Mirabelli

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 ELIZABETH MIRABELLI, and LORI Case No.: 3:23-cv-768-BEN-WVG

ANN WEST, individually and on behalf

8

of herself and all others similarly situated,

9 et al.,

10 Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING CLASS

11 v. CERTIFICATION

12 MARK OLSON, in his official capacity as

President of the EUSD Board of

13 [Dkt. 244]

Education, et al.,

14

Defendants.

15

16 Plaintiffs seek to certify this civil rights action as a class action under Federal Rule

17 of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(1)(A). They seek certification of a plaintiff class

18 with four subclasses and to appoint the plaintiffs as class representatives and counsel as

19 counsel for the class. The Defendants oppose class certification focusing on factual

20 differences among the putative class members and policy variations among the state

21 public school system’s many local arms. The motion is granted.

22 While business litigation has been the main domain for class actions over the past

23 several decades, the Rule 23(b)(2) type of class action was specifically designed for civil

24 rights cases. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he claims raised

25 by the plaintiffs in this action are precisely the sorts of claims that Rule 23(b)(2) was

26 designed to facilitate. . . . 23(b)(2) was adopted in order to permit the prosecution of civil

27 rights actions.”). “As Wright and Miller have explained:

28

1 ‘Subdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 in part to

make it clear that civil-rights suits for injunctive or declaratory

2

relief can be brought as class actions ... [T]he class suit is a

3 uniquely appropriate procedure in civil-rights cases . . . . By

their very nature, civil-rights class actions almost invariably

4

involve a plaintiff class . . . .’

5

Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 686 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wright & Miller, 7AA Fed.

6

Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1776 (3d ed.)). As the court in Parsons observed, “[a]lthough we

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have certified many different kinds of Rule 23(b)(2) classes, the primary role of this

8

provision has always been the certification of civil rights class actions.” 754 F.3d at 686

9

(citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997)).

10

There are four requirements. “‘Under Rule 23, a class action may be maintained if

11

the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met, and the action meets one of the three kinds of

12

actions listed in Rule 23(b).’” White v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Serv. Co., 104 F.4th

13

1182, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). The four threshold requirements are:

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(1) numerosity—the class is so large that joinder of all members is impracticable;

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(2) commonality—one or more questions of law or fact is common to the class;

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(3) typicality—the named parties’ claims are typical of the class; and

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(4) adequate representation—the class representatives will fairly and adequately

18

protect the interests of other class members.

19

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Once Rule 23(a) is satisfied, a plaintiff class action may be

20

maintained under Rule 23(b)(2) where the defendant “has acted ... on grounds that apply

21

generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is

22

appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The requirements

23

of Rule 23(b)(2) “are unquestionably satisfied when members of a putative class seek

24

uniform injunctive or declaratory relief from policies . . . that are generally applicable to

25

the class as a whole.” Parsons, 754 F.3d at 688 (citation omitted).

26

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of adults who teach in, or have children in,

27

California public schools and are adversely affected by school system policies that

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1 prevent teachers from informing parents about their child’s gender identification while at

2 school. Specifically, Plaintiffs propose a plaintiff class and four permissive subclasses1

3 as follows:

4 All individuals who are participating or will

participate in California’s public education system, whether

5

as employees or parents/guardians of students, without

6 having to subject themselves to Parental Exclusion Policies,

and

7

(1) Are employees who object to complying with

8 Parental Exclusion Policies2;

(2) Are employees who submit a request for a

9

religious exemption or opt-out to complying with Parental

10 Exclusion Policies3;

(3) Are legal guardians who object to having Parental

11

Exclusion Policies applied against them and have children

12 who are attending California public schools4; or

(4) Are legal guardians who submit a request for a

13

religious exemption or opt-out to having Parental Exclusion

14 Policies applied against them and have children who are

attending California public schools.5

15

16

In the class definition, Plaintiffs use the term “Parental Exclusion Policies” to

17

mean the policies that exclude parents from being informed about their child’s gender

18

19

20 1 A class may be divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class. See Rule

21 23(c)(5). Where, as here, subclasses are permissive, they do not need to be separately

evaluated for commonality, numerosity, typicality or adequacy. Aldapa v. Fowler

22

Packing Co., Inc., 323 F.R.D. 316, 326 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Rule 23(c)(5)); Am.

23 Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Oreg., 690 F.2d 781, 787 n.5 (9th Cir.

1982). A prospective class representative can represent multiple subclasses. Subclasses

24

are appropriate where class members have separate and discrete legal claims which raise

25 a concern that adjudication of a single class’ claims is impractical or undermines

effective representation of the class.

26 2 (Claim for Relief #1 [Teacher Free Speech]).

27 3 (Claims for Relief #2-3 [Teacher Free Exercise]).

4 (Claim for Relief #7 [Parent Substantive Due Process]).

28

1 identification or expression which are the “result of the interplay of three aspects of

2 California law: (1) the prohibition on gender identity discrimination, Cal. Educ. Code, §§

3 200, 220; (2) the definition of gender identity as whatever a child claims, regardless of

4 any contrary statement by a parent, Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1439.50(b); and (3)

5 minors’ privacy rights with respect to their gender identity, even as against their parents,

6 Cal. Const. art. I, § 1.” See Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification, Dkt 244-

7 1 at 5-6. These policies are evidenced, inter alia, by the California Department of

8 Education’s former FAQ page and its linked model AR 5145.3, the February 2022 EUSD

9 staff wide training, the Attorney General’s “State of Pride” webpage, the Attorney

10 General’s “Know Your Rights” webpage, and the California Department of Education’s

11 new webpage describing student rights under newly-enacted AB 1955. See Plaintiffs’

12 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, et al,

13 Dkt 247 at 6-10.

14 The State Defendants protest that there is no statewide policy.6 However, whether

15 such a policy persists is a question to be decided on the merits in later proceedings, rather

16 than at the class certification stage. The State Defendants also assert that there are 1,000

17 separate public school districts and each school district sets its own policy.7 Yet, the

18 Ninth Circuit has found that the every-school-is-a-policy-island concept is not entirely

19 accurate. California local school districts are ultimately state agents under state control.

20 Sato v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We therefore

21 find that . . . AB 97 did not disturb our longstanding precedent that California law treats

22

23

24 6 “Plaintiffs’ definition relies wholly on a nonexistent webpage that contained non-

25 binding guidance in a withdrawn FAQ, formerly issued by the California Department of

Education.” State Defs’ Oppo, Dkt 257, at 5.

26 7 “There are over 1,000 unique school districts in California, each free to establish its

27 own local policy (written or ad hoc) regarding gender-identity disclosure, so long as it

complies with state and federal law, including Assembly Bill No. 1955.” State Defs’

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1 public schooling as a statewide or central governmental function. . . . that the state itself

2 has decided to give its local agents more autonomy does not change the fact that the

3 school districts remain state agents under state control.”) (citations omitted). This

4 structure is also recognized by the California Supreme Court. Butt v. State of California,

5 4 Cal. 4th 668, 681 (1992) (“Management and control of the public schools is a matter of

6 state, not local, care and supervision. . . . Local districts are the State’s agents for local

7 operation of the common school system and the State’s ultimate responsibility for public

8 education cannot be delegated to any other entity.”) (citations omitted). And the State

9 Board of Education “is responsible for approving and overseeing statewide curriculum

10 content, creating the curriculum framework for kindergarten through twelfth grade, and

11 adopting instructional materials for kindergarten through eighth grade.” Cal. Parents for

12 the Equalization of Educ. Materials v. Torlakson, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1222 (N.D. Cal.

13 2017). Thus, while there are many local school districts, they all must march to the beat

14 of the State Defendants’ drums. Consequently, the potential for declaratory or injunctive

15 relief against the State Defendants on matters of statewide policy make the class action

16 structure superior to numerous individual actions by individual parents and teachers.

17 1. Numerosity

18 Numerosity requires a showing that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all

19 members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). This requirement is not a fixed

20 numerical threshold. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330

21 (1980) (numerosity requirement demands examines facts of each case). “Plaintiffs must

22 show some evidence of or reasonably estimate the number of class members,” as opposed

23 to relying on mere speculation, impression, or extrapolation from cursory allegations.

24 Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183 F.R.D. 672, 681 (S.D. Cal. 1999). Generally, courts

25 presume numerosity is satisfied when there are forty or more members in the proposed

26 class, Rannis v. Recchia, (380 F. App'x 646, 650-51 (9th Cir. 2010)), while a class of

27 fifteen would likely be too small. General Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 330 (numerosity has “no

28 absolute limitations”).

1 Here, for purposes of estimating the number of class members, Plaintiffs rely on

2 the deposition of Richard Barrera. Barrera was designated by the California Department

3 of Education as its most knowledgeable person in response to Plaintiffs’ deposition

4 subpoena. Barrera testified that there are approximately 5,837,690 students enrolled in

5 California public schools. See Dkt. 244-1, Ex 1, at 23. California public school teachers

6 number approximately 319,000. Id. Plaintiffs also look to polling that suggests large

7 numbers of the parents of California’s 5,837,690 public school students hold the opinion

8 that parents should be notified if their child identifies as transgender in school – 72.1%

9 according to a November 2023 poll by the Women’s Liberation Front. See Dkt. 244-1,

10 Ex 5. And 62% of California voters would support a law requiring parents be notified of

11 a child’s gender transition, according to a March 2023 Rasmussen poll. See Dkt. 244-1,

12 Ex 4. Based on the poll numbers, general knowledge, and common sense, it is clear that

13 putative parent class members and teacher class members number in the thousands.

14 Thus, joinder would be impracticable and the numerosity requirement is easily met. In

15 fact, the State Defendants do not contest the question. See State Defendants’ Oppo., Dkt

16 257, at n.1; 7-8 (“These issues are not even contested.”).

17 2. Commonality

18 Commonality requires the plaintiffs “to show that there are questions of law or fact

19 common to the class.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349. The Supreme Court says that

20 commonality requires the plaintiffs to “demonstrate that the class members have suffered

21 the same injury.” Id. at 349-50. “What matters to class certification is not the raising of

22 common questions ... but rather, the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate

23 common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. at 350 (quotations,

24 ellipses omitted). The plaintiffs’ claims must “depend upon a common contention.”

25 Parsons, 754 F.3d at 675 (quotation omitted). The plaintiffs “need not show, however,

26 that every question in the case, or even a preponderance of questions, is capable of class-

27 wide resolution. So long as there is even a single common question, a would-be class can

28 satisfy the commonality requirement.” Id. (quotation omitted); Mazza v. Am. Honda

1 Motor Co., Inc. 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012) (commonality “only requires a single

2 significant question of law or fact.”).

3 Here, Plaintiffs ask for a legal declaration that the Parental Exclusion Policies

4 violate the Fourteenth Amendment right of parents to direct the healthcare and

5 upbringing of one’s own children and parents’ FERPA rights to school records. They

6 also seek to enjoin the Defendants from continuing to violate their rights or enforcement

7 of the defective policies. If their requests are meritorious, a ruling would dispose of most

8 of the four subclass claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have provisionally shown

9 commonality.

10 3. Typicality

11 Considerations underlying commonality and typicality often overlap considerably,

12 such that they “tend to merge.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13

13 (1982). Rule 23(a)(3) provides that one or more class members may sue as a

14 representative of all the members if the representative’s claims are typical of the

15 members’ claims. The named representative’s claims are typical if they are “reasonably

16 coextensive with those of absent class members.” Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685. The

17 typicality element focuses on the claim rather than the specific facts underlying the claim.

18 Just Film, Inc. v. Buono, 847 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017). For Rule 23(b)(2) classes,

19 typicality requires little more than that the main relief sought is declaratory or injunctive.

20 Does 1-10 v. Univ. of Wash., 326 F.R.D. 669, 683 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (citation omitted).

21 Here, the representatives’ claims are typical of the class members. They all seek

22 similar relief from the application and enforcement of the Parent Exclusion Policies

23 against them. Thus, the typicality requirement is met.

24 4. Adequacy

25 Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the class representatives “fairly and adequately protect

26 the interests of the class.” This requirement aims to “uncover conflicts of interest

27 between the named parties and the class they seek to represent” and ensure the

28 “competency . . . of class counsel.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-

1 26 n.20 (1997). The adequacy test asks two questions: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and

2 their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the

3 named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the

4 class?” Kim v. Allison, 87 F.4th 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2023) (quotations and internal

5 citation omitted). Certification requires only one proper class representative. See

6 Rodriguez v. West Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 961 (9th Cir. 2009).

7 In appointing counsel for the class, one asks about: (1) “the work counsel has done

8 in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action”; (2) “counsel’s experience in

9 handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the

10 action”; (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law”; (4) “the resources that counsel

11 will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). As to class counsel,

12 Plaintiffs’ current counsel is certainly adequate for the task and the Defendants do not

13 contest the question. See State Defendants’ Oppo., Dkt 257, at n.1; 7-8 (“These issues

14 are not even contested.”).

15 Defendants do not directly challenge Plaintiffs as adequate representatives. Being

16 familiar with the allegations in the Amended Complaint and associated declarations, it is

17 clear that the plaintiff parents and the plaintiff teachers do not have conflicting interests

18 and are adequate to represent the proposed class and subclasses.

19 5. Certification

20 The plaintiffs have affirmatively demonstrated their compliance with Rule 23 by a

21 preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiffs have proved and not simply pleaded that their

22 proposed class satisfies each requirement of Rule 23(a) and meets the type of action listed

23 in Rule 23(b)(2). White v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Serv. Co., 104 F.4th 1182, 1191–92

24 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Under Rule 23, a class action may be maintained if the four

25 prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met, and the action meets one of the three kinds of actions

26 listed in Rule 23(b).”).

27 The State Defendants’ principal objection is that the proposed class cannot be

28 certified because it lacks “acertainability.” Put differently, the State Defendants assert

1 that it would be “administratively impractical” to manage such a class. See e.g., State

2 Defs’ Oppo., Dkt 257, at 2 (“Because it would be administratively impractical for the

3 Court to ascertain whether an individual is a member of the Class, the Class should not

4 be certified.”); at 7 (“definition must also set forth a class that is ascertainable”); at 8

5 (“courts require that a class’s membership be readily ascertainable”); at 9 (“Courts

6 within the Ninth Circuit have held that putative classes fail to present ascertainable

7 membership when …”); at 10 (“class definition must be definite enough so that it is

8 administratively feasible for the court to ascertain whether an individual is a member”);

9 at 11 (“courts have held fast to the ascertainability requirement”); at 12 (“This makes the

10 Class fail the ascertainability test”); at 13 (“ascertainability is necessary for

11 certification”); at 15 (“Plaintiffs propose no method for these determinations to be made,

12 let alone an administratively feasible means”); at 17 (“because the Class is not

13 ascertainable . . . it also lacks commonality”); at 19 (“because the class is not

14 ascertainable, Plaintiffs also lack typicality”) (italics added in each excerpt).

15 In essence, the State Defendants argue that there is an acertainability test. And the

16 State Defendants argues that if the test is not met then that also undermines findings of

17 class typicality and commonality. Id. at 17, 19. Why the State Defendants would oppose

18 class certification on the basis of an ascertainability requirement is not altogether clear.

19 What is clear is that the Ninth Circuit does not impose an “acertainability” requirement or

20 an “administrative feasibility” requirement for class certification. See Briseno v.

21 ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017). Briseno held that, “[i]n sum, the

22 language of Rule 23 does not impose a freestanding administrative feasibility prerequisite

23 to class certification . . . we decline to interpose an additional hurdle into the class

24 certification process delineated in the enacted Rule.” Id. at 1126. “We therefore join the

25 Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in declining to adopt an administrative feasibility

26 requirement.” Id. at 1133.

27 Similarly, regarding the State Defendants’ notion that there is some kind of

28 “acertainability” requirement for class certification, Briseno has not embraced one. Id. at

1 1125 & n.4 (“[Defendant] cites no other precedent to support the notion that our court has

2 adopted an ‘ascertainability’ requirement. This is not surprising because we have not.”);

3 see also, In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24097*12 (N.D. Cal.

4 2017) (“As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, acertainability (much less

5 ‘administrative ascertainability’) is not a requirement under Rule 23.”) (citing Briseno,

6 844 F.3d at 1125).

7 Ascertainability is not required at the certification stage and other judicial

8 management tools are available. Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1129-31 (mentioning tools such as

9 claim administrators, auditing processes, sampling for fraud detection, notice by

10 publication, follow-up notices, cy pres awards, etc.). Briseno is binding law in this

11 circuit and Briseno holds that “the language of Rule 23 neither provides nor implies that

12 demonstrating an administratively feasible way to identify class members is a

13 prerequisite to class certification,” and a district court did not err in declining to require

14 such a condition for certification. Id. at 1133; see also Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032,

15 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We note that with respect to 23(b)(2) in particular, the

16 government’s dogged focus on the factual differences among the class members appears

17 to demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the rule.”).

18 In the end, after setting aside the acertainability argument that was rejected by

19 Briseno,8 there is every reason to certify Plaintiffs’ proposed class to prosecute the

20

21

8 How did the State Defendants find themselves asserting a now-discarded argument?

22

Perhaps by looking to a bevy of out-of-circuit cases and decisions pre-dating Briseno.

23 See e.g., State Defs’ Oppo, Dkt 257, at 7, Martinez v. Brown, No. 08-cv-565 BEN

(CAB), 2011WL 1130458, *24 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011) (pre-Briseno); at 8-9, Romberio

24

v. Unumprovident Corp., 385 Fed.Appx. 423, 431–33 (6th Cir. 2009) (out of circuit); at

25 9, Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. EEOC, 70 F.4th 914, 934-35 (5th Cir. 2023) (out of circuit);

at 9, EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (out of circuit); at 9,

26

Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir. 2012) (out of circuit); at 9,

27 Crosby v. Soc. Sec. Admin. of U.S., 796 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1986) (out of circuit); at

9, Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (pre-

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1 alleged civil rights violations, as Rule 23(b)(2) was designed to do. See Parsons, 754

2 F.3d at 688 (ruling Rule 23(b)(2) requirements “are unquestionably satisfied when

3 members of a putative class seek uniform injunctive or declaratory relief from policies or

4 practices that are generally applicable to the class as a whole”).

5 The Court has conducted a rigorous analysis and is satisfied that the Rule 23

6 requirements are met. Noohi v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., 146 F.4th 854, 862

7 (9th Cir. 2025) (“Before it can certify a class, a district court must conduct a “rigorous

8 analysis” to ensure that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are

9 satisfied.”) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ claims depend upon a common contention, and

10 the contention is capable of class-wide resolution9 and that determination will resolve one

11

12

13 10776036 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2017) (pre-Briseno); at 11, Kosta v. Del Monte Foods,

Inc., 308 F.R.D. 217, 223 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (pre-Briseno); at 19, In re Principal U.S.

14

Prop. Acct. ERISA Litig., No. 4:10-CV-00198-JEG, 2013 WL 7218827, at *32 (S.D.

15 Iowa Sept. 30, 2013) (pre-Briseno); at 19, Mckinnon v. Dollar Thrifty Auto. Grp., Inc.,

No. 12-CV-04457-YGR, 2016 WL 879784, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) (pre-Briseno);

16

at 20, Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Cnty. of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th

17 Cir. 2008) (out of circuit); at 20, Hernandez v. Grisham, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1140 (D.

New Mexico 2020) (out of circuit); at 20, M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832,

18

847 (5th Cir. 2012) (out of circuit); at 21 C.G.B. v. Wolf, 464 F.Supp.3d 174, 206

19 (D.D.C. 2020) (out of circuit).

Although the State Defendants do not mention Briseno directly, they do

20

acknowledge what they call a loosening of the so-called ascertainability requirement in

21 cases such as A.B. v. Haw. State Dep’t of Educ., 30 F.4th 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2022)

(certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class to end systemic discrimination) and Rodriguez v. Hayes,

22

591 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming Rule 23(b)(2) certification of class of all

23 detainees held pursuant to three immigration statutes). State Defs’ Oppo, Dkt 257, at 10.

9 Here, the class as a whole seeks resolution of the issue of whether “Parental Exclusion

24

Policies” violate parental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Family

25 Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) or teachers’ rights under the First

Amendment. As alleged by the Plaintiffs, “Parental Exclusion Policies” is a term of art

26

referring to the argument of both the California Attorney General and CDE that the

27 privacy rights of minor students require schools to deceive parents about their children’s

gender orientation. See Second Amend. Compl., ¶¶2-5, 22, 256-63, 308-27 (citing Cal.

28

1 or more issues that are central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.

2 Injunctive relief on behalf of the proposed class would achieve systemic changes to the

3 California Department of Education that would obviate the need for future lawsuits

4 seeking similar relief. See e.g., Dunakin v. Quigley, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1333 (W.D.

5 Wash. 2015) (“If the putative class members were to proceed on an individual basis, they

6 might obtain the individual services they seek without obtaining systemic changes to

7 DHHS’s conduct that would benefit the class as a whole, a result that could lead to

8 countless individual claims seeking the exact same relief.”). Accordingly, the proposed

9 Class fits squarely within Rule 23(b)(2) and is appropriate for certification.

10 Plaintiffs alternatively seek certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), which applies

11 when prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a

12 risk of inconsistent adjudications with respect to individual class members or would

13 establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. While it

14 appears at first blush that (b)(1)(A) would be a sufficient ground for certification, because

15 the Court certifies a (b)(2) class, it need not decide whether plaintiffs can proceed under

16 (b)(1)(A).

17 6. Conclusion

18 Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. The following class and subclasses are certified in

19 accordance with Rule 23(b)(2):

20 All individuals who are participating or will

participate in California’s public education system, whether

21

as employees or parents/guardians of students, without

22 having to subject themselves to Parental Exclusion Policies,

and

23

(1) Are employees who object to complying with

24 Parental Exclusion Policies;

25

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10 The inquiry at the class certification stage differs from that at summary judgment. In

27 certifying a class, courts merely decide a suitable method of adjudicating the case and do

not turn class certification into a mini trial on the merits.

28

(2) Are employees who submit a request for a

5 religious exemption or opt-out to complying with Parental

Exclusion Policies;

3 (3) Are parents/guardians who object to having

4 Parental Exclusion Policies applied against them and have

children who are attending California public schools; or

5 (4) Are parents/guardians who submit a request for a

6 religious exemption or opt-out to having Parental Exclusion

Policies applied against them and have children who are

7 attending California public schools.

8

g Dated: October 15, 2025

10

RO . BENITEZ

11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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