that Tessener “said that John Long was down

there sexually, you know, having sex with her, taking her out” to a

shed for those purposes. Johnson allegedly replied, “I told John he

is going to get caught doing the things that he is doing.”

At this stage of the case, we assume that Johnson received

and responded to this news exactly as outlined above. But as we

have said, pointing to a “single incident of a constitutional violation

is insufficient to prove a policy or custom.” Craig, 643 F.3d at 1311.

Rather, a plaintiff “must point to multiple incidents” of misconduct

or cite “multiple reports of prior misconduct by a particular

employee.” Piazza, 923 F.3d at 957. While Johnson’s alleged

comment suggests that she may have suspected other

misconduct—of what kind, it’s unclear—we cannot stretch it to

infer that she had received multiple reports of abusive behavior by

Long (or anyone else). That is all the more true considering that

each plaintiff conceded to not informing any jail supervisor—

including Johnson—about the alleged misconduct.

The other evidence reinforces Johnson’s limited knowledge.

Johnson told Mize that someone informed her that “Jailer John

Long had had sex or attempted to have sex with an inmate Charity

Tessener” in the storage facility. In her written statement, Johnson

explained that she had told him that she “had heard that Charity

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22 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

Tessener had accused C/O Jonathan Long of making inappropriate

advances towards her while inside” the jail’s storage facility. Notes

from her interview with state investigators stated that Johnson

“remembered that Corrections Officer (CO) [Monique] Softley

told her that Tessener complained about CO Jonathan Long

‘talking dirty’ to her 2–3 weeks prior.” And Johnson conceded

during her deposition that she informed the State Bureau of

Investigation about the report, but she said nothing about other

incidents or inmates. Johnson, in short, may have known about

one non-defendant jailer’s alleged assault on one inmate. 6

Timing also presents a problem for the plaintiffs. True,

“post-event evidence can shed some light on what policies existed

in the city on the date of an alleged deprivation of constitutional

right.” Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015)

(alteration adopted and quotation omitted). But the only reports

of sexual abuse to reach either Poe or Johnson came from

6 To be sure, we must read all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.

“But inferences in favor of a plaintiff can be based only on evidence—not on

speculation.” Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1058 (11th Cir.

2020). And several facts point the other way here. For starters, Softley, the

witness who claimed she informed Johnson about the abuse, did not work on

the date she says she first heard Johnson’s comment. The jail log lacks any

mention of the incident. And Tessener herself testified that she was not

sexually assaulted by anyone at the jail other than Boyd—including Long.

These facts undercut the plaintiffs’ insistence “that the record in fact contains

supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion.” Doe

v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 604 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).

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22-12028 Opinion of the Court 23

Tessener—the last inmate released from the jail. 7 Even assuming

the most inculpating version of the conversation about Tessener

and Long, Johnson heard about Tessener’s allegations in

November 2017—after Bridges, Rainer, Dunn, and Goodson had

already been released. So, at most, that discussion could support

the allegations of inmates still incarcerated as of November 2017—

Tessener and perhaps Mann.8 There is no evidence that Johnson

had notice of similar misconduct by any jailer against any inmate

before then.

In sum, this is not a case where Johnson was frequently

alerted to jailers’ misconduct. Cf. Anderson, 778 F.2d at 683. Nor

was Johnson “specifically aware” of “numerous prior incidents of

similar” abuse by jailers. Danley, 540 F.3d at 1315 (quotation

omitted). Failing to “point to multiple incidents or multiple reports

of prior misconduct by a particular employee,” the plaintiffs cannot

establish the required causal link between Johnson’s conduct and

their injuries. Piazza, 923 F.3d at 957 (citation omitted); see also

Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360–61. Johnson’s alleged awareness of a

7 For reference, Bridges was released in May 2017, Rainer in August 2017,

Dunn and Goodson in September 2017, and Mann in early November 2017.

See Bridges, 2022 WL 1598437, at *5–8, *12, *17, *21, *31. Tessener was

transferred from the Jasper City Jail to Walker County Jail in January 2018 and

released in March of that year. Id. at *8.

8 Mann was released on November 9, 2017. Softley testified that she “may

not” have told Johnson of Long’s misconduct on November 5—“it could have

been the 7th, 11th.” So it is unclear from the record whether Johnson knew

of the alleged abuse before Mann’s release.

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24 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

single claim of alleged abuse by one jailer who is not a defendant

in this lawsuit does not show that the jail had a custom or policy

resulting in deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs’ rights.9 See

Piazza, 923 F.3d at 957; Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262.

2.

The plaintiffs also fault Poe and Johnson for “failing to train

against sexual exploitation when that training was obviously

necessary.” We disagree.

Section 1983 allows supervisors to be held liable for failure

to train subordinates “only where the failure to train amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the

officers come into contact.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052 (quoting City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (alteration adopted)). To

succeed on this claim, however, the plaintiffs must show that Poe

or Johnson had “actual or constructive notice that a particular

9 The dissent repeatedly uses plural forms to suggest that Johnson received

more complaints about sexual abuse than she did. To take one example, the

dissent asserts that “there is testimony that Johnson knew that jail officers were

sexually assaulting inmates.” Dissent at 17–18 (emphasis added). The

problem? The record reveals that Johnson only heard about a single officer

(Long) sexually assaulting a single inmate (Tessener). No more, no less. True,

Johnson said that she “told John he [was] going to get caught doing the things

that he [was] doing.” One could speculate, as the dissent does, that Johnson

suspected Long might be involved in some other unspecified misconduct. But

that speculation is a far cry from the dissent’s assertion that Johnson had been

told that other jailers were engaged in misconduct, much less that she had been

told that other jailers were involved in the specific misconduct of sexually

assaulting inmates.

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22-12028 Opinion of the Court 25

omission in their training program” caused the jail’s employees to

violate inmates’ constitutional rights—yet still elected to retain that

insufficient training program. Id. (quotation omitted). Establishing

notice ordinarily requires a “pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

51, 62 (2011). And a supervisor’s “culpability for a deprivation of

rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to

train.” Id. at 61; see also Keith, 749 F.3d at 1053.

The plaintiffs cannot succeed on their failure-to-train theory

for several reasons. First, their contention that there was no policy

“prohibiting jailers from having sex with inmates” is simply not

true. The jail’s internal manual directed that employees could not

“fraternize, cohabitate or engage in sexual activity with any

inmate.” Jail employees were also prohibited from “subject[ing]

inmates to any form of physical or emotional abuse.” And the

manual required employees to record “any disturbances, injuries,

attempted assualts [sic] or suicides” in the jail log, with incident

reports forwarded to the jail administrator.10

Second, neither Poe nor Johnson was on notice that a

“particular omission in their training program” caused the sexual

abuse. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. As explained, only Johnson was

10 We note too that jail employees did undergo training. Softley and Johnson,

for example, testified to receiving sexual-harassment training via the Jefferson

County program. While Buzbee and Boyd did not attend that program, the

City attested that both received “on the job training” from jailers who did. It

is thus difficult to label the Jasper City jailers as “untrained employees.” Keith,

749 F.3d at 1053.

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26 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

aware of, at most, one report of sexual misconduct. Lacking that

notice, decisionmakers like Johnson “can hardly be said to have

deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of

constitutional rights.” Id. at 62.

Third, liability will not attach for failure to train where the

proper response “is obvious to all without training or supervision.”

Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490 (11th Cir. 1997)

(quotation omitted). Both Buzbee and Boyd testified that they

knew from “common sense” and “common knowledge” that it was

wrong for them to have sex with or sexually harass female inmates.

No argument there—the fact that “a police officer should not (and

may not) sexually assault citizens in his custody is obvious to all

without training or supervision.” Christmas v. Harris County, 51

F.4th 1348, 1357 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted); see also

McGuire v. Cooper, 952 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 2020). So too here.

Given the obviousness of the misconduct, the failure to train

subordinates against sexual exploitation will not support an

inference of deliberate indifference.

* * *

We do not minimize the seriousness of the plaintiffs’

allegations. But the standard for supervisory liability is “extremely

rigorous.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048 (quotation omitted). Because the

plaintiffs have failed to meet that benchmark, the district court

properly granted qualified immunity, and thus summary

judgment, to Poe and Johnson in their individual capacities.

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22-12028 Opinion of the Court 27

A.

We turn now to the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims

against Poe and Johnson in their official capacities. These claims

operate as the functional equivalent of suits against the City itself.

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985).

Municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity from suit,

but the individual actions of their employees generally do not

subject them to § 1983 liability. Owen v. City of Independence, 445

U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. As with supervisory

liability, a municipality cannot be held responsible for the actions

of its employees based only on respondeat superior. See Church v.

City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994). Instead, the

plaintiffs must show (1) that their “constitutional rights were

violated”; (2) “that the municipality had a custom or policy that

constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right”; and

(3) “that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v.

Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A custom or policy

must be “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom

or usage’ with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quotation

omitted). Put differently, it must operate as “the functional

equivalent of a policy adopted by the final policymaker.” Church,

30 F.3d at 1343. Finally, municipalities, like supervisors, may be

held liable for failure to train their employees. See Connick, 563 U.S.

at 61.

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28 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

The plaintiffs’ claims against the City mirror those against

Poe and Johnson in their individual capacities. 11 The district court

rejected them for the same reason: a failure to establish that the

City had a custom or policy of disregarding jailer misconduct that

amounted to deliberate indifference. See Bridges, 2022 WL 1598437,

at *13–14, *27. We agree.

There is no evidence that the City knew about the alleged

misconduct until the state investigation, let alone that it had a

permanent practice permitting sexual misconduct that was so well

settled as to carry the force of law. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694.

And as discussed, Johnson’s knowledge of a single allegation of

misconduct by a jailer did not represent a “persistent and wide-

spread practice” that was “so pervasive, as to be the functional

equivalent of a policy adopted by the final policymaker.” Goebert,

510 F.3d at 1332 (quotation omitted); Church, 30 F.3d at 1343.

The failure-to-train claim is even weaker, and we reject it on

the same grounds as the plaintiffs’ claims against Poe and Johnson

in their individual capacities—a written policy barred sexual

contact with inmates, neither Poe nor Johnson knew that an

alleged omission in the jail’s training program caused the plaintiffs’

injuries, and it was obvious to all that sexual abuse of inmates was

11 The City does not challenge Poe or Johnson’s status as final policymakers.

See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion).

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22-12028 Opinion of the Court 29

prohibited. The district court properly granted summary

judgment to the City on these claims.

B.

We next turn to Rainer and Mann’s argument that their

claims are timely. Section 1983 claims are subject to state statutes

of limitations governing personal injury actions. McNair v. Allen,

515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). The events took place in

Alabama, so we look to Alabama law for the deadline. See Rozar v.

Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996). And because the state

applies a two-year statute of limitations to personal-injury claims,

that limitation period governs. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l).

Even so, federal law substantively determines when the

plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued. Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d

711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987). That happens—and the statute of

limitations begins to run—when “the facts which would support a

cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with

a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561–

62 (quotation omitted). Put simply, a federal civil rights claim

accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of

action.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (quotation

omitted).

Rainer and Mann both filed their complaints outside of

Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations. Rainer testified that her

last sexual contact with Boyd was on August 22, 2017. She was

released from the jail on August 24, 2017, and filed her complaint

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30 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

on August 26, 2019. 12 Mann was released on November 9, 2017,

and filed her complaint on December 2, 2019. Each plaintiff had “a

complete and present cause of action” by the last time Boyd

allegedly assaulted her. Id. (quotation omitted). For Rainer, that

was August 22, 2017. 13 For Mann, it was no later than her own

release date—November 9, 2017. Because neither filed her

complaint within two years, the claims are untimely.

Rainer and Mann try to sidestep this result by pointing to

Alabama’s Williams-Coleman Act, which provides a civil cause of

action for human-trafficking victims. See Ala. Code § 13A-6-157(a).

It contains a tolling provision for victims who “could not have

reasonably discovered the crime” due to “psychological trauma,

cultural and linguistic isolation, and the inability to access services.”

Id. § 13A-6-158(a)(3). And because Rainer and Mann allege that

they could have brought their claims under the Act, they say that

the “plain language” of its tolling provision applies here.

Not so. Neither Rainer nor Mann asserted claims under the

Williams-Coleman Act, and that statute’s tolling provision applies

only to persons who file civil actions for offenses “defined by this

12 August 24 and 25, 2019, were a Saturday and Sunday, which would move

the filing date to Monday the 26th if Rainer’s release date were the date of

accrual. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

13 Rainer argues that her claim accrued on her release date, rather than the last

time Boyd assaulted her. Aside from citing no authority to support this

argument, Rainer did not present it to the district court. We thus do not

consider it. Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009).

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22-12028 Opinion of the Court 31

article.” Id. Rainer and Mann offer no support for their argument

to the contrary besides their contention that the tolling provision

“generally applies to all victims of custodial sex violations.” It does

not, and Rainer and Mann’s claims are time-barred.

C.

Finally, Bridges, Tessener, and Goodson challenge the

district court’s grant of summary judgment on their claims against

the City for sex trafficking in violation of the Trafficking Victims

Protection Reauthorization Act.

The TVPRA prohibits sex trafficking by force, fraud, or

coercion. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591. It also creates a civil cause of action

for victims to sue perpetrators, or anyone who knowingly benefits

from participating in a scheme that the “person knew or should

have known” violated the statute. See id. § 1595(a). A plaintiff

asserting a claim under that statute must show that “the defendant

(1) knowingly benefited, (2) from taking part in a common

undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit,

(3) that undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the

plaintiff, and (4) the defendant had constructive or actual

knowledge that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA

as to the plaintiff.” Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 726

(11th Cir. 2021). A claim fails unless it satisfies all of these elements.

Id. at 726–27.

The plaintiffs contend that jailers and inmates orchestrated

a trade of trustee status for sex. The City knowingly benefited (and

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32 Opinion of the Court 22-12028

profited) from this arrangement, they say, because of the free labor

trustees performed around the jail.

We cannot agree. Most important, given that the officials

were unaware of the alleged trustee scheme, the City could not

“knowingly benefit” from it. See id. at 724. And even if we were

to accept that female trustees conferred some kind of financial

benefit on the City by cutting costs, that would not be enough.

There is zero evidence that the City knowingly benefited from the

program, or that its officials had “constructive or actual knowledge

that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the

plaintiff[s].” Id. at 726. The City is entitled to summary judgment.

* * *

This is a difficult case. The plaintiffs’ allegations of abuse are

jarring. Still, they failed to offer evidence that the jail’s officials

knew about it at all—much less that they were running the jail with

a wink-and-nod policy that sexual assault was accepted and

acceptable. The evidence also reveals no doubt that the jailers

knew they were not allowed to treat the women this way. But

breaking the rules is different than not having them.

Civil liability for supervisors and municipalities is a difficult

standard, and on that the plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden.

We thus AFFIRM the district court.

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 1

ABUDU, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

The risk of sexual violence against women increases for

those who are incarcerated. 1 The Prison Rape Elimination Act

(“PREA”), coupled with appropriate local policies, was designed to

address and deter instances of sexual assault against this vulnerable

population.2 As the first piece of federal legislation targeting the

issue of sexual abuse of incarcerated individuals, PREA established

a “zero-tolerance standard” for such sexual abuse in prisons.

34 U.S.C. § 30302(1); Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1271 (11th

Cir. 2020) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). Among other avenues for

relief, the Eighth Amendment specifically prohibits jail officials

from ignoring “a substantial risk of serious harm” when they are

“actually, subjectively aware” of a risk and fail to take objectively

reasonable steps to remedy the violation. Wade v. McDade, 106

F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). In those instances,

1 According to a recent study, “[w]ithin correctional settings in the United

States, incarcerated women disproportionately experience staff-on-inmate

sexual victimization. Whereas women comprise only 7% of prison inmates,

33% of victims of staff-perpetrated sexual victimization in prisons are women.

Of additional concern, only 8% of women’s experiences of staff-perpetrated

sexual victimization are estimated to be formally reported.” Gina Fedock et

al., Incarcerated Women’s Experiences of Staff-Perpetrated Rape: Racial Disparities

and Justice Gaps in Institutional Responses, 36 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 8668,

8668–87 (2021).

2 Relevantly, compliance with the standards PREA sets forth requires

escalation of reports of sexual assault. While states that are not compliant with

the PREA may receive reduced federal funding for detention facilities,

compliance is not mandatory. See 34 U.S.C. § 30305.

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2 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

qualified immunity cannot shield an official from such deliberate

indifference which results in actual harm. This holds true even

where there is little evidence to indicate the likelihood of substan-

tial risk of serious harm is high. For example, in Nelson v. Tompkins,

we affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Key-

von Sellers, an intake officer who failed to notify anyone of the un-

derlying racial motivations for Jayvon Hatchett’s aggravated as-

sault on a White man, which he learned of while conducting

Hatchett’s intake. 89 F.4th 1289, 1297–99 (11th Cir. 2024). While

there was evidence that Hatchett, a Black man, was able to live

with White cellmates for several days without any incident, and

“barely more than a scintilla” of evidence that his attack on his

White cellmate was racially motivated, we determined that Sellers’

knowledge of the underlying racial motivations behind Hatchett’s

first offense were sufficient to provide Sellers with “fair warning

that it was unconstitutional not to prevent” Hatchett from being

alone with a White cellmate. Id. at 1299–1300.

The undisputed facts in this case show that, while some jail

officials remained ignorant of the sexual abuse that women in the

Jasper City jail experienced, there was at least one official—Debo-

rah Johnson—who was notified, consulted, and directly asked to

intervene to stop ongoing violations. Because the record creates,

at a bare minimum, a genuine question of fact regarding the extent

of Johnson’s knowledge, the steps she should have taken after re-

ceiving notice, and whether those steps were objectively

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 3

reasonable, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.3 Accordingly,

I respectfully dissent in part.

I. REVELANT BACKGROUND

First, a full account of the facts pertaining to Johnson,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties and

drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, is necessary. Stan-

ley v. City of Sanford, 83 F.4th 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023). Pertinent

to analyzing this case and reviewing the district court’s judgment

is the evidence of both undisputed and disputed facts contained in

the record on appeal, including sworn affidavits, deposition tran-

scripts, and the documents the parties submitted.

A. Johnson and Operating Procedures

Throughout 2017, Johnson was one of two top-ranking offi-

cials in command of the Jasper City Jail. Although the Chief of Po-

lice, J.C. Poe Jr., served as the final authority over the jail, it was

Johnson who handled the jail’s day-to-day operations. As the jail

supervisor, her duties included training employees, and monitor-

ing their compliance with rules, regulations, and other policies and

procedures. Her position further involved assisting jail officers and

other subordinates in carrying out their tasks, creating employee

schedules, adequately staffing all shifts, reviewing logbooks for

needs she could address, conducting jail walkthroughs, and

3 Additionally, given that the district court’s dismissal of the state law claims

against Johnson was premised upon the dismissal of the federal claims against

her, the district court’s dismissal of the state claims warrants reversal as well.

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4 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

training subordinates to complete their assigned tasks. Johnson

also was responsible for addressing incidents at the jail, whether

reported through staff during or immediately after a shift, through

word of mouth, or from the jail’s logbook.

In addition, Johnson directly engaged with inmates. The

jail’s trustee program allowed supervisors to select individuals to

work on various tasks for the entire city, not just tasks in the jail.

Johnson or other jail staff could assign a trustee to wash cars, laun-

der uniforms, do landscaping, prepare meals, move heavy furni-

ture, and clean up. Although men and women could be trustees,

the men were usually assigned to outdoor assignments while the

women were assigned to more indoor tasks. The program re-

quired a formal selection process of those inmates allowed to par-

ticipate in the trustee program. However, some of the Appellants

testified that certain jail officers nevertheless would escort inmates

out of their cells under the guise of the trustee program, even

though those inmates were not assigned to the program at the time

and otherwise had no permission to be outside of their cells.

B. Jasper Police Department Policies Regarding Reports of and Re-

sponses to Sexual Assault in the Jail

Jail staff testified that the City failed to train or instruct jail

officers in the prevention or response to sexual misconduct towards

inmates. When jail officers were hired, they received training on

use of force and first aid, but everything else was generally taught

on the job. Importantly, Johnson’s testimony about on-the-job

training omits any mention of training on sexual misconduct, and

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 5

both Dennis Buzbee and Rusty Boyd, two of the primary perpetra-

tors of sexual violence against Appellants, confirmed that they

never received such training.

The record evidence regarding the City’s written policies,

practices, and procedures for the prevention, detection, and pun-

ishment of rape and other forms of sexual assault and harassment

at the jail consists solely of excerpts from: (1) the Jasper Police De-

partment Manual (the “JPD Manual”), (2) the jail’s internal manual,

and (3) the City Employee Handbook. Other than a blanket prohi-

bition against “subject[ing] inmates to any form of physical or emo-

tional abuse” or “engag[ing] in sexual activity with any inmate,”

there is nothing in the jail manual that addresses the process for

reporting and addressing complaints of sexual misconduct. The

City Employee Handbook and the JPD Manual are even less help-

ful—neither document mentions anything about the policies and

procedures for inmates lodging complaints against jail officers.

The only written policies that mandate reporting in some

instances are located in the JPD Manual. In particular, the JPD

Manual required Johnson, as the jail supervisor, to “make an imme-

diate, impartial report to [her] commanding officer relating any in-

cident which [s]he is aware of that involved a violation of law or

department regulation by any . . . employee of the department.”

Similarly, the JPD Manual required all employees to immediately

report to their supervisor “any information given to [them] . . . by

any citizen regarding matters that indicate the need for police ac-

tion.” Those general mandates notwithstanding, Appellees did not

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6 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

produce any evidence detailing the process through which employ-

ees should have investigated or expedited complaints of sexual as-

sault that were not based on the employee’s first-hand knowledge.

Moreover, there is no evidence of any procedures or other steps

that Appellees took to monitor or track complaints of sexual as-

sault in the jail. Indeed, the Appellees failed to produce any docu-

ments showing their compliance, or any efforts to comply, with

PREA.

C. Inmate Complaints Regarding Sexual Misconduct

Appellants produced evidence corroborating that both su-

pervisors and regular jail officers implemented an unwritten policy

of actively discouraging complaints. This unwritten policy carried

additional force and was especially effective given the absence of

formal policies that encouraged inmates to file complaints or poli-

cies specifying the process for investigating such complaints.

Moreover, although inmates could submit complaints

through kiosks that the jail operated, the kiosks’ actual functional-

ity remains a disputed fact. The record evidence lacks a physical

description of the kiosks; however, it is clear from context that they

were electronic devices with screens and the capacity to receive ty-

pographical input from inmates. Among other functions, the ki-

osks were designed as a means for inmates to communicate di-

rectly with jail staff, but not outside third parties. Despite the pur-

ported accessibility of the kiosks, some Appellants explained that

reporting sexual assault through the kiosks was not feasible. For

example, Charity Tessener stated that she knew about the kiosks,

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 7

but they were usually non-operational during her incarceration.

Further, while the majority accepts as true Appellees’ claim that

grievances submitted through the kiosks were only accessible by

jail administrator David Mize or Johnson, the record shows that

Appellants had reason to believe this was not the case given the

kiosks’ public location and electronic format. Tessener was among

those concerned about privacy given that “anybody could have

read” any complaints she submitted through the kiosk.

Bridges also testified that jail employees actively discour-

aged inmates from filing complaints, even through the kiosks. She

said that when she was previously incarcerated at the jail, Johnson

chastised her for lodging complaints through a kiosk. Specifically,

Bridges explained that when she submitted complaints through the

kiosk, Johnson would “jump all over [her] because [she] had just

reported something that [she] didn’t agree with.” According to

Bridges, Johnson “said that we were making her look bad,” and

“[Johnson] said she would start taking away privileges” if com-

plaints continued to be filed through the kiosk. Instead, Johnson

ordered Bridges to make any complaints in person, either to jail

officers after a shift change or directly to Johnson. There also was

testimony from Jessica Rainer that Johnson responded poorly to in-

person requests for assistance. Specifically, Rainer asserted that in

addition to acting “rude” and “hateful” towards inmates, Johnson

simply refused to assist inmates even with requests for basic neces-

sities. For example, Rainer explained that when inmates on their

menstrual cycle asked Johnson for feminine hygiene products, she

would not regularly provide them, and those inmates would

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8 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

sometimes have to wait until the next shift or even the next day to

get supplies.

In addition to Johnson’s alleged censuring of inmate com-

plaints, there is evidence in the record that inmates experienced or

risked being retaliated against if they reported staff misconduct.

During her deposition, Tessener explained that early one day be-

fore she was transferred out of the jail, Maverick Bahrick, another

jail officer, pulled her out of her cell and cornered her alone. Bah-

rick said that he “heard [she] might have a lawsuit or something on

Rusty [Boyd] and the Police Department.” He allegedly told Tes-

sener: “[M]ake sure you don’t do this because Rusty has family in

this police department and has a big name . . . and you just don’t

want to do that, just so you know, you just don’t want to do that.”

Tessener said that she interpreted Bahrick’s statements as a threat.

Like Tessener, Bridges feared retaliation for any report of

staff misconduct. Bridges testified that when she told her cellmate

about the sexual acts Buzbee coerced her to do, she asked her cell-

mate not to tell anyone about those incidents because she feared

“being punished in some type of way.” Bridges also declined to tell

any jail staff about other officers’ unlawful behavior until the day

she was released. Even then, Bridges told only Raeven Clay, a jail

officer whom she described as different from other staff members.

Bridges suspected she “would be punished in some way” if she told

anyone other than Clay about Buzbee and Boyd’s misconduct.

Monique Softley, another jail officer, testified that she, too,

observed inmates’ reluctance to report staff misconduct. Softley

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 9

said she could tell that something was wrong with the Appellants

she worked with, but when she would ask them what was wrong,

they did not want to mention the sexual assaults. Softley believed

their silence was because the inmates knew she was likely to expe-

dite any complaint to other JPD staff. Her exact testimony was that

“[t]hey [the inmates] did not come to me with it because they knew

I would be the first one to take the first step to let it be known” and

that if she received a complaint of sexual assault, she “would have

went and told it [sic].”

D. Inmate Complaints to Johnson Regarding Sexual Misconduct

As to Johnson’s knowledge about assaults, harassment, and

other unlawful behavior at the jail, Softley testified that she person-

ally informed Johnson that another jail officer was sexually assault-

ing Tessener, but Johnson never acted on that information. Soft-

ley, who was one of Johnson’s subordinates, testified that on No-

vember 5, 2017, a male inmate told her that Jonathan Long, an-

other jail officer, had been sexually assaulting Tessener. Softley

said she immediately reported this information to Johnson and

that, in response, Johnson said she “told John he [was] going to get

caught doing the things that he [was] doing.” Softley stated that

she reminded Johnson to report the incident to the lieutenant or

assistant chief over the jail. Johnson neither investigated the inci-

dent that Softley reported, nor did she bring it to Poe or anyone

else’s attention.

Mize’s written statement is also probative of Johnson’s

knowledge that Tessener was being sexually assaulted at the jail.

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10 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

Mize wrote that on January 10, 2018, he went to the jail to assist

with a state investigation into a JPD employee. As Mize collected

various records for the investigation, he asked Johnson to assist him

with obtaining certain logbooks. According to Mize, Johnson

asked him, “[I]s this what I have already heard about?” Johnson

explained to Mize that “a while back” someone told her that Long

either “had sex or attempted to have sex with . . . Tessener” in the

storage unit outside the jail. Mize then reminded Johnson that she

was supposed to immediately report any allegations of sexual mis-

conduct by a jail officer to her supervisor—in this case, Mize or

Poe.

The record also contains a written statement, with John-

son’s signature, supporting Mize’s account of his conversation with

her. The statement was dated January 12, 2018, and said that John-

son told Mize that she “had heard that Charity Tessener ac-

cused . . . Jonathan Long of making inappropriate advances to-

wards her . . . .” Johnson admitted that the statement bore her sig-

nature, but she maintained that she had no memory whatsoever of

the described interaction with Mize or the admissions to him.

During her deposition, Johnson wavered as to the extent of

her knowledge regarding Tessener’s allegations of sexual assault,

but she admitted to hearing “rumors” of “dirty talk” from jail offic-

ers in front of inmates. She also conceded that she took no action

at all in response to what knowledge she did have. When the Ala-

bama State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) interviewed Johnson on

January 26, 2018, she indicated she had only recently heard rumors

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 11

regarding sexual misconduct at the jail. She specifically admitted

that Softley reported a complaint from Tessener that Long was

“talking dirty” to her. During her deposition, she testified that she

heard the rumors about Long and Tessener “two to three weeks

prior” to the SBI interview. According to Johnson, she did not ask

Softley for any clarification or additional information when Softley

reported the “dirty talk” complaints to her. When asked whether

she knew of a written JPD policy requiring her to report even ru-

mors concerning sexual misconduct, Johnson replied that “[t]here

may be,” but she did not give a definite answer. Although Johnson

claimed she would have taken reports of sexual misconduct seri-

ously, she again conceded that she failed to report or investigate

Softley’s allegations. Incredibly, Johnson claimed she just “forgot

all about it.”

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Appellants challenge, inter alia, the district

court’s grant of summary judgment on their Eighth Amendment

claims against Johnson in her individual and official capacity.

A. Appellants’ Individual Capacity Claim

When a state official raises a qualified immunity defense, the

official bears the initial burden of proving that they were acting

within their discretionary authority. See Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d

1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020). Then, only if the official meets that

burden, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to show why the official is

not entitled to qualified immunity. See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin,

496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007). Although qualified immunity

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12 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

shields public officials “when they perform their duties reasona-

bly,” it does not circumvent “the need to hold public officials ac-

countable when they exercise power irresponsibly.” See Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Here, the parties concede that,

at all relevant times, Johnson was exercising her discretionary re-

sponsibilities. They also agree that the Appellants’ right to protec-

tion against sexual assault while incarcerated is clearly established.

See Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1199; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994) (“[P]rison officials . . . must take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of the inmates.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). Thus, the only question at issue is whether

Johnson’s actions and/or inactions violated the Appellants’ clearly

established Eighth Amendment right.

A supervisor may be held liable under Section 1983, even

absent personal participation in the constitutional violation, if the

plaintiff can show “a causal connection between the actions of [the]

supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” See

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in

part on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2008), as recog-

nized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs

can establish a causal connection by showing that either: (1) a wide-

spread history of abuse put the supervisor on notice of the need to

take corrective action, or (2) the supervisor’s custom or policy re-

sults in deliberate indifference to a constitutional right. Id. Con-

versely, plaintiffs “can also show that the absence of a policy led to

a violation of constitutional rights.” Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923

F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original). In either case,

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 13

a causal connection relies on the supervisor’s “subjective

knowledge of a risk of serious harm” and a reckless disregard of

that risk. Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014);

see also Wade, 106 F.4th at 1258 (“[A] deliberate-indifference plain-

tiff must show that the defendant official was subjectively aware

that his own conduct—again, his own actions or inactions—put the

plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm.”).

Whether liability is premised on action or inaction, a causal

connection requires evidence of multiple incidents of misconduct

or multiple reports of prior misconduct by one employee. Piazza,

923 F.3d at 957. An individual plaintiff’s “proof of a single incident

of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient” to meet this standard,

see Craig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (em-

phasis added) (citation omitted), but this Court has not otherwise

established a minimum threshold,4 see, e.g., id. (finding no causal

4 The majority opinion relies on this Court’s prior opinions in Danley v. Allen,

540 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled in part on other grounds by Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2008), as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 710, and Valdes

v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2006), overruled in part on other grounds by

Pearson, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), to show that the minimum threshold of evidence

needed is so “high” that even “numerous” instances of abuse may not be

sufficient to demonstrate “a persistent and wide-spread practice” of abuse

necessary to establish a causal connection between a supervisor’s actions and

the alleged constitutional violation. However, in neither Danley nor Valdes did

this Court create such a rule. Instead, in both Danley and Valdes, this Court’s

analysis focused on a case-specific inquiry of whether a defendant was

sufficiently put on notice of the misconduct at issue and relied on evidence of

multiple reports of misconduct to conclude that they were. See Danley, 540

F.3d at 1315; Valdes, 450 F.3d at 1239–44.

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14 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

connection where the plaintiff’s evidence was limited to the actions

of multiple employees evaluating his one reported medical issue

over several days); Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.

1991) (affirming district court decision holding sheriff liable where

he “knew of prior instances of mistaken identity,” without identi-

fying the specific number of prior instances); Anderson v. City of At-

lanta, 778 F.2d 678, 685–86 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that “persistent”

understaffing and “complaints . . . lodged with . . . supervisors,”

although not specific in number, were “[c]ertainly . . . sufficient to

show a custom or policy of understaffing”).

Appellants in this case argue that Johnson was a part of “a

custom of tolerating sexual exploitation of female inmates, of fail-

ing to train against sexual exploitation when that training was ob-

viously necessary, and of failing to require reporting and investiga-

tion of the sexual exploitation of female inmates . . . .” They con-

tend that these customs or policies were causally connected to their

sexual assaults, which violated their Eighth Amendment rights.

Supervisory liability claims premised on a custom or policy

require not only establishing that the pertinent custom or policy

existed; a plaintiff must also show that the policy resulted in delib-

erate indifference. See Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360; Rivas, 940 F.2d at

1496. Applying the deliberate indifference standard to the prison

context, the Supreme Court has held that “an Eighth Amendment

claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act

believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough

that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 15

substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. This

Court, sitting en banc, recently clarified its application of Farmer,

holding that liability for an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indiffer-

ence claim requires a plaintiff to show: (1) “that [s]he suffered a dep-

rivation that was ‘objectively, sufficiently serious,’” and (2) “that the

defendant acted with subjective recklessness as ‘used in the crimi-

nal law.’” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834,

839). Further, to meet the subjective recklessness prong, the plain-

tiff “must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware

that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to

the plaintiff . . . .” Id. Neither party here contends that the alleged

sexual assaults fall short of objectively serious harm sufficient to

invoke the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (“Being violently assaulted

in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders

pay for their offenses against society.’” (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981))). However, Appellants must still meet

their burden of showing subjective recklessness, which includes

subjective knowledge. See id. at 837; Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262.

“A prison official possesses actual, subjective knowledge of a

substantial risk when the official is ‘both . . . aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of seri-

ous harm exists, and . . . also draw[s] the inference.’” Bowen v. War-

den Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2016) (al-

teration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A jury may

find the subjective knowledge element satisfied by the very fact that

the risk was obvious, but plaintiffs asserting supervisory liability

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16 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

claims must still show a heightened degree of culpability as com-

pared to general negligence. Id. at 1321. “Whether a prison official

had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of

fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference

from circumstantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

“Deliberate indifference ‘has two components: one subjec-

tive and one objective.’” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090,

1099 (11th Cir. 2014)). Thus, subjective knowledge, alone, is not

enough—supervisory liability also requires plaintiffs to show that

the defendant’s response to the risk at issue was objectively unrea-

sonable. See id. at 1270–71; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844; Wade,

106 F.4th at 1262 (Jordan, J., concurring) (“[T]he reasonable re-

sponse component of deliberate indifference is objective and not

subjective . . . .”). In other words, a detention facility supervisor

violates the Eighth Amendment when he or she fails to take rea-

sonable steps to ensure and maintain, even inside a penal institu-

tion, the “contemporary concepts of decency, human dignity, and

precepts of civilization which we profess to possess.” Hope v. Pelt-

zer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002) (quoting Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291,

1306 (5th Cir. 1974)). Additionally, cases addressing municipal lia-

bility are “analogous” to supervisory liability; thus, this Court may

use the holdings in municipal liability cases to aid in our assessment

of Johnson’s behavior here. See Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 837

(11th Cir. 1990).

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 17

While our precedent requires plaintiffs asserting supervisory

liability claims to show a “subjective awareness of a substantial risk

of serious harm to the inmate,” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d

1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2013), those cases do not require that the de-

fendant be subjectively aware of the risk from a particular subordi-

nate, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (“[A] prison official [may not] es-

cape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that . . . he did

not know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted

by the specific [person] who eventually committed the assault.”).

The record is replete enough with evidence of Johnson’s

subjective knowledge for a reasonable jury to conclude that she was

deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault against Appel-

lants. Johnson’s entire role was dedicated to the daily functions of

the jail, and her duties included supervising jail officers, training

them to fulfill their roles, and maintaining overall standards at the

jail which included advising Poe or Mize of any report of sexual

assault on an inmate. Yet, despite Johnson’s responsibilities over

the jail, its officers, and the safety of its inmates, there is testimony

that Johnson knew that jail officers were sexually assaulting in-

mates and failed to intervene.

As a recap, Softley specifically told Johnson that inmates

were complaining about male guards making sexual advances to-

wards them, inappropriately touching them, and outright instances

of sexual assault. Johnson’s response—“[I] told John he [was] going

to get caught doing the things that he [was] doing”— is proof that

she already was aware of such complaints, that she knew of at least

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18 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

one officer by name who was accused of misconduct, and that the

behavior was not isolated. Even after Softley reminded Johnson to

report the incident to the lieutenant or assistant chief over the jail,

Johnson neither investigated the complaints, nor did she bring

them to Poe or anyone else’s attention.

There was also written evidence of Johnson’s knowledge.

Mize documented his time assisting with a state investigation into

allegations against a JPD employee and Johnson’s comment to him:

“[I]s this what I have already heard about?” Johnson told Mize that

she “had heard that Charity Tessener accused . . . Jonathan Long of

making inappropriate advances towards her,” and that “a while

back” someone informed her that Long either “had sex or at-

tempted to have sex with . . . Tessener” in the storage unit outside

the jail. Further, during her deposition, Johnson admitted to hear-

ing “rumors” of “dirty talk” from jail officers in front of inmates

“two to three weeks prior” to the state’s investigation and that she

did nothing about it. Like Softley, Mize reminded Johnson of her

obligation to report the abuse, which she did not do. Instead, she

“forgot all about it.” The record also shows that Johnson discour-

aged inmates from reporting grievances dating back as early as

2016, thus supporting a jury finding that Johnson adopted and ex-

ercised a policy of ignoring jail officer’s sexual misconduct

throughout the time period at issue in this case.

Moreover, the district court erroneously concluded that the

November 2017 timing of Softley’s report to Johnson regarding

Tessener and Long was not “early enough” to show that Johnson

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 19

had a widespread, permanent, and well-settled custom or practice

of disregarding sexual misconduct against inmates. Bridges v. Poe,

No. 7:19-cv-00529-LSC, 2022 WL 1598437, at *26 (N.D. Ala. May

19, 2022). Again, Johnson’s response to Softley indicated that Soft-

ley was not the first person to inform Johnson of these sexual alle-

gations. However, if November 2017 arguably is the sharp line for

purposes of identifying the earliest date when Johnson became

aware of jail officers sexually abusing inmates, the allegations

against Boyd involved behavior that continued well into December

2017. There was still ample time for Johnson to take the necessary

steps to investigate the inmates’ and Softley’s complaints and to

prevent the ongoing sexual assault on inmates that the SBI investi-

gation exposed.

Finally, even after establishing that a supervisor is aware of a

risk, liability requires showing that he or she “react[ed] to this risk

in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1047

(quoting Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1029 (11th Cir. 2001)

(en banc)); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Even assuming Johnson’s

subjective knowledge remains a disputed fact, her response to the

risk of sexual assault is not disputed—she did nothing. Inaction is

not an acceptable response from a jail supervisor receiving a report

of a subordinate sexually assaulting inmates. The jail’s policies

with respect to its chain of command required her to inform Poe

or another supervisor of the reports she received. In fact, Poe’s

immediate response to the report of alleged sexual assault demon-

strates the significance of Johnson’s inaction. The same day the SBI

contacted him, Poe permitted the agency to interview employees

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20 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

and inmates at the jail, and he transferred Tessener to a different

facility. The following day, Poe placed Boyd on administrative

leave, which halted any future interaction between Boyd and in-

mates. Unfortunately, all of Poe’s remedial actions took place in

January 2018, way past the time when Johnson became aware of

the abuses happening and could have acted to protect inmates from

further assault.

In sum, a jury could find that Johnson had the requisite sub-

jective knowledge regarding sexual misconduct at the jail and that

she failed to take reasonable steps towards addressing the com-

plaints she received. Those findings would support an ultimate

conclusion that Johnson’s deliberate indifference amounted to a vi-

olation of Appellants’ constitutional rights. Therefore, she was not

entitled to summary judgment as to the Eighth Amendment claim

against her in her individual capacity.

B. Appellants’ Eighth Amendment Claim Against Johnson in her

Official Capacity

Appellants’ Section 1983 claims against Johnson in her offi-

cial capacity are the functional equivalent of claims against the City

of Jasper. See Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1335 n.4 (“[A] suit against a

governmental official in his official capacity is deemed a suit against

the entity that he represents.” (quoting Brown v. Neumann, 188 F.3d

1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999))). With such claims, municipal liability

may be premised upon “a practice or custom that is so pervasive,

as to be the functional equivalent of a policy adopted by the final

policymaker.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1343 (11th

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22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 21

Cir. 1994). Appellants’ official capacity claim against Johnson, and

thus the City, is premised on the Appellees’ alleged custom or pol-

icy of tolerating jail officers’ sexual misconduct, failing to imple-

ment measures to prevent and respond to sexual assaults on in-

mates, and “failing to train against sexual exploitation when that

training was obviously necessary,” which Appellants contend led

to the violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Thus, Appel-

lants’ claims against the City are essentially claims for a failure to

train and supervise.

Municipalities may be held liable under Section 1983 for fail-

ure to train; however, liability only exists where a municipality’s

“failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘de-

liberate indifference’ . . . .” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

389 (1989). In circumstances where the proper response “is obvi-

ous to all without training or supervision,” a failure to train or su-

pervise is generally insufficient grounds for municipal liability.

Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490 (11th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299–300 (2d Cir.

1992)). While the holding in Sewell permits municipalities to rea-

sonably rely on the common sense of employees, “[a] pattern of

known misconduct . . . may be sufficient to change reasonable reli-

ance into deliberate indifference.” Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786,

796 (11th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 525 U.S. 802 (1998), and rein-

stated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999).

In addition, while identification of the alleged municipal cus-

tom or policy is a “threshold” issue, McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d

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22 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 22-12028

1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004), a plaintiff’s claim need not be confined

to a single policy deficiency, see, e.g., Vineyard v. County of Murray,

990 F.2d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming jury verdict for plain-

tiff who “claim[ed] that the county had inadequate policies for

training, supervision and discipline”). To the contrary, where a vi-

olation of constitutional rights arises from a series of customs or

policies that cumulatively amount to a final policymaker’s deliber-

ate indifference, a municipality may still be held liable. See id.

To succeed on their municipal liability claims, Appellants

had to show that the City had a custom or policy which was the

“moving force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. Sew-

ell, 117 F.3d at 489 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690–94 (1978)). Appellants, therefore, had to identify a municipal

policy or custom, that Johnson executed, which in turn caused Ap-

pellants to be unsafe and vulnerable to sexual assault, sexual har-

assment, or other mistreatment in violation of their Eighth Amend-

ment rights. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.

1998) (“It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy

or custom . . . inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held

liable under § 1983.” (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385)); see

also Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2023)

(“A municipality may be held liable for the actions of its law en-

forcement officers only when the officers’ execution of official pol-

icy (or custom) is the moving force of a constitutional violation.”).

A plaintiff must also show that there was an action taken or

policy made “by an official responsible for making final policy in

USCA11 Case: 22-12028 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 10/17/2025 Page: 55 of 55

22-12028 ABUDU, J., Dissenting in part 23

that area . . . [or] a practice or custom that is so pervasive, as to be

the functional equivalent of a policy adopted by the final policy-

maker.” Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1335. At the district court, Johnson

did not dispute her status as a final policymaker. On appeal, the

City similarly waives any argument that Johnson was not a final

policymaker.

Next, there is evidence in the record that Johnson had sub-

jective knowledge that jail officers under her command were abus-

ing inmates, and that she regularly discouraged inmates and jail

staff from reporting sexual misconduct. Overall, there is sufficient

support for Appellants’ claims that Johnson carried out a custom or

practice of tolerating sexual assault and, despite a pattern of known

misconduct, failed to train employees or otherwise act to prevent

such unlawful behavior on the part of her subordinates. Accord-

ingly, the evidence also leads to a finding of deliberate indifference

such that the City would be liable for the violation of Appellants’

Eighth Amendment rights.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Eighth Amendment claims

against Johnson in her individual and official capacity should have

proceeded to trial, and the district court erred in granting summary

judgment in her favor. Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part.